跨國企業(yè)和國際財務管理[文獻翻譯].doc

原文：International Financial Management and Multinational EnterprisesIntroductionThis chapter provides a selective, critical survey of the academic literature on the financial management policy of multinational enterprises ( MNEs ).The focus of much current research interest can be captured in two major themes which also dominate this analysis. The first is financial management policy in relationship to the increasing volatility of real and financial asset prices in the international financial environment within which MNEs operate. This dictates one theme of this chapter: the impact of financial risk, in particular market risk, on MNEs and an appraisal of evolving financial risk management practices.The second theme is international market segmentation (Choi and Rajan1997).The globalization of international business activity has evolved along with increasing financial market integration, particularly in capital markets. To a limited extent this has been accompanied by increased harmonization and standardization of both international regulatory and accounting practices (Roberts et al.1998).Despite such trends, the asymmetric incidence of accounting standards regulations, and taxation has had significant tactical and strategic financial management implications for MNEs (Choi and Levich1990, 1997; Gray et al.1995;Meek et al.1995;Oxelheim et al.1998).We evaluate the nature, incidence, and implications of such market segmentation for selected aspects of MNE financial management activity.It is clear from the context of our analysis that we believe financial factors to have important implications for the comparative advantage of MNEs located in different jurisdictions, and also that financial management plays a critical role in deciding an MNEs competitive prosperity. This belief is supported by surveys of MNEs (Rawls and Smithson 1990;Marshall 2000).Marshall(2000) reports the results of a survey of the 200 largest MNEs which reveal that 87 per cent of Asian Pacific-based MNEs state that foreign exchange risk management is at least as important as business risk management. Nonetheless, to date no generally accepted theoretical underpinning has yet been provided demonstrating that financial factors alone are both necessary and sufficient to rationalize the existence of MNEs,. We further discuss this issue in the context of modes of market entry and participation in a later section.The remainder of the chapter is easily summarized. Section 2 discusses the enhanced importance of recent increases in asset price volatility, relating it to country risk and international investment appraisal. The classification and measurement of risk exposure is considered in section 3. Particular attention is given to recently developed techniques such as value-at-risk and cash-flow-at-risk. Section 4 is concerned with the management of financial risk by MNEs. In particular, a distinction is made between management policies designed primarily to hedge risk, and those intending to exploit its potential to create competitive advantage. This section also evaluates empirical studies of MNE risk management. Section 5 addresses issues relating to the effective implementation of a risk management system within the governance structure of an MNE. Brife concluding remarks follow together with some suggestions for future research.THE NATURE OF FINANCIAL RISKOur emphasis on financial risk and the evolution of MNE risk management practices has been motivated by a number of factors, the most important being the trend toward increasing global financial market integration ( Lessard 1997) and the enhanced volatility in the financial environment within which MNEs operate. We later evaluate studies which argue that these factors can confer certain advantages to internationalization of a firms activities. In preparation for this analysis we chronicle certain major recent developments in the global financial environment, which indicate the increasing importance of market risk in global financial markets.Exchange rate variabilityFollowing the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, exchange rate fluctuations have become increasingly volatile, punctuated by occasional episodes of exchange rate crises. Between 1970 andmid-2000, the Yen/US dollar exchange rate has moved from 361 to 107 and the Deutschmark/US dollar rate has fallen from 4.2 to 1.9. However, the dollar has appreciated by about two-thirds against sterling over the same period. The crisis in the European Monetary System (ERM) in September 1992 led to significant falls in the value of sterling and the Italian Lira, while the currencies of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea lost between one-third and three-quarters of their value in the second half of 1997. There have also been major movements in exchange rates following shifits in the monetary policy stance of certain governments, such as the tighter monetary policy followed in the early days of the Thatcher administration in the UK. Indeed, the average volatility of exchange rates, which is in the region of 10-15 per ent per year, is sufficient to eliminate the average profit margin for the typical multinational corporation.Interest rate variabilityInterest rate volatility has similarly affected corporate funding costs, cash flows, and net asset values since the early 1970s in the US, and although they subsequently declined, a change in policy by the Federal Reserve caused a sharp increase in both the level and volatility of rates in 1979.Interest rates peaked in 1981, and then fell slowly. Since 1983, there have been four more US interest rate cycles. According to Jorion (1996 ), the increase in 1994 eliminated over $1.5trillion dollar from fixed income portfolios. Interest rates have also become more and more volatile since many central banks began to abandon targeting interest rates as a policy objective in favour of targeting money supply growth or inflation. In the UK, interest rates shot up in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to inflationary pressures caused by a relaxation in monetary policy, but then fell substantially with sterlings withdrawal from the ERM in September 1992.Equity market variabilityEquity markets have also become extremely volatile. During the inflationary periods of the early 1970s, prices increased significantly only to fall sharply during the bear market of 1974-5 following a 300 per cent hike in the price of oil. A global recovery then ensued, with minor price reversals in 1982-3, and the market peaked in 1987. On Black Monday, 19 October 1987, prices plunged. US equities lost 23 per cent of their value, equivalent to over US $1 trillion in equity capital. This was followed by another recovery over the next ten years, sustained worldwide with the exception of Japan, where the Nikkei index fell from 39000 in 1989 to 17000 in 1992, a capital loss of US $2.7 trillion. Finally from mid-to end 1997, the stock markets of Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila lost US $370 billion, or 63 per cent of the four countryes combined GDP, while the Seoul stock market declined 60 per cent.Commodity price variability and other sources of increased riskCommodity prices, particularly those in primary product markets, have also been subject to large fluctuations since the 1970s,a trend established subsequent to the oil price rises of 1973-4. This variability also had spollover effects in other financial markets, particularly equity markets, thereby corroborating the view that it is fundamentally incorrect to treat financial markets in isolation from one anthor. Significant regulatory and legal changes, the globalization of the financial services industry, and legal changes, the globalization of the financial services industry, and the emergence of offshore financial activity have also increased financial risks. Finally, risk associated with the enhanced global risk has resulted from increased levels of world trade, major changes in trade policy, the economic and political transition of the former Soviet bloc, the growth of the EU, and the emergence of the Asian tiger economies as economic power.Country riskThis increasing financial market volatility has potentially important consequences for both the issue of international investment appraisal, and also the appropriate measure of country risk. Before we consider methodological issues relating to the measurement of country risk, there are some commentators who argue that country risk is diversifiable(unsystematic) and that there should be no corrections. Recent asset pricing behaviour in international financial markets provides substantial evidence of cross-market correlation(systematic risk) suggesting country risk is non-diversifiable even in a global portfolio, and hence should be incorporated. On the measurement aspects, Damodoran (2000) has argued that the risk premium in any equity market can be conceptualized as:Equity Market Risk Premium in Country A = Base Premium for Mature Equity Market (US) +Country Premium for Country A.In calculating the base premium for the US market, an approach based upon historical premium remains standard. Here, actual equity returns are estimated over a sufficiently long time frame and compared to the actual returns earned on default-free (usually government) securities. The annualized difference is then calculated and represents the historical premium. This method yields substantial differences in the premiums we observe being used in practice: even for the case of the USA estimates range from 4 per cent to 12 percent. This is all the more surprising given that most calculations use identical data, the Ibbotson Associates database of historical returns.We conjecture several reasons exist for this divergence. First: differences in time periods used. Proponents of the use of shorter time periods argue that such estimates are more relevant, as the average risk aversion of investors changes over time. This consideration is likely overwhelmed by the fact that to obtain reasonable standard errors one requires very long time periods (at least twenty-five years). Indeed, the standard errors from ten-year estimates often exceed the risk premium estimates, making the estimates redundant. Second, the risk-free rate chosen in calculating expected returns, in other words the method must match up the duration of the cash flows being discounted (Damodoran 2000). If the yield curve is upward sloping, the risk premium will be larger when estimated relative to short-term government securities. Consistency is required and given the previous comments, the use of equity premium calculated relative to long-dated government bonds seems appropriate for most cases. Third, a debate exists over how to compute the average returns on stocks and bonds, in particular whether to use arithmetic or geometric averages. While conventional wisdom argues for use of arithmetic averages, strong arguments can be made in favor of the geometric alternative. Specifically, empirical studies indicate equity returns are negatively correlated over time, implying the use of arithmetic averages (which assume zero correlation) will exaggerate the premium. Moreover, while assets pricing models are typically single period models, their use to generate expected returns over long periods (say ten year) suggests the single period is much longer than the data period used in their estimation (typically one year). In such a case the argument for geometric premiums is enhanced.A further issue questions whether one should incorporate a country premium, and if so how it is to be estimated. The first question has already been answered in the affirmative. The second issue requires an ability to: ()measure country risk, () convert the estimate into a risk premium, and then () evaluate individual MNEs exposure. On measurement, country sovereign bond ratings provided by rating agencies incorporate current market risk perceptions, and have the advantage of being measured as spreads relative to US treasuries. However, they only measure default risk, not equity risk. A crude method of converting them to the latter involves adjusting the default spread of the country converting for the volatility of its equity market in relation to its bond market (（equity）/(bond). The countrys equity premium is set equal to the country default spread multiplied by (（equity）/(bond). This equity premium will increase if either the countrys rating drops or its equity market volatility increases. Finally, on evaluating MNEs individual exposure, one has to identify the MNEs exposure to country risk in relation to all other marker risks it faces. This requires detailed analysis of the process used to estimate beta. Not only is this beyond the scope of this paper, but it also represents an ongoing research activity over which a concensus has yet to emerge.Finally, we contend that further research attention should be given to alternative methods of estimating country risk premium that do not require corrections for country risk in the manner indicated above. Damodoran(2000) suggests use of implied equity premiums derived from the following equity market valuation model, which essentially measures the present value of dividends growing at a constant rate:Value of Corporation = Expected Dividends next period/(required rate of return of equity expected growth rate in dividends).The only unobservable input in this model is the required rate of return on equity. This relation can therefore be solved to generate an implied expected return on equity, which in turn will generate an equity risk premium once a correction is incorporated for the risk free rate. This approach has two main advantages. It does not require historical data and it reflects current market perceptions. The drawback is that it assumes the market overall is accurately priced, which is problematic in the case of emerging markets. More analysis in this important area would be most welcome.Source: Michael Bowe and James W.Dean,2007. “ International Financial Management and Multinational Enterprises” Oxford Handbook of International Business，PP.558-565. 譯文：跨國企業(yè)和國際財務管理介紹本章提供了一種高選擇性,主要是重點調(diào)查學術文獻對金融管理政策的跨國企業(yè)(跨國公司)的影響。當前研究的重點方向主要在兩個主題，并且這兩個主題主導著這一分析。第一個是財務管理政策在多個國際企業(yè)經(jīng)營的國際金融環(huán)境中和金融資產(chǎn)價格的真正的不斷波動的關系。主宰這一個章的主題的是:金融風險的碰撞，特別是市場風險，在跨國公司發(fā)展的評估金融風險的管理實踐。第二個主題是國際市場細分(彩蔡和瑞娟1997)。隨著金融市場一體化的提高，國際的全球化企業(yè)活動發(fā)展了，尤其在資本市場。國際監(jiān)督管理和會計實務在一定程度上一直伴隨著協(xié)調(diào)和標準化在增加(艾爾羅伯茨1998)。盡管這些趨勢,但會計準則中的不對稱法規(guī)發(fā)生率的稅收對跨國企業(yè)財務管理有著重要的戰(zhàn)略和方針的意義 (彩蔡，里維持1990，1997;艾爾格利特1995;艾爾麥克1995;艾爾奧克斯姆1998)。我們評估的性質(zhì)、 發(fā)生率和這種市場在某些方面的分割方法受到跨國公司財務管理活動的影響。從上下文的分析的中我們可以很明顯看出,金融因素位于不同管轄區(qū)的跨國公司有著重要影響并且在財務管理中起著至關重要的作用，同時也決定一個跨國公司的競爭與繁榮。正是這種信念支持著多國企業(yè)調(diào)查 （羅爾斯和史密森 1990年；馬歇爾 2000年）。馬歇爾(2000) 對200 的最大跨國公司做出了報告，顯示 87%的基于亞太多個國家企業(yè)的國家外匯風險管理是重要業(yè)務風險管理的一項調(diào)查結(jié)果。然而，迄今為止尚未有普遍接受的理論基礎，證明經(jīng)濟因素是跨國公司存在的充分必要條件。我們進一步討論這一問題的市場進入模式方面和參與部分。很容易對本章的余下部分進行總結(jié)。第二節(jié)論述了提高最新的資產(chǎn)價格增加的重要性,還有對國家風險、國際化的投資經(jīng)營方式評價。在第3節(jié)講述了分類和測量的風險。特別需要的注意事最新的技術發(fā)展,如風險價值和現(xiàn)金流量風險。第4節(jié)是關于跨國公司的金融風險管理。特別是,在區(qū)分經(jīng)營方針與對沖風險時,有意利用其潛力創(chuàng)造競爭優(yōu)勢的管理政策。這節(jié)也對國際企業(yè)的風險管理做出了評估實證研究。第5節(jié)對是對國際企業(yè)的地域問題進行風險管理的有效實施的治理結(jié)構(gòu)問題討論。最后對全文進行總結(jié)對未來研究提出一些建議。自然的金融風險我們強調(diào)的財務風險與多國企業(yè)風險管理做法的演變動機因素有多種，最重要的是日益增長的全球金融市場一體化 (麗薩德 1997 年) 的趨勢和增強多國企業(yè)內(nèi)的金融環(huán)境中不穩(wěn)定的操作。我們后面所做的評估研究，認為這些因素可以在國際化的公司活動中被賦予某些優(yōu)勢。在準備這一分析時我們把某些主要的最新的事態(tài)發(fā)展寫進歷史記錄，全球的金融環(huán)境表明在全球金融市場中的市場風險日益重要。匯率變化在七十年代初期布雷頓森林體系瓦解后，固定匯率越來越不穩(wěn)定，還偶爾發(fā)生匯率危機。在1970年到2000年中,日元對美元匯率已經(jīng)變動為316/ 107并且馬克/美元匯率已經(jīng)下降變?yōu)?.2 /1.9。然而, 在同一個時期美元兌英鎊大約變?yōu)槿榷?992年9月的歐洲貨幣體系的危機(ERM)導致英鎊貶值和意大利貨幣里拉價值大幅下降,而僅在九七年下半年，泰國、印尼、馬來西亞、菲律賓、和韓國失去了三分之一到四分之三的貨幣價值。也有匯率發(fā)生重大變動后，某些政府實行緊縮貨幣政策，如在英國撒切爾政府初期所遵循得政策，貨幣政策立場就發(fā)生了轉(zhuǎn)變。事實上，匯率在每人每年10-%15%之間的不穩(wěn)定波動，足以消除對典型的跨國公司平均利潤率。利率變化20世紀70年代初利率波動也同樣影響著美國企業(yè)的資金成本、現(xiàn)金流量，凈資產(chǎn)價值，雖然他們隨后下降，但在1929年美聯(lián)儲政策變化引起了雙方儲蓄水平的波動性急劇增加。利率在1981年達到最高峰,后來就開始逐漸下降。1983年以來,美國的利率周期變化已經(jīng)有四次以上了。根據(jù)吉瑞琳（1996年），1994年增加了$1.5萬億，淘汰了美元固定收益的投資組合。利率也已成為更多和更不穩(wěn)定，因為很多中央銀行開始放棄針對利率為目標這一項政策，轉(zhuǎn)而贊成針對貨幣供應增長或通脹。80年代末到90年代英國的利率猛增是由于通貨膨脹的壓力致使貨幣政策放松引起的,但后來在1992年9月又持續(xù)下滑并退出歐洲匯率機制。股票市場變化股票市場也變得非常不穩(wěn)定的。在二十世紀七十年代早期的通貨膨脹時期, 價格大幅增加只在 1974年5月的熊市期間，大幅下降后 只有中石油價格上調(diào)300%。全球性的經(jīng)濟復蘇后,繼而在1982年3月有小價格的反轉(zhuǎn),市場也就在1987年達到頂峰了。在1987年10月19日,黑色星期一,價格大幅下降。美國股市的市值損失了23%，相當于1萬億美元以上的股本。其次是在未來十年內(nèi)的另一個復蘇，全球持續(xù)著但不包括日本，日經(jīng)指數(shù)1989年到1992年從39000變?yōu)?7000，資本損失的2.7萬億美元。最后,從1997年中期到年底,吉隆坡、雅加達、曼谷,馬尼拉證券市場中我們損失了370億美元, 占四個國家國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值合計的63%，而韓國首爾的股市則下跌了60%。物價變異性以及其它增強的風險的來源商品價格,特別是那些在初級產(chǎn)品市場, 自20世紀70年代以來就受到大的波動，它是建立在1973-4的石油價格上漲的基礎上的。這種差異也有其他金融市場，特別是股市的溢出效應，從而佐證認為， 它這樣對待一個砸碎分