國(guó)際事務(wù)研究院-區(qū)域分裂與歐盟外交與安全政策（英）-2021.11-29正式版

JOINT

ResearchPapersNo.3

November2021

Regional

Fragmentationand

EUForeignandSecurity

Policy

AgnèsLevallois

Contributingauthors:

AssemDandashly,NothandoMaphalalaandAk?nünver

ThisprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion’sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementN.959143.

Thispublicationreflectsonlytheviewoftheauthor(s)andtheEuropeanCommissionisnotresponsibleforanyusethatmaybemadeoftheinformationitcontains.

RegionalFragmentationandEUForeignandSecurityPolicy

Leadauthor:AgnèsLevallois

Contributingauthors:AssemDandashly,NothandoMaphalalaandAk?nünver*

Abstract

ThereisbroadacademicconsensusonthefactthatthefragmentationofregionspresentsasignificantchallengefortheEU.Fragmentationunderminestheauthorityofcentralstates,theEU’smostnaturalcounterparts,anddistributesitamongstagreatnumberofactors–includingnon-statearmedgroups.Toaddressfragmentation,theEUshouldincreasecoordinationbetweenactors(EUinstitutionsandmemberstates),integrateactionsacrossdifferentpolicyareas(securityandnon-security,externalandinternal)andengagewithexternalplayers(multilateralorganisations,globalpowers,regionalandlocalactors).

AgnèsLevalloisisSeniorResearchFellowattheFoundationforStrategicResearch(FRS).AssemDandashlyisAssistantProfessorinPoliticalScienceatthePoliticalScienceDepartmentofMaastrichtUniversity(UM).NothandoMaphalalaisHeadofResearchattheInstituteforPeaceandSecurityStudies(IPSS)ofAddisAbabaUniversity.Ak?nünverisAssistantProfessorofInternationalRelationsatKadirHasUniversity.TheauthorswouldliketothankHylkeDijkstrafromUM,RiccardoAlcaro,HeadofGlobalActorsattheIstitutoAffariInternazionali(IAI)andJOINTCoordinator,GiulioPugliese,SeniorAsiaFellowatIAIandJOINTAssistantCoordinator,andLaurianeHéaufromFRSforprovidingfeedbackandreviewingthetext.

JOINTResearchPapersNo.3 2

Introduction

Overthepastfewyears,scholarsofInternationalRelationshavebeenincreasinglystudyingstatesthatlackcertainelementsofsovereignty,suchas“failedstates”,“weakstates”,“collapsedstates”,statesaffectedby“l(fā)imitedstatehood”or“contestedstatehood”,and“unrecognisedstates”.1Overthepastfewyears,thenumberofcountriesthatfallintooneofthesecategoriesofstateshasincreased–especiallyinareassurroundingtheEuropeanUnion(EU)(eastandsouth).ThisliteraturereviewprovideabetterunderstandingofthephenomenonofregionalfragmentationanditsimpactonEUforeignandsecuritypolicy.Specifically,itanswersthefollowingquestion:accordingtotheexistingliterature,howdoesincreasingregionalfragmentationaffecttheabilityoftheEUanditsmemberstatestodevelop,articulateandimplementcommonactiononcrisesandconflicts?

Thisworkestablishesaconceptualbackground,highlightingtheconnectionbetweenthefragmentationofregionsandthe(in)abilityoftheEUanditsmemberstatestoformulateandimplementcommon(oratleastcoordinated)actions.Thereviewstartsbyprovidingabriefdefinitionofregionalfragmentation.Thisisfollowedbyadiscussionofthemultiplelevelsatwhichittakesplace.Thenextsectionfocusesonthedriversandtheactorsoffragmentation.Lastly,thepaperconsiderstheimpactoffragmentationontheEU’sabilitytoaddresscrisesandconflict.ThefinalsectionconcludeswiththemainfindingsoftheliteratureonregionalfragmentationanditsimpactontheEU.

1.Theconceptofregionalfragmentation

Fragmentationhasbeenconceptualisedindifferentacademicdisciplines,andmanydefinitionsoftheconcepthaveemergedasaresult.InthefieldsofGeography

1ThomasRisse,“GovernanceConfigurationsinAreasofLimitedStatehood.Actors,Modes,Institutions,andResources”,inSFB-GovernanceWorkingPapers,No.32(April2012),

https://www.

sfb-governance.de/en/publikationen/sfb-700-working_papers/wp32/index.html;

ThomasRisse,“GovernanceunderLimitedSovereignty”,inMarthaFinnemoreandJudithGoldstein(eds),BacktoBasics.StatePowerinaContemporaryWorld,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2013,p.78-104;RobertI.Rotberg(ed.),WhenStatesFail.CausesandConsequences,Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,2004;RosaEhrenreichBrooks,“FailedStates,ortheStateasFailure?”,inTheUniversityofChicagoLawReview,Vol.72,No.4(Fall2005),p.1159-1196,

/facpub/1108.

3-RegionalFragmentationandEUForeignandSecurityPolicy

andEconomics,forinstance,fragmentationhasbeenconceivedastheweakeningoftheelementsformingasystem:thediscontinuity,rupture,andisolationofspaces.ThisdefinitionisalsovalidinPoliticalScienceandSociology,insofarasthespacessubjectedtodiscontinuity,ruptureandisolationareunderstoodaspoliticalspaces,namelyspacesthecontrolofwhichisputativelyinthehandsofthestate.Whilevalid,thisdefinitionisinsufficient,asitdoesnottakeaccountoftheprocessbywhichinstitutionssystemserode.Fragmentationrelatestothephenomenonofamultiplicationofactors,affectinggoals,modalities,andinstrumentsofgovernance.2Consequently,somescholarshaveattemptedamorecomprehensiveconceptualisationoffragmentationbytheidentificationofthreedimensions:“thenumberoforganizationsinamovement;thedegreeofinstitutionalizationacrosstheseorganizationsandthedistributionofpoweramongthem”.3

Forthepurposeofthisliteraturereview,inwhichwefocusonregionsaffectedbycrisesandconflict,weunderstandfragmentationastheprocessbywhichstateauthority(thestateholdingthelegitimatemonopolyoverthemeansofviolenceandtheabilitytosetandenforcerules)andregionalrulesofengagementareerodingorcollapsingaltogether.Fragmentationisamultifacetedandmulti-levelphenomenonthatoccursnotonlyatthestatelevel,butalsowithinregionsandcommunities,multiplyingthenumberofactorsinvolvedintheprocess.Followinganexplorationofthekeyfactorsofregionalfragmentation–whetherpolitical,social,economic,ethnic,religious,orideological,thereviewhighlightsthediversityofactorscontributingtoandresultingfromthisprocess.

2.Levelsoffragmentation

Thephenomenonoffragmentationtakesplaceatvariouslevels:states,regionsandcommunities.Statesinfragmentedregionsincreasinglygetincompetitionwithothercentresofpowers,includingnon-stateactors,intheirmissionof

2StephanKlingebiel,TimoMahnandMarioNegre,“Fragmentation:AKeyConceptforDevelopmentCooperation”,inStephanKlingebiel,TimoMahnandMarioNegre(eds),TheFragmentationofAid.Concepts,MeasurementsandImplicationsforDevelopmentCooperation,London,PalgraveMacmillan,2016,p.1-18.

3KristinM.Bakke,KathleenGallagherCunninghamandLeeJ.M.Seymour,“APlagueofInitials:Fragmentation,Cohesion,andInfightinginCivilWars”,inPerspectivesonPolitics,Vol.10,No.2(June2012),p.265.

4-RegionalFragmentationandEUForeignandSecurityPolicy

maintainingorder.4Fragmentationalsooccursattheregionallevel,inthatstatesinageographicalareanolongerhavetheability,eitherbecausetheyareunableorbecausetheyareunwilling,togeneratecollaborativepatternsofcontroloverissueareasorgeographicalspacesofsharedinterests(suchastradeorbordermanagement,tomentionjustafewexamples).Athirdlayerwherefragmentationtakesplaceiswithincommunities,wherearegroupingaroundsociallyconstructedidentitiesinvolvingcultural,national,ethnicorreligiousdimensionstakesplace.Fragmentationtakingplaceatonelevelislikelytohaveanimpactontheothers.

Atthestatelevel,fragmentationisduetothedifficultyofmaintainingorderwithinastate’sborders.Thestateenterscompeteswithothercentresofpower,includingrivalstateauthorities(forinstance,subnationalauthoritiesseekingindependenceorautonomy)ornonstateactorssuchasterroristorganisations(e.g.,theIslamicState)armedmilitias(likethePopularMobilisationForcesinIraq),politicalpartiescontrollingtheirownmilitias(likeLebanon’sHezbollah)orillicittraffickingnetworks.5Statesaffectedbythisfragmentingdynamicsattractcompetitiveoutsideinterventionandserveastargetstoopportunisticaggressors.6FabriceBalancheconsidersthatstatefragmentationhasacommonprocessintheMiddleEast,despitesomenationalspecificities:thesegmentationofsocietyonconfessional,ethnicandnational(asinPalestine)orlocal(asinJordan)divisionsandthelossofstatelegitimacyduetothefailureofcapacitytogenerateanddistributegeneralwelfare.Behindthis,thereisageostrategiclogicofpowersseekingtoincreasetheirinfluenceoverthestateinquestion.7

4StéphaneRosière,“Lafragmentationdel’espaceétatiquemondial”,inL’espacepolitique,No.11

(2010),

/10.4000/espacepolitique.1608.

5WenceslasMonzala,Réflexionssurleconceptd’étatsdéfaillantsendroitinternational,MasterThesis,UniversitédeStrasbourg,2012,

/10/13/7604/m_Reflexions-

sur-le-concept-detats-defaillants-en-droit-international1.html;

SharonLecocq,“EUForeignPolicyandHybridActorsintheMiddleEast:ReadyforGeopoliticalContestation?”,inGlobalAffairs,Vol.6,No.4-5(2020),p.363-380,

/10.1080/23340460.2021.1872401.

6YannisA.Stivachtis,“Political(In)SecurityintheMiddleEast”,inBettinaKochandYannisA.Stivachtis(eds),RegionalSecurityintheMiddleEast.Sectors,VariablesandIssues,Bristol,E-InternationalRelationsPublishing,2019,p.40,

/?p=78695.

7FabriceBalanche,“L’EtatauProche-Orientarabeentrecommunautarisme,clientélisme,mondialisationetprojetdeGrandMoyenOrient”,inL’espacepolitique,No.11(2010),

https://doi.

org/10.4000/espacepolitique.1619;

RaymondHinnebuschandJasmineK.Gani(eds),TheRoutledgeHandbooktotheMiddleEastandNorthAfricanStateandStatesSystem,London,Routledge,2020.

5-RegionalFragmentationandEUForeignandSecurityPolicy

AccordingtoRaymondHinnebusch,“competitionbetweenastateandato-be-state,bothcountingoninterventionsbyregionalpowers”,isexplainedbytheproblematicexportoftheWestphaliansystemtotheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA),withSyriaasthemaincaseinpoint.8Lookingatthe“doublefailure”oftheSyrianstatetokeepcontrolovertheterritoryandstopthespreadofsectariannarratives,9HinnebuscharguesthattheWestphalianorderhasgiven“waytoheterarchiczonesoflimitedstatehoodinwhichthesovereigntyofstates[is]contestedbybothinternational(supra-state)penetrationandsub-statefragmentation”.10Theprocesshasactuallygonesofarthatfragmentedandoverlappinggovernance,permeableandcollapsingbordersandthelossofsovereigntytotransnationalmovementshavenowbecomethe“competitiveregime-building”rationaleoftheAssadregime.Thelatterhasreconfigureditselftofightinsurgentsinthecivilwar,jihadistwarlords,andthe“competitiveinterventionism”ofglobalandregionalpowersactiveinSyria.11

Fragmentationatthestatelevelalsolikelyimpactsregions–andregionalfragmentationcaninturndestabilisestates.ExamplesincludedevelopmentsinNorth-EastearnSyriathathaveimplicationsforTurkeyandtheinstabilityinSomaliathatisaffectingEthiopiaaswellasKenya.TheHornofAfrica(HoA)isactuallyaninterestingcase,asitincreasinglyshowstheelementsthatcharacterisefragmentedregions.Firstistheabsenceofahegemonorananchorstateabletostabilisetheregiontosomeextent.Secondistheeasewithwhichinternalconflictsinindividualstatesspilloverintoneighbouringstates,asisthecasewithSomalia.Thirdistheubiquityofsecessionistthruststhroughouttheregion.Inadditiontohostingsomeofthemostprotractedcrisesonthecontinent,greatpowerrivalriesareoftenplayedoutintheHorn.12

8AbelPoleseandRuthHanauSantini,“LimitedStatehoodanditsSecurityImplicationsontheFragmentationPoliticalOrderintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica”,inSmallWars&Insurgencies,Vol.29,No.3(2018),p.385,

/10.1080/09592318.2018.1456815.

9RaymondHinnebuschmeansbydoublestatefailurethelossofmonopolyofviolenceandterritorialcontroltonon-statearmedmovementsandthespreadofsectariannarratives.

10RaymondHinnebusch,“FromWestphalianFailuretoHeterarchicGovernanceinMENA:TheCaseofSyria”,inSmallWars&Insurgencies,Vol.29,No.3(2018),p.391-413.

11AbelPoleseandRuthHanauSantini,“LimitedStatehoodanditsSecurityImplications…”,cit.,p.

385-386.

12NoelTwagiramunguetal.,“Re-DescribingTransnationalConflictinAfrica”,inTheJournalofModernAfricanStudies,Vol.57,No.3(September2019),p.377-391,

/10.1017/

S0022278X19000107.

6-RegionalFragmentationandEUForeignandSecurityPolicy

Finally,fragmentationaffectscommunities.Theworldisincreasinglyinterconnectedthankstoinformationtechnologies,commercialexchangesandthemovementofpeopleandcapital.Paradoxically,greaterinterconnectionhasentailedgrowingfragmentationofpeoplesandwithincountries.Divisionswithinsocietiesareoneofthekeyemergingdynamicsidentifiedinreportsfocusingonlarge-scalesocietaltrends,withtermssuchas“fragmentation”,“imbalance”and“contestation”increasinglyflaggedout.13Thisfragmentationleadstoaregroupingaroundbasicvaluessuchasculture,nationality,ethnicityorreligion.ThecaseofLebanonisparticularlyrelevant.There,allpoliticalpartiesarebasedoncommunityorconfessionalallegiancesandprivilegesareallocatedonthebasicofethnicorreligiousgroups.14CivilwarsinLibya,YemenandSyriacontributetoatrendtowardsfamilyandclancommunities.

Fragmentationoccursatalllevelswithinsociety,fromthestatetosubnationalcommunities.Besides,fragmentationononelevelimpactsotherlevels.Indeed,areasinwhichstateauthorityisweakoftenexperienceincreasedlocalconflicts,andthisinstabilitycanspilloverintoneighbouringstates,therebydestabilisingandpotentiallyfragmentingwholeregions.

3.Driversoffragmentation

Fragmentationatthevariouslevelsoutlinedaboveisdrivenbyanumberoffactors.Afirstsetoffactorsliewiththedomesticstructure,weakinstitution,andlackoflegitimacyofstateactors.15RomanetPerrouxpointedinthecaseofLibyatodomesticfactorsasoneofthereasonsforthefragmentationexposedduringandafterthe2011revolution,whenarmedgroupswereformedaroundtribes,clansorneighbourhoods.16Thepoliticaltransitioniscurrentlystillatastandstill,andthe

13USNationalIntelligenceCouncil,GlobalTrends2040.AMoreContestedWorld,March2021,

/index.php/gt2040-home.

14RaffaellaA.DelSarto,“ContentiousBordersintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica:ContextandConcepts”,inInternationalAffairs,Vol.93,No.4(July2017),p.767-787,

/10.1093/ia/iix070.

15StephenKrasnerandThomasRisse,“ExternalActors,State-Building,andServiceProvisioninAreasofLimitedStatehood:Introduction”,inGovernance,Vol.27,No.4(October2014),p.545-567.

16Jean-LouisRomanetPerroux,“TheDeepRootsofLibya’sSecurityFragmentation”,inMiddle

7-RegionalFragmentationandEUForeignandSecurityPolicy

countryisriddledwithafragmentedpoliticalandsecuritylandscape.ThelackofasenseofnationalidentityandweakcentralinstitutionsareatthecentreofLibya’sproblems.TheweaknessofinstitutionsandpoorgovernanceisalsoaddressedbyAlexanderRondoswhenresearchingtheHoA.17AccordingtoRondos,factionsactintheirinterestwhentheimpactofeconomicdifficultiesandthelackofeffectiveandcohesivestateandsocialinstitutionskickin.RomanetPerrouxdescribesthesituationasan“insecuritydilemma”,wherebythescarceabilityofthecentralgovernmenttoprovidegovernancestimulatesperipheralcentresofpowertoprovidegovernancethemselves,whichinturnfurtherdiminishesthecentralstate’scapacityforgovernance.Perrouxnoteshowthissituationofinsecuritydilemmaemergesandconsolidatedwhereprocessofstate-buildingbasedonpluralityanddemocratisationaremissing.Moreover,asevidencedintheMENAregion,thelackofefficientinstitutionshasresultedinweakregionalism.18

Theliteraturealsopointstothelackofstatelegitimacyasakeydriveroffragmentation.KrasnerandRissearguethatwithoutlegitimacy,statefailureisallbutguaranteed,althoughtheyalsoarguethatlegitimacyisnotsufficientforeffectivegovernance.19Zartmanalso“raisesthequestionoflegitimacyofplayersaswellastheircapabilities”.20Thispointisimportantwithregardstoconflictmanagementefforts.

Furthermore,theliteraturediscussestheeffectofexternalinterventiononfragmentationofaregion.RondosstatesthatintheHoAexternalinterventionisoneofthecombustibleingredients–alongwithdomesticfactors–inaregionalwayshoveringontheedgesofinsecurity.21Instead,theregionmusttrytosetoffa

EasternStudies,Vol.55,No.2(2019),p.200-224.

17AlexanderRondos,“TheHornofAfrica:ItsStrategicImportanceforEurope,theGulfStatesandBeyond”,inHorizons,No.6(Winter2016),p.150-160,

/en/horizons/horizons-

winter-2016--issue-no-6/the-horn-of-africa---its-strategic-importance-for-europe-the-gulf-states-

and-beyond.

18MortenValbj?rn,“NorthAfricaandtheMiddleEast”,inTanjaA.B?rzelandThomasRisse(eds),TheOxfordHandbookofComparativeRegionalism,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2016,p.249-270.

19StephenKrasnerandThomasRisse,“ExternalActors,State-Building,andServiceProvisioninAreasofLimitedStatehood:Introduction”,cit.,p.563.

20I.WilliamZartman,“FragmentedConflict:HandlingtheCurrentWorldDisorder”,inGlobalPolicy,Vol.10,No.S2(June2019),p.8,

/10.1111/1758-5899.12679.

21AlexanderRondos,“TheHornofAfrica”,cit.

8-RegionalFragmentationandEUForeignandSecurityPolicy

virtuouscycle.Thiswouldincludeelementssuchasgreatersocietalparticipationinpoliticsandgovernment,regionaleconomicintegration,andasaresultinstitutionsthatcannegotiateontheregion’sbehalfwiththeoutsideworld.

Conflictsareanothermaincauseoffragmentation.Scholarsagreeonthehighlydestabilisingpotentialofconflictsinsofarastheyposeathreattothedynamicsofregionalintegrationbywayofcontagion.22Theinabilityofastatetoretainthemonopolyoflegitimateviolenceandeffectivecontroloveritsentireterritoryisthemostcentralaspectofthiscontagiondynamic.Evenwhentheconflictends,fragmentationcanpersistinseveralways,forinstanceincontestedparticipationinpeaceprocesses(whichcanthusbecomethemselvesdriversoffragmentation).23

TewodrosWoldearegayproposesageneraldiscussionontheconflictsituationintheHornofAfrica.HestatesthattheHoAisoneofthemostconflict-pronepartsoftheAfricancontinent,inadditiontobeingoneofthepoorestregionsintheworld.24TheSomaliacrisisaswellastheunsettledpeaceprocessinSudanandSouthSudanremainsourcesofinstability.Atthesametime,thestrategicimportanceoftheregionhasattractedtheinterestofothers,inturnaffectingtheoutcomeofanyattemptatpeaceintheregion.Importantly,Woldearegayshowstheinterdependencebetweenkeyfactors.Accordingtohim,themostcommonsourcesofconflictsintheHoAare:IslamicradicalismandthelackofaneffectivecentralstateinSomalia;piracy;thecrisisinSouthSudan;domesticchallenges;andexternalinterventionandthemanipulationofmultilateralinstrumentsbytheregion’sstates.Indeed,interstaterivalryhashinderedpeaceandstabilityintheregionfordecades.25

22TanjaA.B?rzelandThomasRisse,“ALitmusTestforEuropeanIntegrationTheories:ExplainingCrisesandComparingRegionalisms”,inKFGWorkingPapers,No.85,(May2018),

https://nbn-

/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-57753-6.

23LeeJ.M.Seymour,KristinM.BakkeandKathleenGallagherCunningham,“EPluribusUnum,exUnoPlures:Competition,ViolenceandFragmentationinEthnopoliticalMovements”,inJournalofPeaceResearch,Vol.53,No.1(January2016),p.3-18.

24TewodrosWoldearegay,“MajorSourcesofConflictintheHornofAfricaanditsPossibleRemedies”,inPoliticalScienceandPublicAdministrationJournal,Vol.3,No.1(January-June2018),p.28-43,

/45146174.

25AnneL.ClunanandHaroldA.Trinkunas(eds),UngovernedSpaces.AlternativestoStateAuthorityinanEraofSoftenedSovereignty,Stanford,StanfordUniversityPress,2010.

9-RegionalFragmentationandEUForeignandSecurityPolicy

4.Actorsoffragmentation

Asoutlinedabove,fragmentationresultsinthemultiplicationofactorswithcompetingclaimstoterritorycontrolorprovisionofgovernance,whichmaywellbecomedriversofconflicts.Inturn,thisproliferationofactorsfurthercontributestofragmentation.Whenstatesareunabletoimplementcentralrulesandtoprovidecollectivegoodsandservices,thisinevitablyleadstoablurringbetweenthepublicandprivatespheres,witha“distribution”ofrolesbetweenheterogeneousactors.Therefore,inregionswhereorderiscontested,theweaknessofstateinstitutionsgiveswaytoafragmentationofredistributionandthemaintenanceofclientelistnetworks.26

IntheMENAregion,asillustratedbyGalipDalay,internationalpowershavealsobeenagentsofdisruption.InthecaseofSyria,DalayconsidersthatbothRussiaandtheUnitedStateshavechallengedthesovereigntyofthecountry.27RaffaellaA.DelSarto,bycontrast,haspointedoutthatwhilebordershadbeenputunderpressureintheaftermathoftheArabSpring,thestatemodelhasremainedrelevant.Nevertheless,shehighlights“afurtherfragmentationwithinandalongstateborders”allowingforaneasiercirculationofmigrantsandarmedfightersaswellasvariouskindsoftrafficking.28

TheEU-fundedMENARAproject(MiddleEastandNorthAfricaRegionalArchitecture:MappingGeopoliticalShifts,RegionalOrder,andDomesticTransformation),29whichoutlinedthemaindynamicsaswellasthefactorsofuncertaintyanddestabilisationintheregionwithafocusonpopularuprisings,

26AbelPoleseandRuthHanauSantini,“LimitedStatehoodanditsSecurityImplications…”,cit.;AnnaGrzymala-Busse,“BeyondClientelism:IncumbentStateCaptureandStateFormation”,inComparativePoliticalStudies,Vol.41,No.4-5(April2008),p.638-673;DerickW.BrinkerhoffandArthurA.Goldsmith,Clientelism,PatrimonialismandDemocraticGovernance:AnOverviewandFrameworkforAssessmentandProgramming,reporttotheUnitedStatesAgencyofInternationalDevelopment(USAID),2002,

/pdf_docs/Pnacr426.pdf.

27GalipDalay,“Break-upoftheMiddleEast:WillWeSeeaNewRegionalOrder?”,inMiddleEastEye,14September2017,

/node/65572.

28RaffaellaA.DelSarto,“ContentiousBordersintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica”,cit.,p.780.

29MENARA(“TheMiddleEastandNorthAfricaRegionalArchitecture:MappingGeopoliticalShifts,RegionalOrder,andDomesticTransformation”)isaprojectthathasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion’sHorizon2020ResearchandInnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementNo693244.Seethearchivedwebsite:

http://menara.iai.it/menara-project.

10-RegionalFragmentationandEUForeignandSecurityPolicy

foundthemostprominentfactortobestateerosion.30Theemergenceoftheuprisingsnotonlyhighlightedarejectionofauthoritarianregimes,butalsorevealedachallengetothecentralstateanditsbordersbynon-stateactors(ISISbeingthemoststrikingexample),whichprecipitatedtheregion’sterritorialfragmentation.

Academicsthuspointtotheriseofnon-stateandproto-stateactorsasanothercontributortofragmentation.31WiththecollapseofthestateinIraq,SomaliaorMali,thosenon-stateactorsencouragereturntotribal,religiousorcommunityallegiances.Akeyquestionishowtoencouragenon-state,proto-state,orrebelactorstonegotiateoratleasttobringthemtoanegotiation.Indeed,theseactorsdonotfeelobligedtorespondtointernationalattemptstocontrolorresolveconflicts.32Nevertheless,casessuchastheFebruary2020DohadealbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheTalibanshowsthepossibilityofholdingnegotiationsandreachinganagreementbetweenanon-statearmedactorandastate.Hybridactors,mostoftenarmed,areworkingeitherinconcertwiththestateorincompetitionwithit.33TheyareprominentincertainregionsimmediatelyadjacenttotheEU,particularlyintheMENAregionsincetheArabuprisings.34Somehavebecome“proxymilitias”,35suchasHamasintheGazaStriporHezbollahinLebanon,forcinginternationalactors(includingtheEU)totaketheseactorsintoaccountintheirchoicesandcalculations.36Otherworkshaveexpandedthedebatetoincludemultiplereligiousandideologically-drivengroups.Theseworksanalysehownon-statearmedactorsengagein“state-makingpracticesdrivenbylocalinterests”.37

30MENARAproject,“TransformationsofStateandSocietyintheMENARegion”,inEuropeanPolicyBriefs,March2019,

https://www.iai.it/en/node/10398.

31ThanassisCambanisetal.,HybridActors.ArmedGroupsandStateFragmentationintheMiddleEast,NewYork,TheCenturyFoundationPress,2019,

/?p=34101;

AbelPoleseandRuthHanauSantini,“LimitedStatehoodanditsSecurityImplications…”,cit.;OlivierWalther,ChristianLeuprechtandDavidB.Skillcorn,“PoliticalFragmentationandAlliancesamongArmedNon-stateActorsinNorthandWesternAfrica(1997-2014)”,inTerrorismandPoliticalViolence,Vol.32,No.1(2020),p.167-186.

32I.WilliamZartman,“FragmentedConflict:HandlingtheCurrentWorldDisorder”,cit.

33ThanassisCambanisetal.,HybridActors,cit.

34HassaneinAli,“Post-ArabSpring:TheArabWorldBetweentheDilemmaoftheNation-StateandtheRiseofViolentNon-stateActors(VNSAs)”,inAsianJournalofMiddleEasternandIslamicStudies,Vol.14,No.1(2020),p.68-83.

35OfiraSeliktarandFarhadRezaei(eds),Iran,Revolution,andProxyWars,Cham,PalgraveMacmillan,2020.

36Sharon