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1、標(biāo)題：Secondary market and futures market for the provision of gas pipeline transportation capacity 作者:Raineri, Ricardo B; Kuflik, Andres T 出版物名稱:The Energy Journal卷:24;期：1;頁:23-47;頁數(shù):25;出版年份:2015出版商：International Association for Energy EconomicsISSN: 01956574Secondary market and futures market for the

2、 provision of gas pipeline transportation capacityRaineri, Ricardo B; Kuflik, Andres TINTRODUCTIONMany countries are restructuring their infrastructure sector, which historically has been vertically integrated as a natural monopoly subject to public regulation. Most of the restructuring programs dif

3、ferentiate between potentially competitive segments, such as power generation, gas production, and railroad rolling stock, and segments that should be treated as natural monopolies or network infrastructure such as power transmission and distribution, natural gas transportation and distribution, and

4、 railways. In the first case, industry entry and prices are deregulated; in the second, industry access licenses and minimum service quality standards are usually established. Today, regulatory attention focuses on the efficiency of alternative access schemes to the network infrastructure, which is

5、fundamental to develop a competitive industry and to promote new infrastructure investments.The natural gas pipeline transportation industry has a long history of regulatory interventions limiting the market power of the companies that own the pipeline networks. Currently, the most frequent regulato

6、ry mechanisms are rateof-return regulations, price-cap regulations, and tradable rights.I Thus, the introduction of open access to pipeline transportation or the unbundling of gas supply and pipeline transportation services have unlocked two distinctive markets: the natural-gas market, where agents

7、trade natural gas as a commodity, and the market for pipeline transportation services, where agents trade services to ship natural gas through the pipeline networks.In contrast to most studies, which focus on the static efficiency of the regulatory contract structures, we analyze the intertemporal e

8、fficiency of alternative microstructures of gas pipeline transportation contracts to market the transportation capacity, treated as a durable good. Specifically, we examine lease contracts, tradable rights, and futures markets. Our basic economic model is a two-node network, in which a competitive p

9、roducing region uses the single pipeline available to export natural gas to a competitive consuming region. Because of the pipeline monopoly, tradable rights are meant to create openaccess conditions in the network in order to increase competition in transportation services and to mitigate the marke

10、t power of companies that own the pipelines. We use the newly developed natural gas industry in central Chile, featuring a two-node network, as our reference to calibrate cost functions and analyze resource allocation and efficiency of the alternative market microstructures on transportation capacit

11、y.This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the development and regulations of the natural gas industry in Chile, then introduces pipeline transportation tradable rights and the durable goods problem. Section 3 presents the model of these tradable rights where transportation ca

12、pacity is treated as a durable good. We examine the alternative microstructures of lease and of secondary and futures markets. We then analyze their efficiency using a model calibrated with Chilean cost data. Finally, Section 4 presents and discusses the results of this analysis.NATURAL GAS TRANSPOR

13、TATION, TRADABLE RIGHTS, AND DURABLE GOODSIn the 1990s, the Chilean power industry developed as a result of the successful privatization and deregulation of the electric and gas industries to promote competition. The regulatory framework for the gas pipeline industry mainly promoted the ex-ante comp

14、etition (Raineri, 1997) in the projects development phase, with free entry to the transportation industry, gas pipelines operating under an open-access scheme with an obligation for the transportation concessionary to allow indiscriminate access and use of the available transportation capacity. Howe

15、ver, the industrys ex-ante competition does not guarantee its ex-post competition, mostly because the pipeline owner may exercise dynamic market power when signing transportation contracts or if the gas pipeline operates in areas with no alternative energy supplies. In particular, the fact that gas

16、pipeline transportation prices are not made public in Chile does not favor the development of an informed gas market nor aid our objective which is to analyze the ex-post efficiency of the industry.2The deregulation of the natural gas industry promoted the segregation of natural gas transactions as

17、a commodity and as transportation services. Juris (1998) described two alternative transaction mechanisms that can lead to the development of an efficient natural gas industry in a competitive environment: a Bilateral Transaction Mechanism and a Poolco Mechanism. Both mechanisms are thought to clear

18、 the market at minimum cost, but they differ in the nature of the transactions and in the way the markets are coordinated. The Bilateral Transaction Mechanism is based on decentralized bilateral transactions between interested participants that want to sign a pipeline transportation contract, while

19、the Poolco Mechanism is based on a Central Planner or company who coordinates all the transactions in the gas and transportation markets, and ensures that they are carried out at minimum cost.3 The bilateral transaction mechanism is applied in most countries, for example in the United States, while

20、the Poolco mechanism has been applied in England only.Following a bilateral transactions model, the Chilean regulatory authorities have allowed pipeline transportation tariffs to be free and the transportation capacity to be assigned among the leaseholders by an auction or bidding mechanism. Neverth

21、eless, the strong ex-ante competition witnessed and the open-access scheme, which obliges the pipeline owner to offer non discriminatory access to potential clients, did not ensure the ex-post intertemporal competition of the market, mainly because contracted rights on transportation services are no

22、t tradable and contracts are signed at different periods under a use-it-or-lose-it scheme that enables intertemporal price discrimination.4The use of tradable rights as a mechanism to achieve an efficient resource allocation has been proposed for many areas of the economy, and natural gas pipeline t

23、ransportation is no exception. Smith, De Vany and Michaels (1990) have proposed the use of Exchangeable Transport Entitlements (ETE), which give the right to use, to lease, or to sell the pipeline capacity in a specific segment for a specific period. Thus, the capacity can be used by those who value

24、 it most, with the possibility of being resold in a secondary market. To avoid that some agents exercise market power by a disproportionate accumulation of those rights, the authors propose a use-it-orlose-it clause that mandates the restoration of the unused capacity to the pipeline owner, who can

25、re-allocate it, as in the case of the United States under Order 636 of 1992 that includes concepts such as secondary-market capacity development. Joskow and Tirole (2000) mentioned that the natural gas pipeline system in the United States is based on a system of physical tradable rights, subject to

26、price caps, where right holders that do not use their rights for some period of time are requested to release and sell them to other shippers and consumers. Also, Walls (1995) observed that, under complete deregulation gas pipeline transportation will become a property right, the gas pipeline will b

27、ecome a transportation right supplier, and the owners of these rights will offer transportation capacity; and De Vany and Walls (1995) insisted in deepening gas-pipeline industry deregulation with the use of tradable rights on transportation capacity access to be traded at free prices, where capacit

28、y use or transportation tariff remain regulated.5In two simultaneous articles, Joskow and Tirole (1998a and 1998b) analyzed two proposals that try to solve the power transmission problem using market mechanisms, one with the creation of physical rights on the capacity of the power network and the ot

29、her with the creation of financial rights associated with each congested line. In both articles, they analyzed the effects of agents with market power upon the rights in a two-node model with a set of low-cost generators in the North (exporting region) and consumers in the South, where another set o

30、f generators has higher costs than the ones in the North. For both types of rights, they found that the existence of market power from generators in the South or buyers from the North introduces production inefficiencies that decrease social welfare. As for electricity, other industries where the us

31、e of tradable rights to promote open access in network infrastructure has been considered are the railroad industry (De Vany and Walls, 1997; OECD, 1998a), the air transportation industry (OECD, 1998b; Borenstein, 1988), and the telecommunications industry (Mueller, 1982). All these indicate that tr

32、adable rights are a popular alternative to achieve economic efficiency in industries where open access into the network infrastructure is a requirement for efficient operation.Most of the references above emphasize the static efficiency of the problem and do not consider infrastructure as a durable

33、good. If durability were not an issue, competition and efficiency at one time would not affect competition and efficiency at any other time. In practice, however, property rights on gas pipeline transportation capacity have an expiration date: they allow access to the service for one or more periods

34、 and, in this sense, the degree of competition in one period can affect the degree of competition in future periods. A dynamic setting that explicitly accounts for a gas pipeline as a durable good would allow one to analyze the intertemporal or dynamic efficiency of the resource allocation and the a

35、gents strategic behavior. The durable character is important: the price at which the consumers are willing to buy the good today depends on what they expect it to be tomorrow and on the intertemporal benefits they can thus obtain by buying it today.Coase (1972) was the first to speculate that a mono

36、polist who sells a durable good will be incapable of exercising monopoly power because strategic buyers-anticipating rapid price fall-will not buy while the price is above the competitive level. Indeed, consumers are not willing to pay a high price for the good during the first period, knowing that

37、the monopolist can flood the market in the second period-what in fact takes place. After Coases preliminary ideas, other studies formally modeled the durable-good monopoly problem. Assuming that the monopolist has a constant marginal cost and is unable to commit himself credibly to a future behavior

38、, Stokey (1981) confirmed Coases conjecture only in a continuous time model, in which the time interval between successive vendor offers converges to zero and the discount factor approaches one. For discrete time, the monopolists profits increase monotonously in terms of the time intervals by which

39、prices are adjusted. When the time interval becomes infinitely long, profits come close to the ones that would be obtained when the monopolist is capable of committing himself to a future behavior perfectly (Stokey, 1979). The solution consists of initially selling a quantity of the good equivalent

40、to the one that is offered by a monopolist that leases the good, and not carrying out more production in the future.Thus, a monopolist producing a durable good can avoid Coases commitment problem in many ways. In particular, Bulow (1982) showed that the monopolist can increase his profits if he leas

41、es the good to consumers instead of selling it. As another alternative, Stokey (1979) and Sobel and Takahashi (1983) showed that the monopolist can increase his profits by convincingly committing himself to following a specific price sequence through time. Alternatively, Kahn (1986) showed that incr

42、easing marginal costs of production prevent the monopolist from flooding the market too fast and, consequently, avoid dropping prices in a Coasian manner. Kahns result is interpreted as one where the monopolist produces less than the efficient producer in each period, but more than the previously co

43、mmitted monopolist. Later, Malueg, Solow, and Kahn (1988) showed that, for small values of the time interval t, the previously committed monopolist would be able to produce more than the consistent monopolist with increasing marginal costs, although:.the result reverts itself when t increases.8In an

44、 article that supports our research, Anderson (1984) considered a model in which a monopolist that produces a durable good sells it to price-taker consumers-consumers that trade the goods in a secondary competitive market and in futures markets. He shows that the participation of the monopolist in a

45、 futures market allows him to be convincingly committed to restraining production in future periods, thus avoiding Coases problem. In this sense, through the futures market, the producer can simulate a monopolistic lease market, achieving larger profits than in the absence of futures market.In the n

46、ext section and for the gas pipeline transportation industry, we build a model to analyze the efficiency of alternative tradable-rights contract structures designed to allow the use of the network infrastructure when transportation capacity is treated as a durable good. At odds with models that anal

47、yze the efficiency of tradable rights in a perishable-good environment, this model allows us to analyze scenarios where the units produced in previous periods compete with the units produced in later periods and also to look at the strategic behavior of the producer who must compete with his previou

48、s production.GAS PIPELINE MODELING(完整文獻請到百度文庫)This section analyzes the efficiency of alternative market mechanisms of lease contracts, tradable rights, and futures on gas pipeline transportation capacity. Our basic framework is a monopolistic gas pipeline that connects two nodes-a competitive produ

49、cing node and a competitive consuming node-and two periods. As a key innovation, transportation capacity is modeled as a durable good, and the monopolist acts as a supplier of rights under the alternative predefined contracts scenarios.RESULTSThis section discusses our results for each of the market

50、 structures considered in Section 3.2, first for the base case (Table 2), then for sensitivity analyses (Tables 3-5).Our results clearly show the static nature of the lease structure (see Table 2). In each period, the monopolist obtains the same profits as a monopolist who would produce a durable go

51、od with a linear demand function as (2). Under a lease structure, the only effect of having a durable good is that all the production is carried out in the first period: K2 - K, = 0. In this way, the pipeline owner installs a capacity q, in the market, recalls it at the end of the first period, and

52、leases it again at the same price in the second period.From the point of view of the benevolent Social Planner, a sell structure without secondary market turns out to be the worst scenario, with the monopolist selling most of the rights in the second period. The independence of the firstand second-p

53、eriod demands prevent the monopolist from obtaining, over the second period, profits from the units sold in the first period, thus creating a strong incentive to flood the market in the second period.The results of the sell structure with a competitive secondary market verify Coases, Bulows and Stok

54、eys general result, confirming that the sell structure generates lower total profits for the monopolist than the lease plan: in the second period, the total capacity is larger, but the price is lower. Importantly, the possibility of reselling the good does not imply that it happens in practice. With

55、 a competitive secondary market, the representative agents who own and use the service in the first period are indifferent to reselling it because the market price in the second period is equivalent to the value that it has, and this can be interpreted as an equilibrium without transactions.In the s

56、tructure with a secondary market, the monopolist profits are larger with a futures market than without one; in other words, a futures market allows the monopolist to offset the dissipating role of the sell structure on his market power. The pipeline owner does not add capacity because he has bought

57、future capacity in a manner that matches his optimum behavior under a lease structure. Thus, his participation in the futures market becomes a resource by which he can commit himself to a future behavior. Our results follow Andersons (1984) theoretical results but, like Kahn (1986), we use increasin

58、g costs that soften them. Without a futures market, the monopolist has problems in benefiting from his monopoly because he cannot commit himself to restricting his production in future periods. Thus, the importance of the introduction of futures rests on the fact that they provide a channel by which

59、 the monopolist can convincingly commit himself to restricting production in future periods. To produce now and not later is not an equilibrium strategy, but to produce and buy futures now and not produce later emerges as a time-consistent strategy.The lease structure and the sell one with futures m

60、arket show the same capacity produced in each period, as well as the same total profits. Thus, the market power that the monopolist loses when he is forbidden to lease is totally recuperated by his participation in the futures market: through financial contracts, the futures market allows the monopo