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1、INTERNATIONALFINANCIALMANAGEMENTEUN / RESNICKFourth EditionChapter Objective:This chapter serves to introduce the student to the institutional framework within which:International payments are made.The movement of capital is accommodated.Exchange rates are determined. 2Chapter TwoThe International M

2、onetary System第一頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。 Evolution of the International Monetary System Current Exchange Rate Arrangements European Monetary System Euro and the European Monetary Union The Mexican Peso Crisis The Asian Currency Crisis The Argentine Peso Crisis Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rate RegimesChapter Two O

3、utline第二頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Evolution of the International Monetary System Bimetallism: Before 1875 Classical Gold Standard: 1875-1914 Interwar Period: 1915-1944 Bretton Woods System: 1945-1972 The Flexible Exchange Rate Regime: 1973-Present第三頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Bimetallism: Before 1875 A “double standard” in the sense that

4、both gold and silver were used as money. Some countries were on the gold standard, some on the silver standard, some on both. Both gold and silver were used as international means of payment and the exchange rates among currencies were determined by either their gold or silver contents. Greshams Law

5、 implied that it would be the least valuable metal that would tend to circulate. 第四頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Classical Gold Standard: 1875-1914 During this period in most major countries: Gold alone was assured of unrestricted coinage There was two-way convertibility between gold and national currencies at a stable ra

6、tio. Gold could be freely exported or imported. The exchange rate between two countrys currencies would be determined by their relative gold contents.第五頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。For example, if the dollar is pegged to gold at U.S.$30 = 1 ounce of gold, and the British pound is pegged to gold at 6 = 1 ounce of gold, it

7、 must be the case that the exchange rate is determined by the relative gold contents:Classical Gold Standard: 1875-1914$30 = 6$5 = 1第六頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Classical Gold Standard: 1875-1914 Highly stable exchange rates under the classical gold standard provided an environment that was conducive to international t

8、rade and investment. Misalignment of exchange rates and international imbalances of payment were automatically corrected by the price-specie-flow mechanism.第七頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Price-Specie-Flow Mechanism Suppose Great Britain exported more to France than France imported from Great Britain. This cannot persist

9、under a gold standard. Net export of goods from Great Britain to France will be accompanied by a net flow of gold from France to Great Britain. This flow of gold will lead to a lower price level in France and, at the same time, a higher price level in Britain. The resultant change in relative price

10、levels will slow exports from Great Britain and encourage exports from France.第八頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Classical Gold Standard: 1875-1914 There are shortcomings: The supply of newly minted gold is so restricted that the growth of world trade and investment can be hampered for the lack of sufficient monetary reserve

11、s. Even if the world returned to a gold standard, any national government could abandon the standard.第九頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Interwar Period: 1915-1944 Exchange rates fluctuated as countries widely used “predatory” depreciations of their currencies as a means of gaining advantage in the world export market. Attemp

12、ts were made to restore the gold standard, but participants lacked the political will to “follow the rules of the game”. The result for international trade and investment was profoundly detrimental.第十頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Bretton Woods System: 1945-1972 Named for a 1944 meeting of 44 nations at Bretton Woods, New

13、Hampshire. The purpose was to design a postwar international monetary system. The goal was exchange rate stability without the gold standard. The result was the creation of the IMF and the World Bank.第十一頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Bretton Woods System: 1945-1972 Under the Bretton Woods system, the U.S. dollar was pegged

14、 to gold at $35 per ounce and other currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar. Each country was responsible for maintaining its exchange rate within 1% of the adopted par value by buying or selling foreign reserves as necessary. The Bretton Woods system was a dollar-based gold exchange standard.第十二頁(yè)

15、,共38頁(yè)。Bretton Woods System: 1945-1972German markBritish poundFrench francU.S. dollarGoldPegged at $35/oz.Par ValuePar ValuePar Value第十三頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。The Flexible Exchange Rate Regime: 1973-Present. Flexible exchange rates were declared acceptable to the IMF members. Central banks were allowed to intervene

16、in the exchange rate markets to iron out unwarranted volatilities. Gold was abandoned as an international reserve asset. Non-oil-exporting countries and less-developed countries were given greater access to IMF funds.第十四頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Current Exchange Rate Arrangements Free Float The largest number of count

17、ries, about 48, allow market forces to determine their currencys value. Managed Float About 25 countries combine government intervention with market forces to set exchange rates. Pegged to another currency Such as the U.S. dollar or euro (through franc or mark). No national currency Some countries d

18、o not bother printing their own, they just use the U.S. dollar. For example, Ecuador, Panama, and El Salvador have dollarized.第十五頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。European Monetary System Eleven European countries maintain exchange rates among their currencies within narrow bands, and jointly float against outside currencies.

19、 Objectives: To establish a zone of monetary stability in Europe. To coordinate exchange rate policies vis-vis non-European currencies. To pave the way for the European Monetary Union.第十六頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。What Is the Euro? The euro is the single currency of the European Monetary Union which was adopted by 11 M

20、ember States on 1 January 1999. These original member states were: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Finland, Austria, Portugal and the Netherlands.第十七頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。What are the different denominations of the euro notes and coins ? There are 7 euro notes and 8 euro coins. 500, 200

21、, 100, 50, 20, 10, and 5. The coins are: 2 euro, 1 euro, 50 euro cent, 20 euro cent, 10, euro cent, 5 euro cent, 2 euro cent, and 1 euro cent. The euro itself is divided into 100 cents, just like the U.S. dollar.第十八頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。How did the euro affect contracts denominated in national currency? All insura

22、nce and other legal contracts continued in force with the substitution of amounts denominated in national currencies with their equivalents in euro. 第十九頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Euro Area Austria Belgium Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland 22 Countries participating in the euro:

23、lItaly lLatvialLithuanialLuxembourg lMaltalPolandlPortugal lSlovak RepubliclSlovenialSpainlThe Netherlands第二十頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。The Long-Term Impact of the Euro If the euro proves successful, it will advance the political integration of Europe in a major way, eventually making a “United States of Europe” feasib

24、le. It is likely that the U.S. dollar will lose its place as the dominant world currency. The euro and the U.S. dollar will be the two major currencies.第二十一頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。The Mexican Peso Crisis On 20 December, 1994, the Mexican government announced a plan to devalue the peso against the dollar by 14 percen

25、t. This decision changed currency traders expectations about the future value of the peso. They stampeded for the exits. In their rush to get out the peso fell by as much as 40 percent.第二十二頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。The Mexican Peso Crisis The Mexican Peso crisis is unique in that it represents the first serious intern

26、ational financial crisis touched off by cross-border flight of portfolio capital. Two lessons emerge: It is essential to have a multinational safety net in place to safeguard the world financial system from such crises. An influx of foreign capital can lead to an overvaluation in the first place.第二十

27、三頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。The Asian Currency Crisis The Asian currency crisis turned out to be far more serious than the Mexican peso crisis in terms of the extent of the contagion and the severity of the resultant economic and social costs. Many firms with foreign currency bonds were forced into bankruptcy. The regi

28、on experienced a deep, widespread recession.第二十四頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。The Argentinean Peso Crisis In 1991 the Argentine government passed a convertibility law that linked the peso to the U.S. dollar at parity. The initial economic effects were positive: Argentinas chronic inflation was curtailed Foreign investment

29、 poured in As the U.S. dollar appreciated on the world market the Argentine peso became stronger as well.第二十五頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。The Argentinean Peso Crisis The strong peso hurt exports from Argentina and caused a protracted economic downturn that led to the abandonment of pesodollar parity in January 2002. The

30、unemployment rate rose above 20 percent The inflation rate reached a monthly rate of 20 percent第二十六頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。The Argentinean Peso Crisis There are at least three factors that are related to the collapse of the currency board arrangement and the ensuing economic crisis: Lack of fiscal discipline Labor m

31、arket inflexibility Contagion from the financial crises in Brazil and Russia第二十七頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Currency Crisis Explanations In theory, a currencys value mirrors the fundamental strength of its underlying economy, relative to other economies. In the long run.In the short run, currency traders expectations pl

32、ay a much more important role. In todays environment, traders and lenders, using the most modern communications, act by fight-or-flight instincts. For example, if they expect others are about to sell Brazilian reals for U.S. dollars, they want to “get to the exits first”. Thus, fears of depreciation

33、 become self-fulfilling prophecies.第二十八頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes Arguments in favor of flexible exchange rates: Easier external adjustments. National policy autonomy. Arguments against flexible exchange rates: Exchange rate uncertainty may hamper international trade. No safe

34、guards to prevent crises.第二十九頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes Suppose the exchange rate is $1.40/ today. In the next slide, we see that demand for British pounds far exceed supply at this exchange rate. The U.S. experiences trade deficits.第三十頁(yè),共38頁(yè)。Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rate RegimesSDQ of

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