企業(yè)管理中英文對(duì)照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)

中英文對(duì)照外文翻譯譯文：公司治理與高管薪酬：一個(gè)應(yīng)急框架總體概述20Bruc，BuckMain關(guān)于高管補(bǔ)償?shù)拇蠖鄶?shù)實(shí)證文獻(xiàn)主要集中在對(duì)美國(guó)和英國(guó)的公司部門，當(dāng)分析高管薪理論方面的高管補(bǔ)償和在不同形式的激勵(lì)和公司業(yè)績(jī)方面的探索鏈接。JensenMurphyAguileaFilatotchGospelJackson指出其“情境化”的性質(zhì)，因此它無(wú)法準(zhǔn)確地比較和解釋企業(yè)的多樣性在不同的組織和體制環(huán)境的治理安排。同樣，由此產(chǎn)生的許多政策處方體現(xiàn)在好的公司治理是依靠最好實(shí)踐的普遍觀念，這往往需要適應(yīng)當(dāng)?shù)氐沫h(huán)境或者轉(zhuǎn)化為多樣的國(guó)際化的制度設(shè)置。本文我們討論高管補(bǔ)償?shù)囊粋€(gè)組織的方法能更好的解釋不同組織環(huán)境和體制環(huán)境相Aguileraet量所介導(dǎo)的。規(guī)范和認(rèn)知性相聯(lián)系的社會(huì)合法的。因此這些社會(huì)影響必須與組織有效性相協(xié)調(diào)。委托代理二分法對(duì)高管薪酬的組織方法委托代理理論致力于研究管理激勵(lì)，它主要關(guān)注的是從股東的觀點(diǎn)考慮的的高管補(bǔ)償結(jié)果的有效性，股東是指投資并謀求最大投資回報(bào)的人。這個(gè)方法依據(jù)股東和經(jīng)理之間的“保持距離”假設(shè)，本位主義作為他們合同的基礎(chǔ)。因此，除了吸收和保留高素質(zhì)的管理隊(duì)伍，設(shè)計(jì)良好的激勵(lì)機(jī)制能增加公司的生產(chǎn)能力，能更好的協(xié)調(diào)高管的利益與股東的利益保持一致。一些研究指出高管人員，特別是首席執(zhí)行官，利用自己的權(quán)利來(lái)設(shè)計(jì)薪酬，能夠使他們不受監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和股東對(duì)自己的約束。自利的管理者會(huì)萃取租金通過(guò)他們自己的喜好來(lái)操縱董事會(huì)，主要是被媒體應(yīng)用的憤怒約束的主體。因此首席執(zhí)行官的薪酬安排跟激勵(lì)無(wú)關(guān)而加劇了首席執(zhí)行官的自我充實(shí)或是走過(guò)場(chǎng)。在一定程度上，股東的代理問(wèn)題被解決了，阻止的方法是評(píng)估高管薪酬與公司的業(yè)績(jī)有關(guān)。公司治理的實(shí)證研究已經(jīng)開(kāi)始懷疑經(jīng)理人報(bào)酬與公司效率之間的關(guān)系。許多開(kāi)始質(zhì)疑是否這個(gè)協(xié)會(huì)持有代理沖突的變異；不同的組織背景像創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)、首次募股企業(yè)和成熟企業(yè)；和不同的國(guó)家設(shè)置。也許更重要的是，高管薪酬的業(yè)績(jī)影響對(duì)國(guó)家體制環(huán)境似乎有所不同。例如，高管薪酬的研究表明，在美國(guó)高管薪酬和業(yè)績(jī)之間有很強(qiáng)烈的關(guān)系，但在英國(guó)和德國(guó)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策的影響相對(duì)稍低，然而在日本高管薪酬沒(méi)有激勵(lì)效應(yīng)。同時(shí)，組織理論和戰(zhàn)略管理研究表明，高管薪酬的治理作用存在大量的不同觀點(diǎn)。例如，管家理論放寬了在代理理論中發(fā)現(xiàn)的管理行為假設(shè)，認(rèn)為管理者可以在某些情況下為了組織的利益充當(dāng)管家，只有相對(duì)地的利益沖突存在。同樣，利益相關(guān)者理論認(rèn)識(shí)到，公司治理因素的有效性取決于一系列的公司相關(guān)行為，和他們之間的相互作用，盡管這個(gè)研究較少關(guān)注高管薪酬。和環(huán)境的復(fù)雜性。在代理理論中，方法大多限于股東和經(jīng)理兩方，很少注意代理問(wèn)題可能在不同的任務(wù)和資源環(huán)境、組織的生命周期或不同的體制環(huán)境中中是如何變化的。雖然威廉姆森認(rèn)為交易成本會(huì)因不同的機(jī)構(gòu)和組織環(huán)境而有所不同，他指出公司治理研究的主流是“太專注于資源配置的效率的議題，而忽視了組織效率離散的結(jié)構(gòu)會(huì)帶來(lái)仔細(xì)的審查管家和利益相關(guān)者理論移除了代理理論的一些嚴(yán)格的假設(shè)，但沒(méi)有提供一全面的能夠與不同組織和環(huán)境相聯(lián)系的薪酬激勵(lì)研究框架。Aguileraet后，我們建議高管薪酬的研究應(yīng)該采取更加開(kāi)放的政策，把組織特在整體背景下的重要性而非只是某一因素的作用。代理基礎(chǔ)的傳統(tǒng)觀念和我們的框架的觀點(diǎn)背離，我們的框架植根于綜合各種理論和實(shí)證研究結(jié)果，建立一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)潔的框架。這種方法是為了更好地了解高管薪酬和組織機(jī)構(gòu)環(huán)境的相互依存關(guān)系。這些結(jié)構(gòu)是組織環(huán)境與公司治理和體制影響的互補(bǔ)和替代?？傊覀冎鲝埜吖芗?lì)的組織有效性與主流代理研究建議的業(yè)績(jī)之間不存在直接的線性影響。這個(gè)影響是建立在大量公司水平和宏觀因素上的而沒(méi)有考慮大量的研究。在下面的章節(jié)中，我們?cè)噲D討論這些重要的應(yīng)變因素及高管補(bǔ)償制度的俠侶和有效性。組織環(huán)境這里我們根據(jù)以前研究激勵(lì)機(jī)制的有效性是如何被一個(gè)組織的突發(fā)事件的重要范疇所調(diào)種對(duì)所有人都適合的做法是不可取。一個(gè)在管理方面的研究被日益認(rèn)知，組織資源基礎(chǔ)及他與外部環(huán)境的相互依存關(guān)系不是一成不變的，他是動(dòng)態(tài)組織的一部分。一個(gè)公司治理的權(quán)變概念的應(yīng)用已經(jīng)在一個(gè)研究公司治理的生命周期的新興機(jī)構(gòu)被制定了。這些文獻(xiàn)確定了公司的發(fā)展的大部分階段，和與之相聯(lián)系的需要治理不久的代理沖突的變化，包括激勵(lì)機(jī)制。公司治理可以被看做是一個(gè)動(dòng)態(tài)系統(tǒng)，靠著治理可以改變不同階段的企業(yè)的實(shí)踐環(huán)境間的相互依賴關(guān)系，如新興階段、成長(zhǎng)期、成熟期和衰退期。通過(guò)不同的階段，企業(yè)可以從一個(gè)西債的資源基地演變成一個(gè)更廣泛的的資源基地。這種轉(zhuǎn)變可能至少要臨時(shí)依賴外部資源。這些外部資源的提供者創(chuàng)造新的公司治理，以確保不僅能創(chuàng)造財(cái)富，而且能在股東和其他利益相關(guān)者之間公平的分配。這主要反映在公司管理問(wèn)責(zé)制對(duì)外部資源提供者的改變。CoreGuayv也發(fā)現(xiàn)了這一機(jī)制的具體實(shí)施受到上市公司組織環(huán)境關(guān)于始終控制該公司的創(chuàng)始人的一些限制。在下個(gè)階段，內(nèi)部和外部資源被投資在公司的成長(zhǎng)上。當(dāng)企業(yè)耗盡了重點(diǎn)行業(yè)的增長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)，也許就會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)到相關(guān)或非相關(guān)的行業(yè)上，自利系統(tǒng)就變得不那么透明了。激勵(lì)機(jī)制錯(cuò)位導(dǎo)致一個(gè)逐漸擴(kuò)大的和多樣化的管理驅(qū)動(dòng)產(chǎn)生業(yè)績(jī)惡化、股東價(jià)值損失的結(jié)果。在這一階段的管理人員，特別是首席執(zhí)行官，可以說(shuō)是享有薪酬設(shè)計(jì)的權(quán)利的，首席執(zhí)行官的薪酬安排會(huì)弱化激勵(lì)機(jī)制，而更多的滿足管理層的自我充實(shí)。唯一可行的戰(zhàn)略選擇在第四個(gè)階段，可采取上市公司的私有化。當(dāng)更透明的激勵(lì)和治理機(jī)制被以增加管理資產(chǎn)有私有制公司檢測(cè)和承諾償還債務(wù)的形式被引進(jìn)，伴隨著收購(gòu)的衰退組織的重新調(diào)整會(huì)導(dǎo)致生命周期的重新振作。因此，該組織可能會(huì)縮小其活動(dòng)范圍，并開(kāi)始一個(gè)新周期?？傊?，有效的治理機(jī)制取決于公司治理生命周期的變化，而不是符合一個(gè)普遍性的模型。組織環(huán)境強(qiáng)調(diào)的是組織相互依存本質(zhì)的開(kāi)放性，這樣，成熟企業(yè)會(huì)與通過(guò)激勵(lì)機(jī)制降低代理成本聯(lián)系在一起，新創(chuàng)立企業(yè)面臨不同挑戰(zhàn)的發(fā)展和成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)，因?yàn)樗鼈儑L試著環(huán)境的不確定性。各種治理措施的潛在好處是公司治理研究的核心。但是，Aguileraet為組織環(huán)境同的環(huán)境而有所不同。高管補(bǔ)償方案可能有多種類型的相關(guān)費(fèi)用，直接費(fèi)用反映在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表和其他會(huì)計(jì)資料上。此外，激勵(lì)體制還存在不太明顯的機(jī)會(huì)成本和聲譽(yù)成本。這些成本可能會(huì)對(duì)激勵(lì)體制有效性的多個(gè)參數(shù)產(chǎn)生不同的影響，意味著他們之間的潛在權(quán)衡。Black-Schols式，雖然資源就不能遵守，并可能因此面臨相對(duì)較高的成本。除了這些直接成本，高管補(bǔ)償也要減少明確的成本，需要更多的間接難以量化的機(jī)會(huì)成本。這些費(fèi)用設(shè)計(jì)激勵(lì)機(jī)制如何影響管理者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)觀念和戰(zhàn)略重點(diǎn)，從而影響對(duì)商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)的利用，他們會(huì)根據(jù)不同的組織環(huán)境而改變。例如，Hall和MurphyRENWEI,因?yàn)楣芾碚咴诔墒斓墓臼軞w屬要求和內(nèi)部粉盒的限制，比所期望的從投資組合多樣化的角度持有更多公司的股權(quán)，他們被迫使其持有的股票價(jià)值打折。這種“價(jià)值成本楔”是企業(yè)必須支付的價(jià)格以便產(chǎn)生股權(quán)支付的好處。v上市交易可能產(chǎn)生成本，會(huì)阻止管理人員將他們持有的股份調(diào)整到最佳水平。因此，用先手股權(quán)作為收益或竄是的一種參考點(diǎn)，該作者的行為模型預(yù)測(cè)，當(dāng)考慮到不同類型的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)計(jì)劃在首次公開(kāi)發(fā)行的適當(dāng)性時(shí)，管理者應(yīng)規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。最后，管理補(bǔ)償機(jī)制可能影響到公司的聲譽(yù)成本。例如，HallShahrimHal做法相關(guān)，會(huì)影響到成本效益的不同方面，其顯著性在不同的組織環(huán)境中會(huì)不同。原文：CorporateGovernanceandExecutiveRemuneration:AContingencyFrameworkExecutiveOverviewByintegratingorganizationalandinstitutionaltheories,thispaperdevelopsaapproachtoexecutiveremunerationandassessesitseffectivenessindifferentoftheexecutiveremunerationresearchfocusesontheprincipal-agerameworkandassumesauniversalinkbetweenexecutivincentiveandperformanceoutcomes.Wesuggestaframeworkthatexaminesexecutivecompensationinofitorganizationontextandpotentiacomplementaritieubstitutiffectbetweendifferentcorporategovernancepracticesatboththefirmandnationallevels.Wealsoimplicationsfordifferentapproachestoexecutivecompensationpolicysuchas―softlaw‖and―hardlaw.‖Overthepasttwodecades,companiesaroundtheworldhaveincreasinglymovedfromfixedpaystructuoremuneratioschemesthaarerelatetoperformanceandincludasubstantialcomponentofequity-basedincentives.Asaresult,researchontheofexecutivecompensationhasbecomeoneofthehotlydebatedtopicswithincorporategovernanceresearcsBruce,Buck,andMain(2005p.1493)indicate,Irecenyears,literatureonexecutiveremunerationhasgrownatapacerivaledonlybythegrowthofpayitself.MostoftheempiricalliteratureonexecutivecompensationhasfocusedtheU.S./U.K.corporatesectorswhenanalyzingorganizationaoutcomesofdifferentcomponentsofexecutivepay,suchascashpay(salaryandbonus),long-termincentivesexecutivstockoptions)andperquisite.g.pensioncontributiondcompanycars)Intermsofitstheoreticalunderpinnings,previousresearchhasattemptedtounderstandcompensationintermsofagencytheoryandexploredlinksbetweendifferentformsofexincentivesandfirmperformance.Thisliteratusmotivatebytheassumptionthatbymanagingtheprincipal-agencyproblembetweenshareholdendmanagersfirmswiloperatmoreefficiendperformbetterMuchofcorporatgovernanceresearcisbasedonauniversamodeloutlinebyprincipal-ageor(Fama&Jensen1983;Jensen1986)andthecentrapremiseofthisframeworkisthatshareholdersandmanagershavedifferentaccesstofirm-specificandbroadlydivergeninteresndriskpreferencesaresultmanagersasagentsofengageinthatmaybeshareholderswealthmaximization.AsubstantiabodyofliteratusbasedonthisstraightforwaremiseandsuggestthattoconstraimanageriaopportunismshareholdersmayuseaofmanageriaincentivhaaligtheinteresfagentandprincipalsJensenandMurphy(1990,pp.2243)observe,Agencytheoredictsthatcompensaicwilltietheagent’sexpectedprincipal’sobjective.Theistomaximizewealth;thereforeagencytheorypredictsthatCEOcompensationpolicieswilldependinshareholdewealth.Thekeymetricineffectinpositivorganizationutcomesispay-performancesensitivity(Bruceetal.,2005).However,thi―closystemaproachfoundnagencybasedliteratusitauniversasetoflinkagebetweenexecutivincentiveandperformancanddevotelittttentiothedistinontextinwhichfirmareembedded.Despiteconsiderableresearcheffort,theempiricalfindingsonthesecausallinkagesmixedandtheexecutiveequity-relatedincentivesonfinancialperformancehavefailedtoidentifysignificanteffects(see,forexample,thesurveysandcommentariesofCore,Guay,&2003;Daily,Dalton,&Rajagopalan,2003;Hall,2003;andTosi,Werner,Katz,&2000)InamorerecencritiqfagencytheoryAguileraFilatotcheospelandJackson(2008)pointedoutits―undercontexaendhenceitsinabilitytoaccuratelycompaandexplainthediversityofcorporategovernancearrangementsacrossdifferentandinstitutiontextsSimilarluchoftheresultiolicprescriptionshrineincodesof―goodcorporatgovernancerelonuniversanotionofbestpractichichoftenneedtobeadaptedtothelocalcontextsoffirmsortranslatedacrossdiversenationalsettings(Aguilera&Cuervo-Cazurra,2004;Aguilera&Jackson,2003;Fiss&Zajac,2004)InthipaperwediscusanorganizationpproachtoexecutivcompensatiothawillfortheAguileraetal.(2008)wesuggestthatcorporategovernanceaspectsofexecutivecompensationoutlinedbythestakeholderperspectivesmustcapturethepatternedvariationincorporategovernancedifferencnorganizationontextandtheienvironmentAlongtheslineswebuilonrecentstudiesofcorporategovernancethathaveattemptedtoexplainthedynamicdimenscorporategovernanceoverthecompanylifecycle(Filatotchev&Wright,2005),aswelldiversifcorporatgovernancearrangementacroscountrie(Aguiler&Jackson2003;Bruceatal.,2005).Thus,animportanttaskincorporategovernanceresearchistouncdiversityofarrangementsandtounderstandhowtheeffectivenessofexecutiveremuneramediatedbyitsalignmentvariables(―context‖)contextsandinstitutionalenvironments(Aguileraetal.,2008).Wesuggestanovelcontingency-basedframeworkforunderstandingthegovernanceofexecutivecompensation,whichwetermsofcomplementaritysubstitutietweengovernancefactorsandtheimpactofinstitutionalenvironments.Organizationalcstovariationsinalandexternalstrategicresourcesandspecificstagesintheirorganizationallifecycle(OLC).Forexample,thematurephasesofhaveamoreand―professionaliagementteam.Asaresulttheymaybeingreateneedofformalincentivalignmenmechanismscomparedtoyoungerfounder-ownedfirmsintheistart-upphase,whichmayhavenarrowerresourcebasesandthushigherfocusonreputational,onlypotentialbenefitofexecutivcompensatioschemes,butalsotheicostssuchasthedireccostofequity-basedincentivesandtheirindirecteffectsonmanagerialbehaviorandriskcostswillvaryfordifferenfirmsoperatinindifferensortsofenvironmentssothatcost-benefnalysearerareluniversaomplementarity/substituertotheoverall―bundlefcorporatgovernancepractichaarealignewithoneanotheandmutuallyenhancetheabilityofthosepracticestoachieveeffectivecorporategovernance.thattheexecutivecompensationmaydependonthepresenceofothergovernancefactoruchashighshareholdeinvolvemenandboardindependenceFinally,aonandpathdependenceofexecutivecompensatioasagovernancefactoxecutivpaypackagesmustbesocialllegitimanrelationtoprevailingregulatory,normative,andcognitiveimpactsonorganizations.Athesesocietaleffectsmustbereconciledwithorganizationalefficiency(Bruceetal.,Principal-AgentDichotomyVersusOrganizationalApproachtoExecutiveRemunerationPrincipal-ageheorydominatesresearconmanageriaincentivenditisprimarilyconcernedwithefficiencyoutcomesofexecutivecompensationschemesfromtheperspectishareholders,whoinvestresourcesandseekmaximumreturnontheirinvestment.Thisapreliesontheassumptionoflhscontracweenshareholdersandmanagers,andself-interesportunismasabasioftheicontract(Bruceetal.2005).Thus,besidesattractindretaininahigh-qualianagementteam,well-designeincentivschemesshouldincreasecorporateproductivityandvaluebythoseofshareholders(Hall,2003).

s’interestswithSomestudieowever,claimthaexecutivendparticulaOs,ypowerinrelatiotothedesignofpaypackagesandareabletoinsulatthemselvefromandexecutivesmaynowextractrentbymanipulatinboardstructustheiownfavor(i.e.,bynominatingtheironiesboardmembers),subjecmainlytoan―outragonstraippliebythemedia(Bebchuk&Fried,2004).TheCEO’stherefore,havelesstodowithincentivealignmandmoretodowiththeCEenrichmentor―skimming‖(Bertrand&Mullan,Theextentowhichshareholdergencyproblemsareresolveandskimmingpreventeistypicalssessebyassociatixecutivpaywiththeperformanceofthefirm(Buck&Shahrim,2005).beguntocastdoubtonwhetheradirectanduniversallinkbetweenexecutivecompensationandfirmefficiency.ManytoquestionwhetherthisassociationholdsacrossthemultiplevariantsofagencydenBerghe,Levrau,Carchon,&VanderElst,2002);differentorganizationalcontextsentrepreneurialventures,initialpublicofferings(IPOs),andmaturefirms(Filatotche2005);anddifferentnationalsettings.PerhapsmoreimportantisthefactthattheimpactofthecontextsForexample,studieofexecutivpayshowstrongcorrelatioetweenpayandperformanceintheUnitedandequity-basedincentivesintheUnitedKingdomandGermany(Bruceetal.,2005),whereasexecutiveJapanhasnoincentiveeffects(Kubo,2005).Meanwhile,studiesinorganizationtheoryandstrategicmanagementsuggestaalternativeviewsonthegovernancerolesofexecutivecompensation.Forexample,theoryhasrelaxedsomeoftheassumptionsaboutmanagerialbehaviorfoundinagencyarguingthatmanagersmayactasstewardsforthegoodoftheorganizationinsituationonlyrelativeinorconflicfinteresxis(Davis2005).Likewisestakeholdetheoryonawidersetof1984),althoughthisresearchhasrelativelylessattentiontoexecutiveincentives.Despitetheirdifferences,acommontendencywithintheseresearchstreamsisonuniversalisticmodelsofefficiency,whicastimportanorganizationandenvironmentalcomplexities(Aguileraetal.,the―undercontextualized‖approachremainsrestrictomostlytwoactor(shareholdendmanagers)withlittleattentiontohowagencyproblemsmayvaryacrossdiversetaskandresourcelifecycleoforganizations,ordifferentinstitutionalenvironments.Although277)suggestedthattransactioncostsmaybedifferentindifferentinstitutionalcontexts,hepointedoutthatmainstreamcorporatesecis―toopreoccupiedissueofallocatifficiency.ttheneglecoforganizational efficiennwhichdiscretestructuralunderscrutiny.‖theoryremovesomeoftheagencyapproach,yetdonotprovideacomprehensiveresearrameworkthatlinksexecutiveincentiveswiththedifferentorganizationalenvironments.

contextFollowingAguileraetal.(2008)weproposethatexecutivecompensationresearchadoptamore―opsystem‖approach,whichtreatorganizationafeatureasbeinginterdependeiththediversitluctuationnduncertaintiftheienvironmentandrejectsuniversalsntree‖propositions.Inso-stemapproachemphasizestheimportanceofexaminingexecutivecompensationcontextratherthanassinglefactorsactinginisolation.Themaindeparturebetweenthe―traditional‖toexecutivecompensatioandourconceptuaframework,whichisgroundedinorganizatioeorandsynthesizesvariousempiricalfindingsthrougharelativelyparsimonioussetofapproachisaimedatbetterunderstandingtheinterdependencebetweenexecutivepracticeandtheorganizationndinstitutiovironmentinwhichthesepracticeareconductedThesespecificonstrucreorganizationontextcomplementaritubstitutionwithacorporatgovernance―bundlendinstitutiofectnshortweclaimthatheorganizationaleffectivenessofexecutiveincentivesdoesnothaveadirectandlinearperformanceassuggestedbymainstreamagencyresearch.Thiseffectiscontingentonaoffirm-levndmacrofactorthaareasarulenotaccounteforinthevastmajoritofstudies.InthefollowingsectionsweattempttodiscusstheseimportantcontingencytheirpotentialeffectsontheeffectivenessandefficiencyofexecutivecompensationOrganizationalContextOrganizatiotheorisaveexaminedhowtheeffecoforganiationa(―structural‖)characteristseffectivenerperformancmaybemediatedorinfluencebycontextualvariablessuchastaskuncertaintaskinterdependenceandorganizationynamics(Donaldson,2001;Filatotchev,Toms,&Wright,2006).Althoughexecutivecompensationbeconsidereasastructurovernancecharacteristhinthiframework,organizationtheoryhasnotelaboratedwithregardtotheeffectivenessofthisformofcorporateHerewebuildonpreviousresearchandexaminehowtheeffectivenessofincentivemaybemediatedbyanimportantcategoryoftheresourceandcapabilitihatshapefirmsinterdependenciithdiffererganizationalenvironments(seeAguileraetal.,2008,foramoredetaileddiscussion).Oneaspectofresource-relatedcontingenciesisgroundedintheresource-basedasabilioinnovat(Barney1991)Afurtheaspecofresourcerelatecontingenciomesfromresourcedependencytheory,whichsuggeststhatfirmswillrespondtodemandsexternalactorsororganizationsuponwhoseresourcestheyareheavilydependent,butseektominimizeSalancik,1978).Forexample,thedegreeandnatureofexternalfinanceislikelytodemandsplacedoncorporatgovernancetoensureaccountabilindincentivalignment.Organizationalcontextconsiderationsthusimplythattheroleandeffectsofincentivearelikeltodiffeinwayscontingenuponboththeexternaandinternesourcethaarecriticalwithintheconttrms’organizational,market,sectoral,nearyotherwords,theeffectinecutiveincentivesmaydependonthemosage,thephasesofgrowthordeclineicany’sdevelopment,andthecharacterofonatdifferearketsandsectorsamongmanyotherfactor(Aguileretal.2008).Whileanorganizationerspectiejectthenotiooftalsosuggeststhatpolicywillbemoreeffectiveifittakesintoaccountthepotentialorganizationalcontexts.Inshort,aone-size-fits-allapproachisundesirable.Thereisanincreasingrecognitioninmanagementresearchthattheorganizationalbaseanditinterdependenithexternaenvironmentarenotstatiutanintegraroforganizationynamics.Theapplicatioofacontingency-baseconceptofcorporategovernancehasbeendevelopedwithinanemergingbodyoftheofcorporatgovernance(Filatotchtal.2006;FilatotchvWright2005).ThisliteratureidentifiesanumberofstagesinthedevelopmentofthefirmandlinksthemwithextenandnaturofagencyconflicharequirgovernanceremediesincludinincentiveviewedhereasadynamicsystemwherebygovernancepracticesmayaddresschangingsetsofenvironmentalinterdependenciesthroughoutthestageoftheOLC,suchasstart-urowth,maturityanddeclineFigure1illustraistheoreticalframework.OvertheOLCstages,firmsmayevolvefromhavingaverynarrowresourcebasetoamoreextensiveandheterogeneousresourcebase.ThistransitionmayrequireatleastrelianconexternaresourcesProvideroftheseexternaresourcecreatnewcorporategovernancedemandstoensurethatwealthisnotonlycreatedbutalsodistributedofeachfactorprovider,whethertheseareshareholdersorotherstakeholders.Thisischangesofthefirm’smanagementetal.,2006).

providers(FilatotchevIntheearlstageoftheOLC(Quadran1ofFigure1)theentrepreneurrmhasanarrowresourcebase.Itisusuallyownedandagroupfounder-managersand/orfamilyinvestors,withthelevelofmanagerialaccountabilityshareholdersgenerallylow.Inthiscontext,asubstantialportneer-islinkedtothefirm,whichquestionstheappropriatenesosrmayevenunderminetheeffectivenessofequity-basedincentiveschemes,inlinewithargumentsdevelopedbyCoGuay(2010).Asthefirmgrows,itrequiresaccesstoexternalresourcesandexpertisethatmaysupportthisgrowth,anditopensupitsgovernancesystemtoexternalinvestors,suchangelsandventurecapitalfirms.Atthisstage,thebalancebetweenresourcesandstarttoshiftowardgreatetransparencandincreasinmonitorinbyexternaproviderofresources.AnIPO(Quadrant2ofFigure1)representsadramaticshiftfromanfirmtoa―professionrmwithafullydevelopedgovernancesystem.Theshifinaccountabilitywidensthefirmccesstothefinaciaresourceofthestockmarket.IntheianalysiofcompensationinIPOfirmsAllcockandFilatotch2009)identifinincreasinroleofanemerginggovernancemechanismaimedatmanagersandincomingpublicmarkettheynumberoflimitatiomposedonthimechanismbythespecifiorganizationontexofIPOfirmsrelatedtothecontinantroleofthefirm’sfoundersinitsanceInthenextstageinternndexternaresourceareinvesteinthefirmrowthasitmaturesandexploitstrategiopportunitisWhenthefirmhasexhausteditsgrowththefocalindustryandperhapsunrelatedindustries,thegovernancesystembecomeslesstransparent.Misalignmentofincentivesamanageriadriveforever-increasixpansionanddiversificatducinperformancedeterioratiandlossinshareholdevalueAtthistagexecutivendparticularEOs,arguablyenjoypositionsofpowerinofpaypackages,andthearrangementmayhavelestodowithincentivalignmenandmoretodowiththeCEO’sskimmingInaturnaroundsituation,turnintoatheireffectsonmanagerialrisktakingandtimehorizons(Wiseman&Bromiley,1996).TheonlyviablestrategicalternativeatthisstagemaybetotakeapublicRestructurifadeclininorganizatiollowinapublic-to-privyoutmayresulinareinvigoratiofthelifcyclasmoretransparencentivandgovernancmechanismsareintroducedintheformofincreasedmanagerialequity,monitoringbyprivateequitycommitmenttoservicedebt.Assuch,theorganizationmaynarrowthescopeofitsstartanewcycle.Insum,aneffectiveincentivemechanismdependsonpatternedvariationsovertheratherthanconformingtoauniversalistrtionalcontextunderlinesthe―open‖natureoforganizationalinterdependence,suchthat,whereasmaturefirmsmaybereducinagencycostthroughincentivalignmentnewentrepreneuriirmsfacedifferentchallengeintermsofmakingsurethatfounder-managerareabletoanticipatfuturetechnologicevelopmentsandgrowthopportunitistheytrytobufferenvironmentaluncertainties(Filatotchev&Bishop,2002).Thepotentialbenefitofvariousgovernancepracticesisatthecoreofcorporateresearcowever,Aguileretal(2008)arguedthaorganizationontexmayalsoaffectpotentialcostsrelatedtotheinputsofcorporategovernance.Theseoftenappearas―externalendconsequencesthatstemfromorman-ifestthebroaderenvironmentofthereducethecorporategovernance.Suchcostswillvaryacrossfirmstotheextentthattheyoperateindifferenvironments.Executivecompensationschemesmayhaveassociatedcostsofseveraltypes,startingthedirectcoststhatarereflectedinthefietaheraccountingdocumentation(Hall2003).Inadditioncentivsystemsmayimposelesexplicpportunitcost(e.g.,changesinmanagerialriskpreferences)andreputationalcosts(e.g.,costsoforexecutivirresponsibilisevarioucostmayhavediffereffectonthemultipleparametersncentiveschemes’effectiveness,implyintelbetweenthem.Previousresearchismainlyfocusedondirectcostsofvarioustypesofexecutivecompensation,suchastheout-of-pocketexpensesassociatedwithexecutivestock&Schaefer,2006;Ronen,2008).ThecostofexecutivestockoptionstoshareholderscanbeestimatedusingthefamiliarBlack-Scholesformula,thoughthisbeapplicabltoexecutivoptionthacannotbetradecontinuouslthankstovestinandholdingperiods(Hall&Murphy,2002).differentsectoraandnationaregulatorenvironmentsAnimportanimplicatioisthedifferentialimpactofcostsonfirmsdependingontheirresourcecapacities.Forexample,largesufficieesourcescoreeasilybufferthese,