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PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10966
PerceptionsofEconomicMobilityandSupportforEducationReforms
AlexandruCojocaru
MichaelLokshin
IvánTorre
WORLDBANKGROUP
EuropeandCentralAsiaRegion&PovertyandEquityGlobalPracticeNovember2024
PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10966
Abstract
Thispaperinvestigatestherelationshipbetweentheexpec-tationsofeconomicmobilityandsupportfortax-financededucationreformsusingdatafromtheLifeinTransitionSurvey,whichcovers39countriesinEurope,CentralAsia,andtheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.Theanalysisdemonstratesthatindividualswhoexpectthemselvesortheirchildrentobeupwardlymobilearemorelikelyto
supporttax-financededucationreforms.Thiscorrelationisrobusttodifferentformulationsofmobilityexpecta-tionsandpersistsoveradecade,encompassingbothstableandpost-crisiseconomicenvironments.Therelationshipispartiallymediatedbybeliefsaboutthefairnessofeco-nomicopportunitiesinsocietyandindividuals’readinesstoembracerisks.
ThispaperisaproductoftheOfficeoftheChiefEconomist,EuropeandCentralAsiaRegionandthePovertyandEquityGlobalPractice.ItispartofalargereffortbytheWorldBanktoprovideopenaccesstoitsresearchandmakeacontributiontodevelopmentpolicydiscussionsaroundtheworld.PolicyResearchWorkingPapersarealsopostedontheWebathttp:///prwp.Theauthorsmaybecontactedatacojocaru@,mlokshin@,anditorre@.
ThePolicyResearchWorkingPaperSeriesdisseminatesthefindingsofworkinprogresstoencouragetheexchangeofideasaboutdevelopmentissues.Anobjectiveoftheseriesistogetthefindingsoutquickly,evenifthepresentationsarelessthanfullypolished.Thepaperscarrythenamesoftheauthorsandshouldbecitedaccordingly.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/WorldBankanditsaffiliatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.
ProducedbytheResearchSupportTeam
PerceptionsofEconomicMobilityandSupportforEducationReforms
AlexandruCojocaru,MichaelLokshin,andIván
Torre1
JEL:D3,J62,O1,O15,P2
Keywords:Economicmobility,equalityofopportunity,supportforeducationreform,EuropeandCentralAsia,MiddleEastandNorthAfrica
1TheauthorsareattheWorldBank.Thispaper’sfindings,interpretations,andconclusionsareentirelythoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldBank,itsExecutiveDirectors,orthecountriestheyrepresent.MiguelPurroyprovidedexcellentassistanceincollecting,processing,andanalyzingdataforthispaper.Sendcorrespondencetoacojocaru@.
2
1.Introduction
Structuralreformscanraiseincomes,butthecostsofreformsmightfalldisproportionatelyonsomepopulationgroups,increasinginequalityandfuelingargumentsopposingchange.Theriskoflossesforlargesegmentsofsocietycouldbeapowerfulshapingforceofeconomicandsocialpolicies.Identifyingwhowilllikelyloseoutfromreformsandmanagingpeople’sperceptionsabouttheirfuturewelfareiscrucialforconsolidatingpoliticalsupportforcostlymeasuresandmovingcountriestohighergrowthtrajectories.Itmightbeparticularlyimportanttounderstandthefactorsthatshapesupportforstructuralreformsforthemiddle-incomecountriesinEurope,CentralAsia,andelsewherethatarefacingchallengesinacceleratingeconomicgrowthandraisingtheirpopulations’standardsofliving.
Thispaperinvestigateswhethersupportforeducationreformsisaffectedbyexpectationsaboutfutureeconomicmobility.Thefocusonthesubsetofstructuralreformsrelatedtoeducation
stemsfromtheevidencethatinvestmentsinhumancapitalplayacrucialroleindrivingeconomicgrowth
(HanushekandWoessmann2008)
andthateducationreformsareapowerfulpolicychannelthroughwhichcountriescanimprovetheinclusivenessofgrowthbylevelingtheplayingfieldandenhancingtheupwardeconomicmobilityofdisadvantagedgroups
(IMF2019)
.
Theanalysisisbasedondataon39countriesinEurope,CentralAsia,andtheMiddleEastandNorthAfricafromthe2010,2016,and2023roundsoftheLifeinTransitionSurvey
(EBRD2023)
.Thissampleofcountriesisanalyticallyinterestingbecause,despiteprogressmadeoverthelast
severaldecades,thesecountrieslagthehigh-incomecountriesineducationalachievement
(WorldBank2018)
.Reformsaimedatimprovingthequalityofeducationarealsomorecostlyandpoliticallychallengingthaneffortstoexpandaccesstoeducation,whichhelpedcountriesmovefromlow-incometomiddle-incomestatus
(Aiyarandothers2013)
.Profoundeducationreformsthattakeyearstoachievelastingeffectsrequireastrong,broad-based,durablecoalition
atalllevelsofsociety.
Thepaperfindsthatindividualswhoexpectthemselvesortheirchildrentobeupwardlymobilearemorelikelytosupporttax-financededucationreformsthanindividualswhodonot.Thisrelationshipisrobusttovariousformulationsofmobilityexpectationsandpersistsacrossseveral
3
surveyroundsspanningbothstableandpost-crisiseconomicenvironments.Thisrelationshipispartiallymediatedbybeliefsaboutthefairnessofeconomicopportunitiesinsocietyandindividuals’willingnesstotakerisks.Weusetheinstrumentalvariableapproachtomitigatethepossibilitythatourestimatesarebiasedbythepresenceofunobservedindividualtraitscorrelatedwithexpectationsofmobilityandindividualwillingnesstosupportreforms.
Therestofthepaperisstructuredasfollows.Section2reviewstheliterature.Section3presentsourestimationframework.Section4describesthedataandpresentssomedescriptiveresults.Section5presentsthemainresultsofourmultivariateanalysis.Section6presentstheresultsofoursensitivityanalysis.Section7examineschangesinsupportforeducationreformovertime.Section8summarizesthepaper’smainfindings.
2.Literaturereview
Economictheorysuggeststhatself-interestdrivespolicypreferencesandvotingbehavior.The
poorwouldbemorelikelytosupporthigherlevelsofredistribution,forinstance,whereastherichwouldbemorelikelytoopposethem
(MeltzerandRichard1981)
.Havingexperiencedanadverseeconomicshock,suchasjoblossorinsecureemployment,heightensaperson’ssenseofvulnerabilityandleadstostrongerpreferencesformoreexpansivesafetynets
(Margalit2019;
Heinemannetal.2009;
Boeri,Boersch-Supan,andTabellini2002)
.Ontheotherhand,lotterywindfallsareassociatedwithsupportformoreconservativeandlessegalitarianpoliticalviews
(PowdhaveeandOswald2014)
.Intransitioneconomies,self-reportedupwardmobilitywas
reportedtoberelatedtobroaderacceptanceoftheoutcomesofprivatization
(Denisovaetal.
2012)
andgreatersupportforthemarketeconomy
(Cancho,Davalos,andSanchez2015)
.
Earlierstudiesfoundthatotherfactors—includingthedegreeofunderstandingofwhatthe
reformsentail,politicalaffinities,andnormativebeliefs,suchasattitudestowardfairness—alsoshapepreferences
.AlesinaandGlaeser(2004)
arguethatthedifferenceinthesizeofthewelfarestateintheUnitedStatesandEuropepartlyreflectsdifferencesinbeliefsaboutthefairness
underlyingpovertyandsocialmobility,aswellasethnicfractionalization,whichinfluencespreferencesforredistribution
.LuttmerandSinghal(2011)
demonstratethatimmigrants’politicalpreferencesareinfluencedbybeliefsaboutredistributionintheircountryoforigin.
4
Futureexpectationscanalsoinformeconomicself-interest.BenabouandOk(2001)showthatexpectationsofsocioeconomicmobilitycanaffectpreferencesforredistribution.Individualswithbelow-averageincomeswhowouldbenefitfromredistributivepoliciesfinancedbyhighertaxesmayopposesuchpoliciesiftheyexpecttobeupwardlymobile.Thisprediction,knownastheProspectsofUpwardMobilityhypothesis,hasbeenborneoutbythedatainexperimental
settings(ChecchiandFilippin2004;
AgranovandPalfrey2020)
aswellasinobservationaldata(AlesinaandLaFerrara2005;AlesinaandFuchs-Schuendeln2005;
Cojocaru2014;
Ruedaand
Stegmueller2019)
.
Theliteratureonpreferencesforredistributionpointstotheimportanceofself-interest,culturalfactors,andsocialmobility,bothpastandfuture(CorneoandGruner2002;
AlesinaandGiuliano
2009;
Alesina,Stancheva,andTeso2018;Cavaille2023;seealso
MengelandWeidenholzer2022
foradetailedsurveyofthisliterature).Lessisknownabouttherolethesefactorsplayinshapingpreferencesforpolicychoicesunrelatedtoredistribution.Thispaperaimstocontributetoclosingthisknowledgegap.Severalearlierstudiesconsiderthedriversofsupportformarketreformsatthebeginningofthepost-Soviettransition
(Duch1993;
Denisovaetal.2021;
RovelliandZaiceva
2013)
orinLatinAmerica
(KaufmanandZuckermann1998)
.
Denisovaetal.(2012)
findthat
economichardshipsduringthepost-Soviettransition—suchastheexperienceofdownwardmobility,thelackofhumancapitalsuitableforamarketeconomy,andthelackofprivateassets—significantlyincreasedthedesireforrevisingtheresultsofearlierprivatization.
SeveralearlierstudieshaveexaminedtheindividualdeterminantsofpreferencesforinvestmentsineducationforasmallsubsetofEuropeancountries
(BusemeyerandGarritzmann2017;
Garritzmann,Busemeyer,andNeimanns2018)
.
WieseandEriksen(2024)
investigatelinkagesbetweenexpectationsofmobilityandwillingnesstopayforimprovementsinpubliceducationandhealthcareusingdatafromthe2016roundoftheLiTS,framingitasatestofthePOUMhypothesiswithrespecttoindirectratherthandirectredistribution,whichwasthefocusonthemajorityofearlierstudies.However,willingnesstopayadditionaltaxesforinvestmentsineducationorhealthcaremightnotnecessarilybedrivenbyredistributionmotives,asrespondentscanviewsuchinvestmentsasbenefitingthemselvesandtheirfamilies;thussupport
5
forsuchinvestmentscanbeentirelyconsistentwithself-interest.Thelatterisindeedtheargumentthisstudyproposestoinvestigateempirically.
3.Theoreticalframeworkandempiricalstrategy
Theeffectsofstructuralreformstaketime—possiblyaslongasageneration—tomaterialize.Unlikelow-incomecountries,whereeducationpoliciesfocusmainlyonexpandingaccesstoprimaryand/orsecondaryeducation,middle-incomecountries,whichoftenalreadyhaveuniversalaccesstobasiceducation,requireharder-to-implement,longer-terminvestments,suchasupgradingthevocationalandtertiaryeducationthatiscriticalforresearchanddevelopment
(DonerandSchneider2016).
Indecidingwhethertosupporttax-financedinvestmentsineducation,individualscomparethediscountedvalueoffuturebenefitsfromthereforms(forthemselvesormembersoftheirfamilies)tothelossesincurrentconsumptionbecauseofhighertaxes.Perceptionsaboutsocioeconomicmobilityareanimportantfactorinthisdecision.Intergenerationalmobilityin
educationandincomeischaracterizedbyasignificantdegreeofpersistence.Childrenofbetter-educatedparentsand/orparentswithhighersocioeconomicstatusaremorelikelythanotherchildrentohavehighlevelsofeducationandincomeasadults
(vanderWeideetal.2024)
.Oneofthekeyfactorsdrivingthisintergenerationalpersistence,inbotheducationandincomes,isparentalprivateinvestmentsintheeducationoftheirchildren
(RestucciaandUrrutia2004)
.Individualswhoexpecttoimprovetheirsocioeconomicstatus(ormaintainhighstatus)would
wanttotransferthatstatustotheirchildren,partlybyinvestingineducationalattainmentforthem.
Assumetheeducationaloutcomesareafunctionoftwocomplimentaryinputs–publicly-providedschoolingandprivateparentalinvestment.Then,individualswhoanticipatetheireconomicsituationtoimproveinthefuturewouldexpecthigherreturnsfrombetterpubliceducationbecausetheycancomplementitwithhigherprivateinvestment.Incontrast,peoplewhobelievetheirsituationwilldeterioratemayseelessvalueforgoingcurrentconsumptiontofinanceimprovementsineducation,becausetheymaynotbeabletoaffordtheprivateeducationalinvestmentsnecessarytosecurehighereducationalattainmentfortheirchildren.
6
Morerisk-averseindividualswilldiscountthefuturemoreheavily,reducingtheirsupportforreforms(whichoutcomesareuncertain).Beliefinmeritocracy,ontheotherhand,willbeexpectedtoincreasewillingnesstofinanceinvestmentsinpoliciesthatpromotemeritocraticadvancement.
Theseconsiderationsmotivateourempiricalmodel.Thecorehypothesiswetestisthatsupportforeducationreformsfinancedbyhighertaxesdependsonindividualexpectationsoffuturemobility.Thisrelationshipcouldbeexpressedasthefollowingmodel:
prob(wi>0)=F(βMic+xcY+vc),(1)
wherewiisthelatentwillingnesstopayadditionaltaxesforinvestmentsineducationby
individualifromcountryc(withtheobservedwillingnesstosupporttax-financedreformswic=
1ifwi>0and0otherwise);F(.)isastandardnormalcumulativedistributionfunctionof(—εic);
Micisavariablereflectingtheexpectationoffuturemobility;Xisavectorofindividual-levelcontrols,includingage,gender,education,areaofresidence,currentincome,householdsize,andpresenceofchildreninthehousehold;vcarecountryfixedeffects;andεic~N(0,1)istheidiosyncraticerrorterm.
Giventhetradeoffbetweencurrentconsumptionandthediscountedvalueoffuturebenefitsfromimprovededucation,thecontrolvariablesinourempiricalspecificationareincludedtotheextentthattheyaffecttheindividual’scost-benefitdecisions.Weexpectindividualswithhighereducationorincometosupportinvestmentsinhumancapital.Wealthierhouseholdswouldalsohaveagreatercapacitytosupporttax-financededucationreforms.Youngerpeoplemayhaveadifferentdiscountrateforfuturebenefitsthanolderones.
Wecontrolforthepresenceofchildreninahouseholdtocapturedifferencesinbenefitsfromimprovededucationbetweenhouseholdswithandwithoutchildren.Areaofresidenceisincludedtoaccountforthedifferencesineconomicopportunities—andthusdifferentmobilityprospects—betweenurbanandruralresidents.Socioeconomicmobilityprofilesalsovarybygender(Narayanetal.2018),whichmayaffectexpectationsofmobilityifsuchexpectationsareformedbylearningfromexperience
(Piketty1995)
.Religiouspeoplewereshowntodiscountthefuturelessandmayalsohavedifferentpreferencesrelatedtoinvestmentsinthepublic
7
educationsystem
(Carteretal.2012)
.Morerisk-averseindividualsdiscountthefuturemorebecauseoftheiraversiontouncertainty.Totheextentthatmovinguptheincomeladdercanbeseenasindicativeofsuccessinlife,beliefsaboutwhatunderpinssuchsuccess—hardwork,skills,andpoliticalconnections—isimportant(Alesina,Stancheva,andTeso2018).Supportforpoliciespromotingmeritocraticadvancement(advancementsachievedthroughhardworkandintelligence/skills)dependsonwhetherhumancapitalinvestmentsareseentobeinstrumentalforsocioeconomicmobility.Themodelalsoincludescountryfixedeffectstoaccountforheterogeneityacrosscountriesthatmaybecorrelatedwithindividualbeliefsaboutfuturemobilityandwillingnesstosupporttax-financedreforms.
Unobservedfactorsmayalsoaffectourresults.Forinstance,anindividualwithapessimisticdispositionmayhavemorenegativeexpectationsoffuturesocioeconomicmobilityandholdpessimisticviewsaboutthereforms,andthusbelesslikelytosupportsuchreforms,biasingthecoefficientsonthemobilityexpectationsvariable.Toaddresssuchendogeneity,weinstrumentindividualexpectationsoffuturemobilitywithcohort-levelestimatesofpastintergenerationalmobilityforthe10-yearcountry-birthcohortcorrespondingtoagivensurveyrespondent,obtainedfromtheestimatesby
Torre,Lokshin,andFoster(forthcoming).
Ourchoiceofpastintergenerationalmobilityasaninstrumentforfuturemobilityexpectationsdrawsontheliteratureshowingthatpastmobilityexperiencesinformpeople’sperceptionsandexpectationsofthefuture
(Piketty1995;
KelleyandKelley2009;
Cojocaru2023)
.Ourexclusionrestrictionisbasedontheargumentthatthereisnotheoreticalreasonwhymeasuresofpastintergenerationalmobilityatthebirth-cohortlevelshouldaffectindividualsupportforeducationreformsdirectlybeyondtheireffectonmobilityexpectations.Weshouldnote,however,thatwecannotexcludethepossibilityofcohortshocks,namelythatcohortmeasuresofpastmobilitymaystillbecorrelatedwithotherfactorsthatmayaffectsupportforeducationspending.Assuch,theIVestimatesshouldsimilarlybeviewedwiththesecaveatsinmind.
4.Data
Weusedatafromthe2010,2016,and2023roundsoftheLifeinTransitionSurvey(LiTS)conductedbytheEuropeanBankofReconstructionandDevelopment(EBRD)andtheWorldBank
8
(EBRD2023)
.ThesurveycoversthetransitioneconomiesofEuropeandCentralAsiaandseveralcomparatorcountriesinWesternEurope,theMiddleEast,andNorthAfrica.
2
The2010round
includes35countries,the2016round34countries,andthe2023round39countries.Thesurveyisbasedonanationallyrepresentativesampleofaround1,000householdspercountryinthesecondandfourthroundsandaround1,500householdspercountryinthethirdround.
Wecapturesupportfortax-financedinvestmentsineducationbyexaminingresponsestothequestion“wouldyoubewillingtogiveuppartofyourincomeorpaymoretaxesifyouweresurethattheextramoneywasspentoneducation?”Thisdummyvariableisthemaindependentvariableofouranalysis.
Ourmeasureofexpectationsoffuturemobilityisbasedonthetwosocialladderquestions:“Pleaseimaginea10-stepladderwhereonthebottom,thefirststep,standthepoorest10percentpeoplein[COUNTRY],andonthehigheststep,the10th,standtherichest10percentpeoplein[COUNTRY].Onwhichstepoftheladderisyourhouseholdtoday?”and“Whereontheladderdoyoubelieveyourhouseholdwillbefouryearsfromnow?”Wetakethedifferencebetweentheexpectedfutureandcurrentincomeladderpositionsasourmeasureofexpectationsoffuturemobility,whichrangesfrom–9to+9.Wealsoconductasensitivityanalysisthatreliesonlyonthedirectionoftheexpectationsbycreatingavariablewiththreecategories(downwardlymobile,static,andupwardlymobile)basedonthedifferencebetweentheladderpositiontodayandtheladderpositionfouryearsfromtoday.
TheLiTSdataalsoallowforassessmentoftheexpectationofintergenerationalmobility,whichiscapturedbyresponsestothefollowingstatement:“Childrenwhoarebornnowwillhaveabetterlifethanmygeneration,”withrespondentsansweringonafive-stepLikertscalerangingfromstronglydisagreetostronglyagree.Weconstructadummyvariablethattakesthevalueof1iftheansweriseitheragreeorstronglyagreeandzerootherwise.
2Weusethesecond,third,andfourthroundsoftheLiTS,forwhichcomparableinformationonparentaleducationbackgroundisavailable.TheclassificationofparentaleducationinthefirstroundoftheLiTSisnotcomparabletothatofthefollowingrounds,whichiswhyweexcludeditfromourstudy.
9
Anindividual’sriskaversioniscapturedbyassessingresponsestothefollowingquestion:“Pleaserateyourwillingnesstotakerisksingeneral,onascalefrom1to10,where1meansthatyouarenotwillingtotakerisksatalland10meansthatyouareverymuchwillingtotakerisks.”(Tomeasureriskaversion,wereversethecategoriessothathighervaluesimplyhigherriskaversionandlowervaluesimplylowerriskaversion.)Tocapturebeliefsaboutthefairnessofsocioeconomicmobility,werelyonresponsestothefollowingquestion:“Inyouropinion,whichofthefollowingfactorsisthemostimportanttosucceedinlifein[COUNTRY]now?”Answeroptionsareeffortandhardwork,intelligenceandskills,politicalconnections,breakingthelaw,andothers.Wecollapsetheseoptionsintoabinaryvariablethattakesavalueof1ifrespondentsthinkthatsuccessstemsfrommeritocraticreasons(effort/hardworkorintelligence/skills)andzeroifitreliesonpoliticalconnections,breakingthelaw,orother.
Table1
presentsthesummarystatistics.
5.Mainresults
Inthissection,wefirstexaminetherelationshipbetweenexpectationsoffuturemobilityandwillingnesstopayforeducationinvestmentsacrosscountriesinthelatest(2023)LiTSround.Respondents’averageexpectationsoftheirownmobilityandthatofchildrenborntodayvarysignificantlyacrosscountries.Incountrieswherethepopulationismoreoptimisticaboutthefuture,theshareofthepopulationwillingtopaypartofitsincomeorpaymoretaxestosupportinvestmentsineducationisalsolarger(panelaof
Figure1)
.Positiveexpectationsabouttheprospectsofchildrenborntodaywithrespecttothecurrentgenerationarealsocorrelatedwithgreaterwillingnesstopayforeducationinvestments(panelbof
Figure1)
.
Wethenestimatetherelationshipbetweensupportfortax-financededucationreformsandexpectationsofone’sownfuturemobilityconditionalontherespondent’scharacteristics.
Table
2
reportsthemarginaleffectsfromthisbaselineprobitestimationinSpecification1.
Theresultsindicatethattherespondent’seducationallevelisastrongpredictorofsupportforinvestmentsineducation,consistentwithearlierfindings
(BusemeyerandGarritzmann2017;
Garritzmann,Busemeyer,andNeimanns2018)
.Theshareofthepopulationwithprimaryeducationsupportingeducationreformsis23percentagepointslowerthanthatofrespondents
10
withpost-graduateeducation;forpeoplewithupper-secondaryeducation,supportis19percentagepointslower.Theassociationsbetweenwillingnesstopayforeducationreformsandage,gender,religiousaffiliation,areaofresidence,householdcomposition,andincomearenotstatisticallysignificant.
Turningtoourprimaryvariableofinterest,morepositiveexpectationsoffuturemobilityareassociatedwithincreasedwillingnesstosupporteducationreforms:Movinguponestepontheincomeladderisassociatedwitha1.4percentagepointincreaseintheprobabilityofsupportinginvestmentsineducation.
3
Atfirstglance,agreaterwillingnesstobearhighertaxesforinvestmentsineducationmayseemtocontradictthecanonicalPOUMhypothesis,whichpositsthatitwillbeintheself-interestofupwardlymobileindividualstosupportlowertaxrates.However,aswehavearguedinsection3,ifreachinghigheducationalattainmentrequiresprivateinvestmentsonthepartofparents,theninvestmentsinimprovingeducationwouldactuallybeconsistentwithself-interestforthosewhoexpectupwardmobility,becausetheirchildrenwillbemorelikelytobenefitfromimprovededucation.
Wefurtherhypothesizedthatpeoplewhothinksuccessreflectshardworkandskills(about70percentofthesample)aremorewillingtosupportreformsthatrewardmeritocraticeffortsthanpeoplewhobelievethatsuccessreflectsother(nonmeritocratic)factors.Theperceptionoffairnesscouldbeinterpretedastheeffectivenessofconvertingskillsandeducationintofutureincomes.Beliefsaboutfairnessarealsoassociatedwithexpectationsoffuturemobility.Themeandifferencebetweenfutureandcurrentladderpositionsinoursampleistwiceashighamongthosewhoperceivethepathtosuccesstobedeterminedbymeritocraticfactors.
Peoplewithaloweraversiontorisk
4
mayalsohavealowerdiscountratethanpeoplewithahigherriskaversionandmay,therefore,bewillingtoinvestmoreinreformsthatbringpayoffsinthefuture.Risktoleranceisalsocorrelatedwithexpectationsofmobility–themeandifference
3Wealsoestimatespecificationswithpolynomialsoftheexpectationsofmobilityvariables(quadraticandcubic).Theseestimationsfailedtoproducesignificantcoefficientsonnonlinearparameters.
4Inoursample,theaveragedegreeofrisktolerance(fromalevelof1beingcompletelyriskaversetoalevelof10beingcompletelyrisklover)isabout4.8,suggestingonaverageamildriskaversion.Oftheindividualsinthesample,12.3percenthavearisktoleranceabove7,and36.1percenthavearisktolerancebelow4.
11
betweenthefutureandcurrentincomeladderpositionsisthreetimeshigherinoursampleforthosewithrisktoleranceabove7comparedtothosewithrisktolerancebelow4.
Totestthesehypotheses,were-estimatethebaselinemodel,addingcontrolscapturingfairness(Specification2in
Table2)
,riskaversion(Specification3),andbothjointly(Specification4).Theestimationsshowthatpeoplewhobelievethatsuccessintheirsocietyismeritocratic(determinedbyhardworkandintelligence/skills)are9percentagepointsmorelikelytogiveuppartoftheirincomeorpayadditionaltaxestosupportinvestmentsineducationthanpeoplewhothinkthatsuccessinlifereflectspersonalconnectionsorotherreasonsunrelatedtohardworkorskills.Riskaversionis
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