非文學翻譯練習

1、非文學翻譯練習非文學翻譯練習英譯漢英譯漢1一般應用文體翻譯：公司新聞稿DE BEERS REORGANISES DTC SALES AND MARKETING INTO TWO SEPARATE DIVISIONSDe Beers announced recently the reorganisation of the Diamond Trading Company (DTC). The reorganisation means that the former DTC marketing department will now become a separately managed, inde

2、pendent division called De Beers Group Marketing. All other activities previously conducted by the DTC will continue under the DTC management.De Beers Group Marketing will focus on three core activities:the development and marketing of “big ideas” like Trilogy which have proved so successful at driv

3、ing demandthe continuing exploration and development of the FOREVERMARK programmemaintaining consumer confidence in diamondsThe DTC will focus on being the most effective distribution channel for rough diamonds by focusing on maximising value for its clients and producer partners:Maximising value fo

4、r its clients:osustainable arrangements that deliver consistent and efficient supply of goods ITO, consistent assortment and priceoundisputed commercial benefit to Sightholdersoaccess to DTC industry insights, expertise and technology that position DTC as the most credible and relevant industry part

5、nerMaximising value for our producer partners:oOptimum sustainable price for producers diamondsoAn ethical, secure and sustainable channel to marketoAssisting in the creation of viable downstream industries Gareth Penny, Managing Director, De Beers Group commented: “I am optimistic about this realig

6、nment. There is already a tremendous amount of activity going on at the DTC with the new Sightholder selection process underway for the 2008-2011 contracts, establishing DTC Botswana and Namibia DTC as well as the management of the geographical shift of some of the DTCs operations. There are certain

7、ly challenges ahead, but both divisions are confident and fully committed to delivering the excellent service and delivery of supply that has always been the hallmark of any company within the De Beers Group.” Commenting on the change, Varda Shine, Managing Director, DTC said: “De Beers and the DTC

8、have been actively looking at ways that we can operate more effectively and efficiently. To improve our offer to clients and our producer partners, the DTC needs to focus on being the worlds best rough diamond distributor. We have a clear vision of how to achieve this and this realignment will help

9、us to deliver it.”David Lamb, Worldwide Marketing Director, De Beers Group Marketing commented: “De Beers is constantly evaluating all areas of the business to ensure that we remain highly competitive in a rapidly changing business environment. This reorganisation will help ensure that De Beers Grou

10、p Marketing can focus on creatively and successfully driving demand for diamonds, maintaining consumer confidence in diamonds and exploring the FOREVERMARK programme.” About De Beers:De Beers, established in 1888, is the worlds leading diamond company with unrivalled expertise in the exploration, mi

11、ning and marketing of diamonds. De Beers and its joint venture partners operate in 25 countries across five continents employing more than 23,000 people, 17,000 of whom are based in southern Africa. From its 15 mines across Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania, De Beers produces and markets

12、approximately 40 percent of the worlds supply of rough diamonds. The companys robust portfolio of future mining projects includes two mines in Canada set to begin operations in 2007 and 2008. As part of the companys operating philosophy, the people of De Beers are committed to Living up to Diamonds

13、by making a lasting contribution to the communities in which they live and work. De Beers encourages sustainable working to ensure long-term positive development for Africa and returns approximately US$4.9 billion to the continent every year. For further information about De Beers visit .2公司信息：案例研究S

14、amsung Electronics: Company OverviewIn 2005, the Samsung Group, which included Samsung Electronics Company, was the largest conglomerate (termed chaebol) in South Korea. The total net sales of the Samsung Group had reached $135 billion in 2004. In that same year, the Group had 337 overseas operation

15、s in 58 countries and employed 212,000 people worldwide. The three core business sectors within the Group were electronics, finance, and trade and services. Samsung Electronics Company, henceforth called “Samsung” in this case, was established in 1969 to manufacture black-and-white TV sets. At the e

16、nd of 2004, the company had $78.5 billion in net sales, $66 billion in assets, and 113,000 employees. According to Interbrand, the companys brand value increased from $5.2 billion (ranking 43rd in the world) in 2000, to $12.6 billion (ranking 21st in the world) in 2004. In 2004, Samsung stood ahead

17、of many brands such as Philips, Kodak and Panasonic. Sony ranked 20th by comparison. In 2005, Samsung consisted of five business divisions including the Semiconductor Business that is the focus of this case. Samsungs other divisions included the Digital Media Business, which produced TVs, AV equipme

18、nt, and the computers; the Telecommunications Business, which manufactured mobile phones and network equipment; the LCD Business, which made LCD panels for notebook computers, desktop monitors, and HDTV; and the Digital Appliances Business, which produced and sold refrigerators, air conditioners, an

19、d washing machines. The organization structure is shown in Exhibit 2. Development of the Memory BusinessKoreas semiconductor industry started wafer production in 1974, when a small start-up called Korea Semiconductor Company began manufacturing wafers in October that year. Without strong financing a

20、nd proprietary technology, the start-up quickly ran into financial difficulties, Kun Hee Lee, the third son of Samsung Groups founder Byung Chull Lee (who was also chairman at the time), decided to purchase Korea Semiconductor Company using his own personal savings. Kun Hee Lee saw other Korean comp

21、anies investing in steel and other heavy industries, but he felt that semiconductors investment offered higher growth rates, and the chance to move beyond basic industry into the design and marketing of advanced technologies. At that time, Samsung Electronics itself was a producer of low-end consume

22、r electronics. The company relied on labor-intensive assembly lines, importing semiconductors and other advanced products from abroad. Kun Hee Lee merged the two companies and sought to create a global powerhouse for semiconductors and consumer electronics. The first semiconductor developed by the y

23、oung company was the “watch chip”, used in wristwatches. The then-president of South Korea, Jung Hee Park, was so proud of the companys accomplishment that he had his name printed on many of the watches. President Park would personally give the watches as gifts to visiting foreign dignitaries.During

24、 the 1980s, Kun Hee Lee convinced his father that semiconductors represented the future of Samsung Group, and so the Group made Samsung Electronics its star affiliate and gave it most of the Groups resources. The Group wanted to get into DRAMs, the high-growth memory segment of the 1980s and 1990s.

25、So from 1983 to 1985, even as the global semiconductor market went into a recession and Intel exited the DRAM business, Samsung allocated more than $100 million to DRAM development. At the time, it cost $1.30 to produce a single 64k DRAM chip, whereas market prices were at that time below $1.00. Sti

26、ll, Samsung believed that market growth would vindicate its investment strategy, and so losing money for the first several years did not discourage the Group from making further investments. As the capital requirements for a single firm increased during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese compe

27、titors struggled to make the investment necessary to compete in emerging generations of chips. In the mid-1980s Samsung was building its first large manufacturing facility. Building semiconductors facilities was difficult and time consuming because the production-related machinery was highly sensiti

28、ve to dust and electronic shock. At the time, the normal construction period for a new fab lasted 18 months. As a result, construction crews worked shifts covering all 168 hours of the week in the midst of a harsh Korean winter. One memorable event during the construction process was the completion

29、of a four-kilometer-long road in just a single day. One day, when the main production equipment was shipped in from abroad, the Samsung installation team could not believe themselves. The same road that had been largely unpaved in the morning had been turned into a two-lane asphalt road by the after

30、noon. Manual laborers were not the only ones who were reputed to work long hours in voluntary pursuit of the companys mission. In the 1980s, nearly all of the engineers working on DRAM research and development said their weekly schedule consisted of Monday-Tuesday-Wednesday-Thursday-Friday-Friday-Fr

31、iday.The company became the prime source of value for the Samsung Group, and when the Group founder Byung Chull Lee retired, he handed control over to the current chairman, (his son) Kun Hee Lee. It was a reward for what Kun Hee Lee had already accomplished in making Samsung Electronics a viable com

32、petitor in the global memory industry. Since 1992, semiconductors had been South Koreas largest export, and as of 2004, Koreas semiconductor exports totalled $25.1 billion, fully 10.4% of the countrys export volume. Samsung alone was responsible for 22% of all Koreas exports in 2004, and the company

33、 represented 23% of total market value on Korea Stock Exchange.3國家概況和政策Japans Demographic CrisisAccording to the 2000 population census, Japans total population was 126.93 million. Based on expected birth, fertility, and mortality rates, this number would likely peak in 2006, at 127.74 million. Ther

34、eafter, it would begin a secular decline, dropping gradually at first but eventually reaching 100.6 million by 2050.Japans “baby boom generation” generally referred to persons born from 1947 to 1949. In 2004, this group comprised 6.8 million peoplelarger than all groups before or since. These boomer

35、s would begin retiring in 2007, when they reached the age of 60. But because of a sharp drop in Japans fertility rate, these workers would not be easily replaced. The fertility rate began dropping just after the baby boom, from 3.7 in 1950 to a surprisingly low 1.29 by 2004. Japanese women had been

36、marrying later and later and generally producing only one child in their early 30s. Since the replacement rate in Japan was 2.08, this effectively meant a decline in the population, in the absence of significant immigration.At the same time, improvements in health care and rapidly increasing incomes

37、 had pushed up life expectancy to a record high level78 years for males, 85 years for females. The confluence of these two trends, as Figure A indicates, produced a bubble of elderlysome 22 million by the year 2000. Moreover, this number would continue to grow rapidly through 2025, when it reached 3

38、4.7 million.One implication of these numbers was that Japans labor force was shrinkingand had been shrinking since 1999. On the one hand, this trend had helped hold down unemployment at a time when Japanese business was rationalizing. The decline in Japans working-age population, from 68% in 2000, w

39、ould reach 60% in 2020 and just 53% by 2050. And because of the structural adjustment Japanese firms had recently made, the number of permanent employees had dropped sharply (especially males), with more job openings in temporary employment and part-time employment. As this trend deepened, many Japa

40、nese worried about maintaining the sort of skilled workforce that Japan needed for advanced manufacturing and services.Thus, the portion of working-aged to elderly Japanese would drop by nearly half: from 3.6 to 1 in 2000 to 1.9 to 1 in 2025. This had startling implications for household savings (se

41、e Exhibit 8), for social security funding and, thus, for pension and medical-care benefits.Japans pension system Prior to 2004, when the Koizumi government accomplished significant reform, Japans pension system was heading toward bankruptcy. When originally created in the 1940s, the public pension s

42、ystem provided a single layer of remuneration-based, proportional pension. In the revision of 1954, the pension was restructured into a two-layer systemthe first tier a fixed payment, and the second tier a remuneration-based proportion. A third revision, in 1961, added a national pension scheme for

43、self-employed workers, as well as agriculture, forestry, and fisheries workers.The basic pension system was financed by a fixed amount of insurance premiums. The premium by the end of 2004 was 13,300 per month per person. Government financed one-third of the benefit payment from its general account

44、(to be raised gradually to half with the 2004 reform). The amount of monthly benefits paid to more than 31 million people was 66,200 (multiplied by the ratio of the number of participating months to the full 480 months). The Employees Pension Insurance System (EPI), for which 37 million private-sect

45、or employees were eligible, was financed by premiums (e.g., social security contributions) shared evenly by employer and employee. The current premium was 13.93% of income. Payments in this system rose with the consumer price index. In combination with the fixed National Pension payment, this system

46、 currently paid out about 59% of a workers salary prior to retirement if she earned average salary for her 40-year career.There were two types of supplemental corporate pension plans: an employees pension fund and a defined-benefits corporate pension. In the employees pension funds, employers collec

47、ted supplemental payments from employees and could make supplemental contributions, to be paid out as part of the old-age pension. Under defined-benefits corporate pension plans, contributions were clearly delineated for each employee and managed by the employer. For the self-employed, the National

48、Pension Fund Federation did the same. In October 2001, a defined-contribution pension scheme was introduced in Japan. In contrast to the defined-benefits pensions, this was a 401(k)-style pension whereby employees themselves decided how to invest the contributed funds and were responsible for the re

49、sults of their investments. The adoption of this plan was on an increasing trend, although the number of employees covered by defined-contribution plans was still small (2% of corporate employees as of April 2004).The problem, of course, was that more and more people were retiring, and the number wo

50、uld accelerate after 2007, while fewer and fewer people were working. As Japan ran a pay-as-you-go pension system, the system was not fully funded and needed periodic adjustments in payment and/or premiums to accommodate the changes in demographic and other circumstances. Payout for 2004 was about 4

51、6.4 trillion. Thus, with no reform, pension reserves (10.8 trillion for the NPI and 164 trillion for the EPI) would shortly be depleted.Health care Rapid aging and longevity posed even greater challenges to financing health care.Under a host of programs for private employees, public employees, teach

52、ers, farmers, and self-employed people, virtually all Japanese were insured.Current spending was about 9% of national income, but as Figure C shows, it would rise rapidly over the next 10 years. Medical fees were calculated on a point basis, with each point worth 10.Thus, for example, a hospital vis

53、it was worth 250 points, an appendectomy 6,420 points, and an injection 18 points. For most people under the age of 70, the government insurance covered 70% of medical care; they paid 30%. For the elderly, however, insurance covered 90%, except for high-income retirees, who paid 20% themselves. Mont

54、hly payments by individuals were capped so that they would not have to face catastrophic medical bills. Care for the elderly was particularly expensive, as they required more health treatments and related amenities. In FY 2003, for example, the health expenditure for the elderly was 11.6 trillion (o

55、f which 1.2 trillion came from co-payments). This meant that 10.4 trillion, or about $100 billion, came from the governments budget and contributions from various medical insurance programs. Elderly Japanese went to the hospital about four times a month. The average hospital stay was 31.8 days in 19

56、98. This compared with 12 days in Germany and 7.5 in the U.S. The elderly socialized at hospitals in Japan instead of nursing homes. It was a standard joke that one day, when one woman in a social group did not show up at the hospital, acquaintances asked where she was. The answer: “She must be sick

57、 today.”4企業(yè)政策報告Our ActionsGE 2005 Citizenship ReportGE has a heritage as a performance company. In simple terms, this means that we set challenging growth targets and deliver on what we say we will do. We measure our progress by tracking results against our goals. We recognize that our actions speak

58、 louder than our words.Naturally, we measure our Companys performance through financial results and stock price. But we also view how that performance is achieved in a broader context: the health, safety and opportunities for workers, the impact of our operations on the environment and communities,

59、our interaction with governments and regulatory agencies around the world, and our compliance with legal and accounting rules. Our goal is to grow responsibly while engaging stakeholders.We have applied GEs characteristic rigor in delivering our first Citizenship Report. This report provides a clear

60、 view of our actions: our goals, measures and progress, as well as an honest discussion of our challenges. You will find a myriad of metrics throughout the report, including our workplace injury and illness rates, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, total energy use, and diversity profile. We are contin