外文翻譯模板

1、杭州電子科技大學(xué)畢業(yè)論文外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯要求根據(jù)普通高等學(xué)校本科畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文）指導(dǎo)的內(nèi)容，特對(duì)外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯提出以下要求：一、翻譯的外文文獻(xiàn)可以是一篇，也可以是兩篇，但總字符要求不少于1.5萬（或翻譯成中文后至少在3000字以上）。二、翻譯的外文文獻(xiàn)應(yīng)主要選自學(xué)術(shù)期刊、學(xué)術(shù)會(huì)議的文章、有關(guān)著作及其他相關(guān)材料，應(yīng)與畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）主題相關(guān)，并作為外文參考文獻(xiàn)列入畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）的參考文獻(xiàn)。并在每篇中文譯文標(biāo)題尾部用“腳注”形式注明原文作者及出處，中文譯文后應(yīng)附外文原文（全文，格式為word）。不能翻譯中國(guó)學(xué)者的文章，不能翻譯準(zhǔn)則等有譯文的著作。三、中文譯文的基本撰寫格式1.題目:采用小三號(hào)、黑體字、

2、居中打??；段前二行，段后二行。2.正文:采用小四號(hào)、宋體字，行間距一般為固定值20磅，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)字符間距。頁邊距為左3cm，右2.5cm，上下各2.5cm，頁面統(tǒng)一采用A4紙。四、外文原文格式1.題目:采用小三號(hào)、Times New Roman、居中打印；段前二行，段后二行。2.正文:采用小四號(hào)、Times New Roman，行間距一般為固定值20磅，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)字符間距。頁邊距為左3cm，右2.5cm，上下各2.5cm，頁面統(tǒng)一采用A4紙。五、封面格式由學(xué)校統(tǒng)一制作（注：封面上的“翻譯題目”指中文譯文的題目），并按“封面、封面、譯文、外文原文、考核表”的順序統(tǒng)一裝訂。 畢業(yè)論文外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯畢業(yè)論文題目X

3、xx翻譯題目指翻譯后的中文譯文的題目學(xué) 院會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）專 業(yè)XXXXXX（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）姓 名XXXXXX（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）班 級(jí)XXXXXX（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）學(xué) 號(hào)XXXXXX（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）指導(dǎo)教師XXXXXX（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）杭州電子科技大學(xué)本科畢業(yè)論文外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯譯文管理者過度樂觀與債務(wù)、股權(quán)融資之間的選擇 Michael Gombola. & Dalia Marciukaityte. The Journal of Behavior Finance,2007 Vol. 8, No. 4, P.225235本文采取了一家成長(zhǎng)較快速的公司作為樣本，比較債務(wù)融資和股權(quán)融資后的長(zhǎng)期股票業(yè)

4、績(jī)。如果管理者過于樂觀的預(yù)測(cè)他們將獲得的資產(chǎn),那么他們更有可能通過債務(wù)融資來增加資本而不是股權(quán)融資。然而他們通過債務(wù)融資獲得的資本與股權(quán)融資后的長(zhǎng)期的業(yè)績(jī)相比將會(huì)更差。但是，從另一方面來說，管理者利用“機(jī)會(huì)窗口”發(fā)行股票，我們認(rèn)為會(huì)比發(fā)行債券有更差的業(yè)績(jī)。伴隨著管理者過度的樂觀假設(shè)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，債務(wù)融資比股權(quán)融資后的股票業(yè)績(jī)更差。管理者過度樂觀對(duì)于選擇債務(wù)或股權(quán)融資還有之后的股票業(yè)績(jī)有著顯著的影響。關(guān)鍵詞：過度樂觀、過于自信、債務(wù)融資、股權(quán)融資、長(zhǎng)期的股票表現(xiàn)一、前言股價(jià)低和經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)差的表現(xiàn)導(dǎo)致了一個(gè)假說，即利用高股價(jià)和投資者的過度樂觀的時(shí)期，銷售定價(jià)過高的股票。這個(gè)“機(jī)會(huì)之窗”假說認(rèn)為，管理者

5、存在時(shí)間股權(quán)的問題時(shí)，他們公司的股票會(huì)被高估（Ritter 1991）。然而，這一假說，不能用來解釋股票表現(xiàn)不佳的問題（Spies，Affleck-Graves 1999和Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman 2000）?？?jī)效差帶來的債務(wù)融資問題表明必須要有一種替代假說可以解釋這些發(fā)現(xiàn)。外文原文Managerial over optimism and the Choice between DebtAnd Equity FinancingThis paper compares long-run stock performance following debt finan

6、cing and equity financing for a sample of rapidly growing firms. If managers are subject to overly optimistic predictions for their asset acquisitions, they are more likely to finance asset growth by debt rather than by equity. The managerial over optimism hypothesis predicts worse long-term perform

7、ance for debt-financed asset acquisitions than equity-financed asset acquisitions. If, on the other hand, managers take advantage of “windows of opportunity” for issuing equity, we expect worse performance following equity issuance than following debt issuance. Consistent with the managerial over op

8、timism hypothesis, we find that debt financing is followed by significantly worse stock performance than equity financing. Managerial over optimism seems to be a significant factor affecting the choice between debt and equity financing and post-financing stock performance.Keywords: Over optimism, Ov

9、erconfidence, Debt financing, Equity financing, long run stock performanceIntroductionEvidence of poor stock and operating performance following equity issues has led to the hypothesis that managers take advantage of periods of high stock prices and investor over optimism in order to sell overpriced

10、 equity. This “windows of opportunity” hypothesis suggests that managers time equity issues when their firms shares are overpriced (Ritter 1991). This hypothesis, however, cannot be used to explain poor stock performance following debt issues documented by Spies and Affleck-Graves 1999 and Datta, Is

11、kandar-Datta and Raman 2000. Underperformance following debt financing indicates a need for an alternative hypothesis that can explain these findings.We suggest that managerial over optimism is a factor that can explain poor long-term stock performance following stock and, especially, bond issuance.

12、 Recent studies show that managerial over optimism affects corporate decisions (e.g., Heaton 2002, Gervais, Heaton and Odean 2003, Malmendier and Tate 2003 and 2005). As managers are more affected by the per- formance of their rm than are well-diversied shareholders, moderate managerial over optimis

13、m can help to ensure that managers behave in the best interest of shareholders by counteracting the effect of managerial risk aversion; however, strong managerial over optimism can result in the undertaking of negative net present value projects and destruction of a firms value (Gervais, Heaton and

14、Odean 2003). An excessively favorable estimate of future outcomes for investments is the crux of this managerial overoptimism hypothesis. When managers have optimistic predictions of investment outcomes, they are more inclined to finance with debt rather than equity. Confidence about the size of fut

15、ure outcomes makes managers unwilling to share future profits with new equity investors and make them more willing to issue debt rather than equity.This study tests the managerial overoptimism hypothesis by examining post-financing stock performance for both debt and equity financing. If managerial

16、overoptimism has a more significant effect on the choice between debt and equity financing and postfinancing performance than manager attempts to time the market and take advantage of windows of opportunity for issuing equity, we expect worse stock performance following debt financing than following

17、 equity financing.We focus on a sample of firms with rapid growth in assets and a corresponding need to finance those assets. By focusing on firms that require asset financing, security issuance for other purposes can be largely eliminated. Furthermore, since studying long-term performance does not

18、require identifying a particular issuance date, our study is not limited to firms with explicit announcements of security issuance. Rather than limiting the study to firms that announce new issues of debt or equity, we include all forms of financing and measure financing by the change in debt or cha

19、nge in equity. In this manner, implicit security issuance such as stock-for-stock mergers can be incorporated in the sample. Another reason for focusing on high growth firms is our expectation of stronger managerial over optimism among these firms. All else being equal, overoptimistic managers perce

20、ive that they have more good projects available than other managers. As managers should take all projects they believe to have positive net present value, overoptimistic managers would undertake more projects resulting in the faster growth of their firms. There are two reasons why it is important to

21、 focus on a sample affected by strong managerial over optimism in a study examining whether managerial over optimism affects the choice between debt and equity financing and poor post-financing performance. First, the windows of opportunity hypothesis and the managerial overoptimism hypothesis are n

22、ot mutually exclusive. It is possible that while some managers choose between debt and equity financing to take advantage of windows of opportunity, other managers are significantly affected by overoptimism when making security choice decisions. Even the same manager can be affected by both factors

23、at the same time: an overoptimistic manager may attempt to take advantage of share mispricings. Because of market timing to sell overpriced shares, equity financing will be followed by worse post-financing stock performance than debt financing. Because of the managerial overoptimism effect on the ch

24、oice between debt and equity financing, debt financing will be followed by worse stock performance. As these factors work in opposite directions, the effect of market timing can cancel the effect of managerial overoptimism in a sample of all debt and equity issues. The second reason for focusing on

25、a sample affected by strong managerial overoptimism is related to the market overoptimism. Poor post-financing stock performance indicates that the market is overoptimistic about the firm obtaining external financing. Overoptimistic managers prefer debt financing to equity financing when they percei

26、ve their shares to be underpriced, which happens when managers are more overoptimistic about their firms future than is the market. As the market is overoptimistic about financing firms, overoptimistic manager preference for debt financing will be observed only for the most overoptimistic managers w

27、hose overoptimism exceeds the overoptimism of the market.Consequently, ifwewould examine the whole population of firms obtaining external financing, it is likely that wewould find no evidence of worse stock performance following debt financing than equity financing, even if managerial over optimism

28、significantly affects the choice between debt and equity financing and post-financing stock performance. This expectation is consistent with the Jung, Kim and Stulz 1996 study that compares stock performance after newbond issues and primary stock offerings and, when controlling for the characteristi

29、cs of issuing firms, find no significant difference in the post-issue performance.We examine a sample of high-growth firms that includes the top 10% of firms in the Compustat database, based on their one-year percentage total asset growth. The resulting sample contains firms with significant financi

30、ng during the examined year. We study two subsets of the high-growth sample: a sample of firms that primarily use debt to finance asset growth and a sample of firms that primarily use external equity to finance asset growth. If more overly optimistic managers use debt financing, then we would find w

31、orse performance for the sample that primarily uses debt financing. Worse performance for the sample of equityfinancing firms could provide support for the windows of opportunity hypothesis. We find that debt financing is associated with significantly worse post-financing one- to five-year stock per

32、formance. For example, in the first post-financing year, our debt-financing sample underperforms our equity-financing sample by 8% to 10%, depending on the methodology used to control for risk. We control for risk using the matched-sample approach advocated by Barber and Lyon 1997 and a four-factor

33、model, including the three Fama and French 1993 factors supplemented by a momentum factor.We also examine the effect of the choice between debt and equity financing on post-financing performance using a continuous variable to measure a firms reliance on debt financing and controlling for firm charac

34、teristics. Furthermore, we test the robustness of our results using restricted samples. Regardless of the test design, we find that stronger reliance on debt financing is associated with worse post-financing stock performance. Our results support the notion that the choice between debt and equity fi

35、nancing and post-financing stock performance are affected by managerial over optimism.Alternate HypothesesSeveral hypotheses have been presented to explain the price reaction to the announcement of security issuance and the performance following that issuance. In the signaling model presented by Mye

36、rs and Majluf 1984, investors learn about the private information managers have about the value of the firms assets from their choice of financing. Managers avoid issuing securities they believe are underpriced and avoid sharing the value added from good investment opportunities with outside investo

37、rs. Mangers prefer to fund investments internally and issue lower-risk securities when outside capital is needed. This hypothesis provides background for the managerial over optimism hypothesis and the windows of opportunity hypothesis.Managerial Over optimism HypothesisA corollary to the signaling

38、hypothesis is the suggestion that managers who are overoptimistic about their firms ability to generate wealth-creating projects and believe their equity to be undervalued prefer to issue debt rather than equity. Heaton 2002 formalizes the model examining the effect of managerial over optimism on co

39、rporate decisions. He suggests that when managers are overoptimistic about the firms prospects, they perceive their firms risky securities to be undervalued and, to avoid issuing underpriced securities, prefer debt issues to equity issues. Also, since overoptimistic managers overvalue the projects a

40、vailable to them, they undertake some projects that are negative net present value projects even though their intentions are to act in the best interests of their shareholders.Recent empirical studies support Heatons 2002 hypothesis that overoptimistic managers prefer debt financing to equity financ

41、ing. Malmendier, Tate and Yan 2006 examine a sample of Forbes 500 firms and find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to issue debt than equity. Furthermore, Marciukaityte 2006 finds that firms obtaining substantial debt financing have higher discretionary accruals than firms obtaining substantia

42、l external equity financing. She suggests that high discretionary accruals at the time of debt financing are due to managerial over optimism.Poor stock performance following equity and debt issues (e.g., Ritter 1991, Loughran and Ritter 1995 Spies and Affleck-Graves 1995 and 1999, Datta, Iskandar-Da

43、tta and Raman 2000) suggests that the market is overoptimistic about the value of firms obtaining external financing. For overoptimistic managers to believe that their firm is undervalued, they need to be more overoptimistic than the market about the value of their firm. Behavioral studies suggest t

44、hat at least the most overoptimistic managers are even more overoptimistic about the value of their firms than the market. These studies show that over optimism and overconfidence are not just characteristics of laypeople; managers are also likely to be overconfident. After testing overconfidence am

45、ong groups of managers from different industries, Russo and Schoemaker 1992 conclude that “every group believed it knew more than it did about its industry or company” and more than 99% were overconfident. Also, Langer 1975 and Weinstein 1980 show that people tend to be more overoptimistic about out

46、comes when they believe they have control of those outcomes. Of course, managers do have more control of their firms than investors do. Furthermore, desirability of outcomes and commitment to outcomes increase over optimism (Frank 1935, Weinstein 1980). As managers compensation and reputation are af

47、fected by the performance of their firms, managers are likely to be more strongly committed to their firms than investors. Even higher intelligence does not seem to protect against over optimism; Klaczynski and Fauth 1996 show that over optimism is actually more severe among people with superior int

48、ellectual abilities. Furthermore, as some of the factors affecting managerial and market over optimism may be the same, e.g., past performance of the firm or past performance of similar firms, managers are likely to be the most overoptimistic when the market is overoptimistic. Thus, the most overopt

49、imistic managers will perceive their firm to be undervalued by the market even when it is overvalued.Managerial optimism for individual projects can extend to overconfidence in the ability to add value to any acquired assets, including acquiring an entire firm. Within the context of a merger, the ma

50、nagerial overconfidence is referred to as “Managerial Hubris.” It is an explanation for acquiring firms paying substantial premiums to acquire targets, where the premiums are in excess of managerial ability to add value to the target assets. The methodology of this study incorporates merger activity

51、 within its definition of firm growth, since asset growth can be accomplished either through capital expenditure for new assets, purchase of existing assets from another firm, or mergers. Likewise, debt or equity issued to finance a merger or acquisition is incorporated within the methodology of thi

52、s study. Such debt or equity issuance will not be accompanied by an announcement of a new security offering even though the effect is the same whether securities are issued via a public offering or in conjunction with a merger or acquisition.Windows of Opportunity HypothesisIf managers are reluctant

53、 to issue underpriced securities, then equity issuance would occur primarily when mangers perceive these securities to be overpriced. The managerial practice of issuing overpriced equity receives empirical support in the study by Ritter 1991 of stock underperformance after initial public equity offe

54、rings (IPOs). Ritter finds that IPO firms underperform matching firms for three years after the first day of public trading. Such underperformance is even stronger for firms going public in years with heavy IPO activity. These findings, Ritter suggests, “indicate that issuers are successfully timing

55、 new issues to take advantage of windows of opportunity.” (p. 4) If investors are overoptimistic about the firm value in certain periods, making equity issues in those periods allows a firm to raise the same amount of money with an issue of fewer shares, taking advantage of new shareholders. This hy

56、pothesis suggests that investors are overoptimistic about the value of a firm at the time of the offering and are slow to react to the information contained in the announcement of security issue.Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck- Graves (1995) show that post-issue underperformance is

57、 not restricted to IPOs; firms making seasoned public equity offerings also underperform matched firms in the one- to five-year post-issue periods. The type of equity offering, public or private, also seems not to matter. Private placements of equity are followed by similar-size stock underperforman

58、ce as public equity issues (Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees 2002). Furthermore, post-issue underperformance is not limited to equity issues in the United States. Levis 1995 documents poor post-issue performance in the United Kingdom. Kang, Kim and Stulz 1999 show that private and public equity issue

59、s in Japan are followed by similar poor post-issue performance as equity issues inthe United States.Although empirical evidence of underperformance following equity issuance is consistent with the windows of opportunity hypothesis, underperformance following debt issuance is not consistent with this hypothesis. However, several studies find stock