上市公司論文：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司IPO盈余管理研究

1、上市公司論文：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司IPO盈余管理研究【中文摘要】2009年9月,創(chuàng)業(yè)板的開設(shè),IPO的重啟,進(jìn)一步完善了我國多層次資本市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展,為解決我國中小企業(yè),特別是科技型中小企業(yè)的融資問題提供了平臺(tái)。IPO (Initial Public Offerings)是指企業(yè)首次公開發(fā)行股票,是股份有限公司由少數(shù)人持股轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)楣姵止傻闹匾襟E,是企業(yè)開啟通往資本市場(chǎng)的大門。新股首次公開發(fā)行中存在的現(xiàn)象一直是備受關(guān)注,諸如IPO抑價(jià),IPO上市首日超額收益,企業(yè)IPO過后的業(yè)績(jī)“變臉”等現(xiàn)象,一直是金融界研究的熱點(diǎn)問題。與國外發(fā)達(dá)成熟市場(chǎng)相比,我國證券市場(chǎng)由于特殊的制度背景而存在市場(chǎng)扭曲現(xiàn)象。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)

2、上市和IPO高定價(jià),公司管理當(dāng)局就存在著利用信息不對(duì)稱和契約不完備來進(jìn)行盈余管理的強(qiáng)烈動(dòng)機(jī),而IPO之后業(yè)績(jī)下滑便成了一種普遍現(xiàn)象。這不僅誤導(dǎo)投資者、對(duì)我國證券市場(chǎng)的誠信基礎(chǔ)產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響,而且也不利于我國資本市場(chǎng)的資源優(yōu)化配置,從而損害資本市場(chǎng)的信心和健康發(fā)展。本文將通過借鑒國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的研究方法,并在此基礎(chǔ)上結(jié)合我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板的特征,對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司IPO過程的盈余管理行為進(jìn)行理論和實(shí)證研究,試圖從IPO的門檻、保薦人的制度、中介機(jī)構(gòu)的選擇以及會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的完善等方面提出防范創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司IPO盈余管理的一些政策和建議。本文采用的是理論與實(shí)證相結(jié)合的研究方法,運(yùn)用SPSS軟件對(duì)樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行處理。全文包

3、含六個(gè)部分。第一部分,緒論。論述創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司IPO盈余管理的選題背景和研究意義,同時(shí)對(duì)國內(nèi)外研究進(jìn)行文獻(xiàn)綜述,介紹本文的研究思路及內(nèi)容結(jié)構(gòu)框架。第二部分,闡述了上市公司IPO盈余管理的相關(guān)理論。探討盈余管理的基本涵義和特征,同時(shí)從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的理論角度來解釋盈余管理行為。第三部分,結(jié)合我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板的特征,分別從主客觀兩個(gè)方面闡述IPO公司盈余管理的動(dòng)因。同時(shí)結(jié)合2006年2月修改之后的新企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則,總結(jié)出IPO公司盈余管理的部分方式和方法。第四部分,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司IPO盈余管理實(shí)證分析。本部分首先提出了文章的研究假設(shè)和研究設(shè)計(jì),在此基礎(chǔ)上對(duì)選取的樣本進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì),對(duì)變量進(jìn)行回歸分析。本文提出了3

4、個(gè)假設(shè),H1：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司IPO盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)是基于融資需求。H2：創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO公司在上市過程中存在盈余管理行為。在上市前兩年、上市當(dāng)年、上市后一年存在不同程度的盈余管理。H3：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司存在業(yè)績(jī)“變臉”現(xiàn)象。在實(shí)證分析過程中,運(yùn)用財(cái)務(wù)管理中的“可持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)模型”來驗(yàn)證假設(shè)1：企業(yè)存在資金的需求,從而對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO公司盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)假設(shè)進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。通過SPSS軟件對(duì)修正的瓊斯模型即Jones-CFO模型下的樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行回歸分析來驗(yàn)證假設(shè)2。最后,通過營業(yè)收入增長(zhǎng)率、凈利潤增長(zhǎng)率以及資產(chǎn)收益率(ROA)三個(gè)指標(biāo)來評(píng)價(jià)樣本公司IPO前后的經(jīng)營業(yè)績(jī),從而揭示盈余管理所造成的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果,進(jìn)而說明創(chuàng)業(yè)板上

5、市公司在IPO前后存在業(yè)績(jī)“變臉”的現(xiàn)象,即假設(shè)3。第五部分,規(guī)范創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO公司盈余管理行為的建議。此部分先分析了盈余管理的危害性,然后從IPO的門檻、保薦人的制度、中介機(jī)構(gòu)的選擇以及會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的完善等方面提出防范創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司IPO盈余管理的一些政策及建議。第六部分,研究結(jié)論及展望。介紹本文的研究結(jié)論、創(chuàng)新和不足?！居⑽恼縏he Growth Enterprise Markets opened and IPO restarted in October 2009, which further improves the multi-level capital market and provi

6、des a platform for solving the financing problem of the small and medium-sized enterprises, especially for the High-tech enterprises. IPO which means initial public offering, is the Important steps of changing a minority holdings into public ownership. It put a way for enterprise to the capital mark

7、et. All kinds of phenomenon in the initial public offering are always concerned by people from different areas, such as IPO price of suppression, IPO on the first day the stock market excess returns, Performance variation after IPO. They are the hot problems in the financial research. Comparing with

8、 the developed countries mature markets, the development of securities market in our country presents distortions because of the special system backgrounds. The company has a strong motivation to manage earnings for IPO and high pricing of shares from Information asymmetry and incomplete contract. P

9、erformance declines after IPO has become a kind of common phenomenon. This will mislead investors and bring negative effects to the integrity of our country securities market. It will bring negative influence to the allocation of resources in Chinas capital market and damage peoples confidence to th

10、e entire market. In the end, the healthy development of the securities markets is not guaranteed. This paper will do some research on earnings management from theory and empirical studies, referencing on the basis of the domestic and foreign scholarsresearch methods. This paper tried to put forward

11、some policy suggestions about preventing and supervising the behavior of Earnings management. These suggestions are IPO conditions, Guarantor system, Choice of intermediary institutions and the perfection of accounting standards.The research methods in this paper are empirical research and theoretic

12、al analysis. The data processing is through SPSS software. This paper contains six parts. The first part is the introduction. It discusses the background and significance of the research topicearnings management of IPO companies。It summaries some domestic and foreign research results and introduce t

13、he research conception, content and framework.The second part is related theory of the IPO company earnings management. This part discusses the basic connotation and characteristics of earnings management, as well as explains the behavior of earnings management from the angle of economics.The third

14、part indicates the objective and subjective motivation of earnings management according to the Gems features. In combination with the new enterprise accounting standards which was modified in February,2006, this part also contains the method of earnings management.The fourth part is the empirical an

15、alysis. First, the paper put forward the research hypotheses and study design. On the basis of the selected samples, do some variables descriptive statistics and regression analysis. This paper proposes three hypotheses. They are the motivation of earnings management for Gem companies, the existing

16、of earnings management behavior in the IPO and performance “suddenly turn hostile” phenomenon. Using the “sustainable growth of financial management model” to verify the first hypothesis. Use the modified Jones-CFO model to do regression analysis of the sample data through SPSS software. This paper

17、mainly through operating income growth, net profit growth and adjusted the return on assets (ROA) to evaluate sample companies before and after the IPO, which reveals the economic consequences caused by earnings management and explain the existing of performance “suddenly turn hostile” phenomenon be

18、fore and after IPO.The fifth part proposed regulating earnings management behavior of IPO corporate. Firstly, it analyses the harmfulness of earnings management. And then it offers some policy Suggestions for gem companies to prevent and regulate earnings management behavior.The sixth part is the conclusion and prospect of t