職業(yè)健康安全管理體系和安全文化英文翻譯

1、精選優(yōu)質(zhì)文檔-傾情為你奉上OHSMS and Safety CultureWhat is an occupational health and safety management system(OHSMS)?One difficultly in evaluating the effectiveness of OHSMS lies in the different meanings given to the team .Finding agreement upon criteria for effectiveness, or methods of measure-ment and evaluat

2、ion is especially hard where basic disagreement exists upon what an OHSMS .1、The General Characteristics Of an OHSMSAll OHSMS owe something to the legacy of general system theory. Systems theory suggests that there should be four general requirements for an OHSMS, although how there requirements are

3、 met in practice allows for considerable diversity. The four general requirements are as follows.1）System objectives.2）Specification of system elements and their inter-relationship; not all systems need have the same elements.3）Determining the relationship of the OHSMS to other systems (including th

4、e general management system, and the regulatory system , but also technology and work organization ). 4）Requirements for system maintenance (which may be internal, linked to a review phase , or external , linked for example to industry policies that support OHS best practice; system maintenance may

5、vary between systems).Several Australian authorities upon OHSMS have given definitions broadly consistent with these general system requirements. Thus Bottomley notes what makes an OHSMS a system “is the deliberate linking and sequencing of processes to achieve specific objectives and to create a re

6、peatable and identifiable way of managing OHS. Corrective actions (are also )central to a systematic approach .”Warwick Pearse also emphasises systemic linkages, defining an OHSMS as “distinct elements which cover the key range of activities required to manage occupational health and safety. These a

7、re inter-linked, and the whole thing is driven by feedback loops.”Similarly, Gallagher defines an OHSMS as “a combination of the planning and review, the management organization arrangements, the consultative arrangements, and the specific program elements that work together in an integrated way to

8、improve health and safety performance.”2、Voluntary Or Mandatory Implementation Methods One way that OHSMS differ arises from the various methods of implementation. Frick and Wren distinguish three typesvoluntary, mandatory and hybird. Voluntary systems exist where enterprises adopt OHSMS on their ow

9、e volition. Often this is to implement strategic objectives relating to employee welfare or good corporate citizenship, although there may be other motives such as reducing insurance costs. In contrast, mandatory systems have evolved in a number of European countries where legislation requires adopt

10、ion of a risk assessment system. Quasimandatory methods may also exist where external commercial pressures take the place of legislative requirements. Thus many businesses adopt OHSMS to comply with the requirements of customers and suppliers, principal contractors and other commercial bodies. Hybri

11、d methods are said to entail a mixture of voluntary motives and legislative requirements. 3. Management Systems or Systematic ManagementFollowing from their distinction between voluntary and mandatory OHSMS, Frick and Wren also separate occupational health and safety “management systems”, and the “m

12、anagement systems” of occupational health and safety. Specifically ,the former have been characterized as: market-based, promoted typically by consulting firms, and with usually highly formalized prescriptions on how to integrate OHSM within large and complex organizations and also comprehensive dem

13、ands on documentation.This “management systems” from must meet stringent criteria. Where these requirements of a “systems” are not met, then the term is said to be inapplicable. On the other hand, “systematic management” is described as “ a limited number of mandated principles for a systematic mana

14、gement of OHS, applicable to all types of employers including the small ones”.This approach stems from methods of regulation found in Europe as well as Australia, where businesses, including smaller ones, are encouraged or required to comply with a less demanding framework than “management systems”.

15、 One example of this simpler regulatory framework might be the risk assessment principles within the 1989/391 European Union Framework Directive.Support for such a loose approach to OHSM also exists in Australia. One employer expert on OHS defined systems simply as “just a word for what you do to ma

16、nage safety”. Consistent with this is Bottomleys all-encompassing approach which allows that “an OHSMS can be simple or complex, it can be highly documented or sparingly described, and it can be home grown or based on an available model”. An example of a relatively simple “systematic”approach to the

17、 management of occupational health and safety is to be found in “Small Business Safety Solutions”-a booklet for small business published by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.This advocates a four step process as follows:Step1: Commitment to a Safe Workplace(framing a policy based on co

18、nsultation).Step2: Recognising and Removing Dangers(using a danger identification list)Step3:Maintaining a Safe Workplace (including safety checks, maintenance, reporting dangers, information and training, supervision ,accident investigation, and emergency planning).Step4: Safety Records and Informa

19、tion (including records and standards required to be kept by law)It is debatable whether such a framework for “systematic management” in a small business can include all the elements of planning and accountability that are essential to a “management system” in a large business.4 . System Characteris

20、tics : managerialist and Participative ModelsWithin “management systems” two different models can be found . The first variant stems from what Nielsen terms “rational organisation theory” ( Taylorist and bureaucratic models of organisation ) . Rational organisation theory is associated with top down

21、 managerialist models of OHSMS such as Du Pont . Some authorities now consider most voluntary systems to be managerialist . Thus Frick. et al . observe that “ . . . most voluntary OHSM systems define top management as the ( one and only ) actor”. Conversely, an alternative participative model of “ma

22、nagement systems” can be traced to socio-technical systems theory, which emphasises organisational interventions based on analysis of the inter-relationships of technology , the orientation of participants , and organisational structure . The strengths of this typology are two-fold . First , it is g

23、rounded in the literature that discusses alternative approaches to managing OHS and different control strategies , and it reflects the principal debates in that literature . Second , it can be operationalised through empirical tests to see which type of OHSMS performs best . The typology also faces

24、a difficulty in the fact that the “ safe place control strategy “ is mandatory in Australia and should be found in all workplaces . There in not , therefore . a clear choice between two mutually exclusive control strategies ; the workplace with dominant safe person characteristics should also be imp

25、lementing safe place characteristics . 5 . Degree of Implementation: Quality Levels Frick and Wren expand upon their distinction between mandatory and voluntary OHSMS to further identify three levels of systems objectives , drawn from the literature on product quality control , that represent differ

26、ent levels of achievement and measures of OHSM performance. 6 . degree of Implementation: Introductory and Advanced Systems The idea that there may be different levels of OHSM has been interpreted another way in Australia where performance levers in some programs are explicitly developmental ( the b

27、usiness graduating up an ascending ladder as it demonstrates compliance with the requirements of each successive lever ) . One example of Australian program with developmental steps is the South Australian Safety Achiever Business System ( SABS ) ( formerly known as the Safety Achiever Bonus Scheme

28、) . The program specifies five standards ( commitment and policy , planning implementation , measurement and management systems review and implementation ) linked in a continuous improvement cycle . Three “l(fā)evels”of implementation are then prescribed cumulatively introducing all five standards from

29、a basic or introductory program to a continuous improvement system . Different evaluation standards are prescribed for each level .7. OHSMS Diversity and Evaluation : A Summary While, in general, this Report advocates care in defining OHSMS with respect to the problems outlined above , for the purpo

30、se of this project an inclusive approach to the phenomena is to be adopted .In particular , the term OHSMS will be used broadly to encompass both the highly complex formal systems adopted voluntarily by some businesses as well as the more rudimentary mandatory or advisory frameworks offered to and i

31、mplemented by small business.So far , we have shown that OHSMS can vary upon a number of dimensions relating to method of implementation , system characteristics , and degree of implementation . Such variance is important because it affects evaluation and measurement of OHSMS performance . Measures

32、appropriate for one dimension of a system will be irrelevant to another . Evaluation of OHSMS effectiveness may need to take account of what systems are expected to do . Are they to meet complex system or simple design standards ? Are they implemented at the behest of management or external OHS auth

33、orities ? Are objectives the simple ones such as reducing direct lost-time injuries or do they include satisfying multiple stakeholders ? Are they at an early or established stage of development ; and which of several different configurations of control strategy and management structure/style is ado

34、pted ? Drawing upon the review above , the diagram below sets out five key dimensions on which OHSMS vary that need to be considered in evaluation and measurement . 8. OHSMS Diversity : 5 Key Dimensions for Evaluation While all systems must meet the general requirements for an OHSMS , diversity may

35、occur along five key dimensions as follows : Implementation method (voluntary , mandatory or hybrid) ; Control strategy (safe person/safe place) ; Management structure and style (innovative or traditional) ; Degree of implementation (from meeting basic specifications to meeting stakeholder needs) ;

36、Degree of implementation(form introductory stage to fully operational) .OHSMS is a process of continuous development of innovation, is a process of continuous improvement. In the process, the enterprise culture constantly adjust the original management idea, realize enterprise safety culture reengin

37、eering. 1. What Is Safety Culture?The UK Health and Safety Executive defines safety culture as “ . . . the product of the individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's health and

38、 safety programs.” A more succinct definition has been suggested: “Safety culture is how the organization behaves when no one is watching.”Every organization has a safety culture, operating at one level or another. The challenges to the leadership of an organization are to: 1) determine the level at

39、 which the safety culture currently functions; 2) decide where they wish to take the culture; and 3) chart and navigate a path from here to there. 2. Why Is Safety Culture Important?Management systems and their associated policies and procedures depend upon the actions of individuals and groups for

40、their successful implementation. For example, a procedure may properly reflect the desired intent and be adequately detailed in its instructions. However, the successful execution of the procedure requires the actions of properly trained individuals who understand the importance of the underlying in

41、tent, who accept their responsibility for the task, and who appreciate that taking an obviously simplifying but potentially unsafe shortcut would be, quite simply, wrong. The values of the group (e.g., corporation, plant, shift team) help shape the beliefs and attitudes of the individual, which in t

42、urn, play a significant role in determining individual behaviors. A weak safety culture can be (and likely will be) evidenced by the actions and inactions of personnel at all levels of the organization. For example, the failure of a critical interlock might have been caused by the mechanic who faile

43、d to calibrate the pressure switch and falsified the maintenance records. Alternatively, it might have been caused by the plant manager who denied the funding requested to address staffing shortages in the instrument department. Audits too frequently reveal ostensibly complete, sometimes sophisticat

44、ed, management systems within which one or more elements are falling well short of achieving their desired intent. Previously, we might have attributed such failures to a general concept of “l(fā)ack of operating discipline.” Certainly, the failure to maintain high standards of performance might be a co

45、ntributor to the problem. However, deficiencies in other safety culture features likely contributed to the situation. Industry has gradually accepted the importance of identifying the management system failures that lead to incidents and near misses (i.e., identifying root causes). For example, let

46、us suppose that an incident occurred because a control room operator, leaving at the end of the shift, failed to alert the oncoming operator of a serious, off-standard condition in the process. This problem might be diagnosed generally as a communications problem, with a specific root cause identifi

47、ed as “Communications between shifts less than adequate.” Perhaps, however, perfunctory shift turnovers are the rule rather than the exception, and this circumstance is generally known to supervision. In this circumstance, another root cause related to supervisory practices, “Improper performance no

48、t corrected,” might be identified. This analysis so far leaves a number of questions unanswered, such as “Why do operators shortcut the turnover process and why do they feel comfortable in doing so?” or “Why do supervisors tolerate a practice that jeopardizes the safety of the facility?” We can atte

49、mpt to answer these questions by seeking to understand the values, beliefs and attitudes that shape individual actions and inactions (i.e., by seeking to understand the safety culture). By identifying and addressing the pathologies within the safety culture (or, more appropriately, by proactively se

50、eking to maintain a culture free of such weaknesses), we are effectively addressing the root causes of what we typically regard to be the root causes of safety performance problems.Regardless of whether one is seeking to establish a new safety management system, repair an existing underperforming sy

51、stem, or fine-tune a basically sound system to achieve higher performance, it is the actions or inactions of the individual working within the system that can ultimately be the limiting performance factor. Creating and sustaining a sound safety culture can be a decisive factor in determining the per

52、formance of the individual and the system.3. Who Is Responsible for Safety Culture?It has been suggested that “the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture”The leadership of an organization has the primary responsibility for identifying the need for, and fosterin

53、g, cultural change and for sustaining a sound safety culture once it is established.However, not unlike the concept of “safety as a line responsibility,” the responsibility for fostering and maintaining a sound safety culture cascades down through the organization. Every individual in the organizati

54、on has a role to play.Cultures are based upon shared values, beliefs, and perceptions that determine what comes to be regarded as the norms for the organization; i.e., cultures develop from societal agreements about what constitutes appropriate attitudes and behaviors. If the organization feels stro

55、ngly about a particular behavior, there will be little tolerance for deviation, and there will be strong societal pressures for conformance. Each individual in the organization has a role in reinforcing the behavioral norms.Thus, in the broadest sense for a sound safety culture, “The organization an

56、d each individual” is the most appropriate answer to the question “Who is responsible?” In a sound safety culture, an individual would be expected to intercede if they saw a co-worker about to commit an unsafe act. In a sound safety culture, leadership would be expected to monitor the heath of the s

57、afety culture and reinforce and nurture it when required. In a sound safety culture, individuals and groups would be expected to speak out if they perceived management acting in a fashion inconsistent with the organizations values.4. What Are the Key Attributes Of A Sound Safety Culture? A review of

58、 the literature on the topics of organizational effectiveness and safety culture, reinforced by learning from numerous chemical facility audits and incident investigations, has led to the identification 11 key attributes for a sound safety culture. These attributes, which are described in further de

59、tail in Table 1.Table 1. Key Attributes Of A Sound Safety Culture Espouse safety as a core value Provide strong leadership Establish and enforce high standards of performance Maintain a sense of vulnerability Empower individuals to successfully fulfill their safety responsibilities Provide deference to expertise Ensure open and effective communicati