RawlsTheoryofJustice專題培訓(xùn)課件

JohnRawlsonSocialJusticeJohnRawls’TheoryofJustice1JohnRawls’TheoryofJusticeHowshouldresourcesbedistributedinasociety?Ifthedistributionistobejust,whatconditionsmustbemet?OneofthemostimportantanswerstotheaboveproblemisJohnRawls’answer.2JohnRawls’theorybelongstothetraditionofLiberalism.Liberalismisatheorywhichgiveshighimportancetotheindividual’sfreedoms(orrights),suchasthefreedomsofspeech,religion,andassociation,andwhichinsiststhatthestateshouldnotintrudeintotheareaoftheindividual’sfreedoms,exceptforthepreventionofharmstoothers.LiberalismisavenerabletraditionintheWest.ItsadvocatesincludeJohnLocke,JohnStuartMill,theFoundingFathersofUSA,IsaiahBerlin,JohnRawls,andRobertNozick,etc.Generallyspeaking,Westernnations,suchasHolland,followliberalism.3AccordingtoRawls,ifthedistributionofresourcesinasocietyistobejust,thefollowingconditionsmustbemet:(1)Eachpersonistohaveanequalrighttothemostextensivebasiclibertycompatiblewithasimilarsystemoflibertyforall.(TheLibertyPrinciple)(2)Socialandeconomicinequalitiesaretobearrangedsothattheyareboth:(a)tothegreatestbenefitoftheleastadvantaged(TheDifferencePrinciple);(b)attachedtotheofficesandpositionsopentoallunderconditionsoffairequalityofopportunity(TheFairOpportunityPrinciple).(3)TheLibertyPrinciplehasahigherprioritythantheothertwoprinciples,andtheFairOpportunityPrinciplehasahigherprioritythantheDifferencePrinciple.4NotethatRawls’principlesgiveimportancetobothnegativeandpositivefreedoms.Rawls’principlesemphasizethefirstgenerationhumanrightsandthesecondgenerationhumanrights.5Rawlsprovidestwoargumentstosupporthistheoryofjustice:thehypotheticalcontractargumentandthereflectiveequilibriumargument.6TheHypotheticalContractArgument(1)PeopleintheoriginalpositionwouldchooseRawls’principlesofjusticetoregulatetheirsociety.(2)Thenormsorprincipleschosenbypeopleintheoriginalpositiontoregulatetheirsocietywouldbereasonableandcorrect.Hence,(3)Rawls’principlesofjusticearereasonableandcorrectprinciplesofjustice.7Intheargument,Rawlstriestoshowthathisprinciplesofjusticeareprincipleswhichrational,objectiveandfairpeoplewouldliketoadopttoregulatetheirsociety.Thisisawayofshowingthathisprinciplesarereasonableandcorrect.8TheConceptofOriginalPosition--Theterm“originalposition”referstothehypotheticalsituationthathasthefollowingcharacteristics:(a)Thepersoninthissituationareplacedbehindaveilofignorancewhichmakesthemunawareoftheirparticularcircumstances.(b)Thepersonsinthissituationdonotknowtheirplaceinsociety,ortheirclassposition.Theyareignorantoftheirsocialstatus.(c)Thepersonsinthissituationdonotknowtheirgender.(d)Thepersonsinthissituationdonotknowtheirrace.

9(e)Thepersonsinthissituationareignorantoftheirpossessionofnaturalassets(i.e.theirabilitiesandstrengths).(f)Theydonotknowtheirsubstantialconceptionsofthegood.(g)Theydonotknowtheirspecialpsychologicalpropensities.(h)Theydonotknowtheeconomicandpoliticalsituation,thecivilization,orthecultureoftheirsociety.

10(i)Theyhaveathin(minimum)conceptionofthegood—theywantprimarygoods(i.e.liberties,opportunities,wealth,income,andthesocialbasesofself-respect),andtheyprefermoreprimarygoodstofewer.(Theprimarygoods,Rawlsthinks,arewhatrationalpeoplewantandthesegoodsareneutralbetweendifferentsubstantialconceptionsofthegood.Indeedtheyareall-purposemeanstoone’spersonalends.)(j)Theyarefreeandrational.(Arationalpersonisonewhowouldtakethemostefficientmeanstoachievehisends.)11(k)Theyaremutuallydisinterestedandconcernedonlytofurthertheirowninterests.(l)Theyknowthatrealpeopleinsocietyhaveasenseofjusticeandarecapableofhavingasubstantialconceptionofthegood.(m)Theyknowthattheirsocietyisinthe‘circumstancesofjustice’(i.e.circumstancesbetweenscarcityandabundance—likethecircumstancesofthedevelopedWesternnations).12Rawlsdesignsathoughtexperiment(theexperimentoftheoriginalposition)toshowthatRawls’principlesareprincipleswhichpeoplewhoarerational,objectiveandfairwouldprefertoadopttoregulatetheirsociety.13Rawls’ReasonsforPremise(1)WhywouldpeopleintheoriginalpositionchooseRawls’principlesofjusticetoregulatetheirsociety?14ReasonswhypersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldchoosetheLibertyPrincipleTheywouldchoosetheLibertyPrinciplebecauseiftheydidnot,theywouldbeeithertodiscriminateagainstacertaingroup,ortoacceptdiminishedlibertyforall.Theywouldnotdiscriminateagainstacertaingroup,fortheydonotknowwhichgroupstheybelongto.Alsotheywouldnotchoosetodiminisheveryone’sliberty,sincelibertyisaprimarygood,andsincetheywantasmuchprimarygoodsaspossible.Therefore,personsintheoriginalpositionwouldchooseRawls’LibertyPrinciple.15ReasonswhypersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldchoosetheDifferencePrinciplea)Theywouldnotacceptstrictegalitarianism(i.e.equaldistributionofgoodsamongallcitizens),forthiswouldleavenoroomforincentive.Somepeoplewouldworkmuchharderiftheyknowthattheywillgetextrarewardsfortheirhardwork.Thehardworkofthesepeoplewillbenefitothercitizens,fortherewillbemorejobs,moreinvestments,andmoreresourcesforsocialwelfare.Ifaninequalitycanbenefiteveryone(especiallythepoor)morethananequalitycando,thenitisirrationaltoobjectagainsttheinequality.Therefore,personsintheoriginalpositionwouldpermitsocialandeconomicinequalities.16b)Buthowgreattheinequalitywouldtheyallow?Rawlsthinksthattheywouldpermitonlythoseinequalitiesthatcanmaketheworstoffasbetteroffaspossible(i.e.theywouldaccepttheDifferencePrinciple).Rawls’reasonisthattheprincipleofrationalchoicewhichpersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldadoptinchoosingasetofbasicprinciplesofjusticeismaximin.Letmeexplainthisreasoninmoredetails.17AnExampleMelon:utility5(whethergoodorbad)Mussels:utility20(ifgood;90%chance)utility-100(ifbad;10%chance)Lobster:utility50(ifgood;2%chance)utility0(ifbad;98%chance)18Theaverageutilityofeatingmelon:5Theaverageutilityofeatingmussels:20x90/100+-100x10/100=8Theaverageutilityofeatinglobster:50x2/100+0=119Theprincipleofmaximaxwouldinstructustoeatlobster.Theprincipleofmaximizationofaverageutilitywouldinstructustoeatmussels.Theprincipleofmaximinwouldinstructustoeatmelon.20--Theprincipleofmaximaxwouldinstructthepeopleintheoriginalpositiontohavetheireyesonlyonthebestpositionsinthesocietyandchooseahighlyunequalsociety.--Theprincipleofmaximizationofaverageutilitywouldinstructpeopletomaketheaveragepositionsinthesocietyasgoodaspossible.--Theprincipleofmaximinwouldinstructpeopletohavetheireyesonlyontheworstoffandtrytomaketheworstoffaswellaspossible.Themaximinprinciplewouldyieldasocietywhichhasleastinequalitiesamongthethreemodelsofsociety.21Now,whichprincipleofrationalchoicewouldthepersonsintheoriginalpositionuseinchoosingasetofbasicprinciplesofjustice?22Rawlsarguesthatthepersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldusethemaximinprincipleofrationalchoice.Rawls’reasonsaresimple.JonathanWolffexplainsRawls’reasonsinthisway:“[The]choicefromtheoriginalpositionisnotthefirstinalong-runserieschoices.Itisaone-off,unrepeatableoffer!Ifthingsgobadlyyoudonothaveanotherchance.[Thechoiceistobeaone-off,unrepeatableoffer,becauseifyoucanchangethesystemwhenyouarediscontentedwithit,thenthesocietywouldnotbestable.Correctprinciplesofjusticeshouldbeabletoyieldastablesociety—addedbyK.Y.Chan]…”23“Rawlsarguesthattheuseofthemaximinprinciple,and,therefore,theselectionoftheDifferencePrinciple,isthe[most]rationaldecisionbecause[alternative]principlesofchoiceinvolvetakingriskssogravethattodosowouldbefoolishintheextreme.Ifyoudecidetogamble,andyoulose,youarestuck.Thereisnosecondchance.Theoriginalpositionwillnotbereplayed.Ifyouchoose[theprincipleofthemaximizationofaverageutility],thereisalwaysthepossibilitythatyouwillhavethemisfortunetoendupverybadlyoff.…[You]mightbeverypoor,unemployed,andhomeless.Perhapstheexistenceofsuchdisadvantagedpeopleisaninevitableside-effectofaparticularlyefficienttypeofmarketeconomy.Whytaketheriskofthisifsomethingbettercanbeguaranteedbytheuseofthemaximinprinciple?”(JonathanWolff,AnIntroductiontoPoliticalPhilosophy,pp.183-184)24Therefore,thepersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldchoosethemaximinprincipleofrationalchoiceandaccordinglyRawls’DifferencePrinciple.25ReasonswhypersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldchooseRawls’FairOpportunityPrinciple

Rawls’FairOpportunityPrincipleprescribesthatindividualcitizensshouldhaveequalopportunitytoaccessresources(i.e.thevariousgoods).ThepersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldchoosetheFairOpportunityPrinciplebecauseotherwisetheywouldbetodiscriminateacertaingroup.Buttheydonotknowtowhichgroupstheywouldbelong.Sotheywouldnotchoosetodiscriminateacertaingroup.Opportunitiesareaprimarygoodrationalpersonswouldwantandwantasmuchaspossible.26Sothepersonsintheoriginalposition,whoarerational,andwhodonotknowwhichgroupstheywouldbelongto,wouldchooseRawls’FairOpportunityPrinciple.27ReasonswhypersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldgivethehighestprioritytoRawls’LibertyPrinciple

Rawlsthinksoncewehavereachedcertainlevelofwell-being,considerationsoflibertyshouldhavepriorityovermattersofeconomicwell-beingorequalityofopportunity.Therefore,enforcedslaveryshouldnotbeacceptedevenifithaseconomicadvantagesfortheslaves.SothepersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldchoosetogivethehighestprioritytoRawls’LibertyPrinciple.28Inotherwords,accordingtoRawls,oncehavingreachedacertainlevelofwell-being,arationalpersonwouldconsiderlibertyashavingpriorityovereconomicwell-beingorequalityofopportunity.29ReasonswhypersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldgiveahigherprioritytoRawls’FairOpportunityPrinciplethanRawls’DifferencePrinciple

Rawlsthinks,oncewehavereachedcertainlevelofwell-being,weshouldconsiderfairnessortobetreatedfairlyasmoreimportantthaneconomicadvantages.SothepersonsintheoriginalpositionwouldgiveahigherprioritytoRawls’FairOpportunityPrinciplethanhisDifferencePrinciple.30Becauseoftheaboveconsiderations,Rawlsthinksthathispremise(1)isjustified.31Rawls’ReasonforPremise(2)

(2a)Thenormsorprincipleschosenbypeopleintheoriginalpositiontoregulatetheirsocietyarethosewhichwouldbechosenbypeoplewhoarerationalandimpartial.(2b)Thenormsorprincipleswhichwouldbechosenbypeoplewhoarerationalandimpartialarereasonableandcorrect.Hence,(2)Thenormsorprincipleschosenbypeopleintheoriginalpositiontoregulatetheirsocietyarereasonableandcorrect.32TheReflectiveEquilibriumArgument(1)Rawls’principlesofjusticefitwellwithourbasicmoralconvictionsandprovidefruitfulguidancetosettletheproblemofjustice.∴(2)Rawls’principlesofjusticearecorrect.33LetuslookatRawls’explanationofthereflectiveequilibriummethod(Ihavemadeslightrevisionsofhiswords):“Thereis,however,anothersidetojustifying[asetofprinciplesofjustice].Thisistoseeiftheprinciples[match]ourconsideredconvictionsofjusticeorextendtheminanacceptableway.Wecannotewhetherapplyingtheseprincipleswouldleadustomakethesamejudgmentsaboutthebasicstructureofsocietywhichwenowmakeintuitivelyandinwhichwehavethegreatestconfidence;orwhether,incaseswhereourpresentjudgmentsareindoubtandgivenwithhesitation,theseprinciplesofferaresolutionwhichwecanaffirmonreflection.(tobecontinued)34“Therearequestionswhichwefeelsuremustbeansweredinacertainway.Forexample,weareconfidentthatreligiousintoleranceandracialdiscriminationareunjust.…Theseconvictionsareprovisionalfixedpointswhichwepresumeanyconceptionofjusticemustfit.Butwehavemuchlessassuranceastowhatisthecorrectdistributionofwealthandauthority.Herewem