復(fù)旦大學西方社會思想史課件07啟蒙運動

1、7. 啟蒙運動本章重點啟蒙時代又被稱為“理性時代”，何為啟蒙理性？康德給出一個定義，兩百多年后，?？略俅位卮稹昂螢閱⒚衫硇浴保匦玛U釋啟蒙問題，包括理性、批判、現(xiàn)代性、人文主義等。本章以啟蒙理性議題連接起社會思想史上兩位經(jīng)典學者，把握啟蒙理性的要義，特別是辨析若干重要概念，為本章教學的重點。本章從康德的批判理性開始，終于?？碌目脊艑W和系譜學，了解兩人的相同點，特別是兩人的不同點，是本章學習的關(guān)鍵。由當代學者闡釋學科史范疇，令先輩思想家的得失和意義更為顯豁，是思想史學習的方法之一。啟蒙理性的進步和自然概念進步概念 啟蒙學者全都相信人類持續(xù)進步的前景。歷史進步的基礎(chǔ)是理性，推動力是理性所能掌握的無

2、限積累的知識，進步理論最好地表達了理性主義的意識形態(tài)。這種歷史進步觀本質(zhì)上卻是反歷史主義的。因為進步只是（或主要是）知識的進步，且是為永恒不變的人性（理性）所保證的；這樣，社會歷史的進步、倒退或停滯全然取決于理性是否被人所發(fā)現(xiàn)和發(fā)揚。自然概念 自然概念，包括其所有的派生概念,(如自然秩序、自然法、自然狀態(tài)、自然人性、自然體系等)在理性思想中是一關(guān)健概念。啟蒙學者繼承了自然法學派的自然概念，賦予自然一詞更多人文的、政治的及社會的涵義。自然的就是善的，反自然的就是惡的。啟蒙理性的利益和秩序概念利益概念 啟蒙學者依感覺主義、人文主義觀點肯定個人的權(quán)利和利益。但他們都強調(diào)人們追求私利應(yīng)當是合理的或開明

3、的，他們力圖用功利主義原則統(tǒng)一自身利益與公共利益。理性已經(jīng)消除了除公共利益外的所有超個人的價值，功利主義的原則又將公共利益視為用理性指導與調(diào)和而實現(xiàn)的自身利益及其滿足的總和，這樣啟蒙學者就在利益概念中發(fā)現(xiàn)了社會價值的合理基礎(chǔ)，發(fā)現(xiàn)了個人價值與社會價值的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系，并發(fā)現(xiàn)了唯一有意義的行為規(guī)范準則。秩序概念 理性的批判已將過去的一切世界觀和社會制度拋進垃圾桶里，這要求以新的秩序取而代之。這種秩序應(yīng)該用世俗的、經(jīng)驗的觀點，而非宗教神學的和思辯哲學的觀點來闡述。EnlightenmentCharacteristics of the Enlightenment: 1) Reason should con

4、trol your actions, not dogma. Dont believe something just because its traditional. 2) Doubt everything, lead to Lockes concept of political rights. 3) Linked to development of modern science, e.g., Immanuel Kant. 4) Important figures - Descartes, John Locke, Leibnitz, John Stuart Mill, David Hume, A

5、dam Smith, John Milton.The Enlightenment defined and celebrated modern ideas about reason and rationalismRousseau安放在巴黎先賢祠的盧梭的棺柩。中國人有蓋棺論定的說法，又說“仁以為己任，不亦重乎？死而后已，不亦遠乎？”但這些說法全都不適于盧梭。他無論生前死后，都是毀譽參半，從無論定。即便躺在墓室，似也不安分，還從棺木伸出手臂高舉一柄火炬，他是想繼續(xù)啟蒙人類？還是想讓后人銘記不忘？ 于海：西方社會思想史Montesquieu孟德斯鳩在巴黎的居所，位于巴黎最古老的舊城區(qū)，他在這里寫作和會

6、客，“談笑有鴻儒，往來無白丁”，多少日后塑造時代精神的鴻篇巨制在這里誕生。今天該居所的底層已經(jīng)改作為酒吧，它尋常得與巴黎成千上萬的酒吧一樣，若不是酒保的善意提醒，顧客們再有想象力，都不會想到他們的頭上曾經(jīng)涌動過影響歷史進程的思想風暴。 于海：西方社會思想史巴黎先賢祠與它的朝圣者十八世紀精神：理性與知識分子對比十七世紀：演繹理性（Descartes）和本體論個人主義（Hobbes & Locke）；啟蒙運動的理性：作為能力的理性（對比先驗理性）；作為分析和建構(gòu)的理性，分解一切對象至于最簡單的成分，并據(jù)以建構(gòu)對象的整體；作為批判的理性，確立理性為最高及最后的標準，將一切事物置于理性的法庭上加以審判

7、，以能動的人的理性取代任何其他的權(quán)威。知識分子：作為知識的生產(chǎn)者、傳播者和世界秩序的立法者，世俗知識分子第一次在教會外形成為獨立的知識群體和階層（沙龍、咖啡館等）。人性的知識休謨: 人性的科學是一切科學的首都和心臟.一旦掌握了人性以后,我們在其他各方面就有希望輕而易舉地取得勝利了.從這個崗位,我們可以擴展到征服那些和人生有較為密切關(guān)系的一切科學.任何重要問題的解決關(guān)鍵,無不包括在關(guān)于人的科學中間;在我們沒有熟悉這門科學之前,任何問題都不能得到確實的解決.因此,在試圖說明人性的原理的時候,我們實際上就是在提出一個建立在幾乎是全新的基礎(chǔ)上的完整的科學體系,而這個基礎(chǔ)正是一切科學唯一穩(wěn)固的基礎(chǔ).盧梭

8、:人類的各種知識中最有用的就是關(guān)于人的知識。 Kant: What is Enlightenment?什么是啟蒙？啟蒙就是人從由他自己造成的不成熟狀態(tài)中走出來不成熟是指一個人若無他人指導便不能運用他自己的理智如果不成熟的原因不是由于缺少理智，而是由于若無他人指導便缺少運用理智的決心和勇氣，這種不成熟就是由他自己所造成的因此，啟蒙運動的格言是：有勇氣運用你自己的理智理性的公開運用和私下運用這一啟蒙運動除了自由而外并不需要任何別的東西,而且還確乎是一切可以稱之為自由的東西之中最無害的東西,那就是在一切事情上都有公開運用自己理性的自由.理性的公開運用,指任何人作為學者在全部聽眾面前所能做的那種運用.

9、一個人在其所受任的一定公職崗位或者職務(wù)上所能運用的自己的理性,為私下的運用.以上康德各頁見康德歷史理性批判文集22-31 Foucault: What is Enlightenment?Kant indicates right away that the way out that characterizes Enlightenment is a process that releases us from the status of immaturity. And by immaturity, he means a certain state of our will that makes us

10、accept someone elses authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for. Kant gives three examples: we are in a state of immaturity when a book takes the place of our understanding, when a spiritual director takes the place of our conscience, when a doctor decides for us what our di

11、et is to be. Private Use and Public Use of ReasonWhat constitutes, for Kant, this private use of reason? In what area is it exercised? Man, Kant says, makes a private use of reason when he is a cog in a machine; that is, when he has a role to play in society and jobs to do: to be a soldier, to have

12、taxes to pay, to be in charge of a parish, to be a civil servant, all this makes the human being a particular segment of society; he finds himself thereby placed in a circumscribed position, where he has to apply particular rules and pursue particular ends. Kant does not ask that people practice a b

13、lind and foolish obedience, but that they adapt the use they make of their reason to these determined circumstances; and reason must then be subjected to the particular ends in view. Thus there cannot be, here, any free use of reason.On the other hand, when one is reasoning only in order to use ones

14、 reason, when one is reasoning as a reasonable being (and not as a cog in a machine), when one is reasoning as a member of reasonable humanity, then the use of reason must be free and public. Enlightenment is thus not merely the process by which individuals would see their own personal freedom of th

15、ought guaranteed. There is Enlightenment when the universal, the free, and the public uses of reason are superimposed on one another.Enlightenment and CritiquesI believe that it is necessary to stress the connection that exists between this brief article and the three Critiques. Kant in fact describ

16、es Enlightenment as the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority; now it is precisely at this moment that the critique is necessary, since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to

17、 determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped. Illegitimate uses of reason are what give rise to dogmatism and heteronomy, along with illusion; on the other hand, it is when the legitimate use of reason has been clearly defined in its principles that its autonomy can be assu

18、red. The critique is, in a sense, the handbook of reason that has grown up in Enlightenment; and, conversely, the Enlightenment is the age of the critique.Modernity: an Attitude not a PeriodThinking back on Kants text, I wonder whether we may not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than as a pe

19、riod of history. And by attitude, I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A b

20、it, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos. And consequently, rather than seeking to distinguish the modern era from the premodern or postmodern, I think it would be more useful to try to find out how the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has found itself struggling with attit

21、udes of countermodernity. philosophical interrogationI have been seeking, on the one hand, to emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation - one that simultaneously problematizes mans relation to the present, mans historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as a

22、n autonomous subject - is rooted in the Enlightenment. On the other hand, I have been seeking to stress that the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude - that is, of a philosophical ethos that

23、could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era. Enlightenment: as an Historical Event and ProcessThis permanent critique of ourselves has to avoid the always too facile confusions between humanism and Enlightenment. We must never forget that the Enlightenment is an event, or a set

24、of events and complex historical processes, that is located at a certain point in the development of European societies. As such, it includes elements of social transformation, types of political institution, forms of knowledge, projects of rationalization of knowledge and practices, technological m

25、utations that are very difficult to sum up in a word, even if many of these phenomena remain important today. The one I have pointed out and that seems to me to have been at the basis of an entire form of philosophical reflection concerns only the mode of reflective relation to the present.What is H

26、umanism?Humanism is something entirely different. It is a theme or rather a set of themes that have reappeared on several occasions over time in European societies; these themes always tied to value judgments have obviously varied greatly in their content as well as in the values they have preserved

27、. Furthermore they have served as a critical principle of differentiation. In the seventeenth century there was a humanism that presented itself as a critique of Christianity or of religion in general; there was a Christian humanism opposed to an ascetic and much more theocentric humanism. In the ni

28、neteenth century there was a suspicious humanism hostile and critical toward science and another that to the contrary placed its hope in that same science. Marxism has been a humanism; so have existentialism and personalism; there was a time when people supported the humanistic values represented by

29、 National Socialism and when the Stalinists themselves said they were humanists.Enlightenment and humanism in a state of tension rather than identityNow in this connection I believe that this thematic which so often recurs and which always depends on humanism can be opposed by the principle of a cri

30、tique and a permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy: that is a principle that is at the heart of the historical consciousness that the Enlightenment has of itself. From this standpoint I am inclined to see Enlightenment and humanism in a state of tension rather than identity.critical questio

31、n today has to be turned back into a positive one This philosophical ethos may be characterized as a limit-attitude. We are not talking about a gesture of rejection. We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and refl

32、ecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal necessary obligatory what place is occupied by whate

33、ver is singular contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point in brief is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression. Genealogy and ArchaeologyThis entails an obvious consequence:

34、that criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological - and not transcendental - in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures