減少美國(guó)金融系統(tǒng)的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)外文翻譯

1、原文：the reduction of systematic risk in the united states financial systemgoing forward, the central problem for financial regulation (defined as the prescription of rules, as distinct from supervision or risk assessment) is to reduce systemic risk. systemic risk is the risk that the failure of one s

2、ignificant financial institution can cause or significantly contribute to the failure of other significant financial institutions as a result of their linkages to each other. systemic risk can also be defined to include the possibility that one exogenous shock may simultaneously cause or contribute

3、to the failure of multiple significant financial institutions. this article focuses on the former definition because proper regulation could have the greatest potential to reduce systemic risk in this area.there are four principal linkages that can result in a chain reaction of failures. first, ther

4、e are interbank deposits, whether from loans or from correspondent accounts used to process payments. these accounts were the major concern when continental illinois bank almost failed in the mid-1980s. continental held sizable deposits of other banks; in many cases, the amount of the deposits subst

5、antially exceeded the capital of the depositor banks. these banks generally held such sizable deposits because they cleared payments, such as checks or wire transfers, through continental. if continental had failed, those banks would have failed as well. section 308 of the fdic improvement act of 19

6、91 gives the federal reserve board powers to deal with this problem. the act permits the board to limit the credit extended by an insured depository institution to another depository institution. limitation of interbank deposits may be feasible with respect to placements by one bank with another bec

7、ause the amount of credit extended is fixed for a given term. indeed, it appears that the chain-reaction risk arising from bilateral credit exposures from overnight federal reserve funds transactions is quite low: losses would not exceed one percent of total commercial banking assets as long as loss

8、 rates are kept to historically observed levels.exposures are more difficult to identify with respect to interbank clearing accounts where the amount of credit extended is a function of payment traffic. for example, bank a may be credited by its correspondent bank b for an incoming wire transfer of

9、$10 million. bank a is thus a creditor of bank b for this amount. if bank b were to fail bank a is seriously exposed. without material changes in the payment system, such as forcing banks to make and receive all payments through federal reserve rather than correspondent accounts, it would be quite d

10、ifficult to limit these types of exposures.second, a chain reaction of bank failures can occur through net settlement payment systems. if one bank fails to settle its position in a net settlement system for large value payments, such as the clearing house interbank payments system (chips) in the uni

11、ted states, other banks that do not get paid may, in turn, fail. this risk was the major systemic risk concern of the federal reserve until chips changed its settlement procedures in 2001 to essentially eliminate this risk.third, a chain reaction of bank failures can occur through imitative runs. wh

12、en one bank fails, depositors in other banks, particularly those whose deposits are uninsured, may assume that their banks may also fail and so withdraw their funds, exposing these banks to a liquidity crisis and ultimately to failure. this result comes from a lack of information in the market about

13、 what specifically caused the first bank to fail.(n15) the federal reserve plays the classic role of lender of last resort to stem irrational imitative runs in situations such as this one.lastly, and especially prominent in the current crisis, a chain reaction of bank failures can occur as a result

14、of counterparty risk on derivative transactions, such as credit default swaps (cdss). ).here the concern is that if institution x fails to settle its derivative position with institution y, both x and y will fail. if y in turn cannot settle its positions, other institutions will also fail. this risk

15、 proved potentially significant in the failure of the hedge fund long-term capital management in 1998. concerns of this type also underlay jpmorgan chase's assisted acquisition of bear stearns and the injection of federal funds into aig.(n18) this is one area in which the failure of non-banks is

16、 a major concern, but the severity of this form of systemic risk and the degree of interconnectedness among financial institutions is currently unknown.(n19) a report by the special inspector general for the troubled asset relief program (sigtarp) on the government's investments in aig indicated

17、 that goldman sachs, a major counterparty, would have been made whole in the event of an aig default. the report further indicated that the treasury and federal reserve were primarily concerned with losses that would be incurred by investors in aig in the event of a default, including $10 billion of

18、 state and local government money, $40 billion in 401(k) plans, and $38 billion in retirement plans. the report's explanation of the government's action also mentioned concern over stemming runs on money market funds, which held $20 billion in aig commercial paper. similarly, in their recent

19、 testimony on the "federal bailout of aig," treasury secretary timothy geithner and new york federal reserve general counsel thomas baxter also emphasized factors other than derivatives counterparty risk, including the impact that the failure of aig would have on money market funds, person

20、al savings and retirement plans, and insurance policyholders. if prospective investor losses, rather than the fallout of interconnectedness, were the true basis for the government policy with respect to aig, it may be that the concern with systemic risk is overstated. further study and better disclo

21、sure from the treasury and federal reserve is needed to support informed estimates of the magnitude of the problem. in any event, gauging the impact of systemic risk is difficult to determine and beyond the scope of this article.the threat of systemic risk (whether real or imagined) results in both

22、the need for government bailouts at taxpayer expense and in an increase in moral hazard. these results occur because both equity and debt holders, as well as counterparties, may be protected against losses. of course, the government could decide not to intervene, but this laissez-faire approach coul

23、d put the entire global economy at risk, an even worse outcome. as the financial crisis has illustrated, banks cannot always count on the government to cut off systemic risk when it occurs. the politics of supplying money to banks are unpopular and unsustainable by the federal reserve over the long

24、term without intense public scrutiny and loss of independence.at the outset, it is also worth noting that the "volcker rules" and related limitations on bank size announced by the obama administration on january 21, 2009 do not have much if any potential to reduce systemic risk. the volcke

25、r rules would prohibit bank holding companies and all of their subsidiaries from engaging in proprietary trading, as well as from investing in or sponsoring hedge fund and private equity operations. although president obama has characterized proprietary trading as trading "unrelated to serving

26、customers," a precise legal standard has not been given. the related size limitations were initially described as straightforward caps on each bank's market share of non-deposit liabilities. as deputy treasury secretary neal wolin describes, however, the size limits would not require banks

27、to divest existing operations or restrict organic growth, but would instead limit banks' ability to gain market share through mergers and acquisitions.the volcker rules are unlikely to reduce systemic risk for several reasons. first, banks generally engage in relatively little proprietary tradin

28、g. for example, wells fargo and bank of america, two of the largest deposit-funded banks, are estimated to earn less than 1% of revenues from proprietary trading. second, activities that threaten the financial system do not occur only in banks. in fact, none of the most prominent failures of the fin

29、ancial crisis-fannie mae, freddie mac, aig, bear stearns, or lehman-was a deposit-taking bank. and third, focusing on proprietary trading ignores the real cause of the financial crisis: losses from lending and securitization. goldman sachs has estimated that losses from lending and securitization ac

30、counted for approximately 80% of overall credit losses incurred by u.s. banks.nor should we expect reductions in systemic risk to result from the size limitations. an institution does not pose systemic risk because of its absolute size, but rather because of its debt, its derivatives positions, and

31、the scope and complexity of its other financial relationships. because the problem is not size but interconnectedness, reform should focus on reducing the interconnections so that firms can fail safely. furthermore, even if size were the right issue, mr. wolin's testimony implies that the size l

32、imitations would not require any existing bank to shrink. if size is the source of systemic risk, presumably we should be concerned about it whether it is the result of acquisition, organic growth, or otherwise.the draft legislation introduced by senator dodd on march 15, 2010 (the senate draft) con

33、tained a modified version of the volcker rules and size limitations. though the senate draft calls on the financial stability oversight council to conduct studies of whether these reforms will reduce systemic risk before they are implemented, studies are not needed to confirm that benefits from thes

34、e reforms will be negligible. outright restrictions on proprietary trading proposed in the senate draft would apply to insured depository institutions, companies that control insured depository institutions, bank holding companies, and all subsidiaries of the foregoing. the dodd proposal is even mor

35、e strict than chairman volcker recommended. according to chairman volcker it would be acceptable for goldman sachs to drop its bank charter and continue to engage in proprietary trading. however, under the senate draft, goldman would almost certainly be a systematically important nonbank financial c

36、ompany when it dropped its bank charter, and thus would continue to be supervised by the federal reserve. while goldman could, as a non-bank, continue to engage in proprietary trading, it would be subject to federal reserve controls, including "additional capital requirements" and "ad

37、ditional quantitative limits."thus, even if goldman sachs were to give up its bank charter, it would be required to hold additional capital against its proprietary trading positions. because institutions that are systemically important are likely to be more thoroughly regulated than those that

38、are not, this could encourage proprietary trading to shift to less carefully monitored firms, thereby increasing systemic risk. saddling non-bank financial companies engaged in proprietary trading with additional capital requirements is thus problematic.this article addresses what i regard as the fi

39、ve most important policies for dealing with systemic risk: the imposition of capital requirements (or limits on leverage), the use of clearinghouses and exchanges for over-the-counter derivatives, the resolution of insolvent institutions, the emergency lending by the federal reserve, and the structu

40、re of the regulatory system as it affects the control of systemic risk.ii. capital requirements ex ante, regulatory capital requirements have been the chief measure to reduce systemic risk. capital requirements, which have focused principally on banks, are designed to decrease the likelihood of fina

41、ncial institution failure. if institutions do not fail, the problem of systemic risk largely disappears. capital requirements have been highly regulated for a long time. since 1988, the requirements have been standardized worldwide by the basel committee on bank supervision. the united states implem

42、ented basel i and is in the process of implementing basel ii for banks and their holding companies. the sec had already implemented pillar i of basel ii for securities firms' holding companies before the onslaught of the credit crisis. these capital requirements proved highly inadequate. the sec

43、's basel ii-based rules permitted the top five major investment banks to achieve leverage of over thirty to one.(insufficient capital was a significant cause of the failure of lehman brothers and bear stearns. insufficient capital also played a major role in forcing merrill lynch to sell itself

44、to bank of america. indeed, the most intensive and detailed area of regulation, capital, has proven ineffective. this failure demonstrates that more regulation does not necessarily translate into less systemic risk.source: scott,hal s, 2010. “the reduction of systematic risk in the united states fin

45、ancial system”. harvard journal of law. pp.2-5.譯文：減少美國(guó)金融系統(tǒng)的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)一、系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)減少:核心問(wèn)題 展望未來(lái),中央金融監(jiān)管問(wèn)題(指處方的規(guī)則,有別于監(jiān)督或風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估)是減少系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是沒(méi)有一個(gè)重要的金融機(jī)構(gòu)可以導(dǎo)致或有助于失敗的其他重要金融機(jī)構(gòu)的聯(lián)系。系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也可以確定的可能性,包括一個(gè)外來(lái)沖擊,同時(shí)可導(dǎo)致失敗的多種重要金融機(jī)構(gòu)。這篇文章的重點(diǎn)是前定義,因?yàn)榭梢赃m當(dāng)規(guī)管最大的潛力,減少系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。主要有四種聯(lián)系可以導(dǎo)致連鎖反應(yīng)失敗。第一,有銀行同業(yè)存款,無(wú)論從貸款或代理賬戶用于處理付款。這些賬戶主要關(guān)注的是大陸伊利諾斯銀行。

46、大陸舉行了大量存款的其他銀行，在許多情況下,該筆存款數(shù)量大幅超過(guò)資本的儲(chǔ)戶銀行。這些銀行普遍擁有龐大存款, 因?yàn)樗麄兡軌蚯宄母犊?例如通過(guò)大陸檢查或電匯。如果大陸失敗,這些銀行就會(huì)失敗。第308聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司改進(jìn)了1991年美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)的力量來(lái)處理這個(gè)問(wèn)題。該法案允許董事會(huì)限制信貸保險(xiǎn)的存款機(jī)構(gòu)到另一個(gè)存款機(jī)構(gòu)。事實(shí)上,看來(lái)連鎖風(fēng)險(xiǎn)雙邊信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)從占聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備資金是相當(dāng)?shù)?，損失將不超過(guò)百分之一的商業(yè)銀行資產(chǎn)總額只要損失率保持在歷史上觀察到的水平。 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更難確定關(guān)于銀行同業(yè)結(jié)算賬戶的金額的信貸是一個(gè)功能的支付交通。例如,銀行a可貸記其代理銀行b轉(zhuǎn)帳1000萬(wàn)美元。對(duì)b銀行這筆款項(xiàng)來(lái)說(shuō)銀行a

47、是一個(gè)債權(quán)銀行。如果銀行b失敗銀行a是嚴(yán)重暴露。沒(méi)有重大變化的支付系統(tǒng),如迫使銀行,并得到所有支付聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備而不是代理賬戶, 它會(huì)比較困難的限制這些類型的動(dòng)向。第二,連鎖失敗的銀行可以通過(guò)凈結(jié)算支付系統(tǒng)。如果一個(gè)銀行未能解決其地位凈結(jié)算系統(tǒng)的大額支付,如銀行同業(yè)支付結(jié)算系統(tǒng)(芯片)在美國(guó),其他銀行,并不可能支付,反過(guò)來(lái)則是失敗的。這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是對(duì)重大系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的關(guān)注,美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)在2001年改變了芯片解決程序,基本上消除這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。第三,連鎖失敗的銀行可以通過(guò)模仿運(yùn)行。當(dāng)一個(gè)銀行失敗,在其他銀行存戶,特別是那些存款沒(méi)有醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn), 可能認(rèn)為他們的銀行也要失敗,所以撤回他們的資金,使這些銀行流動(dòng)性發(fā)

48、生危機(jī)并最終失敗。這一結(jié)果來(lái)自缺乏市場(chǎng)信息使第一銀行造成失敗。在這種情況下，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)發(fā)揮作用以阻止模仿運(yùn)行。最后,特別是突出在目前的危機(jī),一個(gè)連鎖的銀行可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)失誤,結(jié)果造成對(duì)方的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),衍生工具交易,如信用違約換匯。在這里關(guān)注的是,如果機(jī)構(gòu)x未能解決其衍生立場(chǎng)與機(jī)構(gòu)y, x和y將失敗。 如果y又無(wú)法解決自己的立場(chǎng),其他機(jī)構(gòu)也將失敗。這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可能顯著的證明了在1998年對(duì)沖基金長(zhǎng)期資金管理公司的失敗。這種類型的關(guān)注也涉及了摩根大通輔助收購(gòu)貝爾斯登及在美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的聯(lián)邦基金。非銀行機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)放在某一方面的失敗是一個(gè)主要關(guān)注的問(wèn)題,但這種嚴(yán)重的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的程度和金融機(jī)構(gòu)之間相互聯(lián)系是目前不明

49、確的。公布的一份報(bào)告顯示特殊的檢察長(zhǎng)為翻騰的資產(chǎn)的救濟(jì)程序在政府的投資表明,高盛集團(tuán)的主要對(duì)手在美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的默認(rèn)值。報(bào)告進(jìn)一步表示,財(cái)政部和聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)主要是關(guān)心的是在美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的投資者的情況下,默認(rèn)的設(shè)置中所造成的損失,包括100億美元州和地方政府的錢, 40億美元的養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃和380億美元退休計(jì)劃。該報(bào)告對(duì)政府的行動(dòng)也提到表明關(guān)注運(yùn)行在貨幣市場(chǎng)基金于200億元在美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的商業(yè)票據(jù)。同樣,在其最近的證詞“聯(lián)邦緩急,美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)”財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)蒂莫西蓋特納和紐約聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)一般律師托馬斯·巴克斯特還強(qiáng)調(diào)衍生品交易對(duì)手以外的其他因素, 包括在貨幣市場(chǎng)基金中影響美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的失敗、個(gè)人儲(chǔ)蓄和退休計(jì)劃、保險(xiǎn)的保單。如果準(zhǔn)投資者損失不是相互關(guān)聯(lián)的影響,是真正的基礎(chǔ)上的政府政策 ,那可能是系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的夸大。進(jìn)一步研究和更好地披露財(cái)務(wù)和聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì),以支持知情估計(jì)問(wèn)題的嚴(yán)重性。在任何情況下,量規(guī)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響是很難決定的,遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了本文所涉及的范圍。威脅的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)(不論是真實(shí)或想像的)結(jié)果,需要政府在納稅人救援費(fèi)用和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)上面的增加和防范。這些結(jié)果可能發(fā)生因?yàn)楣善焙蛡钟腥?以及交易對(duì)手,可免受損失。當(dāng)然,政府可以決定不進(jìn)