供應(yīng)鏈英文加翻譯

1、Leading a Supply Chain Turnaround領(lǐng)導(dǎo)供應(yīng)鏈周轉(zhuǎn)Five years ago, salespeople at Whirlpool said the companyssupplychain staff were sales disablers.Now, Whirlpool excels at getting the right product to the right place at the right time-while keeping inventory low. What made the difference?五年前，在 Whirlpool 的銷(xiāo)售人員

2、表示，該公司的供應(yīng)鏈的工作人員“銷(xiāo)售殘疾人” 。但是現(xiàn)在， Whirlpool 擅長(zhǎng)將正確的 產(chǎn)品銷(xiāo)售在正確的地方在正確的時(shí)間，同時(shí)保持低庫(kù)存。是什么產(chǎn)生了這樣的區(qū)別？Things would be very different today-for me, my colleagues, and my company- if the votes of Whirlpools North American leadership team had swung in a different direction on May 3, 2001. It was a move I hadnt expected;

3、 Mike Todman, our executive vice president at the time, decided to go around the table and ask each member of his staff for a thumbs-up or thumbs-down on the investment that Paul Dittmann and I had just formally proposed. Did I look worried? I cant imagine I didnt, even though wed spent hours in ind

4、ividual meetings with each of them, getting their ideas and buy-in. We thought we had everyones support. But the facts remained: Our proposal had a bigger price tag than anysupplychaininvestment in the companys history. We were asking for tens of millions during a period of general belt-tightening.

5、Some of it was slated for new hires, even as cutbacks were taking place elsewhere in the company. And Paul and I, the people doing the asking, were coming from thesupplychain organization.如果惠而浦在北美的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)團(tuán)隊(duì)在 5 月 3 日，2001 年投票朝向不同的方向上， 那么今天，對(duì)我來(lái)說(shuō)， 我的同事，我的公司， 事情變得非常不同的。 這是我沒(méi)想到的舉動(dòng)：我們當(dāng)時(shí)的執(zhí)行副總裁，邁克托德曼，圍著桌子要求他的每個(gè)工

6、作人員的表決 保羅和我提出了投資方案。難道我當(dāng)時(shí)看起來(lái)很擔(dān)心？我想應(yīng)該是的，即使我們花了時(shí)間與他們每個(gè)人單獨(dú)會(huì)議去尋求他們的 意見(jiàn)和補(bǔ)充。我們認(rèn)為我們得到了大家的支持。但事實(shí)仍然是：我們的建議有比公司歷史上任何供應(yīng)鏈的投資有更大的價(jià)格標(biāo) 簽。在困難時(shí)期我們正在尋求上千萬(wàn)的資金。其中一些給新員工，甚至削減了公司諸多方面的開(kāi)支。而申請(qǐng)資金的的保羅和我是公司供應(yīng)鏈組織人員。Let me be clear: The supplychain organization was the part of the business that Whirlpools salespeople were in the

7、habit of calling the sales disablers in 2000. We were perpetually behind the eight ball, tying up too much capital in finished goods inventory- yet failing to provide the product availability our customers needed. Our availability hovered around 87%. Our colleagues grimly joked that in surveys on th

8、e delivery performance of the four biggest appliance manufacturers in the U.S., we came in fifth.要明確指出：供應(yīng)鏈組織業(yè)務(wù)是曾被惠爾浦的銷(xiāo)售人員在 2000 年的習(xí)慣稱(chēng)為“銷(xiāo)售殘疾人”的。我們永遠(yuǎn)捆綁太多資金在 成品庫(kù)存中，但未能提供一種使得產(chǎn)品能夠有效滿(mǎn)足客戶(hù)需要可行性。我們的可利用率徘徊在87 。我們的同事們嚴(yán)肅地開(kāi)玩笑說(shuō)，在在美國(guó)四個(gè)最大的家電制造商的交貨業(yè)績(jī)調(diào)查中，我們排在第五。And here, with all the credibility that track record con

9、ferred on us, we were proposing an ambitious new suite of IT solutions- something, too, for which the company had little appetite. It had been just 20 months since Whirlpool North America had flipped the switch on a massive new ERP system, with less than desired effect. Normally, Whirlpool ships clo

10、se to 70,000 appliances a day to North American customers. The day after we went live with SAP, we were able to ship about 2,000. A barrage of bad press followed. Even though the situation was soon righted (SAP remains a valued partner), the experience of being treated as a sort of poster child for

11、ERP folly had left scars.在這里，根據(jù)過(guò)去我們的信譽(yù)，我們雄心勃勃的提出了一項(xiàng)在公司沒(méi)有什么興趣的新套件 It解決方案.已經(jīng)有20個(gè)月以來(lái), 惠而浦北美在翻轉(zhuǎn)交換機(jī)上運(yùn)用了一個(gè)巨大的新的 ERP系統(tǒng)，但達(dá)不到不到預(yù)期的效果。 通常情況下，惠而浦產(chǎn)出70000器械 供給北美客戶(hù)。與 SAP 合作后，我們能夠出貨約 2,000。負(fù)面報(bào)道的攻勢(shì)接踵而至。盡管這種情況很快就被糾正( SAP 仍是一 個(gè)有價(jià)值的合作伙伴) ，但是采用 ERP 系統(tǒng)的愚行為被視為典范愚蠢的經(jīng)歷給我們留下疤痕So imagine our relief when we heard the first v

12、oice say yes It was the executive who headed up sales to Sears. Paul and I looked anxiously to the next face, and the next. The heads of our KitchenAid, Whirlpool, and value brands followed suit-a watershed, given that the funding would have to come from their budgets. I could see that J.C. Anderson

13、, my boss and senior vice president of operations, was happy, too. He had tried to voice his support at the beginning of the meeting, but Mike Todman had asked him to wait. Now that it was his turn to vote, he did it with a flourish: I am fully committed he said, to moving our supplychain from a lia

14、bility to a recognized competitive advantage. Only after Todman had heard from everyone in the room-brands, sales, finance, human resources, and operations- did he cast his vote.當(dāng)我們聽(tīng)到第一個(gè)肯定的聲音的時(shí)候那是一種解脫，就是執(zhí)行官同意向Sears 銷(xiāo)售。 我們焦慮的期待剩下的人的同意。我們 KitchenAid 惠而浦的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人們，以及價(jià)值品牌的負(fù)責(zé)人紛紛效仿 ，因?yàn)橘Y金必須來(lái)自自己的預(yù)算。我看得 出來(lái)，JC安德森，

15、我的老板和運(yùn)營(yíng)的高級(jí)副總裁也是開(kāi)心的。他曾試圖表達(dá)他支持的意見(jiàn)在會(huì)議的開(kāi)始的時(shí)候，但是邁克托 德曼要求他等一等。現(xiàn)在，輪到他投票，他做了一個(gè)成分肯定的表態(tài)說(shuō)： “我完全致力于將我們的供應(yīng)鏈從一個(gè)累贅變?yōu)楣J(rèn)有 競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的優(yōu)勢(shì)。 ”在托德曼聽(tīng)了在房間里品牌，銷(xiāo)售，財(cái)務(wù)，人力資源和操作的發(fā)言后，他投了票。With that last yes, the tension broke, and everyone was smiling and nodding. Paul and I had a sense of triumph -but also trepidation. Because now, we

16、knew, there could be no excuses. We were on the hook to deliver some serious value.伴隨著最后一個(gè)人說(shuō) Yes, 緊張情緒被打破了，每個(gè)人都微笑和點(diǎn)頭。保羅和我有一種勝利卻又誠(chéng)惶 誠(chéng)恐的感覺(jué)。因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)在，我們沒(méi)有什么借口了。 我們上了鉤，提供一些嚴(yán)重的價(jià)值Devising the Strategy, 制定戰(zhàn)略My responsibility at Whirlpool today is for the performance of the global supplychain . But in 2001, I wa

17、s focused only on North America, and I was utterly new to the supplychain organization. (I had come into the company a few years earlier to lead its e- business efforts.) By contrast, Paul Dittmann, the vice president of supplychain strategy, was a Whirlpool veteran with a tenure spanning a quarter

18、century. 今天我在惠而浦的責(zé)任是組織對(duì)全球供應(yīng)鏈。但在 2001 年，我只專(zhuān)注于北美，對(duì)于我，供應(yīng)鏈組織是完全新新的領(lǐng)域。 （我 已經(jīng)進(jìn)入公司幾年了， 但只是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司的電子業(yè)務(wù)。 ）相比之下，保羅 Dittmann ，供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略的副總裁， 是一位經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的老兵， 在惠而浦的任期跨越四分之一世紀(jì)。Our lots were cast together in October 2000 by Jeff Fettig. Jeff is now Whirlpools chairman and CEO, but at the time he was president and COO- and h

19、e was good and tired of hearing about spotty service and high logistics costs. Sales had risen to record levels in 2000 as our launch of some innovative products coincided with an uptick in housing starts. With the rest of the company chugging on all cylinders, there was only one thing holding us ba

20、ck: oursupplychain . Jeff called me into his office andgave me a two-word order: Fix it.我們很多人一起聚集在 2000年10月由杰夫費(fèi)蒂格部門(mén)下。杰夫現(xiàn)在是惠而浦公司的董事長(zhǎng)兼首席執(zhí)行官，但在當(dāng)時(shí)， 他擔(dān)任總裁和 COO 。他很優(yōu)秀也聽(tīng)膩了有關(guān)參差不齊的服務(wù)和高物流成本。 2000 年是我們推出的一些創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)品正好與房地產(chǎn) 新建設(shè)相適應(yīng)， 銷(xiāo)售已經(jīng)因此上升到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的水平。 隨著公司對(duì)所有隆隆生產(chǎn)塔的停滯， 只有一件事阻礙我們： 我們的供應(yīng)鏈。 杰夫把我叫進(jìn)他的辦公室，給了我一個(gè)雙字命令： “修復(fù)它”If th

21、at constitutes a mandate, we had one. But it was up to us to figure out what fixing the supplychain would entail. At the top level, of course, its a simple formulation: getting the right product to the right place at the right time- all the time. That gets complicated very quickly, however, when you

22、 consider the scale of the challenge. Whirlpool makes a diverse line of washers, dryers, refrigerators, dishwashers, and ovens, with manufacturing facilities in 13 countries. We sell those appliances in 100 countries, through retailers big and small and to the construction companies and developers t

23、hat build new homes. In the United States alone, our logistics network consists of eight factory distribution centers, ten regional distribution centers, 60 local distribution centers, and nearly 20,000 retail and contract customers.如果這是一個(gè)任務(wù)，我們有一個(gè)。但我們要找出固定供應(yīng)鏈需要的是什么。在頂層，當(dāng)然，這是一個(gè) 簡(jiǎn)單的公式：得到正確的產(chǎn)品 + 銷(xiāo)往在正確的

24、時(shí)間地點(diǎn) + 一直這樣做。然而，當(dāng)你考慮到挑戰(zhàn)的規(guī)模時(shí)，這 會(huì)變得很復(fù)雜?；荻钟卸嘣a(chǎn)線(xiàn)，洗衣機(jī)，烘干機(jī)，冰箱，洗碗機(jī)，和微波爐，在 13 個(gè)國(guó)家擁有生產(chǎn) 設(shè)施。我們?cè)?100 個(gè)國(guó)家，通過(guò)建立新家園的大和小的建筑公司和發(fā)展人員銷(xiāo)售家電。單獨(dú)在美國(guó)，我們 的物流網(wǎng)絡(luò)由八個(gè)工廠(chǎng)配送中心， 十個(gè)區(qū)域配送中心， 60 個(gè)本地配送中心， 和附近 20000 零售及合約客戶(hù) 組成。We needed to formulate a battle plan that would include new information technology, processes, roles, and talen

25、ts. But before we could begin to imagine those, we needed to define our strategy. Looking to the future, what would it mean to be world-class insupplychain performance?我們需要制定一個(gè)計(jì)劃，面向信息技術(shù)，流程，角色和人才。但在我們開(kāi)始構(gòu)想這些之前些，我們需要確定我們的戰(zhàn)略。面向未來(lái)，什么才是世界級(jí)的供應(yīng)鏈該表現(xiàn)出的效績(jī)？The decision we made at this very early point in the pr

26、ocess was, I think, a pivotal one. We decided that we could answer that question only by focusing on customer requirements first. Our approach to developing our supplychain strategy would be to start with the last link-the consumer-and proceed backyard.我認(rèn)為，我們?cè)谶@個(gè)過(guò)程中所做的決定是非常關(guān)鍵的。我們認(rèn)為我們可以回答這個(gè)問(wèn)題，只通過(guò)專(zhuān)注于客

27、戶(hù)的要求。我們發(fā)展我們的供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略的方法是開(kāi)始于一個(gè)連接消費(fèi)者和進(jìn)行后院環(huán)節(jié)，。Its an obvious thought, isnt it? Except that it wasnt. The overwhelming tendency in a manufacturing organization is to think about thesupplychain as something that originates with thesupply base andmoves forward. Its understandable: This is the part of thechai

28、n over which the company has control. Butthe unfortunate effect is that supplychain initiatives typically run out of steam before they get to their end point- and real point. Whether or not they make customers lives easier becomes an afterthought.這是一個(gè)明顯的想法，不是嗎？除了它也沒(méi)有什么了。在制造業(yè)組織中的絕大多數(shù)的傾向是認(rèn)為供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)?源于供應(yīng)基礎(chǔ)

29、的物質(zhì)以及它向前一步步移動(dòng)。很容易理解：這是該公司控制之下的鏈的一部分。但不幸的 是，供應(yīng)鏈發(fā)起者用完了所有蒸汽，在產(chǎn)品達(dá)到終點(diǎn)-和真正的點(diǎn)之前。他們是否讓客戶(hù)的生活更便捷成為一個(gè)事后的想法。Understanding Customers Needs.If you start with the customer, the customer cant be an afterthought.The way I expressed this to my colleagues was to say, Strategic relevance is all from the consumer back.

30、And conveniently, we had new research to consult on the subject of consumer needs. Whirlpool and Sears had recently engaged Boston Consulting Group to study consumers desires with regard to appliance delivery. The top-line finding was that people value what I call delivery with integrity. That is, y

31、our ability to get it there fast is important, but not as important as your ability to get it there when you said you would. Give a date, hit a date is what theyre asking for. This sounded familiar to me, coming from the automotive industry. In my previous position at General Motors, Id been involve

32、d in several studies that emphasized the psychology of delivery date commitments.了解客戶(hù)需求。如果你開(kāi)始于客戶(hù)，就能得到客戶(hù)。我傳達(dá)這個(gè)想法對(duì)我的同事的方式，是說(shuō)，“戰(zhàn)略相 關(guān)性都是起源于消費(fèi)者”。而且很方便的，我們有了新的研究來(lái)對(duì)消費(fèi)者需求的問(wèn)題進(jìn)行探討?；荻趾?西爾斯最近聘請(qǐng)波士頓咨詢(xún)集團(tuán)的研究消費(fèi)者對(duì)于家電配送的愿望。最重要的發(fā)現(xiàn)是，人們看重我所說(shuō)的 “誠(chéng)信傳遞” ，也就是說(shuō)， 快速配送家電是很重要的， 更重要的是你保證配送到哪里就要配送到哪里” “給 定一個(gè)日期，按時(shí)配送”是他們所要求的。這聽(tīng)起來(lái)對(duì)我來(lái)

33、說(shuō)很熟悉，因?yàn)槲襾?lái)自汽車(chē)行業(yè)。我以前在通 用汽車(chē)的職位上，曾參與過(guò)幾項(xiàng)研究，都強(qiáng)調(diào)承諾交付日期并履行的心理需求。Identifying Trade Partners Priorities.確定貿(mào)易伙伴的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)。往上游看，我們需要更好的了解我們直接客戶(hù)的愿望。我們進(jìn)行我們自己的采 訪(fǎng)，分部門(mén)來(lái)確定需求。在關(guān)注小與大的零售商時(shí)，我們集中單獨(dú)關(guān)注 Sears, Lowes, and Best Buy 這三 大客戶(hù)。在合同商市場(chǎng)，我們研究了很多細(xì)分部門(mén)，從合同經(jīng)銷(xiāo)商和公寓開(kāi)發(fā)商到單戶(hù)家庭的建設(shè)者。我 們?cè)儐?wèn)他們所有的可行性的要求，他們?cè)谂c我們溝通的喜好，以及想看到的沿線(xiàn)的電子商務(wù)。我們?cè)儐?wèn)了庫(kù)存管理

34、，以及他們希望 Whirlpool如何來(lái)做好。最終，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了27個(gè)影響做決定的尺度，根據(jù)客戶(hù)每個(gè)都有不同的重要性。Benchmarking the Competition. Naturally, our customers expectations and perceptions were shaped in large part by what others in our industry were doing. So we benchmarked our competitors -primarily GE, which was our biggest rival. We obtained

35、 cross-industry information and competitive intelligence from AMR, Gartner, and Forrester Research to make sure we had a broad and objective assessment of supplychain capabilities. Then we mapped out what would be considered world-class (versus sufficient or transitional) performance for each of the

36、 27 capabilities and how much it would cost us to reach that top level. It turned out that to prevail on every front would require a total investment ofmore than $85million, which we knew wasnt feasible. It was time to get serious about priorities.基準(zhǔn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。當(dāng)然，我們的客戶(hù)的期望和看法在很大程度上是受我們行業(yè)中的其他人所做的影響。所以我們 認(rèn)為我們的

37、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手主要是GE，這是我們最大的對(duì)手。我們獲得了跨行業(yè)信息和 AMR ,Gartner和Forrester研究公司的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)情報(bào)，以確保我們有一個(gè)廣泛的、客觀的評(píng)價(jià)供應(yīng)鏈的能力。然后，我們制定了將被認(rèn)為 是世界級(jí)(與足夠的或過(guò)渡性的相對(duì))的，為每個(gè)的 27個(gè)維度考慮的，花費(fèi)達(dá)成最高水平的計(jì)劃。但是被 證明要考慮每一個(gè)維度，需要總投資超過(guò)85元，我們知道這不可行。因此是時(shí)候認(rèn)真考慮優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)了。Now that we had established the cost of world-beating performance, we asked ourselves: For each capabili

38、ty, what improvement could we accomplish at a low investment level, and at a medium level? We quickly staked out the areas where a relatively small investment would yield supremacy, usually due to an existing strength. A few areas we simply decided to cede. Our plan was to meet or beat the competiti

39、on in most areas, at minimum cost.既然我們已經(jīng)建立了世界級(jí)的成本計(jì)劃，我們就要問(wèn)自己：對(duì)于每一種想要達(dá)到的能力，我們要做怎樣的 改善才能實(shí)現(xiàn)在一個(gè)低的投資水平和一個(gè)中等的水平上？我們很快得岀如果在某些區(qū)域一個(gè)比較小的投資 會(huì)產(chǎn)生霸權(quán)，通常是由于現(xiàn)有的優(yōu)勢(shì)。一些地區(qū)我們只能決定放棄。我們的計(jì)劃是在大多數(shù)地區(qū)以最低的 成本實(shí)現(xiàn)或贏得競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。Building for the Future. Strategy, of course, does not simply address the needs of the moment. I anticipates the ch

40、allenges of the future. A final component of oursupplychain strategy was identifyingthe probable range of future operating scenarios based on industry, economic, and technological trends.The point was to assure ourselves that our proposal was robust enough to withstand these various scenarios. To da

41、te, the planning has worked. Having set a course, weve been able to deal with situations we hadnt conceived of and to continue evolving in the same basic direction.為未來(lái)建設(shè)。當(dāng)然戰(zhàn)略不只是簡(jiǎn)單地強(qiáng)調(diào)目前的需求。它預(yù)示著未來(lái)的挑戰(zhàn)。我們的供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略的最終組 分是建立在根據(jù)工業(yè)、經(jīng)濟(jì)和技術(shù)趨勢(shì)，對(duì)未來(lái)經(jīng)營(yíng)方案的可能范圍進(jìn)行研究之上的。這是為了保證我們 的提議強(qiáng)大到足以承受這些方面的變化。到目前為止，這個(gè)計(jì)劃已經(jīng)在起作用。有了一個(gè)課程，

42、我們就能 夠處理我們從未設(shè)想過(guò)的情況，并繼續(xù)在同一個(gè)基本方向發(fā)展Selling the Revolution銷(xiāo)售革命Its always a difficult decision-when to involve your internal customers in the planning of a major capital investment. Their time is scarce, and they typically dont want to be embroiled in the details of what you, after all, are getting paid

43、to do. You must have your act together and have a solid plan to which they can respond. On the other hand, you cant be so far along in the process that youve become inflexible. You need to maintain a careful balance between seeking their guidance and selling your vision.這總是一個(gè)困難的決定，當(dāng)涉及到您的內(nèi)部客戶(hù)的主要資金投資計(jì)

44、劃時(shí)。他們的時(shí)間是有限的，他們通常 不想卷入的細(xì)節(jié)，畢竟，都是為了支付。你必須有引起他們反向的行動(dòng)和計(jì)劃。另一方面，你不能這樣一 直沿著已經(jīng)變成僵化的過(guò)程往下走。你需要保持在尋求他們的指導(dǎo)和你的銷(xiāo)售愿景之間的平衡。Paul and I liked to think we had that mandate from Jeff Fettig to get thesupplychain fixed. But it wasntthe kind of mandate that comes with a blank check. Like most well-managed companies, Whir

45、lpool will not undertake a capital investment without a compellingbusiness case. As a cost center in the company,we had to justify our project wholly on expense reductions and working capital improvements. Even if we believed that better product availability would boost sales, we couldnt count those

46、 chickens in the business case.保羅和我認(rèn)為我們已經(jīng)從杰夫費(fèi)蒂格任務(wù)固定了供應(yīng)鏈。但這并不是一種帶有空白支票的授權(quán)類(lèi)型。像大 多數(shù)管理良好的公司， Whirlpool 不會(huì)采用一個(gè)缺乏令人信服的商業(yè)案例進(jìn)行資本投資計(jì)劃。 作為公司的一 個(gè)成本中心，我們不得不為我們的項(xiàng)目在減少費(fèi)用和改善營(yíng)運(yùn)資本方面做出證明。即使我們相信，更好的 產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)將促進(jìn)銷(xiāo)售，但我們?cè)诓荒苤竿@些在商業(yè)案例中瑣碎的東西。We spent an enormous amount of time talking with the brand general managers and others w

47、ho would be affected by the changes we were proposing. The Japanese call this kind of consensus-building nemawashi (literally, it means root binding), and it is impossible to overstate its importance. Yet it is often neglected in the midst of a complex project. Note that, at the same time we needed

48、to be meeting with key decision makers, we were also in the thick of the analysis and design of the solution. In those early months, the project needed leadership in two directions - the kind of work people typically refer to as needing a Mr. Inside and Mr. Outside. I made sure we had sufficient con

49、sulting resources for the inside work while Paul and I devoted 50% of our time to the outside work- interfacing with the trade, outside experts, and internal stakeholders.我們花了大量的時(shí)間與品牌的總經(jīng)理和其他會(huì)受到我們提出的變化影響的人交談。 日本稱(chēng)這種共識(shí) nemawas 嗨(字面上的意思，它的意思是“根”) ，是不可能夸大它的重要性的。然而，在一個(gè)復(fù)雜的項(xiàng) 目中它卻常常被忽視。請(qǐng)注意，在我們需要滿(mǎn)足關(guān)鍵的決策者的同時(shí)，

50、我們也在厚厚的分析和設(shè)計(jì)的解決 方案中。在最初的幾個(gè)月，項(xiàng)目需要領(lǐng)導(dǎo)兩方向工作的人典型的那種地稱(chēng)之為“先生需要內(nèi)”和“對(duì)外先 生。 ”我相信我們有足夠的咨詢(xún)資源給向內(nèi)部工作，我和保羅將50% 的時(shí)間花費(fèi)在外面的工作上，如與界面會(huì)計(jì)與貿(mào)易，外部專(zhuān)家，和內(nèi)部利益相關(guān)者交流。In our initial meetings with these key people, wed essentially say, Heres what were doing. What do you think? Typically, the executive would half pay attention, half

51、 blow us off. But wed get some input. In a second meeting, wed show how our work had evolved to incorporate their ideas and others. Usually, wed see more engagement at this point. By the time we were asking for a third meeting, reactions weremixed. People were more or less on board, but some felt an

52、other meeting wasnt needed. They said they had nothing more to add. But we persisted. I remember telling Paul, If they wont let us in the door, well go through the window. And if they lock the window, theres always the air vent.在我們最初與這些關(guān)鍵的人的會(huì)議上，我們說(shuō)，“這里是我們正在做的。你覺(jué)得怎么樣？”通常，半數(shù)高 管會(huì)注意，另一半不認(rèn)同（或者不理會(huì)）。但我們會(huì)得到

53、一些輸入。在第二次會(huì)議上，我們將展示我們的 工作是如何發(fā)展的他們的想法和其他的建議的。通常情況下，我們會(huì)看到更多的人參與進(jìn)來(lái)。我們?nèi)种?一次見(jiàn)面的時(shí)候，反向混亂。人們或多或少都在 船上，但有些人覺(jué)得另一次會(huì)議是不需要的。他們說(shuō)他們 沒(méi)有更多的補(bǔ)充。但我們堅(jiān)持，我記得告訴保羅，“如果他們不讓我們進(jìn)門(mén)，我們會(huì)透過(guò)窗戶(hù)。如果他們 把窗戶(hù)關(guān)上，總有一排風(fēng)口 ,Along the way, wed been particularly concerned about cherry-picking. We knew that, in a company of smart businesspeople, t

54、he first reaction to a multimillion-dollar price tag would be, OK, what can I get for80% of that total? And indeed, from a project management standpoint, we knew it was important tobusiness case.break out each component of the plan into a stand-alone initiative, justified by its ownYetwe knew the wh

55、ole thing came together as a Sort of basket weave, with each part supporting andon multiple other parts.一路上，我們一直特別關(guān)注櫻桃采摘。我們知道，聰明的商人，面對(duì)一個(gè)帶有數(shù)百萬(wàn)美元的價(jià)格標(biāo)簽時(shí)， 第一反應(yīng)：“好的，有什么可以使我得到全部的80% ?事實(shí)上，從一個(gè)項(xiàng)目管理的角度來(lái)看，我們知道這是很重要的，那就是通過(guò)自身的經(jīng)營(yíng)情況打破了計(jì)劃的每一個(gè)組成部分，成為一個(gè)獨(dú)立的行動(dòng)。然而我們 知道，整個(gè)事情都是一種編織的籃子，每一個(gè)部分都支持和依賴(lài)于其他的部分。What helped here wa

56、s our competitive analysis, in which we had plotted our capability levels against others. We charted our current position against our number one competitor on each dimension valued by customers, then extrapolated to show how, depending on the level of investment, we could overtake that company or al

57、low the gap to widen. Sure enough, the competitive instincts of our colleagues kicked in.No one wanted to fall behind.幫助了我們的是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)分析，在分析中我們明白了我們的能力水平與別人的能力。取決于投資水平和顧客， 我們對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者進(jìn)行分析，然后展示岀我們?cè)鯓映皆摴净蛘邔⒉罹鄶U(kuò)大。果然，我們同事的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)本能顯 現(xiàn)岀來(lái)。沒(méi)有人想落后。Getting FocusedOne of the earliest successes in the turnaround of Whirlpools

58、supplychain was the rollout of a new sales and operations planning (S&OP)process. Our previous planning environment had beeninadequate. What passed for planning tools didnt go far beyond Excel spreadsheets. Now, we had the ability to pull together the long-term and short-term perspectives of marketi

59、ng, sales, finance, and manufacturing and produce forecasts that all the participants could base their game plans on.惠而浦的供應(yīng)鏈周轉(zhuǎn)最早的成就之一是推岀一個(gè)新的銷(xiāo)售和運(yùn)營(yíng)計(jì)劃（S&0P ）。我們以前的規(guī)劃環(huán)境是不夠的。過(guò)去的規(guī)劃工具并沒(méi)有遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)電子表格。現(xiàn)在，我們有能力去齊心協(xié)力地?fù)碛虚L(zhǎng)期或短期的視 角，關(guān)于市場(chǎng)營(yíng)銷(xiāo)，銷(xiāo)售，財(cái)務(wù)，和制造環(huán)和生產(chǎn)預(yù)測(cè)，所有的參與者可以根據(jù)他們的計(jì)劃進(jìn)行。soon pushed our forecasting capability furthe

60、r by launching a CPFR pilot. The acronym stands forllaborativewithin a supplychainThe idea is straightforward.Traditionally, we forecast how manyplanning, forecasting, and replenishment, with the collaboration happening across differentliances we will sell through a trade partner (Sears, for example