外文翻譯-財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、破產(chǎn)概率以及企業(yè)投資行為

淺析我國(guó)中小企業(yè)投資存在的主要風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及應(yīng)對(duì)策略翻譯（1）題目財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、破產(chǎn)概率以及企業(yè)投資行為財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、破產(chǎn)概率及企業(yè)投資行為摘要投資和金融之間的聯(lián)系通常是在財(cái)政限制時(shí)內(nèi)部和外部融資不充分或是信貸市場(chǎng)上的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在這種情況下，靈敏度與單一的內(nèi)部或外部的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)被認(rèn)為是投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的衡量指標(biāo)。但是，依賴外部資金的企業(yè)，不只是面對(duì)外部融資溢價(jià)和潛在的借款限額的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，還面臨著無法還款的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因此就出現(xiàn)了破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和融資約束伐薩瑞-哈伯德-彼得森（1988）是最早調(diào)查是否資本市場(chǎng)的不完善導(dǎo)致企業(yè)投資不充分，內(nèi)部資金不充足的團(tuán)體。為了估計(jì)這些融資約束，他們假設(shè)了信息不對(duì)稱的情況，導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)生了金融等級(jí)，但是卻沒有發(fā)生信貸配給的變化。許多企業(yè)認(rèn)為，可以通過量化投資敏感度測(cè)試反映現(xiàn)金流的變化。派息較低的公司被認(rèn)為是對(duì)信貸市場(chǎng)的約束，因此可能會(huì)表現(xiàn)出較強(qiáng)的現(xiàn)金流敏感性。實(shí)證結(jié)果證實(shí)假設(shè)，所有企業(yè)表現(xiàn)出的對(duì)這些重要系數(shù)的敏感度是不同的，留存收益比較高的公司比那些融資受限制的企業(yè)的現(xiàn)金流的變化更敏感。雖然對(duì)有關(guān)現(xiàn)金流敏感度作用支持力度很大，但對(duì)這些敏感的單一性假設(shè)還對(duì)伐薩瑞-哈伯德-彼得森，卡普蘭（1997）等人提出了批評(píng)和建議，他們不贊同前人們申請(qǐng)的分類方法。克利里（1999）反對(duì)卡普蘭用美國(guó)一大企業(yè)群體當(dāng)做樣本，而是采用了一個(gè)更客觀的分類標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，就是利用多元判別分析，類似于奧特曼（1968）的程序，開始了新一輪的研究。模型在這本文中，企業(yè)信息不對(duì)稱進(jìn)行投資行為可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這個(gè)模型的特殊功能是，可以解決那些明確納入到整個(gè)企業(yè)投資決策的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這些財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)存在的形式是在該公司的未來是不確定的，這主要取決于公司是否有能力能夠償還其借入的資金。這里的破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，對(duì)企業(yè)投資行為有兩個(gè)含義，其中一個(gè)是企業(yè)支付借款利息取決于企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)程度，資本成本會(huì)提高企業(yè)的無法償債的機(jī)率。其次，公司擁有其生存概率可能又與違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相關(guān)，因此，如果沒有很好的投資項(xiàng)目，有可能造成損失，就導(dǎo)致企業(yè)借入的資金無法及時(shí)償還。基本設(shè)置時(shí)間是離散的，指標(biāo)是T∈{01}。在本文中的所有變量都是已知的，而未來所有的變量是隨機(jī)的，時(shí)間跨度是有限的，有很多企業(yè)在生產(chǎn)流程中涉及到經(jīng)濟(jì)問題《HWWADISSCUISSIONPAPER》?October2004。每家企業(yè)，產(chǎn)生的輸出與實(shí)際的輸入因素資本有關(guān)系，根據(jù)一貫的新古典主義的技術(shù)，Yit=F(KitLit)。凹生產(chǎn)函數(shù)是兩次連續(xù)在資本和勞動(dòng)力可微，但任何輸入的回報(bào)都是收益遞減的。改變公司的資本存量需要調(diào)整成本，依賴于投資、個(gè)人所得稅和資本存量。這些調(diào)整成本模型輸出的形式，這意味著生產(chǎn)的一部分是要按照新的資本資源的消耗來引進(jìn)的。調(diào)整成本函數(shù)的依據(jù)和普通的一樣，這主要是增加邊際成本。資本增加的同時(shí)期將收購(gòu)成為企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)力，也可能被定義為《HWWADISSCUISSIONPAPER》?October2004利息支付作為一個(gè)靜態(tài)權(quán)衡的假設(shè)，這就是意味著，該公司的平衡是通過稅收優(yōu)惠從企業(yè)稅收中扣除相關(guān)的利息支出，如果公司的債務(wù)水平過高，那么利息支出增加導(dǎo)致成本上升的稅盾。由于公司不一定成立，那部分不保留在公司的利潤(rùn)是要以企業(yè)利潤(rùn)的形式分發(fā)給業(yè)主。但是，股息就不是這樣的，比較適用于后者模型。如果企業(yè)留存收益額超過企業(yè)打算購(gòu)買新的資本貨物的數(shù)量，那么這些企業(yè)利潤(rùn)是流進(jìn)的，留存收益或凈借款超過了企業(yè)的投資資金，那么利潤(rùn)就為負(fù)數(shù)，這個(gè)就不屬于文章中說的這種模型了。公司的所有者，也沒有義務(wù)支付公司的債務(wù)，如果企業(yè)盈利不能償還到期債務(wù)，那缺少了信貸配給，公司就不能在很短的時(shí)間里進(jìn)行融資解決公司的債務(wù)危機(jī)，甚至可能導(dǎo)致企業(yè)破產(chǎn)等。企業(yè)利潤(rùn)最大化正如在前面文章中說到的一樣，公司的投資決策可能與地方融資決定相關(guān)。公司如果能意識(shí)到違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，該公司在未來的任何時(shí)期能將公司價(jià)值風(fēng)險(xiǎn)下降至零。所以，公司的未來價(jià)值與生存的概率有關(guān)，資本和債務(wù)的數(shù)額又可能會(huì)影響概率，因此投資決策是相互影響的。投資決策的時(shí)刻表安排如下：在公司決定所需要的新的資本和債務(wù)所需要的資金后，將把從銀行接到的一定利息率的資金轉(zhuǎn)移到公司。如果破產(chǎn)，在意識(shí)到具體的沖擊前，生產(chǎn)和銷售所有的產(chǎn)品，破產(chǎn)值可以進(jìn)行計(jì)算，之后，就可以申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)。存在的企業(yè)計(jì)算其利潤(rùn)，歸還借來的資金和相應(yīng)的利息給給借款人。破產(chǎn)的公司將被清算，支付銀行手續(xù)費(fèi)。公司投資和融資決策從上面的調(diào)查可以知道，今天的投資成本和未來的投資成本有關(guān)，也顯示了最優(yōu)資本分配路徑?？梢院苋菀椎目吹?，資本標(biāo)準(zhǔn)歐拉等式還是受一些引進(jìn)稅、調(diào)整成本、違約的可能性的影響的。從上文中可以看到顯示了稅后調(diào)整的投資邊際安裝和采購(gòu)成本，右邊的等式顯示了明天投資的機(jī)會(huì)成本，這些費(fèi)用包括預(yù)期的貼現(xiàn)價(jià)值購(gòu)買和安裝的資本，與前面再次的稅后調(diào)整相比，這主要是由于資本存量的變化導(dǎo)致的在生產(chǎn)中的損失變化以及少安裝邊際成本的增加。此外，公司通過資本和債務(wù)水平的變化，已經(jīng)考慮到其破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的變化。推遲投資決策的機(jī)會(huì)成本，當(dāng)資本立馬生產(chǎn)時(shí)，只有推遲投資項(xiàng)目的成本進(jìn)行加權(quán)。雖然公司不得不承擔(dān)還未獲得收入的投資，支付推遲的投資項(xiàng)目成本。連同公司所得稅，這個(gè)比重減少了可變現(xiàn)凈值。另外一個(gè)需要考慮潛在的違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，可以通過鼓勵(lì)投資來降低。首先，一個(gè)資本存量的變化，即可能增加盈利的機(jī)會(huì)，還會(huì)降低違約的概率。企業(yè)在未來的盈利中，一定要知道資本增加額的貼現(xiàn)值。其次，投資在一定程度上可能會(huì)降低利率，有利于及時(shí)歸還借款額和利息。隨著新的投資資本的產(chǎn)品的生產(chǎn)，出現(xiàn)固定利率，減少資本成本。數(shù)據(jù)將德意志聯(lián)邦銀行企業(yè)的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)產(chǎn)生的數(shù)據(jù)與企業(yè)基層進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，這個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)構(gòu)成了德國(guó)非金融企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)最大的數(shù)據(jù)來源。由德意志聯(lián)邦銀行（1998）或者股票交易所（2001）提供了廣泛的資料來源，該數(shù)據(jù)是基于對(duì)企業(yè)提交的法案為基礎(chǔ)的再貼現(xiàn)和貸款業(yè)務(wù)方面的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表數(shù)據(jù)。自1998年貨幣聯(lián)盟被質(zhì)疑后，歐盟貨幣聯(lián)盟在1999年被停止了再貼現(xiàn)業(yè)務(wù)。20世紀(jì)80年代中期，由于德國(guó)企業(yè)法律法規(guī)的變化，1987年之后的數(shù)據(jù)不符合國(guó)家規(guī)定的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表數(shù)據(jù)就不再具有可比性。所以，本次調(diào)查延續(xù)到了從1987到1998，總共持續(xù)12年。德國(guó)統(tǒng)一之前，德國(guó)的東部是最發(fā)達(dá)的地區(qū)，但是各地區(qū)的數(shù)據(jù)來源是不能利用的，直到統(tǒng)一后，西部和東部的企業(yè)都有自己的辦公原則。總結(jié)傳統(tǒng)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資進(jìn)入，比如Q模型或歐拉方程模型在財(cái)政限制的形式下，當(dāng)決定投資水平理論模型時(shí)，企業(yè)面臨信息不對(duì)稱的后果。在這個(gè)背景下，為了提高外部資金或者通過其他途徑借入資金，在財(cái)務(wù)限制時(shí)企業(yè)必須承擔(dān)一定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)。財(cái)政限制的測(cè)試主要是對(duì)企業(yè)內(nèi)部或外部這些限制資金的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)，并對(duì)投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行敏感性分析。然而，企業(yè)在進(jìn)行投資決策時(shí)，財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響因素應(yīng)該當(dāng)做整體分析，而不是僅僅在財(cái)政受限制時(shí)才作為理論或?qū)嵶C調(diào)查依據(jù)，這是企業(yè)必須要注意的。雖然財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)包含企業(yè)內(nèi)部和外部資金的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，還有一些成本風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，主要還是失去了償還短期或長(zhǎng)期借款的能力，以致于導(dǎo)致企業(yè)出現(xiàn)破產(chǎn)的可能性。毫無疑問，財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)都指向來一個(gè)方向，也就是投資成本。外部融資溢價(jià)將導(dǎo)致投資成本上升，直接減少了企業(yè)投資所需要的資金。破產(chǎn)概率的上升將降低企業(yè)預(yù)期的利潤(rùn)，也減少了企業(yè)的投資需求。破產(chǎn)的概率總結(jié)起來歸結(jié)于企業(yè)的實(shí)際收入和預(yù)期收入的差別導(dǎo)致的生存受到?jīng)_擊。后果就直接造成投資功能不夠規(guī)范，包括一個(gè)額外的解釋變量的生存概率。這個(gè)變量的優(yōu)勢(shì)相當(dāng)廣泛，研究者可以很自由的了解和模擬這個(gè)生存概率，也就是說企業(yè)在經(jīng)歷金融危機(jī)時(shí)，可以通過破產(chǎn)預(yù)測(cè)模型來分析和預(yù)測(cè)企業(yè)即將面臨的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和破產(chǎn)概率，在另一方面，這個(gè)可以理解為是財(cái)政限制，這些企業(yè)在財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)下，外部融資成本很高，企業(yè)當(dāng)然也面臨更高的破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。本文通過與德意志聯(lián)邦銀行的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，證明了一個(gè)事實(shí)，公司的投資和財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)都與不同的破產(chǎn)預(yù)測(cè)模型相聯(lián)系。結(jié)果顯示，一個(gè)企業(yè)他們的投資比其他生存概率具有更高的靈敏度，因此，從內(nèi)部和外部的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)進(jìn)行分析等各種其他方法都指出了財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，投資都與破產(chǎn)的概率可能是一個(gè)整體。FinancialRisks,BankruptcyProbabilities,andtheInvestmentBehaviourofEnterprisesKaiKirchesch*HamburgInstituteofInternationalEconomics(HWWA)NeuerJungfernstieg21-20347HamburgAbstractThelinkbetweeninvestmentandfinanceusuallyenterstheempiricalliteratureintheformoffinancialconstraintswhicharedefinedasthewedgebetweenthecostsofinternalandexternalfinanceorastheriskofbeingrationedonthecreditmarket.Inthiscontext,thesensitivityofinvestmentwithrespecttosingleinternalorexternalfinanceindicatorsisassumedtobeappropriatetoproxyfortheseconstraints.However,enterprisesthatrelyonexternalfundsdonotonlyfacethisexternalfinancepremiumandpotentialborrowinglimits,butalsotheriskofnotbeingabletomeettheirrepaymentobligationsandthustheriskofbankruptcy.FinancialRisksandFinancialConstraintsFazzari-Hubbard-Petersen(1988)werethe?rsttoinvestigatewhethercapitalmarketimperfectionsleadtocorporateunderinvestmentasaresultofinsu?cientlyavailableinternalfunds.Inordertoestimatethese?nancialconstraints,theyassumetheexistenceofasymmetricinformationandaresultinghierarchyof?nance,whilecreditrationingdoesnotoccur.Thepresumptionthatatleastsomeenterprisesareconstrainedasregardsthecostsofcreditsistestedbyquantifyingtheinvestmentsensitivityoftheseenterpriseswithrespecttotheircash?ow.Firmswithlowerdividendpayoutratiosareassumedtobemoreconstrainedonthecreditmarket,andthereforeareexpectedtoexhibitstrongercash?owsensitivities.Theempiricalresultscon?rmtheseassumptionsinthewaythatallgroupsofenterprisesexhibitsigni?cantcoe?cientsforthesesensitivities,andthose?rmswithhigherretentionratiosprovetobemoresensitivewithrespecttochangesintheircash?owthan?rmsthataredeemedtobeless?nanciallyconstrained.WhilethereisconsiderablesupportoftheresultsobtainedbyFazzari-Hubbard-Petersen,Kaplan-Zingales(1997)amongothersaddresscriticismconcerningtheusefulnessofcash?owsensitivitiestorepresent?nancialconstraintsbychallengingthemonotonicityassumptionofthesesensitivitieswithregardtothe?nancialconstraints.Additionally,theydisapprovethemethodofclassi?cationthatFazzari-Hubbard-Petersenapply.Cleary(1999)con?rmstheresultsobtainedbyKaplan-ZingalesusingalargesampleofU.S.enterprisesandemployingamoreobjectiveclassi?cationcriterionwhichisobtainedbyusingmultiplediscriminantanalysisanalogoustotheproceedingofAltman(1968).TheModelInthischapter,themodelofcorporateinvestmentbehaviorunderasymmetricinformationand?nancialriskswillbederived.Thespecialfeatureofthismodelis,asaddressedabove,theexplicitinclusionof?nancialrisksasawholeintotheinvestmentdecisionofenterprises.These?nancialrisksoccurinformofthe?rm’suncertaintyaboutitsfutureexistencewhichdependsonwhetherthe?rmisabletopaybackitsborrowedfundsornot.Thisriskofbankruptcyhastwoimplicationsfortheinvestmentbehaviouroftheenterprise,oneofwhichisthattheinterestratethe?rmhastopayforitsborrowedfundswilldependonthedegreeofthe?rm’s?nancialrisks.Hence,thecostofcapitalwillrisewiththedegreeofthe?rm’sindebtness.Secondly,thecompanyhastoaccountforitsdefaultriskbyweightingitsfuturepro?tswithitsprobabilityofsurvival.Asaconsequence,investmentprojectsmaybecomelesspro?tableifthe?rmaccumulatesborrowedfunds.TheBasicSettingTimeisdiscrete,indexedbyt∈{01}.Allvariablesinthecurrentperiodareknown,whereasallfuturevariablesarestochastic.Thetimehorizonis?nite.Thereexistsanin?nitenumberofenterprisesintheeconomythatisinvolvedintheproductionprocess.Each?rmIproducestheoutputYitwithperiodt’srealinputfactorscapital,Kiandlabor,Lit,accordingtotheusualneoclassicaltechnology,Yit=F(KitLit).Theconcaveproductionfunctionistwicecontinuouslydi?erentiableincapitalandlabor,withthetechnologybeingcharacterizedasusualbypositive,butdiminishingreturnswithrespecttoanyinputfactor.Changingthecapitalstockofacompanyentailsadjustmentcosts,G(IitKit),whichdependonthelevelofinvestment,Iit,andthecapitalstock,Kit.Theseadjustmentcostsareintroducedintothemodelintheformoflostoutputwhichmeansthatapartoftheproductionislostduetoaresourceconsumingprocessofinstallingnewcapital.Theadjustmentcostfunctionisconvexinbothitsargumentsand,asusual,itisassumedtobetwicecontinuouslydi?erentiablewithincreasingmarginalcosts.Thecapitalgoodthatisacquiredinperiodtwillbecomeproductiveinthesameperiod,aswillbede?nedlaterinthecapitalaccumulationconstraint.Theexistingcapitalofthepreviousperiodissubjecttodepreciationatthebeginningofthefollowingperiodattheconstanteconomicrateofdepreciationwhere0≤X≤1.Earningsof?rmibeforeinterestandtaxes,EBITit,arede?nedastherevenuefromproducingtheoutputgoodlessthelaboroutlaysandcapitaladjustmentcosts.Interestpaymentsserveasataxshieldintermsofthestatictradeo?hypotheses,whichmeansthatthe?rmisbalancingtherisingdistresscostscausedbyahigherdebtlevelwiththetaxbene?tsofdeductingtheassociatedinterestpaymentsfromcorporatetaxation.Since?rmsarenotnecessarilyincorporated,pro?tsthatarenotretainedinthecompanyareassumedtobepaidouttotheownersintheformofentrepreneurialpro?ts.Yet,theusualnotationfordividends,Dit,appliesforthelatterastheimplicationsforthemodelremainthesame.Theseentrepreneurialpro?tswillbepositiveiftheretainedearningsexceedtheamountofnewcapitalgoodsthattheenterpriseintendstopurchase.Sinceinvestmentis?nancedwithretainedearningsornetborrowing,thepossibilityofnegativeentrepreneurialpro?tsisexludedfromthemodel.Theownerofthe?rmisnotobligedtopaythe?rm’sdebtifitisnotabletocoveritsdebtpaymentswithitsearnings,sincethereisnocreditrationingand?rmsmayborrowasmuchastheywant.ThePro?tMaximizationoftheFirmAsderivedintheprevioussections,theinvestmentdecisionofthe?rmhastotakeplacesimultaneouslywiththedecisionaboutits?nancing.Indoingso,the?rmisawareofitsriskofdefaultandthustheriskofthe?rmvaluefallingtozeroinanyfutureperiod.Therefore,futurevaluesofthe?rmhavetobeweightedwiththeprobabilitytosurvive.Boththeamountofcapitalanddebtwillhaveanimpactonthisprobability,andthusrealand?nancialdecisionswillinteract.Thetimescheduleoftheinvestmentdecisionisasfollows:Afterthe?rmdecidesonitsdesiredlevelofnewcapitalandtherequiredamountofdebt,thebank?xestheinterestrateforthedemandedborrowedfundswiththelatterbeingtransferredtothe?rm.Now,thebankruptcythresholdcanbecalculated,beforethe?rm-speci?cshockisrealized,andtheoutputgoodisproducedandsold.Hereafter,bankruptciesaredetermined.Survivingcompaniescalculatetheirpro?ts,paybacktheirborrowedfundsandtheirinterestobligations,beforepayingouttheentrepreneurialpro?tstotheirowners.Bankruptcompanieswillbeliquidated,withthebanksseizingtheremainsandpayingthemonitoringcosts.TheInvestmentandFinancingDecisionoftheFirmTherearranged?rstorderconditionforcapital,equation(19),relatesthecostsofinvestingtodaytothecostsofpostponingtheinvestmentuntiltomorrow,andthusshowstheoptimalcapitalallocationpath.Ascaneasilybeseen,thestandardEulerequationforcapitalissubjecttosomeimportantextensionsduetotheintroductionoftaxes,adjustmentcosts,andthepossibilityofdefault.Thelefthandsideofequation(19)showsthemarginalinstallationandpurchasingcostsofinvestingtoday,withthelatterbeingtax-adjusted.Therighthandsidepresentstheopportunitycostsofdelayingtheinvestmentuntiltomorrow.Thesecostsincludetheexpecteddiscountedvalueofthecostsforpurchasingandinstallingthenewcapital,withtheformeragainbeingtax-adjusted,aswellastheforegonechangeinproductionlessthemarginalchangeoftheinstallationcostsduetothechangeinthecapitalstock.Additionally,the?rmhastotakeintoaccountthechangesofitsbankruptcyriskduetochangesinthelevelofcapitalanddebt.Thus,theopportunitycostsofpostponingtheinvestmentdecisionareweightedbytheprobabilityofsurvival.Sincecapitalbecomesproductiveimmediately,onlythecostsforthedelayedinvestmentprojecthavetobeweighted.Whilethe?rmhastobeartheopportunitycostsofnotearningtherevenuefromtoday’sinvestmentinanycase,itneedstopaythepostponedinvestmentprojectonlyincaseofsurvival.Togetherwiththecorporatetaxrate,thisweightingreducesthepresentvalueofanadditionalunitoftomorrow’scapital.Twoadditionalconsequencesofapotentialdefaulthavetobetakenintoaccountbothofwhicho?eranincentivetoinvestrathertodaythantomorrow.Firstly,suchachangeinthecapitalstockincreasesthechanceoffuturepro?tsbyloweringthedefaultprobability.Asaconsequence,theprobabilityofreceivingentrepreneurialpro?tsinthefutureandthusthepresentdiscountedvalueofanadditionalunitoftoday’scapitalincreases.Secondly,thisinvestmentlowersinterestratesandthusinterestpaymentsforthenecessaryborrowedfunds.Withthenewlyinvestedcapitalbecomingproductiveimmediately,andinterestratesbeing?xedafteritsinstallation,thecostsofcapitaldecreaseinthepresentperiod.TheDataTheempiricalanalysiswasperformedwith?rm-leveldatastemmingfromthecorporatebalancesheetdatabaseoftheDeutscheBundesbank.Itconstitutesthelargestsourceofaccountingdatafornon-?nancialenterprisesinGermany.AnextensivedescriptionisprovidedbyDeutscheBundesbank(1998)orStoess(2001).Thedatasetisbasedonthe?nancialstatementsthatenterprisessubmittedtotheGermancentralbankinconnectionwithbill-basedrediscountandlendingoperations.WiththebeginningoftheEuopeanMonetaryUnionintheyear1999,theBundesbankdiscontinueditsrediscountlendingoperationswhichisthereasonfortheyear1998beingthelastyearofthecoveredperiod.DuetoaccountingregulatorychangesinGermancorporatelawinlinewiththeharmonizationofnationalrequirementsto?nancialstatementsinthemid1980’s,theuseofdatapriortotheyear1987isnotpossibleforreasonsofcomparability.Thus,aperiodof12yearsrangingfrom1987to1998isavailableforthepresentinvestigation.SincethecoverageoftheEasternpartofGermanybeingratherunsatisfactory,andnodatabeingavailablefortheyearspriortotheGermanuni?cation,theanalysiswillberestrictedtoenterpriseshavingtheirprincipleo?ceintheWesternpartofGermanyConclusionFinancialriskstraditionallyenterthetheoreticalmodelsofinvestmentsuchastheqmodelortheEulerequationmodelintheformof?nancialconstraintsthatenterprisesarefacingasaconsequenceofinformationalasymmetrieswhiledecidingontheleveloftheirinvestment.Inthiscontext,?nancialconstraintsareunanimouslyde?nedastheriskpremiumthatenterpriseshavetobearinordertoraiseexternalfunds,orasalimitedaccesstoborrowedfunds.Testsfor?nancialconstraintsareperformedbyestimatingexcesssensitivitiesofinvestmentwithregardto?nancialindicatorsconcerningtheenterprises’internalorexternalfundsthatareassumedtobestapproximatetheseconstraints.However,theimpactof?nancialrisksasawholeratherthanmerely?nancialconstraintshasrarelybeenimplementedexplicitlyintheoreticalorempiricalinvestigationsdealingwiththeinteractionofthe?rms’?nancialspherewiththeirinvestmentdecisions.While?nancialriskscontainthewedgeinthecostsbetweeninternalandexternalfundsandtherewith?nancialconstraints,theyfurthermoreaccountforthepossibilityofthe?rmloosingitsabilitytorepayitsborrowedfundsandthusbeingsubjecttopotentialbankruptcy.Beyonddoubt,bothkindsofriskspointinthesamedirection.Theexternal?nancepremiumwillcausetheinvestmentcoststorisedirectlywhichlowersthe?rm’sdemandfornewcapital.Theprobabilityofbankruptcylowersexpectedfuturepro?tsandthusdampenstheenterprises’demandforinvestment,too.Theinclusionofthebankruptcyprobabilitieshastotakeplacebyweightingthefuturerevenuesofthecompanywiththeprobabilityofactuallyearningtheserevenues,andthustheprobabilityofsurvival.Asaconsequence,theresultingspeci?cationo