公司的核心競爭力外文翻譯及原文

1、TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporationC.K.PrahaladandGaryHamelThemostpowerfulwaytoprevailinglobalcompetitionisstillinvisibletomanycompanies.Duringthe1980s,topexecutiveswerejudgedontheirabilitytorestructure,declutter,anddelayertheircorporations.Inthe1990s,theyllbejudgedontheirabilitytoidentify,cultivate,a

2、ndexploitthecorecompetenciesthatmakegrowthpossibleindeed,theyllhavetorethinktheconceptofthecorporationitself.ConsiderthelasttenyearsofGTEandNEC.Intheearly1980s,GTEwaswellpositionedtobecomeamajorplayerintheevolvinginformationtechnologyindustry.Itwasactiveintelecommunications.Itsoperationsspannedavari

3、etyofbusinessesincludingtelephones,switchingandtransmissionsystems,digitalPABX,semiconductors,packetswitching,satellites,defensesystems,andlightingproducts.AndGTEsEntertainmentProductsGroup,whichproducedSylvaniacolorTVs,hadapositioninrelateddisplaytechnologies.In1980,GTEssaleswere$9.98billion,andnet

4、cashflowwas$1.73billion.NEC,incontrast,wasmuchsmaller,at$3.8billioninsales.Ithadacomparabletechnologicalbaseandcomputerbusinesses,butithadnoexperienceasanoperatingtelecommunicationscompany.YetlookatthepositionsofGTEandNECin1988.GTEs1988saleswere$16.46billion,andNECssaleswereconsiderablyhigherat$21.8

5、9billion.GTEhas,ineffect,becomeatelephoneoperatingcompanywithapositionindefenseandlightingproducts.GTEsotherbusinessesaresmallinglobalterms.GTEhasdivestedSylvaniaTVandTelenet,putswitching,transmission,anddigitalPABXintojointventures,andcloseddownsemiconductors.Asaresult,theinternationalpositionofGTE

6、haseroded.NonU.S.revenueasapercentoftotalrevenuedroppedfrom20%to15%between1980and1988.NEChasemergedastheworldleaderinsemiconductorsandasafirsttierplayerintelecommunicationsproductsandcomputers.Ithasconsolidateditspositioninmainframecomputers.Ithasmovedbeyondpublicswitchingandtransmissiontoincludesuc

7、hlifestyleproductsasmobiletelephones,facsimilemachines,andlaptopcomputersbridgingthegapbetweentelecommunicationsandofficeautomation.NECistheonlycompanyintheworldtobeinthetopfiveinrevenueintelecommunications,semiconductors,andmainframes.Whydidthesetwocompanies,startingwithcomparablebusinessportfolios

8、,performsodifferently?LargelybecauseNECconceivedofitselfintermsofcorecompetencies,andGTEdidnot.RethinkingtheCorporationOnce,thediversifiedcorporationcouldsimplypointitsbusinessunitsatparticularendproductmarketsandadmonishthemtobecomeworldleaders.Butwithmarketboundarieschangingevermorequickly,targets

9、areelusiveandcaptureisatbesttemporary.Afewcompanieshaveproventhemselvesadeptatinventingnewmarkets,quicklyenteringemergingmarkets,anddramaticallyshiftingpatternsofcustomerchoiceinestablishedmarkets.Thesearetheonestoemulate.Thecriticaltaskformanagementistocreateanorganizationcapableofinfusingproductsw

10、ithirresistiblefunctionalityor,betteryet,creatingproductsthatcustomersneedbuthavenotyetevenimagined.Thisisadeceptivelydifficulttask.Ultimately,itrequiresradicalchangeinthemanagementofmajorcompanies.Itmeans,firstofall,thattopmanagementsofWesterncompaniesmustassumeresponsibilityforcompetitivedecline.E

11、veryoneknowsabouthighinterestrates,Japaneseprotectionism,outdatedantitrustlaws,obstreperousunions,andimpatientinvestors.Whatishardertosee,orhardertoacknowledge,ishowlittleaddedmomentumcompaniesactuallygetfrompoliticalormacroeconomicrelief.BoththetheoryandpracticeofWesternmanagementhavecreatedadragon

12、ourforwardmotion.Itistheprinciplesofmanagementthatareinneedofreform.NECversusGTE,again,isinstructiveandonlyoneofmanysuchcomparativecasesweanalyzedtounderstandthechangingbasisforgloballeadership.Earlyinthe1970s,NECarticulatedastrategicintenttoexploittheconvergenceofcomputingandcommunications,whatitca

13、lledC&CSuccess,topmanagementreckoned,wouldhingeonacquiringcompetencies,particularlyinsemiconductors.Managementadoptedanappropriatestrategicarchitecture,summarizedbyC&C,andthencommunicateditsintenttothewholeorganizationandtheoutsideworldduringthemid1970s.NECconstitutedaC&CCommitteeoftopmanagerstoover

14、seethedevelopmentofcoreproductsandcorecompetencies.NECputinplacecoordinationgroupsandcommitteesthatcutacrosstheinterestsofindividualbusinesses.Consistentwithitsstrategicarchitecture,NECshiftedenormousresourcestostrengthenitspositionincomponentsandcentralprocessors.Byusingcollaborativearrangementstom

15、ultiplyinternalresources,NECwasabletoaccumulateabroadarrayofcorecompetencies.NECcarefullyidentifiedthreeinterrelatedstreamsoftechnologicalandmarketevolution.Topmanagementdeterminedthatcomputingwouldevolvefromlargemainframestodistributedprocessing,componentsfromsimpleICstoVLSI,andcommunicationsfromme

16、chanicalcrossbarexchangetocomplexdigitalsystemswenowcallISDN.Asthingsevolvedfurther,NECreasoned,thecomputing,communications,andcomponentsbusinesseswouldsooverlapthatitwouldbeveryhardtodistinguishamongthem,andthattherewouldbeenormousopportunitiesforanycompanythathadbuiltthecompetenciesneededtoserveal

17、lthreemarkets.NECtopmanagementdeterminedthatsemiconductorswouldbethecompanysmostimportantcoreproduct.Itenteredintomyriadstrategicalliancesover100asof1987aimedatbuildingcompetenciesrapidlyandatlowcost.Inmainframecomputers,itsmostnotedrelationshipwaswithHoneywellandBull.Almostallthecollaborativearrang

18、ementsinthesemiconductorcomponentfieldwereorientedtowardtechnologyaccess.Astheyenteredcollaborativearrangements,NECsoperatingmanagersunderstoodtherationaleforthesealliancesandthegoalofinternalizingpartnerskills.NECsdirectorofresearchsummedupitscompetenceacquisitionduringthe1970sand1980sthisway:Froma

19、ninvestmentstandpoint,itwasmuchquickerandcheapertouseforeigntechnology.Therewasntaneedforustodevelopnewideas.”NosuchclarityofstrategicintentandstrategicarchitectureappearedtoexistatGTE.Althoughseniorexecutivesdiscussedtheimplicationsoftheevolvinginformationtechnologyindustry,nocommonlyacceptedviewof

20、whichcompetencieswouldberequiredtocompeteinthatindustrywerecommunicatedwidely.Whilesignificantstaffworkwasdonetoidentifykeytechnologies,seniorlinemanagerscontinuedtoactasiftheyweremanagingindependentbusinessunits.Decentralizationmadeitdifficulttofocusoncorecompetencies.Instead,individualbusinessesbe

21、cameincreasinglydependentonoutsidersforcriticalskills,andcollaborationbecamearoutetostagedexits.Today,withanewmanagementteaminplace,GTEhasrepositioneditselftoapplyitscompetenciestoemergingmarketsintelecommunicationsservices.TheRootsofCompetitiveAdvantageThedistinctionweobservedinthewayNECandGTEconce

22、ivedofthemselvesaportfolioofcompetenciesversusaportfolioofbusinesseswasrepeatedacrossmanyindustries.From1980to1988,Canongrewby264%,Hondaby200%.ComparethatwithXeroxandChrysler.AndifWesternmanagerswereonceanxiousaboutthelowcostandhighqualityofJapaneseimports,theyarenowover;whelmedbythepaceatwhichJapan

23、eserivalsareinventingnewmarkets,creatingnewproducts,andenhancingthem.Canonhasgivenuspersonalcopiers;Hondahasmovedfrommotorcyclestofourwheeloffroadbuggies.Sonydevelopedthe8mmcamcorder,Yamaha,thedigitalpiano.Komatsudevelopedanunderwaterremotecontrolledbulldozer,whileCasioslatestgambitisasmallscreencol

24、orLCDtelevision.Whowouldhaveanticipatedtheevolutionofthesevanguardmarkets?Inmoreestablishedmarkets,theJapanesechallengehasbeenjustasdisquieting.Japanesecompaniesaregeneratingablizzardoffeaturesandfunctionalenhancementsthatbringtechnologicalsophisticationtoeverydayproducts.Japanesecarproducershavebee

25、npioneeringfourwheelsteering,fourvalve-percylinderengines,incarnavigationsystems,andsophisticatedelectronicenginemanagementsystems.Onthestrengthofitsproductfeatures,Canonisnowaplayerinfacsimiletransmissionmachines,desktoplaserprinters,evensemiconductormanufacturingequipment.Intheshortrun,acompanysco

26、mpetitivenessderivesfromtheprice/performanceattributesofcurrentproducts.Butthesurvivorsofthefirstwaveofglobalcompetition,WesternandJapanesealike,areallconvergingonsimilarandformidablestandardsforproductcostandqualityminimumhurdlesforcontinuedcompetition,butlessandlessimportantassourcesofdifferential

27、advantage.Inthelongrun,competitivenessderivesfromanabilitytobuild,atlowercostandmorespeedilythancompetitors,thecorecompetenciesthatspawnunanticipatedproducts.Therealsourcesofadvantagearetobefoundinmanagementsabilitytoconsolidatecorporatewidetechnologiesandproductionskillsintocompetenciesthatempoweri

28、ndividualbusinessestoadaptquicklytochangingopportunities.Seniorexecutiveswhoclaimthattheycannotbuildcorecompetencieseitherbecausetheyfeeltheautonomyofbusinessunitsissacrosanctorbecausetheirfeetareheldtothequarterlybudgetfireshouldthinkagain.TheprobleminmanyWesterncompaniesisnotthattheirseniorexecuti

29、vesareanylesscapablethanthoseinJapannorthatJapanesecompaniespossessgreatertechnicalcapabilities.Instead,itistheiradherencetoaconceptofthecorporationthatunnecessarilylimitstheabilityofindividualbusinessestofullyexploitthedeepreservoiroftechnologicalcapabilitythatmanyAmericanandEuropeancompaniesposses

30、s.Thediversifiedcorporationisalargetree.Thetrunkandmajorlimbsarecoreproducts,thesmallerbranchesarebusinessunits;theleaves,flowers,andfruitareendproducts.Therootsystemthatprovidesnourishment,sustenance,andstabilityisthecorecompetence.Youcanmissthestrengthofcompetitorsbylookingonlyattheirendproducts,i

31、nthesamewayyoumissthestrengthofatreeifyoulookonlyatitsleaves.(SeethechartCompetencies:TheRootsofCompetitiveness.”)Corecompetenciesarethecollectivelearningintheorganization,especiallyhowtocoordinatediverseproductionskillsandintegratemultiplestreamsoftechnologies.ConsiderSonyscapacitytominiaturizeorPh

32、ilipssopticalmediaexpertise.Thetheoreticalknowledgetoputaradioonachipdoesnotinitselfassureacompanytheskilltoproduceaminiatureradionobiggerthanabusinesscard.Tobringoffthisfeat,Casiomustharmonizeknowhowinminiaturization,microprocessordesign,materialscience,andultrathinprecisioncasingthesameskillsitapp

33、liesinitsminiaturecardcalculators,pocketTVs,anddigitalwatches.Ifcorecompetenceisaboutharmonizingstreamsoftechnology,itisalsoabouttheorganizationofworkandthedeliveryofvalue.AmongSonyscompetenciesisminiaturization.Tobringminiaturizationtoitsproducts,Sonymustensurethattechnologists,engineers,andmarkete

34、rshaveasharedunderstandingofcustomerneedsandoftechnologicalpossibilities.Theforceofcorecompetenceisfeltasdecisivelyinservicesasinmanufacturing.Citicorpwasaheadofothersinvestinginanoperatingsystemthatallowedittoparticipateinworldmarkets24hoursaday.Itscompetenceinprovidedthecompanythemeanstodifferenti

35、ateitselffrommanyfinancialserviceinstitutions.Corecompetenceiscommunication,involvement,andadeepcommitmenttoworkingacrossorganizationalboundaries.Itinvolvesmanylevelsofpeopleandallfunctions.Worldclassresearchin,forexample,lasersorceramicscantakeplaceincorporatelaboratorieswithouthavinganimpactonanyo

36、fthebusinessesofthecompany.Theskillsthattogetherconstitutecorecompetencemustcoalescearoundindividualswhoseeffortsarenotsonarrowlyfocusedthattheycannotrecognizetheopportunitiesforblendingtheirfunctionalexpertisewiththoseofothersinnewandinterestingways.Corecompetencedoesnotdiminishwithuse.Unlikephysic

37、alassets,whichdodeteriorateovertime,competenciesareenhancedastheyareappliedandshared.Butcompetenciesstillneedtobenurturedandprotected;knowledgefadesifitisnotused.Competenciesarethegluethatbindsexistingbusinesses.Theyarealsotheenginefornewbusinessdevelopment.Patternsofdiversificationandmarketentrymay

38、beguidedbythem,notjustbytheattractivenessofmarkets.Consider3Mscompetencewithstickytape.indreamingupbusinessesasdiverseasPostitnotes,magnetictape,photographicfilm,pressuresensitivetapes,andcoatedabrasives,thecompanyhasbroughttobearwidelysharedcompetenciesinsubstrates,coatings,andadhesivesanddevisedva

39、riouswaystocombinethem.Indeed,3Mhasinvestedconsistentlyinthem.Whatseemstobeanextremelydiversifiedportfolioofbusinessesbeliesafewsharedcorecompetencies.Incontrast,therearemajorcompaniesthathavehadthepotentialtobuildcorecompetenciesbutfailedtodosobecausetopmanagementwasunabletoconceiveofthecompanyasan

40、ythingotherthanacollectionofdiscretebusinesses.GEsoldmuchofitsconsumerelectronicsbusinesstoThomsonofFrance,arguingthatitwasbecomingincreasinglydifficulttomaintainitscompetitivenessinthissector.Thatwasundoubtedlyso,butitisironicthatitsoldseveralkeybusinessestocompetitorswhowerealreadycompetenceleader

41、sBlack&Deckerinsmallelectricalmotors,andThomson,whichwaseagertobuilditscompetenceinmicroelectronicsandhadlearnedfromtheJapanesethatapositioninconsumerelectronicswasvitaltothischallenge.Managementtrappedinthestrategicbusinessunit(SBU)mindsetalmostinevitablyfindsitsindividualbusinessesdependentonexter

42、nalsourcesforcriticalcomponents,suchasmotorsorcompressors.Butthesearenotjustcomponents.Theyarecoreproductsthatcontributetothecompetitivenessofawiderangeofendproducts.Theyarethephysicalembodimentsofcorecompetencies.HowNottoThinkofCompetenceSincecompaniesareinaracetobuildthecompetenciesthatdeterminegl

43、oballeadership,successfulcompanieshavestoppedimaginingthemselvesasbundlesofbusinessesmakingproducts.Canon,Honda,Casio,orNECmayseemtopresideoverportfoliosofbusinessesunrelatedintermsofcustomers,distributionchannels,andmerchandisingstrategy.Indeed,theyhaveportfoliosthatmayseemidiosyncraticattimes:NECi

44、stheonlyglobalcompanytobeamongleadersincomputing,telecommunications,andsemiconductorsandtohaveathrivingconsumerelectronicsbusiness.Butlooksaredeceiving.InNEC,digitaltechnology,especiallyVLSIandsystemsintegrationskills,isfundamental.Inthecorecompetenciesunderlyingthem,disparatebusinessesbecomecoheren

45、t.ItisHondascorecompetenceinenginesandpowertrainsthatgivesitadistinctiveadvantageincar,motorcycle,lawnmower,andgeneratorbusinesses.Canonscorecompetenciesinoptics,imaging,andmicroprocessorcontrolshaveenabledittoenter,evendominate,marketsasseeminglydiverseascopiers,laserprinters,cameras,andimagescanne

46、rs.Philipsworkedformorethan15yearstoperfectitsopticalmedia(laserdisc)competence,asdidJVCinbuildingaleadingpositioninvideorecording.Otherexamplesofcorecompetenciesmightincludemechantronics(theabilitytomarrymechanicalandelectronicengineering),videodisplays,bioengineering,andmicroelectronics.Intheearly

47、stagesofitscompetencebuilding,Philipscouldnothaveimaginedalltheproductsthatwouldbespawnedbyitsopticalmediacompetence,norcouldJVChaveanticipatedminiaturecamcorderswhenitfirstbeganexploringvideotapetechnologies.Unlikethebattleforglobalbranddominance,whichisvisibleintheworldsbroadcastandprintmediaandis

48、aimedatbuildingglobalshareofmind,”thebattltobuildworldclasscompetenciesisinvisibletopeoplewhoarentdeliberatelylookingforit.Topmanagementoftentracksthecostandqualityofcompetitorsproducts,yethowmanymanagersuntanglethewebofalliancestheirJapanesecompetitorshaveconstructedtoacquirecompetenciesatlowcost?I

49、nhowmanyWesternboardroomsisthereanexplicit,sharedunderstandingofthecompetenciesthecompanymustbuildforworldleadership?Indeed,howmanyseniorexecutivesdiscussthecrucialdistinctionbetweencompetitivestrategyatthelevelofabusinessandcompetitivestrategyatthelevelofanentirecompany?Letusbeclear.Cultivatingcore

50、competencedoesnotmeanoutspendingrivalsonresearchanddevelopment.In1983,whenCanonsurpassedXeroxinworldwideunitmarketshareinthecopierbusiness,itsR&DbudgetinreprographicswasbutasmallfractionofXeroxs.Overthepast20years,NEChasspentlessonR&DasapercentageofsalesthanalmostallofitsAmericanandEuropeancompetito

51、rs.Nordoescorecompetencemeansharedcosts,aswhentwoormoreSBUsuseacommonfacilityaplant,servicefacility,orsalesforceorshareacommoncomponent.Thegainsofsharingmaybesubstantial,butthesearchforsharedcostsistypicallyaposthocefforttorationalizeproductionacrossexistingbusinesses,notapremeditatedefforttobuildth

52、ecompetenciesoutofwhichthebusinessesthemselvesgrow.Buildingcorecompetenciesismoreambitiousanddifferentthanintegratingvertically,moreover.Managersdecidingwhethertomakeorbuywillstartwithendproductsandlookupstreamtotheefficienciesofthesupplychainanddownstreamtowarddistributionandcustomers.Theydonottake

53、inventoryofskillsandlookforwardtoapplyingtheminnontraditionalways.(Ofcourse,decisionsaboutcompetenciesdoprovidealogicforverticalintegration.Canonisnotparticularlyintegratedinitscopierbusiness,exceptinthoseaspectsoftheverticalchainthatSupportthecompetenciesitregardsascritical.)IdentifyingCoreCompeten

54、ciesAndLosingThemAtleastthreetestscanbeappliedtoidentifycorecompetenciesinacompany.First,acorecompetenceprovidespotentialaccesstoawidevarietyofmarkets.Competenceindisplaysystems,forexample,enablesacompanytoparticipateinsuchdiversebusinessesascalculators,miniatureTVsets,monitorsforlaptopcomputers,and

55、automotivedashboardswhichiswhyCasiosentryintothehandheldTVmarketwaspredictable.Second,acorecompetenceshouldmakeasignificantcontributiontotheperceivedcustomerbenefitsoftheendproduct.Clearly,Hondasengineexpertisefillsthisbill.Finally,acorecompetenceshouldbedifficultforcompetitorstoimitate.Anditwillbed

56、ifficultifitisacomplexharmonizationofindividualtechnologiesandproductionskills.Arivalmightacquiresomeofthetechnologiesthatcomprisethecorecompetence,butitwillfinditmoredifficulttoduplicatethemoreorlesscomprehensivepatternofinternalcoordinationandlearning.JVCsdecisionintheearly1960stopursuethedevelopm

57、entofavideotapecompetencepassedthethreetestsoutlinedhere.RCAsdecisioninthelate1970stodevelopastylusbasedvideoturntablesystemdidnot.Fewcompaniesarelikelytobuildworldleadershipinmorethanfiveorsixfundamentalcompetencies.Acompanythatcompilesalistof20to30capabilitieshasprobablynotproducedalistofcorecompe

58、tencies.Still,itisprobablyagooddisciplinetogeneratealistofthissortandtoseeaggregatecapabilitiesasbuildingblocks.Thistendstopromptthesearchforlicensingdealsandalliancesthroughwhichthecompanymayacquire,atlowcost,themissingpieces.MostWesterncompanieshardlythinkaboutcompetitivenessinthesetermsatall.Itis

59、timetotakeatoughmindedlookattheriskstheyarerunning.Companiesthatjudgecompetitiveness,theirownandtheircompetitors,primarilyintermsoftheprice/performanceofendproductsarecourtingtheerosionofcorecompetenciesormakingtoolittleefforttoenhancethem.Theembeddedskillsthatgiverisetothenextgenerationofcompetitiv

60、eproductscannotberentedinbyoutsourcingandOEM-supplyrelationships.Inourview,toomanycompanieshaveunwittinglysurrenderedcorecompetencieswhentheycutinternalinvestmentinwhattheymistakenlythoughtwerejustcostcentersinfavorofoutsidesuppliers.ConsiderChrysler.UnlikeHonda,ithastendedtoviewenginesandpowertrain