美國(guó)能源部發(fā)布建立網(wǎng)絡(luò)彈性能源系統(tǒng)的戰(zhàn)略 -National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy

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NationalCyber-InformedEngineeringStrategy

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NationalCyber-InformedEngineeringStrategy

NotefromtheSecretary

Intoday’sincreasinglyinterconnectedworld,America’ssafetyandwell-beingdependoncybersecurity.

That’swhyPresidentBidenconsidershardeningthenationagainstcyberattacksatoppriorityforhisadministration—andonethathasonlygrowninimportanceasthecountryembarksonthebiggestbuildoutofcriticalinfrastructureandmanufacturingcapacityinageneration.

Eachstageofthecleanenergytransformationthatwillbringwithitanopportunityandanimperativetofurtherincreasesecurity,reliability,andresilienceinAmerican’senergysector.TheCyber-InformedEngineering(CIE)Strategyshowsushowwecanseizetheopportunitytoaddressthesechallenges.

Thisframework,grownfromearlierCongressionaldirectionregardingthreatstothenation’senergysector,advocatesforanevolutionaryshiftacrosstheenergyindustryandrelatedinstitutions,includingresearchers,standardsbodies,Federalpartners,andothers.Itsrecommendationsreflectexpertiseandinsightfromenergycompanies,energysystemsandcybersecuritymanufacturers,standardsbodies,researchers,DOENationalLaboratories,andFederalpartnersinthecybersecurityandengineeringmissionspace.Itencouragestheadoptionofa“security-by-design”mindsetwithintheEnergySectorIndustrialBase,whichreferstobuildingcybersecurityintoourenergysystemsattheearliestpossiblestagesratherthantryingtosecurethesecriticalsystemsafterdeployment.ThankstoPresidentBiden’sBipartisanInfrastructureLaw,wecanmatchtheCIEframeworkwithnewinvestmentsincleanenergyinfrastructureandmanufacturingtobeginbuildingmoresecurecleanenergysystemshereathome.

CIEfurtherguidesourcyberworkforcedevelopmentbyhelpingusandourpartnersfocusonthestrategicintersectionbetweencybersecurityandengineering,addressinggapsinhowwetrainengineersandtechniciansandprovidingthemwiththemeanstobuildinsecurityfromthegroundup.Whenourworkforceisproperlyeducatedandsupported,wearebetterpositionedtomanufactureandmaintainthetoolsthathelpuspreventandquicklyrecoverfromcyberattacks.

Thisframeworkoffersusaclearpathforwardtothefutureofenergysecurity,inwhichAmericawillstandattheforefrontofglobalinnovationandcleanenergymanufacturing.FollowingtheCIEstrategywillhelpensurethatourgridisnotonlyresistanttoinitialattacks,butresilientenoughtopreventandmitigatedisruptionstoourenergysupplies,economy,andeverydaylives.

I’dliketooffermydeepgratitudeandappreciationfortheSecuringEnergyInfrastructureExecutiveTaskForce(SEIETF)whohelpedustakeacriticalstepforwardbyleadingthedevelopmentoftheCIEstrategy.Thework,however,continues.Itwilltakeclosecollaborationbetweengovernmentandindustrytoensureenergysystemsofthefuturearedesignedandbuiltforsecurityandreliability.Aswe

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pursueourtransitiontoacompletelycleanenergysector,wewillkeepsecurityandreliabilityfrontandcenter,andwillneedtostandshoulder-to-shoulderwithourinter-agencypartnersattheCybersecurityandInfrastructureSecurityAgency(CISA),NationalInstituteforStandardsandTechnology(NIST),andmoretoensurethisCIEstrategyisimplementedtoaddresscurrentandfuturethreatlandscapes.Together,wewillsecureourenergysectoranddeliverastronger,cleanerfuture.

JenniferGranholm

Secretary

U.S.DepartmentofEnergy

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NotefromtheDirector

TheU.S.energysectorfacesever-evolvingcybersecuritythreats.Accordingtothe2022OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence(DNI)AnnualThreatAssessment1,ouradversariesmaintaincapabilitiestolaunchcyberattacksthatcoulddisruptcriticalinfrastructure,includingindustrialcontrolsystemsintheU.S.energysector.Cybersecurityattacksoncriticalinfrastructureareparticularlyconsequentialandensuringthesecurity,reliability,andresilienceofthesesystemsisatoppriorityfortheU.S.DepartmentofEnergy’s(DOE)OfficeofCybersecurity,EnergySecurity,andEmergencyResponse(CESER)anditspartnersingovernmentandtheprivatesector.

Thiswilltakeaconcerted,collaborativeeffortbetweengovernmentandindustrytoensureenergysystemsofthefuturearebuiltsecurelytoprovidereliableenergytothenation.Buildingenergysystemssecurelybydesignmeansensuringallphasesoftheenergysystemlifecycle–fromdesignanddevelopmenttoinstallationandoperation–aresecureandcanquicklyrecoverfromcyberattacks.Thenationnowhasanunprecedentedopportunitytoshapethecybersecurityofourmostcriticalinfrastructurefordecadestocome.

ThereleaseoftheCyber-InformedEngineering(CIE)supportsCESER’sfivepriorities.Thoseprioritiesinclude:1)Strengtheningthevisibilityofcyberthreatsinenergysystems;2)Addressingsupplychainrisks;3)Promotingsecurity-andresilience-by-design;4)BuildingcyberandresiliencecapacityintheprivatesectorandtheState,local,territorial,andtribalcommunities;and5)Beingpreparedtorespondinpartnershipwithourgovernmentandindustrypartnerswhenacyberincidentoccursintheenergysector.CIE,inmanyways,cutsacrossallthoseprioritiesthroughitsfivepillars:awareness,education,development,currentinfrastructure,andfutureinfrastructure.

CIEisanemergingframework,originatedbytheNationalLaboratoriesandadvancedbyDOE,tobuildcybersecurityintothenation’senergysystemsattheearliestpossiblestagesratherthantryingtosecurethesecriticalsystemsafterdeployment.CESERleadsDOE’seffortstoimplementCIEtoprotectcriticalenergyinfrastructureassetsandleveragesexpertiseofitsintra-agencypartners.Forexample,CESERworkscloselywithofficesacrosstheDepartmentsuchastheOfficeofEnergyEfficiencyandRenewableEnergy,theOfficeofElectricity,theOfficeofIntelligenceandCounterintelligence,andotherstoensurecybersecurityisbuiltintoenergysystemsoftodayandintothefuture.

Asapowersystemsengineer,Iknowhowcriticalitistoensurethatcybersecurityisbuiltintostandardsusedtodesignenergysystemsofthefuture.Tothatend,wewillneedpartnerswithstandardsbodiessuchastheInstituteofElectricalandElectronicsEngineers(IEEE)andtheInternationalElectrotechnical

1OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,AnnualThreatAssessmentoftheU.S.IntelligenceCommunity(April2022),4-24.

/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf

.

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Commission,educatorsandresearchersinacademia,andmanyotherstohelpuschampiontheCIEprinciples.Weneedtoensurethatcybersecurityissynonymouswithreliabilityandsafetyinstandardsdevelopmentworkinggroupsandinthehallwaysofengineeringcollegestoensurewearesuccessful.Wecanaccomplishmuchmorewhenwetackletheseissuescollaboratively.

Further,whileDOEisleadingthiseffortfromanenergyindustryperspective,theoverallapproachwillrequireclosecollaborationandsignificantworkwithitsinter-agencypartnersattheCybersecurityandInfrastructureSecurityAgency(CISA),NationalInstituteforStandardsandTechnology(NIST),andotherstoensuretheCIErecommendationshereinareimplementedacrossthecountrytoaddressthecurrentandfuturethreatlandscapes.

IextendmythankstotheSecuringEnergyInfrastructureExecutiveTaskForceandIdahoNationalLaboratorywhowereinstrumentalinthedevelopmentofthestrategy.TherecommendationshereinreflecttheexpertiseofEnergySectorIndustrialBase(ESIB)stakeholderscomprisedofenergycompanies,manufacturers,standardsbodies,researchers,DOENationalLaboratories,andFederalpartnersinthecybersecurityandengineeringmissionspace.

PueshKumar

Director

OfficeofCybersecurity,EnergySecurity,andEmergencyResponse(CESER)

U.S.DepartmentofEnergy

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

NOTEFROMTHESECRETARY 2

NOTEFROMTHEDIRECTOR 4

EXECUTIVESUMMARY 7

CIEInPractice:ExamplesofEngineeringDecisionsInformedbyCyberRisks 9

INTRODUCTION 10

DefiningtheProblem 11

PrinciplesofCIE 12

KEYPREMISESOFTHENATIONALCIESTRATEGY 15

STRATEGICPILLARSANDRECOMMENDEDACTIONS 16

THECIESTRATEGYASAMODELFOROTHERCRITICALINFRASTRUCTURESECTORS 31

NEXTSTEPS 32

APPENDIXA:SECURINGENERGYINFRASTRUCTUREEXECUTIVETASKFORCEPARTICIPANTS 33

SeniorExecutiveGroup 33

SeniorTechnicalGroup 34

TechnicalProjectTeam:NationalCIEStrategy 35

APPENDIXB:EXAMPLESOFCIEIMPLEMENTATION 36

Consequence-drivenCyber-informedEngineering(CCE) 36

IntegratingCIEintoNuclearMicroreactorDesign 37

CybersecurityfortheOperationalTechnologyEnvironment(CyOTE?) 37

CIEinEducation 37

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Cyber-informedengineering(CIE)offersanopportunityto“engineerout”somecyberriskacrosstheentiredeviceorsystemlifecycle,startingfromtheearliestpossiblephaseofdesign—themostoptimaltimetointroducebothlowcostandeffectivecybersecurityapproaches.

CIEisanemergingmethodtointegratecybersecurityconsiderationsintotheconception,design,development,andoperationofanyphysicalsystemthathasdigitalconnectivity,monitoring,orcontrol.CIEapproachesusedesigndecisionsandengineeringcontrolstomitigateoreveneliminateavenuesforcyber-enabledattack,orreducetheconsequenceswhenanattackoccurs.

ExecutiveSummary

ThePersistentCybersecurityChallenge

Theindustrialcontrolsystemsthatoperatecriticalenergyinfrastructurefaceincreasinglysevereandsophisticatedcyberattacksfromdeterminedadversaries.Toavoiddisruptionstothenation’scriticalenergyfunctions,energysystemsmustbeengineeredtowithstandintentionalcybercompromise,exploitation,andmisuse.

Whiletraditionalengineeringincludesconsiderablesafetyandfailuremodeanalysis,theseriskmanagementapproachesrarelyaddresstherisksintroducedbyanintelligentandcapableadversarywiththegoalofdenying,disrupting,ordestroyingacriticalfunctionusingcybermeans.Mostcybersecuritysolutionsare“boltedon”lateintheengineeringlifecycle,ratherthanintrinsicallybuiltintothesystemdesign.

TheOpportunityofCyber-InformedEngineering

NationalCIEStrategyDirective

EnactedintolawonDecember20,2019,Section5726oftheNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2020directedtheSecretaryofEnergytoestablishagovernment-industryworkinggrouptoaccomplishaseriesoftasks,includingtodevelopanationalcyber-informedengineeringstrategytoisolateanddefendenergyinfrastructurefromsecurityvulnerabilitiesandexploitsinthemostcriticalsystems.TheSecuringEnergyInfrastructureExecutiveTaskForcedevelopedthisNationalCIEStrategyforadoptionbytheDepartmentofEnergy.

Whilespecializedinformationtechnology(IT)andoperationaltechnology(OT)cybersecurityexpertsbringstrongcybersecuritycapabilitiestosecuringtoday’senergysystems,manyoftheengineersandtechnicianswhodesignandoperatetheseenergysystemscurrentlylacksufficientcybersecurityeducationandtrainingtoengineersystemsforcybersecurityfromtheoutset,inthesamewaytheyengineerthesesystemsforsafety.

ANationalCIEStrategyforEnergy

Pursuanttocongressionaldirection,2theU.S.DepartmentofEnergyandtheSecuringEnergyInfrastructureExecutiveTaskForcehavedevelopedastrategytoenabletheenergysectortoleadthenationinincorporatingCIEintothedesignandoperationofinfrastructuresystemsthatrelyondigitalmonitoringorcontrols.

2Section5726oftheNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2020.

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TheNationalCIEStrategyisbuiltonfiveintegratedpillars(see

Figure1)

,offeringasetofrecommendationstoincorporateCIEasacommonpracticeacrosstheenergysector.Together,theseapproachesprovidethebodyofknowledge,thediverseandexpandedworkforce,andtheengineeringandmanufacturingcapacitytoapplyCIEtotoday’senergyinfrastructure,andtoengineerfutureenergysystemstoeliminateorreducetheabilityofacyber-enabledattacktosucceed.

Figure1.NationalCyber-InformedEngineeringStrategy

CIEprovidesthebasisandapproachforinstitutingacultureofcybersecuritywithintheenergyindustry,akintotheindustry’sstrongcultureofsafety.Leadingthisculturalshiftwillbetheengineers,industrialcontrolsystemtechnicians,cybersecurityprofessionals,manufacturers,andownersandoperatorsintheEnergySectorIndustrialBase.TheNationalCIEStrategypillarsprovideastrong,integratedfoundationtoacceleratethisculturalshift.ThenextstepinmovingCIEforwardwillbetoconveneabroadsetofstakeholderstodevelopdetailedimplementationplansforeachpillarofthestrategy.

WhilethisNationalCyber-InformedEngineeringStrategyhasbeendevelopedfortheenergysector,itcanserveasaleverageablemodelforothercriticalinfrastructuresectorstoadoptandincorporateCIEintoindustrypractices.CIEconceptsandstrategiesincludefoundationalengineeringprinciplesthatapplytoalltypesofengineeringforcriticalinfrastructure.EmbeddingCIEmethodsintotheeducationandcredentialingofthenation’snextgenerationofengineersandindustrialcontrolsystemtechnicianswillcreateacyber-awareworkforcethatcandesignandmanufactureresilientinfrastructuresystemsacrosssectors.

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CIEInPractice:ExamplesofEngineeringDecisionsInformedbyCyberRisks

CIEguidesanengineeringteamtoconsiderandmitigatethepotentialforcybercompromisethroughouttheengineeringdesignlifecycle,leveragingengineeringsolutionstolimitthepathwaysforcybersabotage,exploitation,theft,andmisusewithinthesystem.

InafullymatureCIEdesign,requirementswouldbedevelopedtodescribenotonlyexpectationsforhowthesystemwouldfunction,butalsospecifichigh-consequencecyberimpactswhichmustbepreventedwithinthesystemdesign.Duringthedesignprocess,theteamwouldmakeaffirmativedecisionsabouthowtobestaccomplishthoserequirements,whetherbyenactingmanualengineeringcontrols,limitingdigitalfunctionality,employingoperationalcybersecuritysolutions,orenactingmonitoringschemes,orcombinationsofalltheabove.Theriskofafuturecybercompromisewouldbetrackedanddiminishedasafundamentalengineeringrisk.

Whatdoesthismeanintoday’spractice?ThefollowinghypotheticalscenarioshighlightthetypesofdesignchangesandengineeringdecisionsthatcouldresultfromapplyingCIEduringthedesignandbuildprocess:

?A60-percentdesignreviewofagreenfieldwatertreatmentplantrevealsthatthedesignengineerreplacedthemanualhand-off-autoswitches—whichallowoperationsstafftoruntheplantmanually—withanetwork-basedcommunicationdevicewithoutmanualoverrides.Theteamelectstoundothismodification,justifyingthehighercostofconstructionwiththebenefitofassuredmanualcontrolsintheeventofacybercompromise.

?Adesignteamnotesthatthevibrationtripsensorforagasturbineisaddressableonthesameoperationaltechnologynetworkwiththeturbine,andthus,couldbecompromisedalongwiththeturbinebyanadversarywhogainsaccesstothenetwork.Becausethissensorisasafetyfeaturefortheturbine,theteamchoosestodeployitonanisolatednetwork—sothatitismoreinaccessibletocyberadversaries—andtoemployahigherlevelofsecuritycontrols,includingamonitoringsystem,toheightenawarenessofnetworkanomaliesaffectingthesensor.

?Acyberexerciserevealsthepotentialforadigitalcontrollertobeusedtosupplyaharmfulamountoftreatmentchemicalsintoaprocess,potentiallycausingdamagetoplantequipment.Theengineeringteamisunabletoremovethecontrollerfromserviceortoenactmanualoverrides,sotheychoosetoadoptanengineeringcontrollimitingthechemicalavailabletotheprocesstoanamountbelowtheharmfullevel.ThiscontrolisenactedthroughphysicalchangestothedispensingtankanddocumentedintheStandardOperatingProcedures.

?Duringthevalueengineeringprocessforawastewatertreatmentplantcontrolsystem,thedesignteamdecidedtosavemoneybyremovingredundanthardwiredcontrolsandreplacingthemwithdigitalinput/outputsfromtheindustrialcontroller.Duringareview,theengineeringteamnotedthatthisdecisionwouldremoveallmanualoperatingcapabilitiesfromthepumps,meaningasuccessfulransomwareattackonthecontrolsystemcouldleavethepumpsinoperable,resultinginpotentialspillsandequipmentdamage.Theprojectownerelectedtoabsorbtheadditionalcostinordertoensurethepotentialformanualcontrolsintheeventofacyberattack.

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Today,engineersandindustrialcontrolsystemtechniciansbuildenergysystemswithspecificgoalsforsafety,reliability,andfunctionality.Whilesystemsengineeringincludesconsiderablesafetyandfailuremodeanalysis,cybersecurityrisksareoftennotspecificallyaddressed—particularlytherisksofintentionalcybercompromise,exploitation,andmisuse.Simplyput,traditionalengineeringriskmanagementapproachesrarelyaddresstherisksintroducedbyanintelligentandcapableadversarywiththegoalofhigh-consequencecyber-enabledimpacts.4

Asaresult,mostcybersecuritysolutionsareintroducedlateintheengineeringlifecycle,ifatall,providinginadequateandmorecostlyprotectionforthenation’senergyindustrialcontrolsystems(ICS).This

Introduction

Currently,cybersecurityformostcriticalinfrastructurecontrolsystemsisaddressedseparatelyfromsystemdesignandengineering.Thisgaphasresultedinanever-growinglistofadditivesecuritytechnologiesthatareintroducedafterthefacttomitigatecybervulnerabilities.Addingsecuritytechnologiesafterthefactismorecostlyandlesseffective.Whatifcriticalenergyinfrastructuresystemsweredesignedandoperatedwithcybersecuritybuiltin,ratherthanboltedonafterdeployment?CIEprovidesawaytogreatlyreduce,andinsomecaseseliminate,cyberrisksfromtheoutsetandincreaseoverallefficiencyandeffectiveness.

CIEisanemergingapproachthataimstointegratecybersecurityconsiderationsintotheconception,design,build,andoperationofanyphysicalsystemthathasdigitalconnectivity,monitoring,orcontrol.3CIEcanbebroadlydefinedas:Theinclusionofcybersecurityconsiderationsasafoundationalelementofengineeringriskmanagementforanyfunctionaidedbydigitaltechnology.

CIELinkagetoZeroTrustandSecurebyDesign

Cyber-informedengineeringembraces“securebydesign”and“zerotrust”softwaresecuritystrategies,andexpandstheseconceptsbeyondsoftwareengineeringtotheengineeringofcyber-physicalsystems.

Secure-by-designsoftwaredevelopmentshiftsthesecurityfocusfromfindingandpatchingvulnerabilitiestoeliminatingdesignflawsinthearchitectureofasoftwaresystem.CIEexpandsthisconcepttobuildsecurearchitecturesintophysicalinfrastructuresystemsthathavedigitalaccessorcontrol.

Azero-trustarchitectureremovesanyimplicittrustfromdevicesoruseraccounts,movingawayfromtheconceptofasecurityperimeterthatkeepsattackersout.CIEembodiesthisapproachbyassumingthatcompromiseislikely,anddeployingresilientlayereddefensesthatminimizetheconsequencespossiblewhenanassetorcredentialiscompromised.

CIErepresentstheDepartmentofEnergy’sstrategyforimplementingtheseapproachesintoenergyinfrastructure.

approachmissessignificantopportunitiesto“engineerout”cyberrisk—thatis,usingearlydesigndecisionsandengineeringcontrolstomitigateoreveneliminateavenuesforcyber-enabledattack,orreducetheconsequenceswhenanattackoccurs.CIEembracesmanycomplementarysecurityapproachestoday,suchas“zerotrust”and“securebydesign,”conceptuallyextendingthembeyondapplicationtosoftwaresystemstoincludeapplicationtocyber-physicalinfrastructure.

CIEproposesashiftinfocusinthewaythenation’sengineers,controlsystemtechnicians,manufacturers,andoperatorsapproachsecurityinenergysystemsdesign.Researchersbegantodefine

3SeemoreinformationonCIEat

/cie

.

4High-consequenceimpacts,achievedusingcybermeans,thatmaydisruptenergysectorfunctionsthatarecriticaltothenation.

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Theadoptionofdigitaltechnologyintocriticaloperationalandengineeringfunctionscanintroducevulnerabilitiesthatcouldcompromisetheavailability,integrity,trustworthiness,orauthenticityofthecomplexcontrolsystemsservingthosefunctions.Unlesscybersecurityrisksareexplicitlyconsideredwithincurrentapproachestohazardevaluation,6thesevulnerabilitiesarenottypicallycaptured,missingcriticalopportunitiestoreduceoreliminatethemduringengineeringanddesign.Theengineerswhooversee,invent,design,create,install,maintain,anddisposeofthesecomplexcyber-physicalsystemsmaylackthenecessaryrequirements,context,7education,practices,andtools(inorderofdescendingimportance)toidentify,understand,andmitigatetheserisks.Instead,engineersandthetechnicianswhosupportthemtoooftenrelyontheexternalapplicationofcybersecuritymeasuresbyspecializedpractitionerslateinthesystemimplementationlifecycle.Thiscurrentstate

theCIEapproachin2017.5intheinterveningyears,thefederalgovernmenthassupportedseveraleffortsthatreducecyberriskstothenationbyapplyingCIEprinciplestocriticalenergyinfrastructureandnewsystemdesigns.However,thereisnotyetamatureengineeringdisciplineforidentifyingandaddressingcybersecurityriskearlyinintheconceptanddesignphases.TherearealsofewcommonlyappliedstandardsorguidelinestoperformsystemsengineeringriskmanagementforICScybersecurityrisksthroughoutthesystemslifecycle.

CIEremainsapromisingapproachthatisnotyetwidelyknown,understood,orimplemented.ThisNationalCIEStrategyoffersanintegratedsetofrecommendationstobringabouttheawareness,education,andresourcestointegrateCIEasacommonpracticewithintheEnergySectorIndustrialBase.

DefiningtheProblem

Engineers—andthetechnicianswhosupporttheengineeringprocess—arecriticaltothedesign,implementation,andsecureoperationofcomplexenergyinfrastructureandcontrolsystems.Eveninthiscriticalrole,engineersoftenlacktraining,abodyofknowledge,andotherreinforcementofcybersecuritypracticestoeffectivelyaddresscyberthreatsinenergyinfrastructure.Giventhecurrentandincreasingcriticalityofdigitalcontrolsystemswithincriticalenergyinfrastructure,thisisaprioritygapthatmustbeaddressedbytheengineeringcommunityandthenation.

CurrentState

AlignmentofCIEwithIndustryStandardsandGuidelines

TheNationalCIEStrategywillinformtheevolutionandmaturationofindustrystandardsandguidelinestoalignwithCIEprinciplesandprovidemanufacturersandassetownerswithessentialtoolstodemonstratetheiradoptionofCIE.RecentguidanceshowsstrongalignmentwithCIE.AlignmentwithCIEcanbeanearlytargetforthestandardsspecificationactivitiesrecommendedintheDevelopmentpillar.ExamplesincludetheInternationalSocietyofAutomation(ISA)/InternationalElectrotechnicalCommission(IEC)62443seriesofstandards,theNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST)SP800-160guideline,andtheSAEInternationalG-32Cyber-PhysicalSystemsSecurityCommitteestandardswork.

5RobertS.Anderson,JacobBenjamin,VirginiaL.Wright,LuisQuinones,andJonathanPaz,Cyber-InformedEngineering,IdahoNationalLaboratory,2017.

doi:10.2172/1369373

.

6Suchas:failuremodeseffectsanalysis(FMEA),What-Ifanalysis,hazardandoperabilitystudy(HAZOP),faulttreeanalysis(FTA),andeventtreeanalysis(ETA).

7Contextreferstothebroaderenvironmentinwhich