TED演講—JosephNye《21世紀(jì)權(quán)力的變遷》中英對照教學(xué)提綱

1、Good is good, but better carries it.精益求精，善益求善。TED演講JosephNye21世紀(jì)權(quán)力的變遷中英對照-Imgoingtotalktoyouaboutpowerinthis21stcentury.Andbasically,whatIdliketotellyouisthatpowerischanging,andtherearetwotypesofchangesIwanttodiscuss.Oneispowertransition,whichischangeofpoweramongststates.Andtheyarethesimpleversionof

2、themessage,isitsmovingfromWesttoEast.Theotherispowerdiffusion,thewaypowerismovingfromallstates,WestorEast,tonon-stateactors.Thosetwothingsarethehugeshiftsofpowerinourcentury.AndIwanttotellyouaboutthemeachseparatelyandthenhowtheyinteractandwhy,intheend,theremaybesomegoodnews.我想討論的是21世紀(jì)的權(quán)利?；旧衔蚁敫嬖V大家的是

3、權(quán)利的變化，有兩種變化是我想探討的。一種是權(quán)利的轉(zhuǎn)移，國家和國家之間的權(quán)利變化。這是對權(quán)利轉(zhuǎn)移的簡單解讀，即權(quán)利正從西方轉(zhuǎn)移到東方。另一種是權(quán)利的分散，即權(quán)利的轉(zhuǎn)移是從西方和東方的各個(gè)國家到非國家的范圍。以上兩種情況是本世紀(jì)權(quán)利的重要轉(zhuǎn)移。我想分別說說這兩種情況和它們之間的相互影響以及為什么說最終可能是個(gè)好消息。Whenwetalkaboutpowertransition,weoftentalkabouttheriseofAsia.Itreallyshouldbecalledtherecovery,orreturn,ofAsia.Ifwelookedattheworldin1800,youdf

4、indthatmorethanhalfoftheworldspeoplelivedinAsiaandtheymademorethanhalftheworldsproduct.Nowfastforwardto1900:halftheworldspeople-morethanhalf-stillliveinAsia,buttheyremakingonlyafifthoftheworldsproduct.Whathappened?TheIndustrialRevolution,whichmeantthatallofasudden,EuropeandAmericabecamethedominantce

5、nteroftheworld.Whatweregoingtoseeinthe21stcenturyisAsiagraduallyreturningtobeingmorethanhalfoftheworldspopulationandmorethanhalfoftheworldsproduct.Thatsimportant,anditsanimportantshift.ButletmetellyoualittlebitabouttheothershiftthatImtalkingabout,whichispowerdiffusion.說到權(quán)利的轉(zhuǎn)移，我們經(jīng)常會(huì)提起亞洲的崛起。確切地說應(yīng)該稱作亞洲

6、的復(fù)興或者亞洲的回歸?；仡?9世紀(jì)的世界，你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)世界上一半以上的人口都居住在亞洲而且他們生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品占了世界總量的一半以上?，F(xiàn)在我們來看20世紀(jì)，世界上一般的人口超過一半仍然在亞洲居住，但是他們的生產(chǎn)總值進(jìn)占全球的五分之一。這是為什么呢？工業(yè)革命，也就是說突然之間，歐洲和美國成為主導(dǎo)世界的中心。而到了21世紀(jì)，我們看到的是亞洲將重新回到占世界一半以上人口和生產(chǎn)總值的位置。這很重要，而且是一次重大的權(quán)利轉(zhuǎn)移。但是接下來我要和你們探討一下剛才提到的另外一種轉(zhuǎn)移，那就是權(quán)利分散。Tounderstandpowerdiffusionputthisinyourmind:computingandcommu

7、nicationscostshavefallenathousandfoldbetween1970andthebeginningofthiscentury.Nowthatsabig,abstractnumber,buttomakeitmorereal,ifthepriceofanautomobilehadfallenasrapidlyasthepriceofcomputingpower,youcouldbuyacartodayforfivedollars.Nowwhenthepriceofanytechnologydeclinesthatdramatically,thebarrierstoent

8、rygodown;anybodycanplayinthegame.Soin1970,ifyouwantedtocommunicatefromOxfordtoJohannesburgtoNewDelhitoBrasiliaandanywheresimultaneously,youcoulddoit,thetechnologywasthere.Buttobeabletodoit,youhadtobeveryrich-agovernment,amultinationalcorporation,maybetheCatholicChurch-butyouhadtobeprettywealthy.Now,

9、anybodyhasthatcapacity,whichpreviouslywasrestrictedbypricejusttoafewactors,iftheyhavethepriceofentryintoaninternetcafe-thelasttimeIlooked,itwassomethinglikeapoundanhour-andifyouhaveSkype,itsfree.Socapabilitiesthatwereoncerestrictedarenowavailabletoeveryone.要理解權(quán)利分散就要明白一點(diǎn)：計(jì)算和交流的成本已經(jīng)降到原來的千分之幾從1970年到本世紀(jì)

10、初。這個(gè)數(shù)字很大，很抽象，但是具體來說，如果汽車價(jià)格的降幅和計(jì)算機(jī)的降幅一樣，那么今天你只花五美元，就可以買輛車。那么如果所有的技術(shù)價(jià)格都以這個(gè)幅度下跌，獲得這一技術(shù)的門檻就會(huì)降低；人人都可以享有。從20世紀(jì)70年代開始，如果你想從牛津到約翰內(nèi)斯堡或到新德里或到巴西利亞或是其他任何地方獲得即時(shí)通訊，是可行的，因?yàn)榧夹g(shù)已經(jīng)發(fā)展到了這個(gè)階段。但是要真正做到這一點(diǎn)，你需要很有錢才行你要么是政府，要么是跨國公司，也可能是基督教堂不過你得及其有錢才行。但是幾天人人都能享有這些技術(shù)，以前人們受到價(jià)格的制約只有少數(shù)人才能享有，如果人們有足夠的錢去網(wǎng)吧我上次查到的價(jià)格大概是每小時(shí)一磅左右但是如果你用Skype

11、，是免費(fèi)的。所以曾經(jīng)被限制的能力現(xiàn)在人人都可以享有。AndwhatthatmeansisnotthattheageoftheStateisover.TheStatestillmatters.Butthestageiscrowded.TheStatesnotalone.Therearemany,manyactors.Someofthatsgood.Oxfam,agreatnon-governmentalactor.Someofitsbad.AlQaeda,anothernon-governmentalactor.Butthinkofwhatitdoestohowwethinkintraditio

12、naltermsandconcepts.Wethinkintermsofwarandinterstatewar.Andyoucanthinkbackto1941,whenthegovernmentofJapanattackedtheUnitedStatesatPearlHarbor.Itsworthnoticingthatanon-stateactorattackingtheUnitedStatesin2001killedmoreAmericansthanthegovernmentofJapandidin1941.Youmightthinkofthatastheprivatizationofw

13、ar.Sowereseeingagreatchangeintermsofdiffusionofpower.這并不意味著國家的時(shí)代結(jié)束了。國家依然很重要。但是舞臺(tái)是很擁擠的。國家不可能單獨(dú)存在。還有很多很多的角色。其中有一些是好的角色。比如牛津饑荒救濟(jì)委員會(huì)（樂施會(huì)）就是一個(gè)很重要的非政府角色。其中也有一些是不好的?；亟M織，是另一個(gè)非政府角色。但是試想這些對我們傳統(tǒng)的思維方式和觀念有哪些改變。我們過去考慮的是戰(zhàn)爭和內(nèi)戰(zhàn)。大家可以想一想1941年，日本政府日本政府襲擊美國珍珠港。只得注意的是在2001年，一個(gè)非政府的角色襲擊了美國在這次襲擊中喪生的美國人超過了1941年日本政府的行為。你可能會(huì)想

14、戰(zhàn)爭已經(jīng)不再是國家行為。因此我們看到的是權(quán)力分散的一個(gè)重大變化。Nowtheproblemisthatwerenotthinkingaboutitinveryinnovativeways.Soletmestepbackandask:whatspower?Powerissimpletheabilitytoaffectotherstogettheoutcomesyouwant,andyoucandoitinthreeways.Youcandoitwiththreats,ofcoercion-sticks,youcandoitwithpayments-carrots,oryoucandoitbyge

15、ttingotherstowantwhatyouwant.Andthatabilitytogetotherstowantwhatyouwant,togettheoutcomesyouwant,withoutcoercionorpayment,iswhatIcallsoftpower.Andthatsoftpowerhasbeenmuchneglectedandmuchmisunderstood.Andyetitstremendouslyimportant.Indeed,ifyoucanlearntousemoresoftpower,youcansavealotoncarrotsandstick

16、s.Traditionally,thewaypeoplethoughtaboutpowerwasprimarilyintermsofmilitarypower.Forexample,thegreatOxfordhistorianwhotaughthereatthisuniversity,A.J.P.Taylor,definedagreatpowerasacountryabletoprevailinwar.Butweneedanewnarrativeifweretounderstandpowerinthe21stcentury.Itsnotjustprevailingatwar,thoughwa

17、rstillpersists.Itsnotwhosearmywins;itsalsowhosestorywins.Andwehavetothinkmuchmoreintermsofnarrativesandwhosenarrativeisgoingtobeeffective.HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html可問題是HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html我們對此的看法不夠新。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/

18、eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html所以讓我們再退一步重新審視HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html并且想一想：什么是權(quán)利？HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html權(quán)利其實(shí)就是一種能力HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html能夠影響他人HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/jos

19、eph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html以達(dá)到你的目的，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html實(shí)現(xiàn)權(quán)利的方式有三種。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html可以威脅他人，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html通過強(qiáng)迫棍棒，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_glob

20、al_power_shifts.html可以買通他人HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html胡蘿卜，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html或者通過讓別人心甘情愿地HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html做你想要達(dá)成的結(jié)果。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.

21、html而讓別人心甘情愿地做逆向要做的，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html來達(dá)到你的目的，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html而不是通過強(qiáng)迫或買通，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html就是我所說的軟實(shí)力。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.htm

22、l而這種軟實(shí)力很大程度上被人們所忽視HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html所誤解了。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html然而軟實(shí)力是極其重要地。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html事實(shí)上，如果你知道如何HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html運(yùn)用

23、軟實(shí)力，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html你會(huì)節(jié)省很多地HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html胡蘿卜和棍棒。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html按照慣例，人們認(rèn)為權(quán)利HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html基本就是軍事力量。HYPERLINK/

24、talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html例如來自牛津的偉大的歷史學(xué)家HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.htmlA.J.P.泰勒HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html對大國的定義是HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html能夠打贏戰(zhàn)爭的國家。HYPERLINK/talks/lan

25、g/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html但是我們需要一個(gè)新的闡述HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html來真正懂得21世紀(jì)地權(quán)利。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html權(quán)利不僅僅是贏得戰(zhàn)爭HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html盡管戰(zhàn)爭依舊存在。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/en

26、g/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html哪一個(gè)國家的軍隊(duì)贏了并不重要；HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html重要的是誰講的故事能夠贏得人心。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html而且我們需要進(jìn)一步考慮這個(gè)闡釋HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html以及誰的闡釋更加有效。Nowletmegoback

27、tothequestionofpowertransitionbetweenstatesandwhatshappeningthere.thenarrativesthatweusenowtendtobetheriseandfallofthegreatpowers.AndthecurrentnarrativeisallabouttheriseofChinaandthedeclineoftheUnitedStates.Indeed,withthe2008financialcrisis,manypeoplesaidthiswasthebeginningoftheendofAmericanpower.Th

28、etectonic【筑造的;構(gòu)造的】platesofworldpoliticswereshifting.AndpresidentMedvedevofRussia,forexample,pronouncedin2008thiswasthebeginningoftheendofUnitedStatespower.Butinfact,thismetaphor【暗喻】ofdeclineisoftenverymisleading.Ifyoulookathistory,inrecenthistory,youllseethecyclesofbeliefinAmericandeclinecomeandgoev

29、ery10or15yearsorso.In1958,aftertheSovietsputupSputnik【俄人造衛(wèi)星】,itwasThatstheendofAmerica.In1973,withtheoilembargo【禁運(yùn)】andtheclosingofthegoldwindow,thatwastheendofAmerica.Inthe1980s,asAmericawentthroughatransitionintheReaganperiod,betweentherustbelt【鐵銹地帶(指從前工業(yè)繁盛今已衰落的發(fā)達(dá)國家一些地區(qū)】economyofthemidwesttotheSili

30、conValleyeconomyofCalifornia,thatwastheendofAmerica.Butinfact,whatweveseenisnoneofthoseweretrue.Indeed,peoplewereover-enthusiasticintheearly2000s,thinkingAmericacoulddoanything,whichledusintosomedisastrousforeignpolicyadventures,andnowwerebacktodeclineagain.HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_glo

31、bal_power_shifts.html現(xiàn)在我要回到HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html國家之間HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html權(quán)利轉(zhuǎn)移HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html的問題HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html講講最新的動(dòng)態(tài)。HY

32、PERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html我們現(xiàn)在用的闡釋HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html大多是大國的HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html崛起和沒落。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html而近來這種闡述全都是HYPERLINK/talks/lang

33、/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html中國的崛起HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html和美國的沒落。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html確實(shí)，2008年發(fā)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html會(huì)讓很多人說這是HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_n

34、ye_on_global_power_shifts.html美國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力終結(jié)的開始。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html全球政治格局的板塊HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html正在發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)變。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html例如俄羅斯的總統(tǒng)梅德韋杰夫，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_g

35、lobal_power_shifts.html在2008年曾說過HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)是美國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力結(jié)束HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html的開端。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html然而事實(shí)上，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shift

36、s.html這種衰落的比喻HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html非常誤導(dǎo)人。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html如果回顧歷史，近代歷史HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)這種認(rèn)為HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html美國衰落的說法HYP

37、ERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html每隔10年到20年左右就會(huì)出現(xiàn)。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html1958年，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html蘇聯(lián)發(fā)射人造衛(wèi)星以后HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html人們就說“美國要衰落了?！盚YPERL

38、INK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html1973年的石油禁運(yùn)HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html和黃金窗口的關(guān)閉，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html又有人說美國要衰落了。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html20世紀(jì)80年代，HYPERLINK/talks

39、/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html在里根就職期間，美國經(jīng)歷了一次HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html從美國中西部老工業(yè)基地HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html到加州的硅谷經(jīng)濟(jì)的轉(zhuǎn)變，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html又有人在說美國要衰落了。HYPERLINK/tal

40、ks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html但事實(shí)上，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html所有這些謠言都不是真的。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html事實(shí)上，正是人們在21世紀(jì)初HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html過分樂觀，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/

41、eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html認(rèn)為美國無所不能，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html導(dǎo)致了我們作出了一些災(zāi)難性的HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html外交政策，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html現(xiàn)在又出現(xiàn)了美國衰落的聲音。Themoralofthisstoryisallthe

42、senarrativesaboutriseandfallanddeclinetellusalotmoreaboutpsychologythantheydoaboutreality.Ifwetrytofocusonthereality,thenwhatweneedtofocusoniswhatsreallyhappeningintermsofChinaandtheUnitedStates.GoldmanSachshasprojectedthatChina,theChineseeconomy,willsurpassthatoftheU.S.by2027.Sowevegot,what,17morey

43、earstogoorsobeforeChinasbigger.Nowsomeday,withabillionpointthreepeoplegettingricher,theyaregoingtobebiggerthantheUnitedStates.ButbeverycarefuloftheseprojectionssuchastheGoldmanSachsprojectionasthoughthatgivesyouanaccuratepictureofpowertransitioninthiscentury.Letmementionthreereasonswhyitstoosimple.F

44、irstofall,itsalinearprojection.Youknow,everythingsays,heresthegrowthrateofChina,heresthegrowthrateoftheU.S.,hereitgoes-straightline.Historyisnotlinear.Thereareoftenbumpsalongtheroad,accidentsalongtheway.ThesecondthingisthattheChineseeconomypassestheU.S.economyin,letssay,2030,whichitmayit【就算事實(shí)真的如此】,t

45、hatwillbeameasureoftotaleconomicsize,butnotofpercapitaincome-wonttellyouaboutthecompositionoftheeconomy.Chinastillhaslargeareasofunderdevelopment.Andpercapitaincomeisabettermeasureofthesophisticationoftheeconomy.AndthattheChinesewontcatchuporpasstheAmericansuntilsomewhereinthelatterpart,after2050,of

46、thiscentury.HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html總之HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html所有這些關(guān)于崛起，倒退和衰落的闡述HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html講的更多的是一種心理HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html而不是事實(shí)。H

47、YPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html現(xiàn)在讓我們只關(guān)注事實(shí)，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html那么我們就需要關(guān)注HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html當(dāng)下在中國和美國HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html正在發(fā)生的事情。HYPERLINK/tal

48、ks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html高盛預(yù)言HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html中國，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html將會(huì)在2027年HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html超過美國。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_o

49、n_global_power_shifts.html所以我們只剩下HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html在中國超過美國之前HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html我們只剩下17年左右。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html也許未來HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_sh

50、ifts.html等到這1.3億人口富起來的時(shí)候，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html他們將超過美國。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html但是不要輕易接受HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html高盛這些公司做出的預(yù)測。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts

51、.html盡管這些預(yù)測能給你本世紀(jì)潛力轉(zhuǎn)移的HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html精確畫面。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html讓我來給出為什么這些預(yù)測過于簡單的原因。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html第一，它是線性的預(yù)測。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_s

52、hifts.html種種跡象HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html這是中國的增長率，這是美國的增長率，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html請看直線HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html然而歷史不是一條直線。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html歷

53、史進(jìn)程經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)曲折和突發(fā)事件。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html第二HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html中國經(jīng)濟(jì)HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html如果說在2030年超過了美國經(jīng)濟(jì)，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html就算事實(shí)真的如此，H

54、YPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html也是按經(jīng)濟(jì)總量來衡量的，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html并非人均收入HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html并不能說明經(jīng)濟(jì)的組成。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html中國的廣大地區(qū)HYPERLINK/tal

55、ks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html還很落后。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html人均收入能夠更好的衡量HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html經(jīng)濟(jì)的復(fù)雜性。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html在這之后，中國才有可能在人均收入HYPERLINK/talks/lang/e

56、ng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html超過美國，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html那會(huì)是在本世紀(jì)，2050年以后。Theotherpointthatsworthnoticingishowone-dimensionalthisprojectionis.Youknow,itlooksateconomicpowermeasuredbyGDP.Doesnttellyoumuchaboutmilitarypower,doesnttellyouverymuchabouts

57、oftpower.Itsallone-dimensional.Andalso,whenwethinkabouttheriseofAsia,orreturnofAsia,asIcalleditalittlebitearlier,itsworthrememberingAsiasnotonething.IfyouresittinginJapan,orinNewDelhi,orinHanoi,yourviewoftheriseofChinaisalittledifferentthanifyouresittinginBeijing.Indeed,oneoftheadvantagesthattheAmer

58、icanswillhaveintermsofpowerinAsiaisallthosecountrieswantanAmericaninsurancepolicyagainsttheriseofChina.ItsasthoughMexicoandCanadawerehostileneighborstotheUnitedStates,whichtheyrenot.SothesesimpleprojectionsoftheGoldmanSachstypearenottellinguswhatweneedtoknowaboutpowertransition.HYPERLINK/talks/lang/

59、eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html另外值得一提的是HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html這個(gè)預(yù)測的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html是多么的單一。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html它看到是通過GDP，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye

60、_on_global_power_shifts.html衡量的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html并不說明軍事實(shí)力，HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html也不能說明軟實(shí)力。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html它的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是單一的。HYPERLINK/talks/lang/eng/joseph_nye_on_global_