物流成本 外文翻譯 英文文獻 分銷渠道中的物流服務.doc

文獻出自：Rabinovich E, Knemeyer A M, Mayer C M. Why do Internet commerce firms incorporate logistics service providers in their distribution channels?: The role of transaction costs and network strengthJ. Journal of Operations Management, 2007, 25(3): 661-681.Why do Internet commerce firms incorporate logistics service providers in their distribution channels: The role of transaction costs and network strengthAbstractThe Internet has redefined information-sharing boundaries in distribution channels and opened new avenues for managing logistics services. In the process, firms have started to incorporate new service providers in their commercial interactions with customers over the Internet. This paper studies conceptually and empirically why Internet commerce firms (ICFs) have established relationships with these providers. Focusing on logistics services in outbound distribution channels, we rely on transaction cost theory to reveal that low levels of asset specificity and uncertainty drive Internet commerce firms to establish these relationships. Moreover, we apply strategic network theory to show that Internet commerce firms seek these providers because they offer access to relationship networks that bundle many complementary logistics services. In addition, logistics service providers make these services available across new and existing relationships between the Internet commerce firms, their customers, and their vendors.1. IntroductionThe growth of electronic commerce has driven Internet commerce firms (ICFs) retailers and other organizations that market products over the Web to increasingly share market demand data with other firms so as to enrich the order fulfillment services they offer to customers (Frohlich and Westbrook, 2002). Along these efforts, ICFs have started seeking logistics service providers to tap into resources and skills that could improve their fulfillment capabilities (Dutta and Segev, 1999).These logistics service providers are not simply variants of transportation companies, and as such, they are not to be confused with what are known nowadays as third party logistics (3PL) firms. They offer logistics services, of course, but they could also enable ICFs to leverage other distribution parties logistical resources and skills in order to fulfill their customer orders more effectively. They may use their assets to take care of product returns, for instance, or work with established carriers on “l(fā)ast-mile” deliveries. Or their value may be primarily in managing order information shared among distribution partiese.g., centralizing inventory data, especially when products are being shipped directly from upstream echelons in the distribution channel. Logistics service providers such as Parcel Direct, for instance, participate in this kind of activity to ultimately assist ICFs in consolidating orders for drop-shipping to their customers.Past research has identified the relationships with these logistics service providers in offline settings and has positioned them within logistics triads (Larson and Gammelgaard, 2001) and extended-enterprise logistics systems (Stock et al., 2000). Yet, what is ground-breaking about these relationships for an ICF is that they are driven by their potential to (1) generate low transaction costs, (2) bundle complementary logistics services, and (3) expand the availability of those services across customers, vendors, and “l(fā)ast-mile” delivery companies, such as UPS (Amit and Zott, 2001).The goal of this study is to conceptualize and empirically assess how these drivers shape ICF managements decisions to develop mechanisms to form and manage dyadic exchanges between their firms and focal organizations offering logistics services in outbound distribution channels. Prior literature has used the term “governance” to define these mechanisms (Barney, 1999, p. 138) and has delineated governance decisions through which a firm can infuse order in exchanges with a focal provider where potential conflicts threaten to undo or upset opportunities to realize economic gains (Williamson, 1999, p. 1090). These decisions center on the extent to which firms rely on a particular governance mode for a service. Since our research context focuses on outbound distribution channels, we define such reliance as the proportion of Internet orders for which a governance mode is used for a service supporting the fulfillment of those orders. This definition is consistent with that used by John and Weitz (1988) for distribution in an offline setting.Our conceptualization and empirical assessment are unique because they recognize that governance in an exchange between an ICF and a focal logistics service provider is embedded within a networked structure that also comprises a broader collection of relational links among other distribution-channel members (Chen and Paulraj, 2004andJones et al., 1997). In this context, our research is primarily concerned with ICFs reliance on networked governance structures. These structures have been defined as economic forms of organization that are built on reciprocal exchange patterns, enabling firms (in this case, ICFs) to obtain resources and services through dyadic relationships with other organizations (i.e., focal logistics service providers), as well as through broader relational links where these relationships exist ( Powell, 1990andGulati, 1998).To fulfill the goal of this study, Section 2 positions our research in the strategic- and operations-management literatures. Also, it develops the theoretical foundation and hypotheses that articulate a decision-making framework for ICF reliance on networked governance structures for logistics services. Section 3 discusses methodological issues pertaining to the data collection and the operationalization of the constructs developed as part of the theoretical framework presented in Section 2. We analyze the empirical results in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5 with a presentation of findings, academic and practical contributions, and future research opportunities stemming from our study.2. Theoretical frameworkBecause networked governance structures are based on linkages among interdependent firms (Powell, 1990), they constitute an alternate form of exchange (Spulber, 1996) that expands two traditional forms: perfectly competitive markets and vertically integrated hierarchies (Williamson, 1975). Theoretically, decisions to adopt such exchanges rest on costs potentially incurred by ICFs when they establish market-based linkages with focal providers to manage i.e., plan, organize, operate, and control logistics services (Madhok, 2002). However, these decisions are also linked to scale, skills, and resources that ICFs may obtain in broader networks of services and entities accessible through their relationships with focal providers (Doz and Hamel, 1998andGulati, 1998).Consequently, our assessment of these decisions integrates two distinct theoretical perspectives: transaction cost theory and strategic network theory. Transaction cost theory helps us understand how efforts and risks in establishing links with focal logistics service providers are related to expenditures that impact ICFs reliance on these specialists. Through strategic network theory, and in accordance with its definition, we can establish how the access offered by focal logistics service providers to networked governance structures shapes ICFs relationships with the providers (Granovetter, 1973).This integration adds to extant literature that has independently relied on transaction cost and strategic network theories to conceptualize similar phenomena at a strategic level (e.g., Eccles, 1981, Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Granovetter, 1992andJones et al., 1997). The integration builds on work by Amit and Zott (2001), who used exploratory case studies to apply these theories to an Internet setting and concluded that neither of these theories can fully explain by itself value creation across different governance structures present in Internet business models. Therefore, Amit and Zott (2001) posit that transaction cost and strategic network theories complement each other in explaining the emergence of governance structures in Internet settings.Individually, transaction cost theory focuses on an exchange between two parties (e.g., an ICF and a focal logistics service provider) as a discrete event that is valuable by itself, as it reflects the choice of the most efficient governance form and hence contributes to lower the exchange costs incurred by one of the parties, i.e., the ICF. Strategic network theory complements transaction cost theory because it considers the individual dyadic exchange collectively with other relational links that may accompany that exchange (Amit and Zott, 2001). This does not mean, however, that strategic network theory would become the dominant research view, thus rendering transaction cost theory irrelevant. By articulating a framework necessary to define the choice regarding the most efficient governance form in the exchange between an ICF and its focal provider, transaction cost theory would actually pave the way for strategic network theory to define whether resources and services available through other links surrounding the ICFprovider exchange would confirm or modify that choice (Amit and Zott, 2001).Within operations management, our assessment of these theories answers calls by researchers to offer a better understanding of (1) decision-making mechanisms behind the development of relationships between firms (Mabert and Venkataramanan, 1998) and (2) managerial decisions concerning logistics operations in inter-firm relationships (Grover and Malhotra, 2003). As a result, our research contributes to the operations-management literature because it offers a more detailed understanding as to why firms, in this case ICFs, utilize alternative structures to incorporate solution specialists, in general, and logistics service providers, in particular, into their distribution channels.Moreover, in studying decisions about the management of inter-firm exchanges, our research conceptualization follows that introduced by Choi et al. (2001) and Choi and Hong (2002), who advocated that operational decisions around inter-organizational exchanges be positioned within larger networks of firms. However, by focusing on logistics services necessary to carry out the fulfillment of customer orders, we extend those conceptualizations from a manufacturing context to a service setting. This allows us to study not only cost considerations, but also value-adding parameters in decisions to incorporate networked governance structures to connect with other distribution-channel members.Our assessment of decisions by ICF management to form networked governance structures also contributes to literature in service operations management. With the advent of Internet commerce, experts predicted that greater opportunities for information interaction between ICFs and other distribution-channel members would lead to greater efficiency in the performance of distribution-channel services (Benjamin and Wigand, 1995). In theory, this efficiency would inevitably compel ICFs to lower their prices to compete with other organizations. Otherwise, ICFs would likely succumb to price-aggressive competitors who would be able to offer these same services to customers at relatively lower costs (Giaglis et al., 2002).In fact, Dell Computers and other ICFs have succeeded at increasing the efficiency of their distribution channels by offering wide product variety at low prices. However, evidence suggests that other ICFs have chosen not to rely exclusively on low prices to compete and instead have obtained price premiums by offering services with the support of providers in areas such as logistics (Maltz et al., 2004). After all, through logistics services, providers can add value to Internet transactions by allowing customers to obtain exact product specifications that match their needs (Boyer et al., 2002). Moreover, Internet customer satisfaction (Thirumalai and Sinha, 2005), loyalty (Heim and Sinha, 2001), and, thus, willingness to ultimately pay price premiums (Rabinovich and Bailey, 2004) are likely to be related to the availability of those services.中文翻譯為什么網(wǎng)絡電子商務公司將其分銷渠道中的物流服務歸于交易成本的作用和網(wǎng)絡的力量摘要：互聯(lián)網(wǎng)重新定義了信息共享邊界的分銷渠道和物流管理服務開辟了新的途徑。在這個過程中，公司已經(jīng)開始把新的服務提供商在他們的商業(yè)在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上與客戶互動。本文研究的概念上和經(jīng)驗的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)電子商務公司（ICFS）與這些供應商建立了合作關系。專注于物流服務，在出站的分銷渠道，我們依靠交易成本理論表明，水平低的資產(chǎn)專用性和不確定性驅(qū)動的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)電子商務公司要建立這些關系。此外，我們實施戰(zhàn)略網(wǎng)絡理論表明，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)電子商務公司提供許多互補的物流服務捆綁的關系網(wǎng)絡，尋求供應商，因為他們。此外，物流服務供應商提供這些服務跨越新的和現(xiàn)有的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)電子商務公司，他們的客戶和他們的供應商之間的關系。1.介紹電子商務的增長推動了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)電子商務公司（ICFS） - 零售商和其他機構越來越多地分享市場的產(chǎn)品通過Web - 與其他公司的市場需求數(shù)據(jù)，以豐富他們提供給客戶的訂單執(zhí)行服務（Frohlich和威斯布魯克，2002）。隨著這些努力，ICFS已經(jīng)開始尋求物流服務供應商進軍資源和技能，可以提高他們的履行能力（Dutta和塞格夫，1999年）。這些物流服務供應商不能簡單地運輸公司的變種，正因為如此，他們現(xiàn)在被稱為第三方物流（3PL）公司是不被混淆。當然，他們提供物流服務，但他們還可以使ICFS利用其他分銷各方的后勤資源和技能，以更有效地履行他們的客戶訂單。產(chǎn)品的回報率，例如照顧，或與既定的“最后一英里”的交付運營商，他們可以利用自己的資產(chǎn)?；蛘咚麄兊膬r值可能主要在訂單信息共享之間的分布各方，例如管理，集中庫存數(shù)據(jù)，特別是當產(chǎn)品被運往在分銷渠道直接從上游梯隊。物流服務供應商，如包裹直接，例如，參加這樣的活動，最終協(xié)助ICFS在鞏固他們的客戶訂單下降，航運。過去的研究已經(jīng)確定了脫機設置這些物流服務供應商的關系，他們在物流黑社會（拉爾森和Gammelgaard，2001年）和擴展企業(yè)的物流系統(tǒng)（Stock等人，2000）。然而，什么是這些關系的ICF是突破性的，他們都在為自己的潛力：（1）生成低交易成本，（2）捆綁互補性的物流服務，及（3）擴大客戶提供這些服務的整個，供應商和“最后一公里”的快遞公司，如UPS（Amit和Zott，2001年）。本研究的目的是概念化和實證評估這些驅(qū)動程序的形狀ICF管理層的決定是如何建立機制，形成二元之間的交流和管理他們的公司提供物流服務，在出站的分銷渠道和聯(lián)絡組織。之前的文獻中使用了“管理”一詞來定義這些機制（巴尼，1999年，第138頁），并劃定了管理決策的公司注入秩序的交流與重點供應商，潛在的沖突威脅撤消或不高興的機會實現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟收益（威廉姆森，1999年，1090年）。這些決定公司在何種程度上依賴于一個特定的治理模式的服務中心。由于我們的研究內(nèi)容集中在出站的分銷渠道，我們定義這種依賴的治理模式，用于支持履行這些訂單的服務網(wǎng)絡訂單的比例。這個定義是一致的分布由約翰和Weitz（1988）為在脫機設置。我們的概念化和實證評估是獨一無二的，因為他們認識到，治理被嵌入到一個網(wǎng)絡結(jié)構，還包括其他分銷渠道成員關系之間的聯(lián)系，更廣泛的收集（陳和Paulraj在ICF和重點物流服務供應商之間的交流， 2004年，Jones等人，1997）。在這種情況下，我們的研究主要關注的與ICFS依賴網(wǎng)絡的治理結(jié)構。這些結(jié)構都被定義為經(jīng)濟的組織形式，是建立在相互交換模式，使企業(yè)（在這種情況下，ICFS）獲得的資源和服務，通過與其他組織（如重點物流服務供應商）的二元關系，以及通過這些關系存在的更廣泛的關系鏈接（鮑威爾，1990年和古拉蒂，1998年）。為了完成這項研究的目標，我們的研究第2個位置的戰(zhàn)略和運營管理文獻。此外，它的發(fā)展的理論基礎和假設，闡明一個決策網(wǎng)絡治理結(jié)構的框架為ICF依賴于物流服務。第3節(jié)討論的方法問題，有關的數(shù)據(jù)收集和運作的第2節(jié)中提出的理論框架的一部分開發(fā)的結(jié)構。在第4節(jié)，我們分析了實證結(jié)果。最后，我們的結(jié)論在第5節(jié)的調(diào)查結(jié)果，學術界和實際貢獻和未來的研究機會，從我們的研究帶來演示。2.理論框架由于網(wǎng)絡的治理結(jié)構，根據(jù)之間的聯(lián)系，相互依存的企業(yè)（鮑威爾，1990年），它們構成了另一種形式的交流（Spulber，1996年），擴大兩個傳統(tǒng)的形式：完全競爭市場，垂直整合的層次結(jié)構（威廉姆森，1975）。從理論上講，決定采用這樣的交流，其余的成本可能所產(chǎn)生的ICFS時，建立以市場為基礎的聯(lián)系與聯(lián)絡供應商管理 - 即計劃，組織，運作和控制 - 物流服務（Madhok，2002年）的。然而，這些決定也與ICFS可能會獲得更廣泛的網(wǎng)絡服務和實體可以通過與重點供應商的關系（打和Hamel，1998年和古拉蒂，1998年）的規(guī)模，技能和資源。因此，我們評估這些決策集成了兩個不