考研英語精讀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人

1、Beyond crisismanagement超越危機(jī)處理Bold ideas for solving Americasfinancial mess 解決美國金融危機(jī)的大膽想法EVERY financial crisis involves a tug of warbetween the tacticians and the strategists. The tacticians dash from skirmishto skirmish trying to control a crisis, deciding in each case whether taxpayersshould bail

2、out a distressed bank, firm or country. The strategists call for a more comprehensive approach to resolving the messoften involving newgovernment bodies to recapitalise banks or take over troubled assets.每一次的金融危機(jī)中，那些戰(zhàn)術(shù)家和戰(zhàn)略家 之間總是存在激烈地競爭。戰(zhàn)術(shù)家們不停地從一個(gè)沖突奔向另一個(gè)沖突，考慮是 否應(yīng)該用納稅人的錢來拯救那些兵臨破產(chǎn)的銀行、公司甚至是整個(gè)國家，以此來 試圖控制

3、危機(jī)。而戰(zhàn)略家們則主張應(yīng)當(dāng)采取綜合性措施來解決危機(jī)中的問題 這經(jīng)常會(huì)涉及一個(gè)新的政府機(jī)構(gòu)來拯救銀行或者接收問題資產(chǎn)。The present crisis in America conforms to this pattern.So far, the government s response has been ad hoc and focused on crisiscontainment. The tacticians at the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have putplenty of taxpayers money on the linewhe

4、ther through the huge expansion inthe central banks liquidity facilities, the loan to Bear Stearns in March, orthe government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage giants,and, now, of AIG, a huge insurer. But they have focused on staving offcatastrophe one bail-out at a time. 美國現(xiàn)在的狀況就

5、符合上述說法。到目前為止，政府對危機(jī)的回應(yīng)是特別的，他 把精力僅僅集中在危機(jī)處理方面。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)和財(cái)政部的戰(zhàn)術(shù)家們立即注入了大量納 稅人的鈔票無論是通過擴(kuò)展中央銀行的流動(dòng)性工具，在3月對貝爾斯登的貸 款，還是政府對抵押借款巨頭房利美和房地美的接管，而現(xiàn)在又是保險(xiǎn)巨頭AIG。 然而他們所做的僅僅是在一次緊急救援中救助一個(gè)病危企業(yè)。Now the strategists are pushing back. From across thepolitical spectrum people are arguing that it is time for America toshift to a more

6、systematic approach. In the past week Barney Frank, the leadingDemocrat on financial matters in the House of Representatives, Paul Volcker, aformer chairman of the Fed, as well as writers of the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journa/,have suggested that Congress may need to create a new agency t

7、o deal with themess. All have pointed to the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), a governmentbody set up in 1989 to deal with the fallout of the savings and loan (S&L)bankruptcies.現(xiàn)在戰(zhàn)略家們正在向前推進(jìn)。來自不同政治背景的人 都認(rèn)為，是時(shí)候該轉(zhuǎn)向那些更加系統(tǒng)性的方法了。在過去的一周，美國眾議院財(cái) 經(jīng)問題專家民主黨派領(lǐng)導(dǎo)成員BarneyFrank,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)前主席，同時(shí)也是華爾街日 報(bào)社論版撰稿人保羅沃爾克都建議國會(huì)成立

8、一個(gè)新的機(jī)構(gòu)來處理當(dāng)下的混亂狀 況。而他們不約而同的都指向了美國清算信托公司，這一 1989年成立的為處理 當(dāng)時(shí)存款借貸危機(jī)的政府機(jī)構(gòu)。Americans focus on the RTC because it is the countrysmost recent example of a comprehensive government plan to deal with a financialcrisis. Between 1980 and 1994 almost 1,300 specialised mortgage lenders, knownas thrifts, failed. Th

9、eir combined assets amounted to more than $600 billion. By 1986 these failures had bankrupted the Federal Savings and Loan Insurancecorporation, the federal insurer for the thrift industry. At first thegovernment tried to muddle through by trying to recapitalise the insurer. Butthe S&L mess escalate

10、d. In 1989 Congress created the RTC, an entirely neworganisation, to dispose of the failed thrifts1 assets in a way that minimiseddownward pressure on financial and property markets.之所以美國對清算信托公司如此關(guān)注，是因?yàn)檫@是美國政府最近一個(gè)采取綜合性 計(jì)劃處理金融危機(jī)的案例。在1980年到1994年間，約1300個(gè)專業(yè)抵押借款 人（以儲(chǔ)蓄聞名）破產(chǎn)了。他們的總資產(chǎn)達(dá)到了 6000億美元。到1986年這些 損失使得

11、儲(chǔ)蓄業(yè)的承保人聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄貸款保險(xiǎn)公司破產(chǎn)。一開始，政府試圖通 過援助聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄貸款保險(xiǎn)公司來對付危機(jī)，但是這場存款借貸危機(jī)卻逐步惡化 To 1989年，國會(huì)成立一個(gè)全新的機(jī)構(gòu)清算信托公司，希望以一種新的方 式來處置那些不良儲(chǔ)蓄資產(chǎn)，同時(shí)又盡量使危機(jī)對金融和房地產(chǎn)市場造成盡可能 的小沖擊。The RTC is not a perfect parallel for todays needs. Itwas set up-years after the S&L crisis began-to deal with the aftermath ofwidespread bank failures. Those

12、 who advocate comprehensive action today want tominimise the mess, not just clean up afterwards. Their proposals vary, but many who cite the RTC envisage an institution that buys troubled mortgage-backedsecurities （not only from failing institutions), putting a floor under theirprice. Some propose t

13、hat the putative new agency should manage and write downthe underlying mortgages, in effect combining the functions of the RTC with aDepression-era institution, called the Home Owners Loan Corporation, whichbought and restructured defaulting mortgages. Details are in short supply, butintellectual mo

14、mentum is building for a broader solution.但是清算信托公司并不是我們今天所正好需要的。當(dāng)初它是在儲(chǔ)蓄借貸危機(jī)發(fā)生 后成立的，用來處理銀行破產(chǎn)所產(chǎn)生的爛攤子。而今天那些主張綜合性行動(dòng)的人 是想要使危機(jī)最小化，而不是通過救助使其贏利。他們的建議不斷變化，但是很 多提議R T C的人設(shè)想這樣一個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)：用它來以很低的價(jià)格購買那些有問題的抵 押支持債券(并不只是從破產(chǎn)的機(jī)構(gòu)卜另一些人主張這個(gè)被新定的機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該管 理并處理那些潛在的抵押貸款，并有效的整合R T C和危機(jī)時(shí)期被稱為業(yè)主借貸 公司所具有的功能，后者負(fù)責(zé)購買和重置那些違約抵押資產(chǎn)。當(dāng)局沒有提供進(jìn)一 步的細(xì)

15、節(jié)，但是那些智囊的目標(biāo)是要形成一個(gè)更廣泛的解決措施。Not a moment too soon, suggest the results of a new studyby Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, two IMF economists/They examined all systemically important banking crises between 1970 and 2007,creating a database on how much financial crises cost and how they areresolved. The e

16、vidence is clear. Tactical crisis containment is expensive andfrequently inadequate. In most financial meltdowns a comprehensive solution wasrequired, and the sooner it was provided the better.沒過多久，兩位國際貨幣基金組織的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家LucLaeven和FabianValencia就 提出了他們的建議。在系統(tǒng)的研究了從1970年到2007年間所有重大銀行危機(jī) 后，他們形成了一個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)庫，統(tǒng)計(jì)出了金融危機(jī)的成

17、本和各種救助方法。證據(jù)是 很明顯的。戰(zhàn)術(shù)家的救助行動(dòng)通常成本更高而且救助不夠充分。在大多數(shù)金融危 機(jī)中，一個(gè)綜合全面的解決方案是非常必需的，而且出臺(tái)越早效果越好。The study looks at 42 crises in all, spanning 37countries. Like Americatoday, most governments began with ad hoc crisis management. In 74% of cases,for instance, governments pumped emergency loans into failing banks org

18、uaranteed their liabilities. An equally common tactic has been regulatoryforbearance. Governments allowed banks to hold less capital than was normallyrequired or softened their rules in other ways. These tactical responses,however, often did not work and ended up increasing the overall bill from acr

19、isis. All too often, the economists conclude, central banks privilegestability over cost in the heat of the containment phase. 該研究報(bào)告觀察了 37個(gè)國家的總計(jì)42場危機(jī)。就像今天的美國一樣，大部分 政府都是以一種特殊的危機(jī)處理方式開始。比如，在74%的例子中，政府都向 破產(chǎn)銀行注入緊急貸款或者擔(dān)保他們的債務(wù)。同樣常見的一個(gè)戰(zhàn)術(shù)就是監(jiān)管當(dāng)局 延長償還期限。政府允許銀行持有低于名義上的法定準(zhǔn)備金，或者以其他方式放 松監(jiān)管。然而，這些戰(zhàn)術(shù)性的救助措施往往都不會(huì)發(fā)揮作用，并

20、且都以增加危機(jī) 的總成本而告終?！疤毡榱?，一經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家總結(jié)道，”在危機(jī)處理最緊張的時(shí)期，央 行最先考慮的是穩(wěn)定而不是成本No such thing as a free crunch沒有零成本的危機(jī)Sooner or later most governments realise the need for acomprehensive solution to the crisis, involving public funds. This can take differentforms, from bank recapitalisation to forgiveness of all the un

21、derlying debts.In three-quarters of the cases, governments shored up bank capital by, forinstance, injecting preferred stock. About 60% of the time, governments set upinstitutions to manage distressed assets.遲早，大多數(shù)政府會(huì)認(rèn)識(shí)到他們需要一個(gè)綜合性的解決方案來處理危機(jī)，包括公 共基金。它可以采取從銀行資本重組到赦免所有不良基礎(chǔ)資產(chǎn)等多種不同的形 式。比如說，在四分之三的危機(jī)中，政府通過注

22、入優(yōu)先股來支持銀行資本。多半 時(shí)候，政府則通過建立專門的機(jī)構(gòu)來處置不良資產(chǎn)。The evidence from these attempts is sobering forproponents of an RTC II. Some institutions worked well. In the early 1990s, forinstance, Swedensuccessfully set up an asset-management company to take over and sell the badloans from its biggest banks. But, in gene

23、ral, the paper argues, suchgovernment-owned asset-management firms are ineffective - often becausepoliticians try to push them around.以前種種嘗試的證據(jù)使得那些R TC二代的支持者變得清醒些了 .一些機(jī)構(gòu)運(yùn)作 地是很不錯(cuò)。比如在上個(gè)世紀(jì)90年代早期，瑞典就成功地設(shè)立了 一個(gè)資產(chǎn)管理 公司來接管和處置銀行的呆賬壞賬。但是研究報(bào)告表明，從總體上來看，那些由 政府所有的資產(chǎn)管理公司是無效的因?yàn)檎蛡兛偸腔ハ嗤普?。On average, the study finds

24、that government attempts tostanch systemic banking crises over the past three decades have cost 16% ofGDP. That average hides enormous variation, much of which depends on how criseswere handled. Americasmess, even if it has already led to the demise of famous Wall Street firms, isfar from finished.

25、That is why the international lessons are worth takingseriously. Resolving a financial mess is cheaper, quicker and less painful ifgovernments take a rounded approach. For the moment, the bail-out tacticiansare in overdrive. But the strategists moment is approaching.報(bào)告發(fā)現(xiàn)，平均來說，在過去的三十多年，政府嘗試處理銀行系統(tǒng)性危機(jī)的

26、成本 是GDP的16%o但這個(gè)平均水平掩蓋了巨大的變動(dòng)性，他們其中很多還是要看 具體的危機(jī)處理方法。美國的危機(jī)，即使現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)導(dǎo)致了知名華爾街公司的破產(chǎn)， 但還遠(yuǎn)沒有結(jié)束。這就是仍然應(yīng)該從國際案例中認(rèn)真學(xué)習(xí)的原因。解決金融危機(jī) 時(shí)，如果能夠采取一個(gè)考慮周全的方法，那么成本會(huì)更低，而且更迅速，對經(jīng)濟(jì) 的傷害也較輕。現(xiàn)在，那些救助戰(zhàn)術(shù)家們已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了加速擋，接下來應(yīng)該是戰(zhàn)略 家動(dòng)手的時(shí)候了。The financial crisis 金融危機(jī)A break in the clouds黑云裂日，曙光顯現(xiàn)But questions abound over a $700 billion rescue plan

27、 for WallStreet有關(guān)7000億美元華爾街拯救計(jì)劃的問題仍然不少THE threat of impending financial disaster concentrates political minds wonderfully. On Thursday a group of Congressional leaders heard Hank Paulson, the Treasury secretary, and Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, paint a dire economic scenario if they d

28、id not approve a more sweeping remedy for the financial crisis. Student and car loans, not just mortgages, would all be harder to get. The economy would sink into a severe recession.迫在眉睫的金融災(zāi)難引起了相當(dāng)多的政治關(guān)注。上周四，一群國會(huì)領(lǐng)袖聽了財(cái)長 保爾森和美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席伯南克所描述的，當(dāng)國會(huì)不通過這項(xiàng)全面拯救金融危機(jī)的方 案，經(jīng)濟(jì)上將會(huì)出現(xiàn)的可怕場面。那時(shí)，不僅僅是抵押貸款，甚至連助學(xué)貸款和 買車貸款可能都很難獲

29、得。經(jīng)濟(jì)將陷入嚴(yán)重的衰退。So by Sunday September 21st support was coalescing around the Treasurys rescue proposal: that Congress authorise it to purchase up to $700 billion in mortgage and other assets in an effort to resolve the root of the financial crisis, which is the mountains of illiquid and uncollectible

30、mortgage debt on financial institution balance sheets. (One senator predicted $1 trillion would be needed.) Passage this week, before Congress breaks for the election, seems likely.因此，周日(9月21日)之前國會(huì)議員大多支持財(cái)政部的拯救提案：國會(huì)授權(quán) 使用多達(dá)7000億美元來購買抵押貸款以及其它資產(chǎn)，從而解決這次金融危機(jī)中 最根本的問題。這些資產(chǎn)正是金融機(jī)構(gòu)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上堆積如山的非流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)和抵 押貸款壞賬。一位參議

31、員預(yù)計(jì)大約需要1萬億來處理這些東西。國會(huì)有望于本周 在因大選休會(huì)前通過這項(xiàng)提案。Democrats in Congress have two priorities in negotiations. They want mortgages written down so that homeowners can avoid foreclosure and that any firm selling assets to the Treasury accept limits on executive compensation. This is more contentious. If its puni

32、tive.institutions arent going to participate, Mr Paulson noted.國會(huì)里的民主黨人有兩個(gè)優(yōu)先考慮的問題。他們希望抵押貸款減記從而能避免房 主被取消贖回權(quán)，而且任何將資產(chǎn)賣給財(cái)政部的公司必須接受限制高管薪酬的規(guī) 定。后者很容易引起爭議。保爾森說，如果“這是懲罰性質(zhì)的那么一些機(jī)構(gòu)就 可能不參與了。”Mr Paulsons plan is stunning in its brevity (two-and-a-half pages) and audacity. It would authorise him to purchase any re

33、sidential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages, implying the right to take over derivative positions. A fact sheet later distributed by the Treasury broadened it to include other assets, as deemed necessary to ef

34、fectively stabilise financial markets. The government could, in effect, buy anything it wanted: student or car loans, loans, equities, entire companies.保爾森計(jì)劃的簡潔(只有兩頁半紙)和大膽令人驚訝不已。這個(gè)計(jì)劃授權(quán)他可以 購買任何“住房和商業(yè)抵押貸款和任何證券、債務(wù)，以及其它任何基于或者與抵 押貸款有關(guān)的票據(jù)，”這暗示其有權(quán)購買衍生品頭寸。稍后由財(cái)政部發(fā)布的情況說 明書將范圍擴(kuò)大包括“其它任何被認(rèn)為可以穩(wěn)定金融市場的資產(chǎn)?！睂?shí)際上，政府 可以

35、買任何它想買的東西：助學(xué)和購車貸款，貸款，股權(quán)，甚至整個(gè)公司。The treasury secretarys decisions may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency. He would report to Congress three months after the programme begins and every six months thereafter. It is now conventional wisdom that recent events have guaranteed

36、 a heavier regulatory hand for government in the economy. Mr Paulsons programme raises the prospect of it becoming a huge player in the allocation of capital as well. The ability to purchase assets expires after two years, but its management of those assets would continue.財(cái)政部長的決定“不會(huì)被任何法庭或者行政機(jī)構(gòu)重新檢閱?！?/p>

37、他將在計(jì)劃實(shí)施三個(gè) 月后向國會(huì)首次報(bào)告，并在之后每六個(gè)月向國會(huì)報(bào)告一次。人們普遍認(rèn)為，近期 在金融市場發(fā)生的此類事件會(huì)使得政府加大其對經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)控監(jiān)管的力度。保爾森的 計(jì)劃將會(huì)使政府成為市場中分配資本的重要參與者。政府購買資產(chǎn)的期限為兩 年，但是其對這些買到資產(chǎn)的管理將會(huì)繼續(xù)。Mr Paulson said that the lack of oversight gives future administrations ,flexibility to run this any way they would like to run it. And some experts say decisions

38、must not risk being tied up in lawsuits, or confidence could suffer. But the great discretionary power seems to fly in the face of the original rationale for the programme, which was for a systematic rules-based approach to resolving the crisis rather than ad-hoc bailouts. Future administrations cou

39、ld find a $700 billion fund a potent tool for various policy goals. 保爾森說監(jiān)察的缺失使得可能使得未來的管理“會(huì)非常靈活，使他們想怎樣運(yùn)營 便怎樣運(yùn)營。”有些專家認(rèn)為，此項(xiàng)決定不要冒陷入法律訴訟的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，否則會(huì)讓公 眾的信心受損。但是太大的自行決定權(quán)卻與這個(gè)計(jì)劃的原意相悖。這個(gè)計(jì)劃的原 意是用一個(gè)系統(tǒng)的，基于法律的方法來解決危機(jī)，而不是使用特別的緊急救援來 解決問題。未來的管理可以建立一個(gè)7000億美元基金的強(qiáng)大工具來解決各種問 題。To acquire mortgages the Treasury plans to use r

40、everse auctions. But as Lou Crandall of Wrightson ICAP, a research firm notes, Auctions work well when you have a group of bidders for a single set of identical assets. They work less well when you have a single bidder for a group of disparate assets. 為了得到抵押貸款資產(chǎn)，財(cái)政部計(jì)劃使用“倒拍賣”的方法。但是研究機(jī)構(gòu) Wrightson ICAP

41、的Lou Crandall謝 ，一群競標(biāo)人爭奪僅單組同類資產(chǎn)時(shí)，拍 賣會(huì)很有效。一個(gè)競標(biāo)人卻有一大堆不同的資產(chǎn)時(shí)，拍賣就不那么有效了?！?Another problem is that it would reward the least deserving institutions the most. Banks that stayed clear of this debt or sold such debt at cut-rate prices earlier this year in an effort to move beyond the crisis would receive no

42、direct gain from such a programme, notes Doug Elmendorf of the Brookings Institution, a think-tank, while banks who had the most junk and had dragged their feet on writing it down would benefit most.另一個(gè)問題是，最不該得到的機(jī)構(gòu)卻會(huì)得到更多的援助。當(dāng)擁有最多垃圾資產(chǎn)而 且遲遲不愿減記的銀行獲益最多時(shí)，智庫布魯斯金學(xué)會(huì)的Doug Elmendorf指出，不接觸這些垃圾資產(chǎn)的，或者今年早些時(shí)候低價(jià)賣出

43、這些垃圾資產(chǎn)以遠(yuǎn)離危 機(jī)的銀行在這次計(jì)劃中不會(huì)獲得直接的收益?！盡r Paulson has rightly noted that the cost of the programme should be well below $700 billion since some of the mortgages will be repaid. But it may be optimistic to expect it to turn a profit. Indeed, profit is inconsistent with the point of such a programme which is

44、 to socialise losses that would otherwise cripple the financial sector and toss millions of people out of their homes. The lack of an upside for taxpayers is one reason that some scholars, like Mr Elmendorf, favour the taking of direct stakes by the government in financial firms instead. 保爾森肯定地指出，這項(xiàng)

45、計(jì)劃的成本肯定比7000億美元要低，因?yàn)橛行┑盅嘿J 款會(huì)償還的。但是期望它能帶來收益就未免太樂觀了。而且，收益與其計(jì)劃的原 意有所違背，這項(xiàng)計(jì)劃就是讓金融業(yè)收到巨大沖擊并讓數(shù)百萬的人失去房屋的損 失成本由大家來共同承擔(dān)。缺少對納稅人的好處，這正是有些學(xué)者，例如 Elmendorf ,更傾向于用政府直接入股金融機(jī)構(gòu)來取代上述計(jì)劃的一個(gè)原因。Profit is possible, of course. The market prices of many mortgage securities today reflect not just the likelihood of default, but

46、 a steep liquidity premium, because the paper no longer trades. The Treasury could conceivably buy something above market value but below fair value and hold it to maturity. But it could deepen the financial crisis by forcing institutions to recognise the assets deeply distressed prices.當(dāng)然，收益也是有可能的。

47、許多抵押貸款證券今天的市場價(jià)格不僅反映了違約的 可能性，也有過高的流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)，因?yàn)檫@些證券不再交易了。財(cái)政部可以購 買到高于市場價(jià)值但是低于公平價(jià)值的債券，持有直至到期。但是強(qiáng)迫金融機(jī)構(gòu) 認(rèn)可這些資產(chǎn)的過低的價(jià)格會(huì)加深金融危機(jī)。Even if the program is designed perfectly, its no sure thing it will end the crisis. It does address the root problem, defaulting mortgages, and Mr Bernanke has long worried that bad d

48、ebt would fuel a vicious circle of crippled lenders, constricting credit, weakening growth and more defaults. But thats not what happened last week. Losses on Lehman debt forced several money-market funds to break the buck, triggering a flight out of short-term commercial paper. Banks, forced to con

49、template redeeming hundreds of billions of dollars in maturing commercial loans, began hoarding liquidity. Interbank lending froze. This generalised loss of confidence was many steps beyond the root cause of the crisis. Announcement of bail-out plans helped ease things, but the effect was purely psy

50、chological.即是這項(xiàng)計(jì)劃設(shè)計(jì)的非常完美，但是并不能確定它就能夠終結(jié)這場金融危機(jī)。它 確實(shí)瞄準(zhǔn)了根本問題，違約抵押貸款，而且伯南克一直擔(dān)心這會(huì)引起貸方陷入困 境，信貸緊縮，增長放緩從而更多違約的惡性循環(huán)。但是上周這些沒有發(fā)生。雷 曼債務(wù)引起的損失使好幾家貨幣市場基金“跌破凈值”，從而引發(fā)投資者大規(guī)模逃 離短期商業(yè)票據(jù)。銀行被迫考慮收回?cái)?shù)千億美元的到期商業(yè)貸款，從而囤積其流 動(dòng)性。銀行間的拆借幾乎停滯。信心的全面喪失使得危機(jī)從其引發(fā)原因開始擴(kuò)散。 接管的拯救計(jì)劃有助于危機(jī)的緩和，但是其效果僅限于心理層面。For this reason, ad hoc responses will sti

51、ll be critical, such last weeks federal guarantees for money-market funds, Fed loans to banks to purchase asset-backed commercial paper and, on Sunday, approval of the remaining two big independent investment banks, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, to become Fed-regulated bank holding companies who

52、se investment bank units can now borrow from the Fed on the same terms as other banks.基于這樣的原因，特別的拯救措施仍然非常關(guān)鍵，上周對貨幣市場的聯(lián)邦擔(dān)保， 通過美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)購買資產(chǎn)抵押的商業(yè)票據(jù)對銀行的貸款，以及在周日允許剩下的兩家 大型投行摩根斯坦利和高盛變?yōu)槊缆?lián)儲(chǔ)監(jiān)管銀行控股公司，使其投行部分現(xiàn) 在也可以向其它銀行一樣向美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)借錢。It could be some time before the Treasury is able to purchase mortgages en masse, and long

53、er still before that starts to affect the broader financial system and economy. In the meantime, the crisis could claim other victims.財(cái)政部可以購買所有的抵押貸款可能還需要一段時(shí)間，而且對整個(gè)金融系統(tǒng)和經(jīng) 濟(jì)產(chǎn)生作用也要好久。其間，還會(huì)有其它的金融危機(jī)的受害者。And then there were none投行之死What the death of the investment bank means for Wall Street投資銀行模式消失對華爾街來說意

54、味著什么THE radical overhaul of Britains financial sector in 1986 was dubbed the Big Bang. The brutal, unplanned reshaping of Wall Street might be better described as the Big Implosion. As if too ashamed to go on after the humbling of the countrys mortgage agencies and its largest insurer, the bulge-bra

55、cket brokerage model has collapsed in on itself. Even more humiliating for the erstwhile masters of the universe, the new force in finance is now the government.1986年英國金融系統(tǒng)的大整頓被稱為“金融大爆炸而這次對華爾街進(jìn)行的殘酷 而又無計(jì)劃的重塑應(yīng)該被稱為“金融大風(fēng)暴在繼美國最大的兩家抵押貸款機(jī)構(gòu) 和最大的保險(xiǎn)商蒙羞受辱之后，華爾街的“頂級(jí)投行”的經(jīng)紀(jì)模式也似因連遭重創(chuàng) 而無法運(yùn)行下去，只得轟然垮臺(tái)。對昔日的世界巨頭來說更丟臉的是

56、，如今金融 市場的主導(dǎo)力量變成了美國政府。The last remaining investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, were forced to seek sanctuary by converting into bank holding companies after the trampling of Lehman Brothers turned into a full-scale run on the industry. Though neither was particularly sickly, markets cou

57、ld no longer stomach their potentially lethal combination of illiquid assets and skittish wholesale liabilities. 碩果僅存的兩家投行高盛和摩根斯坦利在雷曼垮臺(tái)后，尋求政府保護(hù)：允許 其成為銀行控股公司從而能夠全面涉足金融行業(yè)業(yè)務(wù)。盡管二者都不是完全陷入 困境，但是市場對于其潛在的致命缺陷非流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)和不可靠的大規(guī)模債務(wù)的 模式已經(jīng)不再信任。Both will now start gathering large amounts of deposits, a more stable for

58、m of funding. Signing up strong partners should also help. Mitsubishi UFJ, a giant Japanese bank, will buy up to 20% of Morgan. Late on Tuesday September 23rd Goldman went one better, coaxing $5 billion from Warren Buffett, an investing legend. This endorsement helped Goldman to raise a further $5 b

59、illion in a share offering the next day.高盛和摩根斯坦利現(xiàn)在會(huì)去用吸收大量存款這種穩(wěn)定的模式來籌資。當(dāng)然，他們 如能和強(qiáng)有力的伙伴合作，那么會(huì)對他們籌資有很大幫助。日本銀行巨頭三菱日 聯(lián)銀行會(huì)購入摩根斯坦利20%的股份。高盛做的更好，在周二（9月23日）晚 些時(shí)候，它從傳奇投資人物巴菲特那里搞到50億美元。巴菲特的這個(gè)支持有助 于高盛第二天從股票發(fā)行中再籌得50億美元。Mr Buffett, no idle flatterer, describes Goldman as exceptional. But some doubt that it can ad

60、apt and thrive. As a bank it faces more intrusive supervision from the Federal Reserve, tougher capital requirements and restrictions on investing. Universal banks, such as Citigroup and Bank of America, long dismissed as stodgy, argue that their vast balance sheets and wide range of businesses, fro