畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯1.doc

The Effect of a Generalized Appreciation of East Asian Currencies on Exports from China(節(jié)選)Gordon RSmith George Mason University, 2002Master of Business Administration Over the past several years, China has seen a significant rise in its trade and current account surpluses. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that by the end of 2007,Chinas current account surplus represented 11.1 percent of the countrys gross domestic product (GDP). At $361 billion, it was the largest surplus of any country in the world, more than $100 billion greater than the country with the second largest surplus, Japan. With such a large overall surplus, it would seem that China would have a trade surplus with just about every other country in the world. Interestingly, this is not the case. There appears to be a fairly clear delineation, as it regards Chinas trade accounts between those countries in East Asia and the rest of the world Of Chinas seven largest trading partners in 2007 (countries/regions that represented more than $100 billion in total trade value each), five were in East Asia.They were Japan, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. Excluding Hong Kong, the four remaining countries/regions, as agroup, recorded a trade surplus with China of more than $180 billion. That is, in terms of its trade accounts, China ran a substantial trade deficit with its major trading partners in East Asia. On the other side of the equation, China had a substantial trade surplus with its two largest trade partners, the European Union (EU) and the United States (U. S.). With a total value in trade of more than $600 billion (imports plus exports), the EU and U.S. Had a combined deficit with China of more than $270 billion. What this implies is that the trade deficits which China carries with its trading partners in East Asia are more than compensated by the trade surpluses that China carries with the rest of the world. It is the size of these trade surpluses that has become the focus of attention of a number of countries, especially the United States. China has received a great deal of scrutiny in the U.S. because of the size of its bilateral trade surplus. Several politicians and some economists have called for anappreciation of the RMB as a possible means of affecting Chinas trade surplus with the United States. This has come largely on the belief that China has intervened in the foreign exchange market in order to keep its currency artificially low with respect to the U.S.dollar. An appreciation of the RMB is seen as a way to increase the cost of, and thus reduce, Chinas exports. However, an appreciation of the RMB alone may not deliver the desired impact on all exports originating out of China. This is due to the intricate production and trade networks which exist in East Asia. Referred to as vertical intra-industry trade, manufacturing firms in East Asia have taken advantage of differences in a countrys factor endowments (e.g. access to raw materials, low input costs, labor supply) to exploit efficiencies in cost and production. By utilizing foreign direct investment, firms located primarily in developed East Asia (e.g. Japan) have established production platforms throughout the rest of the region. In many cases, extensive trade relationships have been established between emerging Asia (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan), providing intermediate parts and components, and developing Asia (e.g. China), providing assembly and export operations. Therefore, the total value of final goods for export from East Asia is often a combination of value added from several different countries in the region. Though China maintains a sizeable percentage of trade in goods producedprimarily from its own domestic inputs, the majority of its exports have been produced primarily from inputs originating from other countries in East Asia. This accounts for the large trade deficits China has with countries like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. A significant percentage of these goods are exported to the EU and the U.S., which helps to explain the large trade surpluses China maintains with these countries/regions. Therefore, given the value added to Chinas exports from other countries in East Asia, an appreciation of the alone may not have the same impact as a generalized appreciation of currencies. This generalized appreciation would include not only the RMB ,but also the currencies of those countries which are Chinas primary suppliers of parts and components. This would go a lot further in affecting those goods produced primarily from Chinese inputs, as well as those goods produced primarily from inputs originating from other countries in East Asia. The U.S. Trade Deficit and China These issues highlight just some of the potential outcomes which could resultfrom a consistent and growing U.S. trade and current account deficit. However, thepotential problems dont end here. Another issue for the U. S. is the primary driver behind its trade deficit; the deficit in the trade of goods Splicing the trade deficit into goods and services, had it not been for a favorable run of trade surpluses in the services sector, the trade deficit would have easily eclipsed 6 percent of GDP by the end of 2005. On a year-to-year basis, trade in goods as a group has represented more than 100 percent of the total trade deficit from as early as 1976, the first year of the current string of consecutive trade deficits. Even when deflating the dollar value of the trade in goods and taking it as a percentage of real GDP, the percentages are roughly the same as those obtained using nominal data When disaggregated into its component parts, and accounting for energy products within the industrial sector, a large part of the trade deficit is in consumer goods . These goods, which have little income producing value, represent more than 35 percent of the trade deficit. Capital and industrial supplies (excluding energy products), which are primarily used as investment for building and supporting income producing assets, account for less than 5 percent of the total trade deficit. The U. S. is apparently going into debt with the rest of the world in order to increase its levels of personal consumption. While the U. S. deserves much of the focus for its large trade deficit, most of the attention over the past several years has fallen on China. Of the nations that the U. S. Is most indebted to in terms of trade, China is the largest. In 2006, the U.S. trade deficit in goods and services with China was $229.4 billion, or approximately 30 percent of the total U. S. trade deficit with the rest of the world. This is more than ten percentage points higher than the percentage of the deficit represented by all the countries in Europe, more than 50 percent of the entire trade deficit with those countries in the Asia and Pacific region, and three times as large as any other single nation with which the U. S. engages in trade . China has also gained a significant amount of attention with regards to the size and composition of its foreign exchange reserves. By the end of 2006, the Peoples Bank of China (PBoC) held more than $1 trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves.This growth has come largely on the heels of Chinas rapidly expanding export economy. Since 2003, Chinas economy has grown in real terms by more than 10 percent per year, facilitated by large inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). When combined with its trade surplus, China has faced significant inflationary pressure due to the potential increase in the supply of money in the economy. In spite of this phenomenon, Chinas inflation rate through 2006 remained relatively benign, rising above 2 percent only once since 2000. The conversion of dollars into Yuan into RMB一denominated bonds has provided a substantial barrier to the growth of RMB over the past several years. As for the composition of Chinas foreign exchange reserves, no official breakdown is available, however several estimates have been offered. In terms of dollar reserves, the general range of approximations has been between 60 and 75 percent.Setser (2007) estimates that Chinas dollar reserves peaked at around 80 percent in 2003 but have fallen to around 70 percent since that time. Though 70 percent in reserve holdings represents a substantial percentage in a single currency, it doesnt capture the significant increase in dollar holdings that havetaken place in China since 2000. As an example, in terms of fixed income dollardominated assets, China has been an aggressive buyer of U. S. Treasury securities over the past several years. using data from the US treasury departmenti, China purchased an average of $48.2 billion of treasury securities per year from 2000 to 2007. In addition, over the same time period, Chinas average yearly increase in Treasury securities purchased was 30.3 percent. In the process, the relative size of Chinas position in terms of official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities rose from 6.4 percent in 2000 to 18.6 percent in 2007. While most of East Asia has been a significant buyer of dollar-denominated fixed income securities, due in part to the speculative runs that took place in the currency markets at the turn of the century, Chinas rapid growth in this area stands out by comparison. In June 2000, Japan dwarfed the other major East Asian holders of U.S. Treasury securities, including China, by more than 370 percent. By June 2007, while Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand had all doubled their holdings, Chinas total holdings had grown by 5 times their original amount. Within that time, the relative gap in U.S. Treasury security holdings between Japan and China had narrowed to a little more man 50 percent. The growth and size of Chinas dollar reserves have had a direct impact on the foreign exchange rate between China and the United States. From 2000 to 2004, the exchange rate between the Chinese Yuan and U. S. dollar remained essentially unchanged at approximately 8.28 Yuan to 1 U.S. Dollar. Only since 2005, when the Chinese government made a decision to move their foreign exchange rate policy to a basket of currencies and allow the RMB some movement against the dollar did the Yuan actually begin to appreciate, reaching 7.97 Yuan to the dollar by the end of 2006. This represented a small adjustment compared to a number of estimates for the RMBs real bilateral undervaluation with the dollar of 15 to 40 percent.The Issue of Exchange Rates All these factors in combination; large trade surpluses with the U.S., a significant percentage of reserves in U. S. dollars, a rapidly growing economy, and a relatively stableand undervalued RMB, have raised important questions regarding the means by which China has achieved its unprecedented growth. There is some belief that China has engaged in unfair trading practices by keeping its exchange rate artificially low. During a trip to China in late 2006, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke referred to the exchange rate value of the RMB as an effective subsidy for Chinese-based firms focused primarily on export trade, this has been the contention by several representatives in congress ,precipitating legislation aimed at offsetting the perceived advantage of the current exchange rate by applying duties and tariffs on Chinese imports. In addition, increasing pressure on the White House to address the trade deficit and exchange rate issues with China have resulted in both action taken against China through the World Trade Organization and the imposition of countervailing duties on coated paper imported from China. In spite of all this legislative wrangling, economists have thus far been split on the appropriate response that the U. S. should take in regards to this situation. A number of economists have investigated the effect that an appreciation of the RMB would have on Chinas trade surplus. Up to this point, the results have been inconclusive. A major part of the reason involves the unique trading and manufacturing relationships that China and the rest of East Asia have with one another. The triangular trading pattern, in which intermediate goods are exported to China from other East Asian countries, manufactured into final goods, and then exported to the rest of the world, has become an established model for business operations in East Asia. Given the extensiveness and fluidity of the trading relationships in East Asia, an appreciation of the RMB alone may do little to affect Chinas trade surplus. Ageneralized, integrated appreciation of the RMB and the currencies of Chinas supply chain providers, which are predominantly countries in East Asia, could potentially have a more beneficial and significant impact on the exports originating out of China. Ageneralized appreciation would affect the prices of all goods in East Asia, bothintermediate and final goods. This would correspondingly impact the prices of Chinasexports, both those goods produced primarily with Chinese inputs and those goodsproduced primarily with inputs from Chinas East Asian trading partners. 東亞國家貨幣普遍升值對中國出口的影響（節(jié)選）Gordon RSmith喬治梅森大學,2002工商管理碩士 在過去的幾年中，中國的對外貿易和貨幣經常賬戶盈余獲得了顯著的提升。國際貨幣基金組織預測到2007年底，中國的經常賬戶盈余將占到中國國內生產總值的11.1%。中國擁有世界上最大的順差3610億美元，比順差位列世界第二的日本還要多1000億美元。擁有這樣一個大的整體盈余，這似乎表示，中國與世界上的幾乎每一個其它國家都保持著貿易順差。有趣的是，事實上卻并非如此，似乎存在著一個相當明確的界定，認為中國的貿易收入在東亞和世界其它國家之間。2007年，中國的七大貿易伙伴（總貿易額超過1000億美元的國家或地區(qū)）中，有五個國家是來自東亞，它們分別是日本、東南亞國家聯(lián)盟、香港、韓國和臺灣。除了香港以外，其余四個國家或地區(qū)作為一個整體，它們與中國的貿易順差超過了1800億美元。也就是說，在貿易收入方面，中國與東亞的主要貿易伙伴保持著一個巨大的貿易赤字。在等式的另一個方面，中國與它最大的兩個貿易伙伴：歐盟和美國保持著巨大的貿易順差。在總價值超過600億美元（進口和出口）的貿易中，歐盟和美國加起來與中國有著超過2700億美元的貿易赤字。上述事實意味著,中國與東亞貿易伙伴的貿易赤字被中國與世界上其它國家更多的貿易順差所補償了,正是這些貿易順差的規(guī)模成為了一些國家關注的焦點,例如美國。中國因為雙邊貿易順差的大小受到了美國很大的爭議，一些政治學家和經濟學家呼吁人民幣升值企圖以此作為影響中國對美國貿易順差的一種可能手段，這種說法在很大程度上來自于信仰中國在外匯市場上進行干預以維持人民幣對美元的人為低價，人民幣升值被視為增加成本最終減少中國出口的一種方法。然而，僅僅單靠人民幣升值恐怕不能把所需要的影響傳遞給所有來自中國的原產出口商品，這是由于存在于東亞的錯綜復雜的貿易和生產網絡。簡稱為垂直產業(yè)內貿易，東亞的制造公司利用國家的要素稟賦（例如獲得原材料、低投入成本、勞動力供給的權利）在成本和生產上的差異來提高效率。通過利用國際直接投資，首先選址于發(fā)達東亞地區(qū)（例如日本）的公司已經建立了遍布其它地區(qū)的生產平臺。在很多情況下，提供中間零部件的亞州新興國家（例如韓國和臺灣）和提供裝配和出口業(yè)務的亞州發(fā)展中國家（例如中國）之間建立了廣泛的貿易關系。因此，來自東亞的最終產品的出口總值往往是來自于該地區(qū)幾個不同國家增加值的結合。盡管中國在主要是由本國投入生產出來的產品貿易上占有很大的比例，其出口的大部分已經靠來自東亞其它國家的投入來生產。這就是為什么中國和臺灣、韓國、日本等國家保持著巨大的貿易赤字。而這些商品的絕大部分又被出口到了歐盟和美國，這就可以解釋為什么中國和歐盟、美國保持著巨大的貿易順差。因此，考慮到東亞其它國家賦予中國出口的增加值，僅僅靠人民幣升值所帶來的影響恐怕不能和廣義上的貨幣升值所帶來的影響一樣。這個廣義上的升值將不僅僅包括人民幣，而且也包括作為中國零部件主要提供商的國家的貨幣。這對于主要由中國投入生產出來的產品和由東亞其它國家投入生產出來的產品的影響將更為深遠。這篇文章只是突出了一個持續(xù)增長的美國貿易和經常賬戶赤字可能導致的潛在后果。然而，潛在的問題并沒有在這里結束，美國的另一個問題是其貿易赤字背后的主要驅動力：貨物貿易赤字。結合貨物和服務的貿易赤字，如果不是服務貿易順差的良好運行作為一個支持因素，2005年底貿易赤字將很容易超過國內生產總值的百分之六。連續(xù)幾年，貨物貿易作為一個整體，已經占據了所有貿易赤字超過百分之百，而早在1976年，連續(xù)的貿易差額就已經出現(xiàn)了。即使扣除貨物貿易的美元價值，并把它作為實際國內生產總值的一部分，這個百分比也幾乎與使用標準數據所得到的大致相同。當分解它的組成部分，并考慮工業(yè)部門內的產品貿易時，貿易赤字的很大一部分來源于消費品。這些貨物，生產的價值帶來的收入很少，卻占據了超過貿易赤字的百分之三十五。資本和工業(yè)用品（不包括能源產品），主要用于投資建設和支持產生收入的資產，占據所有貿易赤字不到百分之五。顯然，美國為了增加其個人消費水平，將與世界其它國家陷入債務。然而當美國要求充分關注其貿易赤字時，在過去幾年中關注的焦點已經轉移到了中國。在貿易上使美國陷入負債的國家里，中國排第一位。在2006年，美國與中國在貨物和服務貿易上的赤字達到了2294億美元，或