國(guó)際事務(wù)研究院-美意政治安全關(guān)系現(xiàn)狀綜述（英）-2022.5

IAIPAPERS22|13-MAY2022ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-251-0?2022IAI

AnOverviewoftheCurrentStateof

US-ItalianPolitical-SecurityRelations

byDarioCristiani

MinistryofForeignAffairs

andInternationalCooperation

ABSTRACT

TherelationshipbetweentheUnitedStatesandItalyhas

historicallybeenstrong,althoughtherehavebeenmoments

ofmisunderstandingandtension.ThenewphaseofEuropean

(in)securitytriggeredbyRussianimperialandrevisionist

ambitionshaspushedItalytocommittoincreasingdefence

spending.AlthoughItalywasabletosatisfytheoperational

andtechnologicalrequirementstooperateinthetransatlantic

allianceevenunderthecurrentspendinglevels,theallocation

ofalargershareoftheGDPtodefencewillreinforceits

readiness,whilealsocreatingdeeperconnectionwith

theUnitedStates.Italyisincreasingitscontributionsto

internationalmissions,bothontheeasternfrontasameans

tosupportNATOdeterrenceagainstRussiaandinthesouth,

especiallyinIraq.Thelatterispartofabroadereffortto

increaseItaly’sstatusasareliablepartnerinthelogicofa

greatertransatlanticburden-sharingoftasksintheEuropean

neighbourhood.

Transatlanticrelations|NATO|China

US-Italianbilateralrelations|USmilitarypolicy|Italy’smilitarypolicy|keywords

IAIPAPERS22|13-MAY2022ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-251-0?2022IAI

AnOverviewoftheCurrentStateofUS-ItalianPolitical-SecurityRelations

AnOverviewoftheCurrentStateofUS-ItalianPolitical-SecurityRelations

byDarioCristiani*

Introduction

Theyear2021markedthe160thanniversaryoftheestablishmentofformalItalian-Americandiplomaticrelations.InApril1861,theUnitedStatesrecognisedthenewlyestablishedKingdomofItaly.

Thiswasthebeginningofalastingandpositiverelationship,althoughtherehavebeendifficultmomentstoo.ThemassmigrationofItalianstotheUnitedStatesbetweenthe19thand20thcenturyprovokedoccasionalbacklash,withdiplomatic

repercussions.TensionsbetweenRomeandWashingtongrewintheinterwarperiod,especiallyfromthelate1930son,andculminatedintheItalianFascistregime’sdecisiontofollowNaziGermany’sleadanddeclarewarontheUnitedStatesinDecember1941.1DuringtheColdWar,WashingtondidnotappreciatethefreedomthatItalysometimestookinitsrelationswiththeSovietgovernment,forinstancewhenItaly’scarmakerFiatopenedaplantintheSovietUnionin1970.AnothermatterofcontentionwasthedivergingapproachesofItalyandtheUnitedStatesintheMediterraneaninthe1980s,especiallyoverLibya2andthePalestinianLiberationOrganization.3

1LeopoldoNutiandDanieleFiorentino,“US-ItalianRelations”,inLeopoldoNutiandDanieleFiorentino(eds),OxfordResearchEncyclopediaofAmericanHistory,OxfordUniversityPress,31March2020.

2PaoloSoave,FraReaganeGheddafi.Lapoliticaesteraitalianael’escalationlibico-americanadeglianni’80,SoveriaMannelli,Rubbettino,2017.

3MjriamAbuSamra,“Italian-PalestinianRelations:WhatWentWrong?”,inJadaliyya,30August2014,

/Details/31162

.

*DarioCristianiisaResearchFellowwithintheMediterranean,MiddleEastandAfricaprogrammeattheIstitutoAffariInternazionali(IAI).

.Revisedversionofapaperpresentedatthe13thTransatlanticSecuritySymposiumentitled“ALastingBond.Revisiting&ReinvigoratingItaly-USRelations160YearssincetheirInception”,heldinRomeon13December2021andorganisedbytheIstitutoAffariInternazionali(IAI)andtheItalianMinistryofForeignAffairsandInternationalCooperation.TheviewsexpressedinthisreportaresolelythoseoftheauthoranddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheItalianMinistryofForeignAffairsandInternationalCooperation.

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AnOverviewoftheCurrentStateofUS-ItalianPolitical-SecurityRelations

DisagreementsalsoextendedtoareasfarawayfromEuropeandtheMediterranean.AlthoughRome’srecognitionofthePRCanticipatedtheAmericandétentewithChinathatwouldbecomearealityafewyearslater,4theUSgovernmentwaswaryofItaly’sintentions,specificallyofthethenMinisterofForeignAffairsPietroNenni,tomoveaheadinestablishingformaldiplomatictieswiththePeople’sRepublicofChinain1970(asitwasconsidereduntimely)5or,muchmorerecently,wheninMarch2019RomedecidedtojointheBeltandRoadInitiative,ChinesePresidentXiJinping’splantofundinfrastructuredevelopmentincountriesalongtraderoutesbetweenAsiaandEurope.6

Thelastyearhasseentherelationshipregainmomentum,particularlyafterbothcountriesexperiencedachangeofleadership.PresidentJoeBidenbeganhistermon20January2021amidtheglobalpandemiccrisisandinthewakeoftheassaultonCapitolHillbyamobofsupportersofformerPresidentDonaldTrump.HisprimaryaimwastobringbacksomesortofnormalitytoWashingtonaftertheerratictenureofhispredecessor.MarioDraghiwassworninasItaly’sprimeminister,replacingGiuseppeConte,on13Februaryofthatsameyear.Draghi’smaintasksweretopullItalyoutofthepandemiccrisisandcompletetheNationalRecoveryandResiliencePlan(PianoNazionalediRipresaeResilienza,PNRR),withthesupportofalargebutextraordinarilydiverseandchaoticmajorityconsisting

ofcentre-leftandcentre-rightmainstreampartiesaswellasanti-establishment,nationalisticandpopulistforces.

Trump’stransactionalforeignpolicy7andscepticalapproachtotransatlanticrelations8inevitablyimpactedItaly.Therulingcoalitionsbetweenfirst(in2018–19)theanti-establishmentFiveStarMovement(M5S),thenationalistandEuroscepticalLeagueandthen(2019–21)betweentheM5Sandthecentre-rightDemocraticParty(PD),bothledbyPrimeMinisterGiuseppeConte,hadtwoproblems.ThefirstwasthatConte’sandtheM5S’ssoftapproachtoChinaandRussiacreatedapprehensioninWashington,andthesecondwasthatContewasseenbythenewDemocraticadministrationastooclosetoTrump.ThiswasexemplifiedbyConte’shesitationbeforecongratulatingBidenforhiselectoralvictory.UnderDraghi,tiesbetweenthetwogovernmentsimproved.

4EnricoFardella,“ASignificantPeripheryoftheColdWar:Italy-ChinaBilateralRelations,1949–1989”,inColdWarHistory,Vol.17,No.2(2017),p.181-197.

5EnnioDiNolfo,“LereazioniamericanealriconoscimentoitalianodellaCina”,inEunomia,Vol.1,No.1(2012),p.11,

/10.1285/i22808949a1n1p9

.

6ChicoHarlan,“ADefiantItalyBecomestheFirstG-7CountrytoSignontoChina’sBeltandRoadInitiative”,inTheWashingtonPost,23March2019,

/

world/europe/defiant-italy-becomes-the-first-g7-country-to-sign-on-to-chinas-belt-and-road-

initiative/2019/03/22/54a732d4-4bdf-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html

.

7JosephS.Nye,“Trump’sTransactionalMyopia”,inProjectSyndicate,4February2020,

https://

/HBjog6T

.

8KristianL.NielsenandAnnaDimitrova,“Trump,TrustandtheTransatlanticRelationship”,inPolicyStudies,Vol.42,No.5-6(November2021),p.699-719.

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InApril2021,Italy’sForeignMinisterLuigiDiMaiowasthefirstforeigndignitarytovisitWashingtonafterthenewadministrationwasswornin.9Inthefollowingmonths,thetwocountrieshadseveraloccasionstoworktogether,fromtheministerialmeetingoftheGlobalCoalitiontoDefeatISIStotheG20SummitinRome.Observingpoliticalanddiplomaticdynamicsoverthepastmonths,thetwocountrieshavecoordinatedeffortsonanumberofissues.Theconvergencehasbeenparticularlysignificantinmultilateralfora,somethingthatlikelywouldnothaveoccurredwiththepreviousleaders,asTrumpwasgenerallyhostiletomultilateralapproaches.RomeandWashingtonworkedtogetherintheG20andtheCOP26climatechangeconferencetopushfortheadoptionofambitiousinternationaltargetsforreductionofcarbonemissions.DuringtheG20RomeSummit,theUnitedStatesalsoannouncedtheliftingofAmericansteelandaluminiumtariffsonEurope,andtheEuropeanUnionreciprocatedbyliftingitsowncounter-tariffs.Theoverallrelationshipisthussettoremainstrongandstableintheforeseeablefuture.TheconvergenceofviewsontheRussianmilitaryaggressioninUkraineisproofofthisstability.

1.Strategicinterests,securitycooperation,defenceprocurement

Italyisamiddlediplomaticpower,10whosesecurityisprimarilyaffectedbystrategicandmilitarydevelopmentsintheEuropeancontinentandthewiderMediterranean,includingitsappendixes–theSahel,thePersianGulf,theSouthCaucasus.However,fromaneconomicperspective,Italycanbeconsideredaglobalpower:amemberoftheG7sincethe1970s;thesecondEuropeanmanufacturingeconomyafterGermany;andthethirdEuropeanUnionmemberbyGDPsize,withcommercialandtradeintereststhatspanacrosstheglobe.11Italyalsohasarelevantglobalpositionthankstoitssoftpowerprojection,12frombeingamajordestinationforglobaltourismtotheattractionthatItalymaintainsinanumberofculturalandeconomicdomains,fromfoodtoart,fashionandlifestyle.ThisuniquepositioningleadsItalytobediplomaticallyactiveinareasoftheworldthatdonotrepresentanimmediategeopoliticalandsecurityconcern.Moreover,itcontributestoexplainingwhyItalyhassuchadeepconnectionwiththeUnitedStates,whichhasbeenhistoricallyresilientirrespectiveofthepartiesandpersonalitiesinpowerin

Rome.

9“ItalianForeignMinistertheFirsttoVisitBiden’sWashington”,inFrance24,12April2021,

https://

/en/live-news/20210412-italian-foreign-minister-the-first-to-visit-biden-s-

washington

.

10CarloM.Santoro,Lapoliticaesteradiunamediapotenza.L’Italiadall’Unitàadoggi,Bologna,IlMulino,1991.

11ValerioCastronovo,Storiaeconomicad’Italia.Dall’Ottocentoal2020,Newed.,Torino,Einaudi,2021.

12DavidEllwood,“Italy:SoftPowerSuperpower?TheNewOfficialProjectionofItalianCreativity”,inCDPBlog,16February2022,

/node/91967

.

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TheUnitedStatesremains,byallmaterialmeans,themainglobalsuperpower.DespiteallthefussaboutAmericandeclinism,13theriseofChina,14thereturnofRussia15andtheemergenceofamultipolarorder,theUnitedStateshasnotlostprimacyonanumberofdomains,themilitaryonebeingthemostrelevant.16Washingtonstillhasanunmatchedcapacityforprojectingpower,asparadoxicallydemonstratedevenbythechaoticwithdrawalfromAfghanistan:17althoughtheactualdynamicsofthewithdrawaldidnotbodewellfortheimageoftheAmericansintheeyesofalliesandglobalpublicopinion,theUnitedSateswastheonlycountrythathadthecapacitiestodosomethingaslogisticallycomplicatedasextricatingoverahundredthousandpeoplefromafarawaytheatre.Italy’stwenty-yearpresenceinAfghanistanwasafunctionofitsrelationshipwiththeUnitedStates:AfghanistanwasneverapriorityinItalianforeignpolicy,butItalydecidedtoparticipateinthemultinationalcoalition(from2003ledbyNATO)thatwentthereaftertheoustingoftheTalibaninlate2001becauseofitscommitmenttoWashington’scampaignagainsttheperpetratorsofthe9/11attacksandthosewhoharbouredthem,namelyal-QaedaandtheTaliban.Assuch,theendoftheinternationalmissioninAfghanistanhasbeenaquiterelevantdevelopmentforItalian-Americanrelations.Italy,oneoftheEuropeancountriesmostinvolvedinAfghanistan,inevitablysufferedfromtheuncoordinatedfashioninwhichtheBidenAdministrationorderedthewithdrawal.Romewasamajorcontributortotheevacuationefforts.ItwastheEUcountrythatextractedthelargestnumberof

Afghansfromthecountryandoneofthemostactiveacrosstheentirespectrumoflogisticalactivitiesneededtocompletetheseoperations.Italiandiplomatsalsoplayedanimportantrole,forinstanceNATO’sSeniorCivilianRepresentativeStefanoPontecorvo.18Italy,initscapacityasholderoftheG20presidencyfor2021,arrangedanextraordinarymeetingonAfghanistan,19whichresultedintheEUpledgingonebillioneurosinaidtoAfghanistanandneighbouringcountries,20amovethatwasseenaspositivebytheUnitedStatesasitmeantgreaterburden-sharingwithEuropeanallies,oneofAmerica’shistoricalobsessions.

13TomMcTague,“TheDeclineoftheAmericanWorld”,inTheAtlantic,24June2020.

14ZhenHanandT.V.Paul,“China’sRiseandBalanceofPowerPolitics”,inTheChineseJournalofInternationalPolitics,Vol.13,No.1(Spring2020),p.1-26,

/10.1093/cjip/poz018

.

15KathrynE.Stoner,RussiaResurrected.ItsPowerandPurposeinaNewGlobalOrder,NewYork,OxfordUniversityPress,2021.

16AndreaGilliandMauroGilli,“WhyChinaHasNotCaughtUpYet:Military-TechnologicalSuperiorityandtheLimitsofImitation,ReverseEngineering,andCyberEspionage”,inInternationalSecurity,Vol.43,No.3(Winter2018/19),p.141-189,

/10.1162/isec_a_00337

.

17DavidRohde,“Biden’sChaoticWithdrawalfromAfghanistanIsComplete”,inTheNewYorker,30August2021,

/news/daily-comment/bidens-chaotic-withdrawal-from-

afghanistan-is-complete

.

18ElisabethBraw,“NATO’sManinKabul”,inForeignPolicy,16September2021,

https://foreignpolicy

.

com/2021/09/16/natos-man-in-kabul

.

19ItalianGovernment,G20ExtraordinaryLeaders’MeetingonAfghanistan,PrimeMinisterDraghi’sClosingRemarks,12October2021,

erno.it/en/node/18220

.

20EuropeanCommission,Afghanistan:CommissionAnnounces€1BillionAfghanSupport,12October2021,

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5208

.

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DespitetheproblemsexperiencedoverAfghanistan,thealliancewiththeUnitedStatesremainsacrucialelementinthesecurityarrangementsofItaly,andtheUkrainecrisishasreinforcedtherelevanceofNATOmembershipforRome’ssecurity.Beingamajorexportingcountry,whoseeconomydependsontheimportofanumberofrawmaterials(primarilyenergy-related)andonintegrationinanumberofglobalsupplychains,Italyisparticularlysensitivetoanyshockthatmightaffectgloballogisticsandmaritimesecurity.Fromthispointofview,thestructuralalliancewiththeUnitedStates,whosedominanceoverglobalshippinglanesmakesitthecornerstoneoftheinternationalarchitectureofmaritimesecurity,isfundamentalforItalytoguaranteethesecurityofitslogisticalchains.

Atthesametime,Italy’sgeographicalpositioninthecentreoftheMediterraneanisasignificantassetfortheUnitedStates.ItwascrucialbackinthedaysoftheColdWar,whenthestrategicrelevanceofItalywasnotonlyduetothepresenceonitsterritoryofthebiggestCommunistpartyinWesternEurope,butalsotoitspositionintheMediterraneanbasin,whichwasaparticularlysensitiveareaofconfrontationwiththeSovietbloc.ThestrategicvalueofItaly’spositiondidnotdisappearwiththeendoftheColdWar.Onthecontrary,itcontinuedtobecentraltoUSandNATOoperationsintheBalkansandtheMiddleEast.Italystillhoststhesecond-largestnumberofAmericantroopsinEurope(afterGermany),around15,000militaryandcivilianstaff,accordingtothelatestdatafromtheUSDepartmentofDefense.21

AmericananalystsincreasinglyperceiveItalyasthecentreofUSmilitaryactivitiesintheMediterranean.NaplesishometotheAmericanSixthFleet,22andthereareanumberofmilitarybasesthatareparticularlyrelevantfortheAmericanprojectioninthewiderMediterranean,suchasSigonellainSicilyandAvianoinFriuli(northeastItaly).

Besidesgeostrategicconsiderations,therehasalsobeenasignificantAmericanpoliticalandindustrialattentioninItaly’sdefencesector,particularlyconcerningaeronautics.Inthepost–ColdWarperiod,defenceindustrialrelationsbetweenRomeandWashingtonincludedtwoimportantelements:first,procurementprogrammes;23andsecond,thepenetrationoftheUSdefencemarketsbyFinmeccanica(nowLeonardo),AgustaWestlandandFincantieri.24Inthisperiod,theprocurementprogrammeforthemulti-roleF35aircraftwasparticularlyrelevant,givenitsmilitary,industrialandpoliticalimportance.25InItaly,theprogrammewasmiredincontroversyasitsoonbecamethetargetofwidespread

21USDefenseManpowerDataCenter(DMDC)website:DoDPersonnel,WorkforceReports&Publications:MilitaryPersonnel,

/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-

reports

.

22Seeofficialwebsite:

.

23C130JandC27JSpartantransportaircraft,theKC-767tanker,theMediumExtendedAirDefenseSystem(MEADS)and,aboveall,theF-35fighteraircraft.

24AlessandroMarroneandAlessandroR.Ungaro,“RelationsbetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandItalyinthePost-ColdWarPeriod:ADefense-IndustrialPerspective”,inCahiersdelaMéditerranée,No.88(June2014),p.157-181atp.160,

/10.4000/cdlm.7542

.

25Ibid.,p.163.

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criticisms,particularlyfromanti-establishmentandleft-wingparties.Therewasapublicopinionmovementdemandingthattheprogrammebecancelled,inlinewiththehistoricalpacifistapproachsharedbycatholicandleft-wingforces.26TheM5Swasthemostvocalcritic.InOctober2019,whenitwasinpowerastheseniorcoalitionpartner,thepartywasstillcallingforarenegotiationoftheagreement.27Inthepast,eventhePDwentvocalagainsttheF35.FormerPDsecretarygeneralNicolaZingarettisaidthattheF35choicewas“unacceptable”,andhepostedonhisTwitteraccountapictureofhimselfholdingaposterstating“StopF35”.28Inthepreviouslegislativeterm,thePDvotedamotiontohalvetheprogramme.29However,onceLorenzoGuerinibecameMinisterofDefenceinSeptember2019,heputanendtothedebateonItaly’sparticipationintheF35programmealmostimmediately.30

TheissueofdefenceexpenditurehaslongremainedacomplicatedissueintherelationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandItaly.SinceformerUSSecretaryofDefenseBobGateswarnedEuropeanalliesabouttheriskof“collectivemilitaryirrelevance”shouldtheimbalancedburden-sharingwithinNATOremain,31theUnitedStateshasmadespending2percentoftheGDPondefenceastandingrequesttoNATOallies.Italy,foryears,hasstressedtheneedtolookatmilitarycontributionswithinNATOinadifferentway.DuringhisvisittoWashingtoninOctober2019,PresidentoftheRepublicSergioMattarellahighlightedhow“Italy

hasalwayscontributedintenselyandeffectively,toNATOmissionsandoperations,significantlysupportingtheactivitiesoftheAlliance.Moreover,ItalyisnotonlythesecondcontributorofmilitarypersonnelinNATOmissions,butalsothefifthNATOcontributor.”32AttheendofJanuary2020,meetingItalianDefenceMinisterGuerini,formerUSSecretaryofDefenceMarkT.Esperpraised“theexpansiverolethatItalydidasamemberofNATO”,33makinganexplicitreferencetotheItalianrole

26CarmineSaviano,“‘StopagliF35’.DaSavianoaZanotelli,daServilloaRorhwacherl’appelloaiparlamentari”,inRepubblica,10September2014,

https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2014/09/10/

news/f35_-95439105

.

27“F35,Cinquestelle:‘Ridimensionareilprogrammadiacquisti’.Conte:‘D’accordoconlarinegoziazione’”,inRepubblica,6October2019,

https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2019/10/06/

news/f35_rinegoziazione_m5s_giuseppe_conte_usa-237855408

.

28NicolaZingaretti,“RivederelaspesasuF35èunimpegnoimportante”,Twitter@nzingaretti,23January2013,

/nzingaretti/status/293784016430178304

.

29EnricoPiovesana,“F35,sìamozionePd:Cameradimezzaifondipericaccia:da13a6,5miliardi”,inIlFattoQuotidiano,24September2014,

http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/09/24/f35-la-

camera-dimezza-i-fondi-per-i-cacciabombardieri-da-13-a-65-miliardi/1131605

.

30“F35,Guerini:datoavvioafase2delprogramma”,inReuters,28November2019,

https://www

.

/article/f35-guerini-idITL8N28824Q

.

31“GatesPartingShotWarnsNATORisksIrrelevance”,inReuters,11June2011,

https://www.reuters.

com/article/us-usa-nato-idUSTRE7591JK20110611

.

32ItalianPresidency,StatementstothepressbythePresidentoftheRepublicSergioMattarellaattheEndoftheTalkswiththePresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,DonaldTrump,16October2019,

https://www.quirinale.it/elementi/40197

.

33USDepartmentofDefense,SecretaryofDefenseDr.MarkT.EsperandMinisterofDefenseLorenzoGueriniofItaly,31January2020,

/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/

Article/2072124/secretary-of-defense-dr-mark-t-esper-and-minister-of-defense-lorenzo-guerini-of

.

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inmultinationalmissions,addingthat“whetherit’sburdensharing[…]inIraqorAfghanistan,orevenAfrica,Italyleadswithaveryrobustpresence[…]ofitsforces”.However,Esperdidpointoutthatbringingdefenceexpendituretothe2percentthresholdremainedafundamentalobjective.Gueriniexpressedhiscommitmenttoincreasemilitaryspending,althoughhehadbeenveryclearthatreachingthe2percentthresholdindefencespendingby2024,asNATOmembershadcommittedtointheAlliance’sWalessummitin2014,was“realisticallyunachievable”.34TheideawastobringItalyclosertotheaverageofEuropeancountriesandgiveitmorecredibilitywithagreaterspendingcommitment–similarlytowhatCentralandEasternEuropeancountrieshavedoneinrecentyears.35

ThecurrentwarinUkraineislikelytohaveaground-breakingeffectonEuropeanapproachestodefence.MinisterGuerinisaidthat,inlinewiththedecisionstakenbythenewgovernmentinGermanytomassivelyincreasethemilitarybudget,Italymustincreaseitsmilitaryspendingfrom25to38billioneuros(overthecourseofseveralyears)