股權結構與企業(yè)績效：來自以色列的證據(jù)外文翻譯

股權結構與企業(yè)績效：來自以色列的證據(jù)外文翻譯外文翻譯OwnershipStructureandFirmPerformance:EvidencefromIsraelMaterialSource:////0>.Author:ChristophKasererAEBenjaminMoldenhauer1.AbstractThestudyexaminestheeffectofownershipstructureonfirmperformance.Wedistinguishbetweenfamilyfirms,firmscontrolledbypartnershipsofindividuals,concerncontrolledfirms,andfirmswhereblockholdershavelessthan50%ofthevote.Theempiricalworkanalyzesdataon280IsraelifirmsandemploysthetechniqueofDataEnvelopmentAnalysis.Itisfoundthatowner-managerfirmsarelessefficientingeneratingnetincomethanfirmsmanagedbyaprofessionalnon-ownermanager,andthatfamilyfirmsrunbytheirownersperformrelativelytheworst.Thisevidencesuggeststhatthemodernformofbusinessorganization,namelytheopencorporationwithdisperseownershipandnon-ownermanagers,promotesfirmperformance2.IntroductionFormanyyearsandinmanyeconomies,mostofthebusinessactivitywasconductedbyproprietorships,partnershipsorclosedcorporations.Intheseformsofbusinessorganization,asmallandcloselyrelatedgroupofindividualsbelongingtothesamefamilyorcooperatinginbusinessforlengthyperiodsrunsthefirmandsharesitsprofits.However,overtherecentcentury,anewformofbusinessorganizationflourishedasnon-concentrated-ownershipcorporationsemerged.Themoderndiverse-ownershipcorporationhasbrokenthelinkbetweentheownershipandactivemanagementofthefirm.Moderncorporationsarerunbyprofessionalmanagerswhotypicallyownonlyaverysmallfractionoftheshares.Inaddition,ownershipisdisperse,thatisthecorporationisownedbyanditsprofitsaredistributedamongManystockholders.Theadvantagesofthemoderncorporationarenumerous.Itrelievesfinancingproblems,whichenablesthefirmtoassumelarger-scaleoperationsandutilizeEconomiesofscale.Italsofacilitatescomplex-operationsallowingthemostskilledorexpertmanagerstocontrolbusinessevenwhentheytheprofessionalmangersdonothaveenoughfundstoownthefirm.Moderncorporationsraisemoneysellcommonstocksinthecapitalmarketsandassignittotheproductiveactivitiesofprofessionalmanagers.Thisiswhyitisplausibletohypothesizethatthemoderndiffuse-ownershipcorporationsperformbetterthanthetraditional“closelyheld”businessforms.Moderatingfactorsexist.Forexample,closelyheldfirmsmayissueminoritysharestoraisecapitalandexpandoperations.Moreimportantly,moderncorporationsfaceaseverenewproblemcalledtheagencyproblem:thereisachancethattheprofessionalmangersgoverningthedailyoperationsofthefirmwouldtakeactionsagainstthebestinterestsoftheshareholders.Thisagencyproblemstemsfromtheseparationofownershipandcontrolinthemoderncorporation,andittroubledmanyeconomistsbeforee.g.,BerleandMeans,1932;JensenandMeckling,1976;FamaandJensen1983.Theconclusionwasthatthereneedstoexistamonitoringsystemorcontract,aligningthemanagerinterestsandactionsWiththewealthandwelfareoftheownersstockholders.Agency-typeproblemsexistalsoincloselyheldfirmsbecausetherearealwaysonlyafewdecisionmakers.However,giventhepersonaltiesbetweentheownersandmangersinthesefirms,andgiventhemuchclosermonitoring,agencyproblemsincloselyheldfirmsseemingenerallesssevere.Thepresenceofagencyproblemsweakensthecentralthesisthatmodernopen-ownershipcorporationsaremoreefficient.Itispossiblethatinsomebusinesssectorsthecostsofmonitoringandbondingthemanagerwouldbeexcessive.Itisalsoprobablethatinsomecasestheadvantagesoflarge-scaleoperationsandprofessionalmanagementwouldbeminorandinsufficienttooutweightheexpectedagencycosts.Nevertheless,giventhehistoricaltrendtowardsdisperse-ownershipcorporations,wemaintainthehypothesisthatdiffuse-ownershipfirmsperformbetterthancloselyheldfirms.Inourview,thetrendtowardsdiffuse-ownershipcorporationsisrationalandcanbeexplainedbyperformancegains.Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.Section2offersaliteraturereview.Section3Describesthedata.Section4presentsourmethodologybasedonDataEnvelopmentAnalysis.Section5summarizestheresults,andSection6concludes.3.OwnershipStructureandFirmPerformanceOneofthemostimportanttrademarksofthemoderncorporationistheseparationofownershipandcontrol.Moderncorporationsaretypicallyrunbyprofessionalexecutiveswhoownonlyasmallfractionoftheshares.Thereisanongoingdebateintheliteratureontheimpactandmeritoftheseparationofownershipandcontrol.EarlytheoristssuchasWilliamson1964proposethatnonownermanagersprefertheirowninterestsoverthatoftheshareholders.Consequently,non-ownermanagedfirmsbecomelessefficientthanowner-managedfirms.4.Methodology:DataEnvelopmentAnalysisInthisstudy,wemeasurerelativeperformanceusingDataEnvelopmentAnalysisDEA.DataEnvelopmentAnalysisiscurrentlyaleadingmethodologyinOperationsResearchforperformanceevaluationsseeSeifordandThrall,1990,andpreviousversionsofithavebeenusedinFinancebyElyasianiandMehdian,1992,forexample.ThemainadvantageofDataEnvelopmentAnalysisisthatitisaparameter-freeapproach.Foreachanalyzedfirm,DEAconstructsa“twin”comparablevirtualFirmconsistingofaportfolioofothersamplefirms.Then,therelativeperformanceofthefirmcanbedetermined.Otherquantitativetechniquessuchasregressionanalysisareparametric,thatisitestimatesa“productionfunction”andassesseseachfirmperformanceaccordingtoitsresidualrelativetothefittedfixedparameterseconomy-wideproductionfunction.Wearenotclaimingthatparametricmethodsareinadequate.Rather,weattemptadifferentandperhapsmoreflexiblemethodology,andcompareitsresultstothestandardregressionmethodologyfindings.DataEnvelopmentAnalysispresentsandsolvesthefollowinglinearprogrammingproblemforeachfirm:……….5.ConclusionsTheempiricalanalysisof280firmsinIsraelrevealsthatownershipstructureImpactsfirmperformance,whereperformanceisestimatedastheactualnetincomeofthefirmdividedbytheoptimalnetincomegiventhefirm’sinputs.Wefindthat:1.Outofallorganizationalforms,familyowner-managedfirmsappearleastefficientingeneratingprofits.Whenallfirmsareconsidered,onlyfamilyfirmswithownermanagershaveanaverageperformancescoreoflessthan30%,andwhenperformanceismeasuredrelativetothebusinesssector,onlyfamilyfirmswithowner-managershaveanaveragescoreoflessthan50%.2.Non-ownermanagedfirmsperformbetterthanowner-managedfirms.Thesefindingssuggestthatthemodernformofbusinessorganization,namelytheopencorporationwithdisperseownershipandnon-ownermanagers,promotesperformance.Criticalreadersmaywonderhowcome“efficient”and“l(fā)ess-efficient”organizationalstructurescoexist.Theansweristhatweprobablydonotdocumentalong-termequilibriumsituation.Thelower-performingfamilyandpartnership-controlledfirmsarelikely,astimeprogresses,totransformintopublic-controllednon-majorityownedcorporations.Afewreservationsareinorder.First,wedonotcontendthateverycompanywouldgainbytransformingintoadisperseownershippublicfirm.Forexample,itisclearthatstart-upcompaniesareusuallybetteroffwhentheyarecloselyheld.Second,thereremainquestionsaboutthemethodologyanditsapplicationDataEnvelopmentAnalysisisnotstandardinFinance.Last,wedidnotshowdirectlythattransformingintoadisperseownershippublicfirmimprovesperformances.FutureresearchshouldfurtherexploreanyperformancegainsfromtheseparationOfownershipandcontrol.譯文股權結構與企業(yè)績效:來自以色列的證據(jù)資料來源:////.作者:克里斯托夫這篇論文探討了股權結構對公司績效的影響,我們把公司分為家族企業(yè),合伙企業(yè),集體企業(yè)和股東持有少于50%投票權的公司。使用技術數(shù)據(jù)實證分析了280個以色列公司。結果發(fā)現(xiàn),公司所有者獲得的凈收益要少于由專業(yè)經(jīng)理人管理的公司,由自己運營的家族公司表現(xiàn)最差,這一證據(jù)表明,現(xiàn)代企業(yè)組織形式是分散所有權和非所有者的經(jīng)理一起運營公司,提高公司業(yè)績。多年來,在許多經(jīng)濟體中的大多數(shù)商業(yè)活動是獨資企業(yè),合伙企業(yè)或倒閉企業(yè)。在這些企業(yè)組織形式中,利潤屬于同一個家庭或在長時間的業(yè)務合作和密切相關的個人小組。然而,在最近的一個世紀,一個名為非集中所有制企業(yè)的新的企業(yè)組織形式蓬勃發(fā)展,應運而生?，F(xiàn)代不同所有制之間打破了公司的所有權與企業(yè)的積極管理環(huán)節(jié)?，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)通常都有職業(yè)經(jīng)理人,并且只有一小部分股權。此外,所有權分散,該公司所股權被股民擁有,其利潤也被被許多股民分配。現(xiàn)代公司的優(yōu)勢是多方面的。它能緩解融資難問題,使公司能夠開展較大規(guī)模的行動,并利用規(guī)模經(jīng)濟。它還有助于復服務,使得最熟練的管理人員或專家來控制業(yè)務,即使他們(職業(yè)經(jīng)理)沒有足夠的資金來自己的公司?，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)在資本市場籌集資金(出售普通股),并將其分配到職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的生產(chǎn)活動。這就是為什么它是合理的推測對于現(xiàn)代所有制企業(yè)表現(xiàn)比傳統(tǒng)的“封閉型“的經(jīng)營形式好。但是也存在其他干擾因素。例如,少數(shù)人持股公司可以發(fā)行少數(shù)股份,籌集資金,擴大業(yè)務。更為重要的是,現(xiàn)代企業(yè)面臨新的嚴峻問題即所謂的代理問題:專業(yè)的管理者對于公司日常運營方面會會采用對股東最有利的措施。這種代理問題源于所有權和控制權分離的現(xiàn)代公司,并且困擾了以前的許多經(jīng)濟學家(e.g.,BerleandMeans,1932;JensenandMeckling,1976;FamaandJensen1983)結論是這里需要有一個存在的監(jiān)測系統(tǒng)。管理者的利益調整與財富和所有者(股東)福利的行動。代理型中存在的問題進行密切合作公司也因為總是只有少數(shù)決策者。不過,由于業(yè)主之間在這些企業(yè)管理人員的個人關系,并給予更密切的監(jiān)測,密切舉行的公司代理問題,似乎一般不太嚴重。代理問題的存在削弱了關于現(xiàn)代開放所有制企業(yè)更為有效的中間論點,這可能是在一些業(yè)務部門的監(jiān)管和經(jīng)理結合成本過高,在某些情況下也可能是規(guī)?；?jīng)營和專業(yè)管理優(yōu)勢的不足以超過預期的代理成本。然而,由于分散所有制企業(yè)的歷史潮流,我們假設分散型的企業(yè)比緊密型的企業(yè)表現(xiàn)得更好。在我們看來,分散型企業(yè)的趨勢是合理而且從收益表現(xiàn)方面是可以解釋的。本文的結構如下。第2節(jié)提供了一個文獻回顧,第3節(jié)是描述的數(shù)據(jù),第4節(jié)是我們的方法基于數(shù)據(jù)包絡分析,第5節(jié)是總結,而第6是結論。3.股權結構和公司業(yè)績 對現(xiàn)代企業(yè)最重要的標志之一是所有