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1、Economic Development of JapanNo.13 The Bubble Burst and RecessionNikkei Stock Average 225Urban land price indexSource: Japan Real Estate InstituteP.202Industrial ProductionBase year 2005P.2052021 prel.202120212021ProductionShipmentInventoryGDPAfter the bubble burst, economy looked up in 1996-97, 200

2、0, 2003-07, 2021, 2021.Economy fell in 2021-09 due to global Lehman Shock, which had greater macroeconomic impact than the earthquake.2021-12: global Euro shock2021The Heisei Bubble (Economic Boom in late 1980s)CausesStructuralbank deregulation and the loss of large corporate borrowers in the early

3、1980s led banks to overlend to risky borrowers (SMEs, real estate developers) without proper risk management.Monetaryas the yen rose sharply after 1985, the Bank of Japan injected liquidity to counter it and ease endaka fukyo (high-yen caused recession). This led to asset bubbles without igniting in

4、flation.Consequences Excess investment in properties, over-expansion in capacity, lavish consumption, rise in outward FDIPP.202-203Japans Lost Decade (early 1990s-early 2000s):Why Did the Recession Last So Long?Long adjustment after a large asset bubbleNon-performing loans (late policy response)Japa

5、ns economic system became obsolete (*)Aging population and associated problems (pension, medical care, dissaving, etc) (*)Snowballing fiscal debt (*)Peoples lack of confidence in the future or policy (*)The China challenge (*)Lack of political leadership to propose solutions, convince people, and im

6、plement actions(*) True even todayP.206Non performing loans-Jusen problem: failure of nonbanks specializing in real estate loans (1995-96)-Bankruptcies of Yamaichi Securities & Hokkaido Takushoku Bank: credit crunch and mini bank runs (1997-98)-Bank recapitalization: public money injection, creation

7、 of Financial Services Agency (1998-2000)Monetary policy for recovery-Injecting liquidity by buying up unconventional assets (corporate & bank bonds, etc): but the monetary transmission mechanism was broken (MBMoneyLending)-Zero interest rate policy (Feb.1999-Aug.2000; Mar.2001-Jul.2006; Dec.2021-)-

8、Inflation targeting (debated but not adopted) (“1% Feb.2021)-Foreign exchange intervention to prevent yen appreciation (but without aggressive yen depreciation)Policy Issues for the Bank of JapanPP.207-210Call rate (interbank short-term interest rate)Money & bank lendingBubbleZerointerest ratepolicy

9、Excess reserves are built up during zero interest rate periods Source: McKinnon (2007)Buy Dollar (resist yen appreciation)Sell Dollar (resist yen depreciation)Monthly Changes in International Reserves(Proxy for F/X intervention)Yen/USDInternational ReservesCredit & Trust BankLong-term Credit BankHok

10、kaido Takushoku BankChuo Trust BankMitsui Trust BankSumitomo Trust BankDaiwa BankSaitama BankKyowa BankYasuda Trust BankIndustrial Bank of JapanFuji BankDaiichi Kangyo BankSumitomo BankTaiyo Kobe BankMitsui BankToyo Trust BankTokai BankSanwa BankJapan Trust BankMitsubishi Trust BankBank of TokyoMits

11、ubishi BankAozoraShinseiBankruptedBankruptedChuo Mitsui Trust(Merged)Mitsui Sumitomo Trust HoldingsAsahiSaitama KyowaDaiwaRisona HoldingsMizuhoMizuho Asset TrustMizuho Financial GroupTaiyo Kobe MitsuiSakuraMitsui SumitomoMitsui Sumitomo Financial GroupUFJMitsubishi TokyoMitsubishi UFJ Financial Grou

12、pDebate on Fiscal StimuliSince the 1990s, large fiscal spending has been used to stimulate the economy. But there was no strong recovery, while the government debt skyrocketed.Some argued for even bigger stimuli; others said that would only worsen the debt crisis.PP.211-212Government debt in % of GD

13、PBubble burstPM Koizumi (2001-06) set limits on spending (infrastructure, welfare).PM Aso (2021-) and DPJ (2021-) returned to big fiscal spending.KoizumiAbeFukudaAsoHatoyamaKanLDPDPJNodaRecovery, Global Recession, RecoveryMain causes of recovery (2003-2007)-Strong foreign demand (US, China)-Decade-l

14、ong corporate restructuring effort-Yen depreciation (up to 2007) Recovery was not mainly due to reforms or good macro policiesGlobal financial crisis (late 2021-2021)Traditional industrial exports (cars, electronics) which led recovery suddenly lost export markets.Thanks to strong demand in China an

15、d other emerging economies, growth picked up in 2021Earthquake & tsunami, and Euro Shock (2021-2021)Production fell temporarily in 2021 due to supply chain disruption and depressed psychology, but recovered soon due to the start of vigorous reconstruction investment.Recovery is fragile due to global

16、 recession (incl. China), yen appreciation, power shortage, etc.Politics: The End of the 1955 Regime?The last three Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governments were weak and unpopular (Abe, Fukuda, Aso).In July 2007 election, opposition seized majority in the Upper House-“twisted politics causes conf

17、rontation and slowdownIn Aug. 2021 election, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took over the Lower Houseend of the 1995 Regime?In July 2021, DPJ lost the Upper House: weak leadership, political mishandlings? “Twisted politics again.Weak leadership continues; popular discontent with random measures

18、 over tax, welfare, growth, TPP, Okinawa, future power, etc.LDP dominance based on rural expenditure and supportTwo party politicswith clear policy choicefor voters?Earthquake and Nuclear Disaster in 2021:Immediate impact and issuesEarthquake relief budget is expected about 10-20 trillion yen or 2-4

19、% of GDP (excl. atomic power related costs). In 1995, the Kobe earthquake cost 3 trillion yen. Debate over funding: tax increase, debt issue or cutting unnecessary spending (small saving?). But fiscal problem is caused not mainly by earthquake but by social welfare explosion.Growth impact of earthqu

20、ake may be neutral: output loss offset by private & public investment for recovery. Supply chain disruption is usually followed by sharp recovery.Government (PM Kan, PM Noda)s handling of reconstruction plan, radiation problem, power shortage & future energy policy is random and inconsistent. Busine

21、sses fear loss of competitiveness and domestic production base due to political risk.Crisis Management: Learning from International Best PracticesEmergency management headquarters (headed by PM) and taskforces should be established within a few days.HQ should have daily meetings to hear reports and

22、give orders to TFs. PM should be the hub of coordination and dissemination of information and policy directions.TFs should be made up of officials & experts. Relevant ministry should be the secretariat. Unresolved problems and multi-sectoral issues should be taken up to the HQ meeting.Workload shoul

23、d shift from TF1-5 (immediate problems) to TF6 (reconstruction plan) over time. Recovery & reconstruction vision must be declared within one month followed by detailed roadmaps and action plans within 3-6 months.HeadquartersVictim supportTransport & logisticsRelief funds& volunteersNuclearaccidentPo

24、wershortageLong-term reconstruction planTF1TF2TF3TF4TF5TF6MOVIE: GO! TO THE BUBBLE (2007)The Concept of MonozukuriJapanese Style Skill-based ManufacturingMonozukuri means “making things in native Japanese.Pursuit of high quality and customer satisfaction as the primary goal with pride and dedication

25、; profits or balance sheets a secondary consideration.Features long-term relationship and skill & knowledge building within companies and among companies.Strong demand for 5S, QCD, kaizen, quality control (QCC & TQM), and other efforts for constant improvement.Modular manufacturingIntegral manufactu

26、ringParts interfaceParts are common and can be used for any modelEach product has unique parts, specifically designedMeritsQuick results and flexibilityEndless pursuit of qualityDemeritsNo differentiation, excess entry, low profit, no R&DIt takes much energy and time to achieve resultsInstitutionalr

27、equirementOpenness, quick decision making, flexible outsourcingLong-term relations, building internal skills & knowledgePerformanceTimeTimeBusiness ArchitecturesTakahiro Fujimoto (Tokyo Univ)Basic Classifications of Product-Process ArchitectureModular architecture one-to-one correspondence between f

28、unctional and structural elementsIntegral architecture many-to-many correspondence between the functional and structural elements BodySuspensionEngineHandlingRideFuel EfficiencyPCPC SystemAutomobileComputingPrinterProjectionProjectorPrintingOpen architecture:“mix and match of component designs acros

29、s firmClosed architecture:mix and match only within a firmC Takahiro Fujimoto, University of Tokyo(1) Closed-integral , (2) Closed-modular, (3) Open-modular Three Basic Types of Product ArchitectureC Takahiro Fujimoto, University of TokyoClosed-IntegralOpen-ModularPredictions on Architecture-based C

30、omparative AdvantageJapanese firms - integration capability More competitive in products with closed-integral architecture. based on integration-based manufacturing capabilityChinese firms mobilization capability More competitive in labor-intensive products with open-modular (or quasi-open) architec

31、tureKorean (large) firms concentration capabilityMore competitive in capital-intensive products with modular architecture (moving toward integral?)ASEAN firms labor-retaining capability? More competitive in labor-intensive productswith closed-integral architecture?U.S. firms conceptualization capabi

32、lityMore competitive in knowledge-intensive products with open-modular architectureEuropean firms expression capability More competitive in closed-integral productsbased on brand-design-marketing capability - What about Vietnam?C Takahiro Fujimoto, University of TokyoArchitectural Geopolitics: A Pre

33、diction in the Pacific RegionIntegral AxisModular AxisChina(south)JapanTaiwanKoreaC Takahiro Fujimoto, University of TokyoVietnam? Male Female Male FemaleSource: US Census Bureau, International Database.Unit: millionJapan 2005Vietnam 2005Prof. Fujimoto at Vietnams Ministry of Industry, Jun.11, 2007Z

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