平狄克《微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)》課后答案 13-14

1、PAGE Two competing firms are each planning to introduce a new product. Each firm will decide whether to produce Product A, Product B, or Product C. They will make their choices at the same time. The resulting payoffs are shown below.We are given the following payoff matrix, which describes a product

2、 introduction game:Firm 2ABCA-10,-100,1010,20Firm 1B10,0-20,-20-5,15C20,1015,-5-30,-30a.Are there any Nash equilibria in pure strategies? If so, what are they?There are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Each one involves one firm introducing Product A and the other firm introducing Product C.

3、We can write these two strategy pairs as (A, C) and (C, A), where the first strategy is for player 1. The payoff for these two strategies is, respectively, (10,20) and (20,10).b.If both firms use maximin strategies, what outcome will result?Recall that maximin strategies maximize the minimum payoff

4、for both players. For each of the players the strategy that maximizes their minimum payoff is A. Thus (A,A) will result, and payoffs will be (-10,-10). Each player is much worse off than at either of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium.c.If Firm 1 uses a maximin strategy, and Firm 2 knows, what will

5、Firm 2 do?If firm 1 plays its maximin strategy of A, and firm 2 knows this then firm 2 would get the highest payoff by playing C. Notice that when firm 1 plays conservatively, the Nash equilibrium that results gives firm 2 the highest payoff of the two Nash equilibria.1212112111212121122112You play

6、the following bargaining game. Player A moves first, and makes Player B an offer for the division of $100. (For example, Player A could suggest that she take $60 and Player B take $40). Player B can accept or reject the offer. If he rejects, the amount of money available drops to $90, and he then ma

7、kes an offer for the division of this amount. if Player A rejects this offer, the amount of money drops to $80, and Player A makes an offer for its division. If Player B rejects this offer, the amount of money drops to 0. Both players are rational, fully informed, and want to maximize their payoffs.

8、 Which player will do best in this game?Solve the game by starting at the end and working backwards. If B rejects As offer at the 3rd round, B gets 0. When A makes an offer at the 3rd round, B will accept even a minimal amount, such as $1. So A should offer $1 at this stage and take $79 for herself.

9、 In the 2nd stage, B knows that A will turn down any offer giving her less than $79, so B must offer $80 to A, leaving $10 for B. At the first stage, A knows B will turn down any offer giving him less than $10. So A can offer $11 to B and keep $89 for herself. B will take that offer, since B can never do any better by rejecting and waiting. The following table summarizes this.Round MoneyOffering PartyAmount to AAmount to BAvaila