Theories of ethics

1、THEORIES OF ETHICSEdited byPHILIPPA FOOTOXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESSThis book has been printed digitally and produced in a standard specificationin order to ensure its continuing availabilityOXFORDUNIVERSITY PRESSGreat Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DPOxford University Press is a department of the Univers

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6、 binding or coverand you must impose this same condition on any acquirerISBN 0-19-875005-6CONTENTSINTRODUCTION1I. MOORES ARGUMENTS AGAINST CERTAIN FORMS OF NATURALISMby C. L. Stevenson16II. A REPLY TO MY CRITICSby G. E. Moore33III. THE NATURALISTIC FALLACYby W. K. Frankena50IV. GOOD AND EVILby P. T.

7、 Geach64V. GEACH: GOOD AND EVILby R. M. Hare74VI. MORAL BELIEFSby Philippa Foot83VII. How TO DERIVE OUGHT FROM IS by John R. Searle101VIII. THE PROMISING GAME by R. M. Hare115IX. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF J. S. MILLby J. 0. Urmson128X. INTERPRETATIONS OF MILLS UTILITARIANISMby J.

8、 D. Mabbott137XI. Two CONCEPTS OF RULES by John Rawls144XII. EXTREME AND RESTRICTED UTILITARIANISMby J. J. C. Smart171NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS184BIBLIOGRAPHY185INDEX OF NAMES188Most of these articles are reprinted without revision, or with only small alterations. They are not, of course, to be take

9、n as necessarily reflecting their authors present opinions.INTRODUCTIONTHE ARTICLES reprinted here centre round two topics lately much debated : firstly the nature of moral judgement, and secondly the part played by social utility in determining right and wrong. Both these debates go back to the eig

10、hteenth century, for at that time philosophers divided for and against the moral sense and intellectualist theories of moral judgement, and at the end of the century Bentham laid down that the principle of utility was the foundation of moral good.The later articles in the volume (numbers IXXII) are

11、quite simply about utilitarianism, so their relation to the past is clear. Numbers IVIII are less obviously related to the subject of eighteenth-century battles ; but nevertheless the connexion is close. Like ourselves Hume and his contemporaries were concerned with the possible, or impossible, obje

12、ctivity of moral judgements. In what, they asked, did the virtuousness of virtuous actions consist? How was it apprehended? Was it rather judged of or felt? Did we know what we ought to do by the intellect or by a moral sense? Was there, indeed, anything there to be known, or did moral discourse rat

13、her express our feelings than speak of our discoveries about virtue and vice? Hume himself decided that the search for objective moral properties was vain, and argued that in calling an action virtuous we say nothing but that we feel a pleasing sentiment of approbation in contemplating it, a theory

14、that seemed to explain how moral judgements were linked to action. For we shall naturally be concerned to do, and to promote, what affects us in this pleasing way, whereas if the morality of actions were said to lie in something of which our reason tells us it would have to be shown why this discove

15、ry should have a necessary influence on the will.One might say that the problems that trouble us at the present time are precisely Humes problems. More directly, however, it has been Professor G. E. Moore who has set the stage for us, and the name of Hume does not even appear in the index of Moores

16、Principia Et/flea. It is as if we have started with Moore and then worked back from him to Hume. Let us first then say something about the immensely2THEORIES OF ETHICSinfluential arguments advanced by Moore in 1903.1 Moores central thesis was that goodness is a simple non-natural property discovered

17、 by intuition. The rest of his ethics was built on this foundation, since Moore believed that other moral judgements, for instance those about right action, were related to the basic intuitions of goodness, right action being action that produced the greatest possible amount of good. This last belie

18、f made Moore into a kind of utilitarian, but it is not this part of his theory that has interested people most. What seemed particularly important, at least in succeeding generations, was his idea about the judgement that got the whole thing going. Moore insisted that these judgements were objective

19、, and he explained that they were made by intuition. He is therefore called an intuitionist, sharing this label with philosophers such as Prichard and Ross who agreed that moral intuition was the basis of moral judgement, even if they disagreed about where the intuitions came in. An intuitionist is

20、one who believes that in the end we must see that certain things are good, or right, or obligatory. Up to a certain point, they say, one may argue a question of morals, showing that individual cases fall under particular principles by the nature of the facts; but in the end one is driven back to a p

21、oint at which one can say nothing but I see it to be so.The difficulties in this position are by now clear enough, and he would be a brave man who would assert, like Ross in the middle thirties, that every ethical system admits intuition at some point. For moral intuition, unlike the ordinary kind o

22、f intuition that tells one what someone else is thinking or feeling, is supposed to be the apprehension of a quality whose presence cannot be discovered in any other way. Now of course if one knows intuitively that, for instance, someone who is showing no obvious signs of it is angry, then one says

23、I just know. But one learns what it is to be angry from the other cases, and in principle one can put a check on ones intuitions by taking evidence that would settle the matter. Thus one discovers whether, or in which cases, one can trust ones intuitions, and some peoples intuitions are demonstrably

24、 better than others because more closely correlated with the independently established facts. This independent check is just what is lacking for the supposed moral intuitions, and attempts to assimilate the two by talking, for instance, about intuitions that stand the test of time or those of more h

25、ighlyG. E. Moore, Principia Ethica. (See Bibliography ior all publications whose details are not given in the footnotes to this Introduction.)INTRODUCTION3developed peoples are simply a cheat. For what tells us that the correct moral intuitions may not be those that we think of first but later aband

26、on (first thoughts are best)? What tells us that primitive peoples do not have a faculty of correct moral intuition that civilization tends to destroy?It seems, then, that the intuitionists talk about apprehension and seeing is unjustified given his own premises; so also his claim that the man who j

27、udges on the basis of his moral intuition is putting forward an opinion about an objective matter. For without any method that could, even in principle, decide between conflicting intuitions we seem to have the mere trappings of correction. I say I am right and you are wrong and I was wrong when I s

28、aid . . ., but these sentences merely express a reaction. And if they merely express a reaction we are not far from the subjectivist theories that Moore and the other intuitionists rejected.Why then, given the difficulties, did Moore support a theory of moral intuition against those who, like Hume,

29、saw moral judgements as an expression of the speakers feelings or attitudes? Moores arguments against these theories are the subject that he and Professor C. L. Stevenson are debating in the first and second essays in this volume.Moore had argued that a man who says that a certain action is right or

30、 wrong cannot simply mean that he has a feeling of approval, or any other feeling or attitude, towards it. For, he says, that would imply that when one speaker says X is right and another X is wrong X would be both right and wrong; and when a man says at one time X is right and at another X is wrong

31、 that same individual action X would be at one time right and at another wrong. Stevenson counters by suggesting that X is right means I now approve of X, arguing that if consistently applied this would have neither of the consequences suggested by Moore. Thus we cannot say, with Moore, that If X is

32、 right said by A is true, then X is right and if X is wrong said by B is true X is wrong for the conclusions, when translated, becomes I approve (disapprove) of X and I may be a different person from A or B. Moore has, however, a third argument which Stevenson is prepared to allow some plausibility.

33、 He says that a subjective attitude theory fails to provide for the disagreement that clearly exists between two speakers who say X is right and X is wrong respectively. For if each is speaking only of his own feelings how will they contradict each other? Perhaps one has the feeling and one does not

34、. StevensonsEthics, ch. iii.4THEORIES OF ETHICSreply is that there is indeed no logical incompatibility between the two statements: that the speakers do not necessarily hold contradictory beliefs. Nevertheless there is disagreement between them, since their attitudes are opposed. It is the expressio

35、n of opposed attitudes that gives the opposition between As X is right and Bs Xis wrong, and it is in this way only that they need disagree.Stevenson is here drawing on the theory of the emotive meaning of ethical terms, which goes back to the discussions of the Vienna Circle in 1918-19, and was sta

36、ted clearly by Ogden and Richards in 1923 when they wrote, in The Meaning of Meaning, that in moral language . . the word good serves only as an emotive sign expressing our attitude . . . and perhaps evoking similar attitudes in other persons or inciting them to actions of one kind or another. The t

37、heory had also been advanced by Professor A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic, but had nowhere been expounded in such detail as in Stevensons articles in Mind for 1937 and 1938, and he was further to develop it in Ethics and Language published in 1945. There he says that a words emotive meaning

38、is what makes it suitable for such dynamic purposes as expressing our own attitudes and changing those of other people, rather than the descriptive purpose of communicating beliefs. The emotive meaning of a word is its tendency to produce affective responses in the hearer, and to be used as a result

39、 of affective states in the speaker.Confronted by the suggestion that ethical disagreement might be merely disagreement in attitude, Moore, who characteristically said that this possibility had simply not occurred to him, agreed that his arguments had been inconclusive. The cause of ethical objectiv

40、ism now seemed in a bad way. As put forward by Moore it had involved the dubious notion of ethical intuition, and the arguments in its favour had collapsed. Meanwhile it was Moore himself who had attacked the other foi in of objectivism that might have held the field. For he had insisted that no def

41、inition of goodness could exist to link the property with provable matters of fact. Thus it was impossible to say, for instance, that good just meant productive of happiness, when it might have been provable that certain things were good. Moore said that such theories committed the naturalistic fall

42、acy, and this time he found the emotivists on his side.That Moores arguments against naturalism are inconclusive is the thesis of the third article in this volume, which is largely taken up with the discussion of what those arguments were. Moore thinks that no one has the right to put forward propos

43、itions such as pleasure1p. 125.INTRODUCTION5and pleasure alone is good on the basis of a definition: such statements must always be synthetic and never analytic. But what exactly is the fallacy supposed to be? Professor Frankena considers three possible suggestions: (i) that the mistake is that of d

44、efining a non-natural property like goodness in terms of a natural one, (ii) that it is the mistake of defining one property in terms of another, and (iii) that it is an attempt to define the indefinable. Frankena argues that whichever version we take Moore has failed to show that any mistake is inv

45、olved and has in fact simply begged the question. To establish (i) he would have to show that goodness is a non-natural property, which he simply states. For (ii) he would have to show, for each example, that goodness was some other thing from the property with which it was being equated, and this h

46、e does not do. To establish (iii) he would have to prove that goodness is a simple and therefore indefinable property, which is something he asserts without proof.Frankena says, and is surely right in saying, that Moore believed the naturalistic fallacy to be committed by any definition of good; but

47、 it is not this that later writers have in mind when they think of Moore as the great opponent of naturalistic ethics. They themselves are interested in ruling out a certain type of definition, and go back to what Moore said about the impossibility of identifying natural with non-natural properties.

48、 Unfortunately, however, Moore had never succeeded in explaining what he meant by a natural property; the nearest he came to it was in saying that the goodness of a thing did not belong to its description as its natural properties did. So it did not seem clear what kind of definition was to be exclu

49、ded. Stevenson, however, claimed that his theory of emotive meaning showed the truth for which Moore had been groping. The point was not that goodness was a special kind of property, for it was no property at all; rather there was a special kind of meaning belonging to ethical terms, and the defecti

50、ve definitions were those that omitted this emotive element in the meaning of good. Thus Moores non-naturalism could be defended while his intuitionism was undermined. We may notice that the emotivists and intuitionists are alike in one important way: both deny that moral propositions are open to or

51、dinary kinds of proof. The intuitionist says that in the end one must say I just see that it is so, while the emotivist admits that he will be driven back to the expression of his fundamental attitudes. For both the argument will come to an end once all the facts have been exposed.For a number of ye

52、ars it was emotivism, and theories related to6THEORIES OF ETHICSemotivism, that held the centre of the stage. Of related theories the most influential was that developed by Professor Hare, which came to be known under the label of prescriptivism. Hare replaced Stevensons emotive meaning with his own

53、 evaluative meaning, explaining that words like good and ought were used evaluatively (to make value judgements) when they were used with commendatory force. As so used they entailed imperatives, for Hare says that he makes it a matter of definition that if someone is using the judgement I ought to

54、do X as a value judgement he must recognize that . if he assents to the judgement he must also assent to the command Let me do X Thus a man who uses the word good evaluatively must accept a first person imperative, and behind each particular imperative will lie a general quasi-imperative addressed,

55、as it were, to all persons at all times. Hare is not denying that words such as good and ought can be used non-evaluatively, but the definition is supposed to have some rough correspondence with what we would mean by a value judgement in everyday life. With evaluative meaning Hare contrasts descript

56、ive meaning, but like Stevenson gives no account of this side of the dichotomy. To be descriptive a word must be non-evaluative, so that he says there must be definite criteria for its application which do not involve the making of a value judgement. A word may have both descriptive and evaluative m

57、eaning, but is called a descriptive word only if there is no evaluative element.Thus equipped Hare proceeds to launch a full scale attack on ethical naturalism, defining a naturalist as one who tries to equate value words with those whose meaning is purely descriptive and who therefore believes he c

58、ould deduce an ethical conclusion from descriptive premises. The price of naturalism, says Hare, is the loss of the commendatory or action-guiding force of the ethical terms, and one of the great advantages that he claims for his own theory is that it shows how moral judgement is necessarily connected with choice. Indeed both Stevenson and Hare seemed to have provided for the necessary connexion between morality and the will on which Hume had insisted. In Stevenson the connexion between moral judgement and action was built into