高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口翻譯

1、高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口，是發(fā)展中國家的技術(shù)突破的標志還是數(shù)據(jù)上的虛像？【資料來源】：該文章為隆德大學 DIME WP 2.3 工作室的“產(chǎn)業(yè)創(chuàng)新動態(tài)和知識的特點”而準備， 2006年4月26日至27日。【作者】：Martin Srholec，奧斯陸大學創(chuàng)新和文化技術(shù)中心。摘要： 高科技產(chǎn)品的專業(yè)化經(jīng)常用于加大技術(shù)出口的力度，而發(fā)展中國家正日益成為這些產(chǎn)品的出口商，有的甚至成為高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口中最為專門化的國家。這篇文章仔細研究了根據(jù)技術(shù)密集性進行出口歸類的分類標準的相關(guān)性。結(jié)果表明，高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的專業(yè)化通常不會與發(fā)展中國家的本土技術(shù)能力同步發(fā)展。而據(jù)國內(nèi)進口產(chǎn)品的分析表明，大比例的高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出

2、口實際上可以歸因于日益國際化的電子生產(chǎn)系統(tǒng)的分散性對于貿(mào)易統(tǒng)計有深刻的影響。計量經(jīng)濟學的構(gòu)架證實國內(nèi)的技術(shù)能力與電子產(chǎn)品的出口性能相關(guān)，正是由于對電子元件的進口傾向使得迄今為止國內(nèi)各地在電子產(chǎn)品的進口專業(yè)化方面有如此大的差異。本文將以一些關(guān)于政策和未來研究方面的啟示作為總結(jié)。高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口方面的專業(yè)化趨勢：什么樣的指示？在學術(shù)界，眾所周知經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展需要結(jié)構(gòu)性的變化，因此在研究中分析結(jié)構(gòu)性的轉(zhuǎn)變也是非常重要的一個方面。由于經(jīng)濟的規(guī)模和范圍的擴大、出口的多樣化以及與基于剝削自然資源的出口相比通常具備更高的技能和技術(shù)強度這些原因，我們可以理所當然地認為進入到制造業(yè)出口的時代將會給我們帶來更大的發(fā)展

3、機遇。雖然初級資源型貿(mào)易和加工貿(mào)易之間的區(qū)別相對容易辨別，但是加工貿(mào)易的技術(shù)強度之間的區(qū)分卻變得復雜得多。 如上所述，習慣上來說，通過比較各個國家的高科技產(chǎn)品專業(yè)化之間的比較，我們就可以捕捉到技術(shù)的出口力度。圖一提供了一個關(guān)于各個國家相關(guān)的可用數(shù)據(jù)之間的比較（在2003年的108個國家的樣本）。圖中垂直軸繪制的是商品出口中的高科技產(chǎn)品比例，而水平先則表示電子產(chǎn)品出口中的專業(yè)化。虛線則表示樣本的平均數(shù)，它把整個圖表分為四個象限，即沿著兩個方向分為以下/以上的平均系數(shù)，以此表明這些國家的產(chǎn)品在出口中的專業(yè)化程度。 圖一 2003年高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品與電子產(chǎn)品的專業(yè)化高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的數(shù)據(jù)是以世界發(fā)展指標

4、數(shù)據(jù)集（世界銀行，2005）為基礎(chǔ)的，它指高研發(fā)強度的產(chǎn)品，諸如航空航天，計算機，醫(yī)藥，科學儀器和電氣機械等。這與經(jīng)合組織的分類定義是一致的，而且與基于Pavitt的分類科學并得到普遍認可的出口行業(yè)相當接近。電子產(chǎn)品出口可以COMTRADE數(shù)據(jù)庫（聯(lián)合國2005年）中獲得，它并覆蓋了以下產(chǎn)品的相關(guān)貿(mào)易：辦公、會計和計算機械（75）；電臺、電視和通訊設(shè)備（76）；電氣機械（77）；以及醫(yī)療、精密和光學儀器（87，881，884和885）。所有的代碼都是根據(jù)SITC, rev. 3而來。 大多數(shù)國家在高科技產(chǎn)品出口的份額上一直保持低于平均水平，而大部分的低收入國家的高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口報告甚至可以忽略

5、不計，即使高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的專業(yè)化絕不是最先進的國家的特權(quán)。然而，最引人注目的事實是專門從事高科技產(chǎn)品出口的國家是菲律賓。在那里，幾乎有三分之二的出口都屬于高科技類。其他高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口專業(yè)化的國家還包括馬耳他、新加坡、馬來西亞和臺灣，其中超過三分之一的出口都是高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品。此外還有幾個隨手可得的關(guān)于發(fā)展中國家或新興國家的典型例子，如中國、泰國、哥斯達黎加、墨西哥、匈牙利、韓國等在高科技領(lǐng)域也表現(xiàn)的相當出色。在仔細觀察其結(jié)構(gòu)之后就可發(fā)現(xiàn)，在大多數(shù)國家的高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口中，電子產(chǎn)品占大部分的比重，且這種匹配關(guān)系在專業(yè)化程度高的國家表現(xiàn)的尤其明顯。這些國家通常以有限范圍內(nèi)的電子產(chǎn)品為主要的高新技術(shù)

6、出口產(chǎn)品。高科技產(chǎn)品出口的專業(yè)化與電子產(chǎn)品出口的整體相關(guān)性非常高。圖1顯示，這些指標在全國各地的差異超過了80%，如果排除一些重要的出色者的話那么差異會更大。因此，在下面的章節(jié)中，我們將會集中分析狹義上的電子貿(mào)易，以此作為一個具有廣泛代表性的高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口分析。這些到底是什么意思呢？它告訴我們什么呢？僅就高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的角度看，人們會認為很多發(fā)展中國家在科技發(fā)展這個層面已經(jīng)取得了很大成就。如果從高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的統(tǒng)計數(shù)字上看，甚至會有人認為這些國家在經(jīng)濟技術(shù)上已經(jīng)超越了日本、美國、歐盟。Srholec通過舉例的方式直接比較了經(jīng)合組織地區(qū)的國家高科技領(lǐng)域的研發(fā)力度。通過比較產(chǎn)生的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，經(jīng)

7、合組織成員國中的那些收入比較低的國家例如墨西哥、波蘭、斯洛伐克、匈牙利和捷克共和國等國家，他們在產(chǎn)品科技研究發(fā)展強度仍然比那些通過對高科技產(chǎn)品和其他制造業(yè)實施差異稅額征收的手段來限制高新科技企業(yè)發(fā)展的發(fā)達國家的科技研究發(fā)展水平要低得多。這些都讓我們很難認為這些國家都屬于高科技發(fā)展的國家。盡管發(fā)展中國家在高科技產(chǎn)品的研究發(fā)展上的投入還很低，但是對于那些非經(jīng)合組織成員國關(guān)于高科技研究發(fā)展數(shù)據(jù)也是可以進行比較的。高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的發(fā)展和科技發(fā)展的支出的經(jīng)濟力度并不是成比例的。貧富懸殊是菲律賓、馬耳他和馬來西亞最引人注目的地方，這些國家的另一個比較特殊的地方在于這些國家在高新科技領(lǐng)域的出口占到總出口的

8、45%，在那些高新科技領(lǐng)域出口所占比例稍微低點的國家例如哥斯達黎加、泰國和墨西哥，他們的高科技研究發(fā)展的支出費用仍地遠低于GDP的1%。因此，這些實例能夠證明，國家高速發(fā)展的高新技術(shù)出口或許不是因為其具有先進的技術(shù)能力。這些都證明了這樣的假設(shè)：高新技術(shù)的發(fā)展已經(jīng)把國際生產(chǎn)分散，一個科技發(fā)展落后的國家仍然可以制造出具有高科技含量的產(chǎn)品。隨著外資企業(yè)的增多，東亞地區(qū)已經(jīng)發(fā)展成為高科技制造業(yè)的集聚地，但是在這一地區(qū)，定位在“第一梯隊”的新型工業(yè)化國家和其他地區(qū)的相關(guān)科技能力還存在一定的差距。亞洲的一些高收入國家例如新加坡、臺灣、韓國和日本，他們的高新技術(shù)出口和研發(fā)強度都排在全球前15位，其他的亞洲國

9、家的科技能力則遠遠落后于他們。由于擁有龐大的市場規(guī)模和獨特的發(fā)展軌跡，中國在科技研發(fā)方面則屬于一個特殊情況。在高科技產(chǎn)品研究發(fā)展強度方面，中國已經(jīng)超越了一些高收入國家例如愛爾蘭和南歐的一些國家。由于經(jīng)濟發(fā)達地區(qū)和偏遠地區(qū)的地區(qū)之間存在差異，中國的一些地區(qū)可能保持著高于全國平均水平的高科技產(chǎn)品研究發(fā)展強度，甚至接近發(fā)達國家的研究發(fā)展水平。正如前面提到的，日益發(fā)展的高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口和當?shù)氐目萍寄芰薮蟛町惐澈箅[藏著的是當今科技發(fā)展和相關(guān)制造業(yè)發(fā)展的分離。相關(guān)事實似乎證明高科技研發(fā)活動高度依附于空間，并且最終會形成地區(qū)化。雖然目前在世界范圍內(nèi)對于高科技研發(fā)的海外投資日益增加，但是這些投資主要都來自于

10、發(fā)達國家。對企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)的分析表明，在那些企業(yè)技術(shù)落后于世界科學技術(shù)發(fā)展前沿的國家，例如捷克共和國，相比較于內(nèi)資企業(yè)，外資企業(yè)更不太愿意冒險對高科技研發(fā)活動進行投資。在許多發(fā)展中國家，盡管國家吸引了主要以制造業(yè)為基礎(chǔ)的全球生產(chǎn)商的生產(chǎn)資料的進入，高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口激增，但是高新技術(shù)依然集中在別的國家。這種現(xiàn)象的產(chǎn)生并不讓我們感到奇怪。雖然高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口對于發(fā)展中國家當?shù)乜萍寄芰Φ陌l(fā)展的幫助很小，但是很多人認為高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)仍然能夠憑借其潛在的溢出效應對當?shù)氐陌l(fā)展有所助益。然而，知識溢出效應的涉及范圍到底有多大，我們?nèi)匀徊荒茴A測。正如先進的文獻資料所言，溢出效應的范圍應當限于當?shù)?，因為知識是隱形的對空

11、間具有高度依附性的。我們需要有適當?shù)奈漳芰?，從溢出效應中收益。技術(shù)的價值不僅僅在于能夠提供生產(chǎn)，更在于它具有可傳播性；當然，當技術(shù)越是復雜時，技術(shù)在地區(qū)間的傳播就越發(fā)困難。由于基于科技而產(chǎn)生的知識外溢是具有界限的(國家邊界或者是其他有關(guān)的界限)并且受到當?shù)氐奈漳芰χ萍s，因此最終決定知識外溢效果的因素是在當?shù)亻_展活動的實際技術(shù)水平而不是一般行業(yè)的技術(shù)強度。High-tech exports from developing countries: A symptom of technology spurts or statistical illusion? Martin SrholecCentr

12、e for Technology, Innovation and Culture (TIK), University of OsloPaper for the DIME WP 2.3 workshop on “Industrial innovation dynamics and knowledge characteristics, 26-27 April 2006, Lund University Abstract Specialization in high-tech products is frequently used to capture technology intensity of

13、 exports. Developing countries are increasingly becoming exporters of these products, and some may even be among the most deeply specialized countries in the high-tech exports. The paper scrutinizes the relevance of the taxonomies that classify exports by technological intensity. It is shown that sp

14、ecialization in high-tech exports typically does not appear in tandem with indigenous technological capabilities in developing countries. The analysis of intra-product imports suggests that the bulk of high-tech exports can actually be attributed to the effect of increasingly international fragmenta

15、tion of production systems in electronics on trade statistics. It is confirmed in an econometric framework that while domestic technological capabilities are associated with export performance in electronics, it is the propensity to import electronics components that accounts for by far the largest

16、proportion of cross-country differences in specialization in electronics exports. The paper concludes with some implications for policy and future research. Specialization in high-tech exports: The indicator of what? It is well established in the literature that economic development requires structu

17、ral change, so it is important to analyse structural shifts along the way. It is also rightly argued that moving into manufacturing exports entails greater development opportunities because of economies of scale and scope, export diversification and typically higher skills and technological intensit

18、y, compared with exports based on exploitation of natural endowments. Although a broad distinction between primary, resource-based and manufacturing trade is relatively straightforward, it is far more complicated to differentiate technological intensity of manufacturing trade. As noted above, it is

19、customary to capture technological intensity of exports by comparing specialization in products perceived as high-tech across countries. Figure 1 provides a comparison for all countries for which the relevant data is available (a sample of 108 countries in 2003). The share of high-tech products in m

20、erchandise exports is plotted on the vertical axis against specialization in exports of electronics on the horizontal axis. The dotted lines show sample averages, which divide the figure into four quadrants with below/above average scores along the two dimensions to indicate countries specialized in

21、 exports of these products. The data for high-tech exports are based on the World Development Indicators dataset (World Bank 2005), which according to the source refers to “products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical mach

22、inery”. This is in line with the definition of the OECD taxonomy and is fairly close to exports of industries generally viewed as science-based in Pavitts taxonomy. Exports of electronics have been obtained from the Comtrade Database (United Nations 2005) and cover trade in the following products: o

23、ffice, accounting and computing machinery (75); radio, television and communications equipment (76), electrical machinery (77) and medical, precision and optical instruments (87, 881, 884 and 885) - all codes according to SITC, rev. 3. A majority of countries maintain a below-average share of high-t

24、ech product in exports. Most low-income countries report negligible high-tech exports, although specialization in high-tech exports is by no means a privilege of the most advanced countries. Striking is the fact that the country specializing the most in high-tech exports is the Philippines, where al

25、most two-thirds of exports fall into the high-tech category. Other outliers include Malta, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan, where high-tech products account for more than a third of exports. A handful of typical examples of developing (or emerging) countries, such as China, Thailand, Costa Rica, Mexi

26、co, Hungary and Korea also perform quite well in the high-tech area. A closer look at the structure reveals that electronics accounts for the bulk of high-tech exports in most countries. The match is particularly strong for the most specialized countries, where high-tech exports are typically domina

27、ted by a limited range of electronic products. Overall correlation between the specialization in exports of high-tech products and electronics is extremely high. Figure1 shows that these indicators share more than 80% of cross-country variance, and even more if important outliers are excluded. 3 The

28、refore, in the following sections, we focus narrowly on the analysis of trade in electronics as a broad representation of high-tech exports. What does it mean? What does it tell us? Looking solely at the specialization in high-tech (or electronics) exports, one could easily conclude that a number of

29、 developing countries have been extremely successful in technological catching up. If taken literally, the figure might be interpreted to suggest that these countries have even overtaken the United States, Japan and the EU in terms of the technological intensity of their economies. Srholec (2006) di

30、rectly compares R&D intensity of the high-tech sectors in the OECD area. It is shown that some countries with a relatively low income compared with the advanced OECD members, such as Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, maintain vastly lower R&D intensity in high-tech electronic

31、s compared with the threshold that draws a cut-off point in the taxonomy between high-tech and the rest of manufacturing (around 20% of R&D in relation to value added according to OECD 2003, p. 156). It makes it truly problematic to use any high-tech labels in the context of these countries. Althoug

32、h R&D data for developing countries is scarce, a limited comparison at least at the aggregate level can be made also for non-OECD members. Specialization in high-tech exports does not match the intensity of the economy on R&D expenditure in many areas. The disparity is most striking in the Philippin

33、es, Malta, Malaysia, which have more than 45% of exports in the high-tech fields, and to a lesser extent in Costa Rica, Thailand and Mexico, also with significant high-tech exports, but in all of these countries spending on R&D remains well below 1% of GDP. Hence the fundamentals of specialization p

34、atterns of these countries are probably not based on sophisticated technological capabilities. This confirms the expectation that production systems in the high-tech fields became internationally fragmented to the extent that countries can export large amounts of high-tech products while actually ma

35、stering very limited technological capabilities themselves. The East Asian region clearly emerges as an important cluster for the manufacturing of high-tech products, but there seems to be a fairly strong divide in localization of related technological capabilities in the “first tier” of the newly i

36、ndustrialized countries and the rest of the region. A group of high-income Asian countries, namely Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Japan, is among the top 15 countries in the world in both specialization in high-tech exports and R&D intensity, while the others fall well behind in technological capabili

37、ties. As a consequence of its sheer size and unique development trajectory, China is arguably a special case in this context. In terms of R&D intensity, China has already overtaken some of the high-income countries such as Ireland and some southern European countries. Regional differences between gr

38、avitational centres of business activity and other mainly rural areas suggest that some Chinese regions probably maintain R&D intensity substantially above the national average and even closer to that of developed countries. As suggested, the phenomenon behind the contrast between specialization in

39、high-tech exports and indigenous technology capabilities is the increasing fragmentation of value chains, particularly the separation of technological development from related manufacturing activities. The available empirical evidence seems to confirm the fact that technologically intensive activiti

40、es are sticky, highly concentrated in space and remain localized in the home areas of large multinational corporations (Patel and Pavitt 1991, Cantwell and Iammarino 1998, Pavitt and Patel 1999, Verspagen and Schoenmakers 2003). Foreign direct investment in R&D is increasing worldwide, but it is hig

41、hly concentrated among developed countries (Le Bas and Sierra 2002). Analyses of firm level data even suggest that foreign affiliates are less likely to venture into R&D activity compared to domestic owned firms in countries behind the technology frontier, such as the Czech Republic (Srholec 2005). It is therefore not surprising that R&D intensity remains