Allianz+經(jīng)濟(jì)展望2023-2024：保持冷靜繼續(xù)前進(jìn)

PhotobyAnnieSpratPhotobyAnnieSpratonUnsplash15December202217Corporates:trifectaofriskswillbitein2023081011Energycrisis:howInflation:reach-Monetrypolicy:Amuchlonger?ingthepeaktimidpivotinlate20231819BalanceofrisksA“perma-risk”out-remainstiltedtothelook:volatiletimestlookdownsideareheretostay15Fiscalpolicy:2023anotherexceptionyear20Tooearlytore-riskAllianzResearchEconomicOutlook23-24:andcarryandcarryonPleasescanthisQRcodetolistentoourcompanionplaylisttoboostyourveryownenergylevel2ExecutiveSummaryLudovicSubran,ChiefEconomistludovic.subran@AnaBoata,HeadofEconomicResearchana.boata@AndreasJobst,HeadofMacroeconomicandCapitalMarketsResearcht@ EricBarthalon,HeadofCapitalMarketsResearcheric.barthalon@ JordiBascoCarrera,LeadInvestmentStrategistjordi.basco_carrera@ MaximeDarmet,SeniorEconomistforFranceandUSmaxime.darmet@PabloEspinosa-Uriel,InvestmentStrategistpablo.espinosa-uriel@Fran?oiseHuang,SeniorEconomistforAPACandTradefrancoise.huang@AnoKuhanathan,HeadofCorporateResearchano.kuhanathan@RobertaFortes,EconomistforLatinAmericaroberta.fortes@ MaximeLemerle,LeadAdvisorInsolvencyResearchmaxime.lemerle@ MaddalenaMartini,EconomistforItaly&Greecemaddalena.martini@ManfredStamer,SeniorEconomistforEmergingEuropeandtheMiddleEastmanfred.stamer@KatharinaUterm?hl,SeniorEconomistforEuropekatharina.utermoehl@SinceourlastquarterlyeconomicupdateinSeptember,thedeterioratingenergycrisisandachallengingpolicymixhaveconfirmedourforecastofslowinggrowth,stickyinflationandrisinginterestrates.Fornextyear,wehaveidentifiedeightsongsandthemestokeepyoureartothegroundduringthegreatenergyquarantine:#1.SlowDown.In2023,wecontinuetoforecastamildrecessioninEuropeonthebackoftheenergycrisis,andintheUSduetotheabruptnormalizationofmonetaryandfinancialconditions.Thistriagingrecessionwilltestresilience.Strongerbalancesheets,demandbacklog,andfiscalsupportwillhelplimitthedamage.Intheemergingworld,growthisexpectedtoremainstablein2023.In2024,weanticipatearecoveryintheUSwhiletheeurozonecouldbestuckinamuddle-throughscenariobecauseoftheenergystop-and-go.#2.ColdHeart.TheenergygapwillcontinuetoposeconcernsinEurope.Afterrecordgasstorageandenergyefficiencygainshelpedavoidablackoutscenarioin2022,prospectsfornextwinter(2023-2024)arelimitedassubstitutiontoRussiangasimportswillnotsuffice.Uncertaingassupplywillcreatenegativeconfidenceeffectsandputtheregion’sfiscalcapabilitiestothetesttocushiontheimpactofhighelectricitypricesonfirmsandhouseholds.Itwillalsocompelpolicymakerstofindwaystoenhanceenergyefficiencyandstabilizegasconsumptionbeyondneartermsavings,together.Thealternativeisarepeatof2012andariskoffragmentationinEurope.#3.BadBlood.(Geo)politicsmadeaburstingcomebackattheforefrontofconcerns.FromasplitCongressandanoticeablereturntogood‘oleprotectionismthroughtheInflationReductionAct(IRA)intheUS,toEurope’sredherringpoliciestothenegativecompetitivenessshockstemmingfromtheenergycrisis(sovereignty,re-industrialization),toChina’sbalancingacttoexitzero-Covid,andthemanyimportantelectionsupcoming,investorsandcorporateswillhavetoplaycopingstrategiesandbuffers.#4.DragonAttack.TheshiftinChina’scontainmentmeasureswillalleviatepressuresonaslowingglobaltrade,andacceleratethedeclineofproducerprices.Thedomesticpost-Covidreboundcouldstarttobefeltinthesecondhalfof2023,andinto2024asweexpectsanitaryrestrictionstobeeasedinspring2023.Afastereasingwouldbenefittheglobaleconomywhileanysetbackcouldweighonglobaltradeanddelaytheeasingofinflationarypressures.#5.NeverGiveUp.Emergingmarketswillfaceverydifferentchallengesandheadwindsinthecomingmonths.PoliticalriskhasbeenrisinginLatinAmerica,EasternEuropeancountriesarebeinghitharderthanmostbytheenergycrisis,andcommodityimportersthroughouttheworldwillhavetocopewithastrongdollar,highenergyandfoodprices.Crediblepolicymoveswillmakethedifference.Debtsustainabilityconcernsareincreasingforsomecountriesinacontextofincreasingratesandcapitalflighttosafety.#6.CastleontheHill.Centralbankersaredeterminedtofightinflationandmakesurethatitdoesnotbecomeentrenched.Whilethecurrenthikingpathisabouttomoderate,centralbanks’independencewillbetestedeitherway:iferringonthesideofkeepingtheirmonetarystancemorerestrictiveforlongerdespitealoomingrecession,orifthrowinginthetoweltoearlyandriskingstagflationforgood.Againstthebackgroundofmoderatequantitativetighteninganddecreasingsystem-wideliquidity,thereisariskofsqueezefromapolicymistake.#7.BadHabits.Since2020,thewaragainstthevirus,andnowagainstRussiahaveonesuperweapon:fiscalspending.Itwillremainatthecenterstageoverthenextcoupleofyears,fromreliefmeasurestothecostoflivingcrisis,togreenindustrialpoliciestohelpwithsilentwars(climatechange,ageing),tofightingtheurgetoamassivetaxpolicyU-turn.Moretargetingforaid,andfewerdistortionsarewelcometoavoidthatfinancialmarketsbecomeveryselective.#8.EasyonMe.In2022,capitalmarketsexperiencedanunmitigateddisasterwithanunprecedentedpricecorrectioninbothequitiesandfixedincome.Goingforward,earningsforecastsstillseemtoobenign,andevenamilderrecessionisnotfullypricedin.Fixedincomeisbackbutmindtherisk.Also,ascentralbanksdrainexcesssystem-wideliquidityandtradingvolumeseveninhistoricallyliquidmarketsdecline,financialaccidentsneedstobewatchedoutfor.4PhotoPhotobyDeniseJohnsononUnsplashGlobalOutlookSinceourlastquarterlyeconomicupdate,thedeterioratingenergycrisisandtoughpolicychoiceshaveconfirmedourforecastofslowinggrowth,higherinflationandrisinginterestrates.Whileinflationarypressuresremainstrongerthanexpected,realactivityhasbeenmoreresilientthanexpectedinboththeUSandtheEuropeduetoacombinationofstrongerconsumptionandscaled-upfiscalsupport.Afteratumultuousyear,weanticipatelacklustergrowthin2023,followedbydifferingrecoverypathsacrosscountriesin2024(Table1).Globalgrowthislikelytoslowto+1.4%in2023(-0.1ppdownsiderevision)andtorecovermodestlyto+2.8%in2024,withsignificantdivergenceacrosscountries.Advancedeconomieswillregisterashallowrecessionof-0.1%in2023(aftergrowthof+2.5%in2022),followedbyareboundtobelow-potentialgrowthof+1.5%in2024(Figure1).Europewillmuddlethroughtheongoingenergycrisis,whiletheUSrecoveryisconstrainedbyacautiouspolicymix.Amongemergingmarkets,growthisexpectedtoremainstablein2023at+3.3%–mainlysupportedbythecautiousreopeningofChina,whilemostotheremergingcountriesarelikelytoslowdownduetobothexternalanddomesticheadwinds.Areboundto+4.3%isexpectedin2024,supportedbythepolicypivotaswellastherecoveryofChinesedemand.1.1-0.7-0.74.00.8.01.8UnitedStates:Despiterapidmonetarytighteningandelevatedinflation,theeconomyhasprovenresilientsofar.Thisismainlythankstostrongexportsamidastilllargebacklogofpreviouslyunfilledordersinthemanufacturingsectorwhileconsumptionisholdingup.Householdshavereducedtheirsavingsandthelabormarkethasremainedstrong,bolsteringconsumerspending(Figure2).However,thehousingmarkethascontinuedtoweakenrapidlysincethesummer:homesalesandmortgagedemandhavedippedamidtighterfinancingconditionswhileresidentialinvestmentisfalling.WeexpectGDPgrowthtofallby-0.3%in2023,withtherecessionstartinginQ12023.Growthislikelytopickupbyamodest+1.6%in2024,heldbackbyfiscalconsolidationandstillelevatedrealinterestrates.TableGDPgrowth(%)lyUSAUSA-2.86.0LatinLatinAmerica-7.16.7Brazil-4.25.0UKUK11.07.5EurozoneEurozone-6.35.3Germany-4.12.6France-7.96.8Italy-9.16.7Spain-11.34.6RussiaRussia-2.74.7Turkey1.911.45.1Poland-2.06.8AsiaAsiaPacific-1.06.1China2.28.1Japan-4.71.7India-6.68.3MiddleMiddleEastSaudiArabia3.2AfricaAfrica-1.75.8SouthAfrica-6.34.9Source:AllianzResearch6Figure1:EuropeandUS:recessionprobabilities(%)UnitesStates100806040200198019881996200420122020NBERRecessionTechnicalRecessionRecessionProbabilitySources:RefinitivDatastream,AllianzResearchEurozone:Whilegasrationingislikelytobeavoidedontheassumptionthatdemandfornaturalgascanbereducedbyatleast-10%relativetolastyear,persistentlyhighenergypriceswillpushtheEurozoneintoarecessionattheturnoftheyear.Westillexpectabottom-outinH12023,followedbyashallowrecoverybelowpotentialgrowth.Scaled-uppublicsectorsupportoverthepastmonthsonlypartiallycompensatesforhouseholds’decliningpurchasingpowerandlowercorporateprofitability.Weanticipateonlyamodestpick-upin2024-25forcountrieswithFigure2:EuropeandUS:householdsavingsandconsumercreditHouseholdsavingrate,%3025202520Eurozone15105020142016201820202014Sources:RefinitivDatastream,AllianzResearchChina:Thecomingmonthsarestilllikelytobedifficult.Thereisahighprobabilityofnegativeq/qgrowthinQ42022,withoverallgrowthfor2022likelyat+2.8%(downfromourforecastof+2.9%previously).WealsoexpectsoftgrowthinQ12023.Asaresult,wehavecutour2023GDPgrowthforecastto+4.0%from+4.5%butrevisedupour2024growthforecastfrom+4.7%to+5.2%.Againstthelatestsocio-economicbackdrop,ChineseauthoritieshavemadeconcessionsandEurope10080604020020062010201420182022GermanyUKFranceItalySpainahigherdependenceongasandlargermanufacturingsectors(Germany).Spain(andtoalesserextentFrance)shouldbemoreresilientcomparedwithEurozonepeers.Theenergycrisiswilldepressgrowthforanotherfewyears,withmaterialdownsiderisksforwinter2023-24amidastillnegativeoutputgapin2024.WeexpectGDPgrowthtofall-0.4%in2023beforepickingupby+1.0%in2024,whichwouldmaketherecoveryasweakasaftertheEurozonedebtcrisisin2012.Allinall,weseeariskthattheenergycrisiswillputEuropeonalowergrowthtrajectorygoingforward.Consumercredit,y/y%151050USUSEurozoneUK2004200720102013201620192022acceleratedeffortstomovetowardsanexitfromzero-Covidpolicies,including:(i)doublingdownoneffortsandincentivestoinoculatethevulnerablepopulation;(ii)easingquarantineconditionsforsomeCovid-19casesandcontactcases(e.g.athomeinsteadofatquarantinefacilities)and(iii)reducingthefrequencyandscopeoftestingrequirements.Asaresult,ourexpectationsforafullreopeningfrom20042007201020132016201920227afewmonthstospring2023.Thismeansthat,afterthedifficultongoingwintermonthswherethenumberofcasessurgedasaresultofrelaxedrestrictions,thepost-Covidreboundcouldstarttobefeltalittleearlierinthesecondhalfofnextyear,andinto2024.Realestatewillremainastructuraldragongrowthbutmonetaryconditionswillcontinuetobeaccommodative,notablythroughselectiveliquidity.ThedomesticrecoverybecomingmoresustainableshouldallowthestartofagradualtighteningofmonetarypolicyinH22024.willcontinuetobeimpactedbystrongglobalheadwindsandmanyarefacingadditionaldomesticchallenges,allofwhichvaryacrossregionsorifacountryisacommodityimporterorexporter.Globalheadwindsincludestilltighteninggloballiquidity,astrongUSD,elevatedfoodandenergypricesandtheongoingslowdownofChinesedemand.Netimportersofenergyandfoodwillremainparticularlyvulnerabletotheadverseeffectsofthehighpricesforthesegoodsoninflation,publicandexternalfinances.CentralandEasternEuropeancountrieswillbethemostaffectedastheyfaceanenergy-supplycrisisontopoftheenergy-pricecrisisoverthewinterasRussiaandUkraineweretheirmainpre-warsuppliers.ManyDEsinAfricaandAsiaaswellasnon-commodityexportersintheMiddleEastwillalsocontinuetosufferfromthefood-andenergy-pricesurgeandareespeciallyvulnerabletoincreasedsocialriskasaresult.MajorEMsinLatinAmericabenefitfromthecommoditypriceboom,andastrongjobmarketandresilientdomesticconsumptionfurtherhelpedtoboosteconomicgrowthinmostof2022.Thatsaid,politicaluncertaintieshavecreatedheadwinds.InEmergingAsiaexcludingChina,growthisexpectedtotakeastepdownin2023(+5.4%after+5.8%in2022)beforerecoveringmildlyin2024(to+6.2%).Afterayearofpost-Covidrecovery,SoutheastAsianeconomiesarecaughtupbythenegativeimpactofhigherinflationandtighteningmonetarypolicies(eventhoughlesssothaninotherregions),whiletheexport-orientedAsianTigersarealsoweigheddownbyslowingglobaldemand.Inthemeantime,theGulfCooperationCouncileconomiesappeartobethesolewinnersfromthecurrentcrisesintheEMDEsworld,eventhoughtheyarealsolargenetfoodimporters.Theywillcontinuetoexperiencerobustgrowthandimprovingpublicandexternalfinancesin2023,whileinflationwillremainincheckintheregion,thankstomonetarytighteningandtargetedfiscalmeasuresmitigatingfood-priceincreases.Lastbutnotleast,wewillbewatchingtheEMelectioncalendarcloselyaspolicymistakesintherun-uptotheelectionscannotberuledout:Nigeria(February),Thailand(May),Türkiye(June),Argentina(October),Poland(November)andBangladesh(December).8100%75%100%75%Energycrisis:howmuchlonger?Thecontinueduncertaintyaboutgassupplyandhighelectricityandfoodpriceswillweighonconsumersentimentandbusinessprospects,resultinginastop-and-gogrowthmomentumduetoincreasinglyentrenchednegativeconfidenceeffects.Europeistheepicenteroftheenergycrisisandhence,intheshort-run,thenegativeimpactwillbemostpronounced,whilerisksremainclearlytiltedtothedownside.Morespecifically,thedepthofthecost-of-livingcrisisinEuropewilldependonhowlowtemperaturesfallthiswinter,howwellEUsolidarityholdsupandhowefficientlycorporatescanweanthemselvesoffRussiangasorswitchtolessenergy-intensiveinputs.Frenchnuclearplantsarealsocomingbackonthegridlaterthaninitiallyplanned,whichcomplicatesthecurrent“energybalancingact”.nexttwoyears.WeassumethatRussiangasflowstoEuropeviatheNordStreampipelinewillremainatzerountilspring,withalowprobabilityofsomeresumedexportsinfall2023(potentiallytriggeredbypeacetalksbetweenUkraineandRussia).AdditionallimitedsupplythroughtheYamalgaspipeline(viaPoland)wouldbeseenasapositivesignalbymarkets.WithOPEC+beingconservativeandLNGvolumeslimited,supplyshouldremainconstrainedbothforoilandnaturalgas.Furthermore,despitesomeeasingindemandduetotheglobalrecessionpenciledinfor2023andgas-demanddestruction,webelievemarketswillremaintightandpriceshighforthenextcoupleofyears.Weexpectoilpricestoaverage95USD/bblin2023and90USD/bblin2024,whileTTFnaturalgaspriceswouldaverage170EUR/MWhin2023beforeconsolidatingslightlyto150EUR/MWhin2024.Riskstotheupsidecouldcomefrom(i)asofterrecession,(ii)furthersupplycutsfromproducersor(iii)insufficientgassavingsinEurope.Riskstothedownsidecouldcomefroma(i)harderrecessionand(ii)afasterenergytransition(throughgreaterefficiencyorincreasedelectricityavailability).supplycrisisInourbaselinescenario,weassumeEuropewillbeenteringwinter2023/24withstorageat65-70%ofcapacityatbest(assuming+20-25ppsreplenishingofstoredgasfromend-March2023tothestartofNovember).However,asEuropeenteredQ32022withstoragelevelsabove80%,wearealsopencilinginsustainedenergysavings.ThegreateravailabilityofFrenchnuclearpowerwillprovidequiteasignificantbuffer.Asadownsidescenario,wesee40%ofstorageatthestartofwinter2023,whichshoulddoubletheenergygapandpushEuropeintoitssecondyearofrecession(Figure3).Goingforward,keychallengesrelatetothedesignofnationalenergymarketsandthecompatibilityofdifferentenergyinfrastructures(e.g.deliveringgasfromSpain,whereimportsoutstripconsumption)tootherpartsofEurope.Scalingupinvestmentinrenewableenergyinfrastructureandviablealternativestopipelinegas,suchasLNGterminalsinports,isalsoessential,butwilltaketime.Inthemeantime,effectivelymitigatingtheimpactoftheenergycrisiswillrequireacoordinatedfiscalpolicyresponse,(1)repurposingthemorethanEUR200bnofNextGenerationEUfundsstillremainingand/or(2)settingupanewcrisisfundattheEuropeanCommission,usingSUREasablueprint(backedbygovernmentguarantees).Figure3:EuropeangasstoragescenariosUpsideBaselineDownsideDec-22Mar-23Jun-23Sep-23Dec-23Mar-24Sources:ENTSO-G,AllianzResearch9Demand(Neworders+Backlogsofwork)H12021H12021Mar-22Sep-22Oct-22Jun-22Aug-22Demand(Neworders+Backlogsofwork)H12021H12021Mar-22Sep-22Oct-22Jun-22Aug-22Nov-22H120204).OversupplyinthemanufacturingsectorhasworsenedsinceQ32022,notablyinEurope.Newordersandback-logsofworkareattheirlowestlevelsincethepandemicin2020.Hence,themanufacturingsectorisexpectedtoremaininrecessionin2023duetolowerdemand,mainlyforconsumer-drivenindustries,andamorepronounceddestockingprocessfromcorporatesinsectorswhereoversupplyishighest.Thelargestcliffisexpectedincycli-calsectorssuchasconstruction,consumergoods(electro-nics,householdequipmentetc.)andretail.Supplychainscontinuetonormalize,supportedbyslowingdemandandChina’sprogressivereopening.TheGlobalSupplyChainPressureIndexreacheditslowestlevelsinceearly2020andfreightratesarethreetimeslowercomparedtothebeginningofthisyear(thoughstilltwicehigherthanpre-pandemiclevels).Anormalizationinsupplychainswouldlowerinflationbymorethan-1ppinadvancedeco-nomiesbymid-2023.Amanufacturingrecessionalongwiththecontinuedslowrecoveryofservicestradeandacorrectioninpricepressuresmeanthatweexpectglobaltradeingoodsandservicestogrowbyonly+0.7%involu-metermsin2023(-0.5ppfromourpreviousforecast)andtocontractby-1.3%invalueterms(-0.2ppfromourprevi-ousforecast).Amildrecoveryshouldbepossiblein2024,withglobaltradeingoodsandservicesgrowingby+3.6%involumeterms(i.e.roughly1ppbelowthepre-pandemiclong-termaverage)andaneutralpriceeffectresul-tingfromopposingsectoraltrends.Beyondthecyclicaldevelopments,tradeandindustrialpolicieswillremaintopicaloverthecomingyears.Whileourpastresearchhasshownthatreshoringwasmoretalkthanwalk1andthatcriticaldependenciesonChinaaretoonumeroustobedisentangled2,policymakersacrosstheworldseemfocusedontakingactiontosecuresupplychains(e.g.EUChipsAct,USInflationReductionAct).Notalltradepar-ticipantswillbehinderedbysuchprotectionistmeasures(e.g.SoutheastAsiabenefitingfromUS-Chinatensions),butglobaltrademaybeheadingtowardslowergrowthratesinthecomingyearscomparedtothepre-pandemiclong-termaverage.1SeeGlobalTradeReport:Battlingoutofsupply-chaindisruptions2SeeGlobalization2.0:CantheUSandEUreally“friendshore”awayfromChina?Figure4:StateofglobaltradeDemandisslowingdownfast…0300-30-6015%-30%20072011201520192023Demand(neworders&backlogsofworks)-Stocks(manufacturingPMIindices,y/y),lhsGlobaltradeofgoods(volume,y/y),rhs…withnewordersandbacklogsofworkattheirlowestlevelsincetheworstofthepandemicMar-22Productionshortfall(Neworders-Output)USEurozoneSources:Markit,AllianzResearch14.072.614.52.02.37.0Inflation:reachingthepeakremainstrongoverthecomingquarters(despitestrongdisinflationarybaseeffectsin2023),withcoreinflationremainingratherstickynextyear.Forinstance,intheEurozone,energypricesshouldstillexplainaboutathirdoftotalinflationcomparedtoalmost50%in2022(Figure5).Besidesthelowercontributionfromsupplychainsandanegativecontributionfromdemandandmonetarypolicy,astrongereuroshouldreduceinflationbyaround-1ppin2023-24.Inadvancedeconomies,weexpectinflationtoreach4.7%in2023(downfrom7.4%in2022).Continuedwagepressurescoupledwithpersistentlyhighenergyandfoodpriceswillkeepinflationat2.4%untillate2024,especiallyinEurope.Inflationinemergingmarketswilldeclinetoonly8.5%ableInflation(from10.4%in2022)andremainelevatedat5.9%in2024.Structuralfactors(includingdemographics)willkeeplabormarketstightdespitetheanticipatedrecession,andpolicysupportwillpreventlargeradjustmentsindomesticdemandandhencestrongerdisinflation,notablyforservices.Onthegoodsside,importeddeflationfromChinastartingtobemorevisibleinthecomingmonths.Thisshouldshaveoffatleast-0.5ppofinflationintheUS,EurozoneandtheUK,andsupportadownwardadjustmentininflationexpectations.IntheUS,accordingtotheNFIBsurvey,theshareofsmallcorporatesthatwanttoincreasepricesinthecomingmonthsfellto34%fromapeakof52%inMarch.IntheEurozone,thesamesharedecreasedfromcloseto60%inAprilto44%recently.tionyearlyBrazil12.01.95.8GermanyFranceItalySpain0.50.5-2.23.5RussiaTRussiaTurkey3.412.36.719.620.6PolandChinaJapanIndia.SaudiArabia7.0SouthSouthAfricaSources:RefinitivDatastream,AllianzResearch4028352244028352249Figure