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2022
COLLECTEDESSAYS
ESG:I
ESGInvestingandAssetReturns
StevenGloberman
ABOUTTHISPUBLICATION
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DateofIssue
October2022
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ESGInvestingandAssetReturns
StevenGloberman
ExecutiveSummary
ESGinvestingisaninvestmentstrategythat
incorporatesenvironmental,social,andgov-
ernance(ESG)informationintheinvestment
decision-makingprocess.Thereisagrowing
interestinESGinvesting,andthusalargeand
growingempiricalliteratureexaminingthe
returnstoESGinvesting.Atthesametime,
thedemandformoreandbetterinformation
aboutfirms’ESGactivitiesisincreasing.In
responsetothisdemand,manyjurisdictions
(e.g.,theUSSecuritiesandExchangeCom-
mission)areconsideringESGreportingman-
datestoencourageESGinvestingbyhelpingtheinvestorssmoothlyidentifyfirmswithbetterESGmetrics(greenfirms)fromtheinferiorones(brownfirms).
Inthisessay,weprovideasummaryoftheprevioustheoreticalandempiricalacademicstudiesexaminingtherelationshipbetweenESGinvestingandassetreturns.WethenexplainhowthesefindingscanbearguablyrelevantforevaluatingthepublicpolicyofmandatoryESGreporting.WeonlyfocusonhowthispolicycanpotentiallychangethecostofcapitalandconsequentlygivefirmsincentivestoimprovetheirESGperformance,whichistheintendedgoalofthispolicy.
ManyclaimthatthereturntoESGinvestingisnegative.Themainconceptualframeworkthatsupportsthisclaimisthatinvestorshavenon-pecuniarypreferencesforgreenfirms,andthustheyarewillingtoacceptlowerexpectedreturnsforholdingstocksandbondsthatgreenfirmsissue.Thus,thesefirmsbenefitfromlowerfinancingcosts(costofcapital)inthecapitalmarket.Sogreenfirmscaninvestmoreandgrowmore.Moreover,brownfirmswillhaveanincentivetoimprovetheirESGpracticestolowertheirfinancingcoststoremaincompeti-tive.Ifthechannelthroughinvestors’preferencesworks,ESGinvestingmayhaveapositivesocialoutcomeaslongasempiricalevidenceconfirmsthatESGinvestingcansignificantly
2ESG:MythsandRealities
decreasetheexpectedreturns(decreasethecostofcapitalforfirms).Inthisscenario,man-datingESGreportingmaybejustifiedifinvestorshavedif-ficultyidentifyinggreenfirmsfrombrownfirms,andiffirmscanprovidebetterESGinfor-mationtoinvestorsunderthemandatoryregime.
Incontrast,manyESGadvo-
catesclaimthatthereisnotrade-offbetweenESGinvesting(doinggood)andassetreturns(doingwell).Themainconceptualframeworkthatcansupporttheirclaimisthatgreenfirmshavehigherprofit-abilityorlowerESG-relatedrisks,whileinvestorscannotreadilyidentifygreenfirmsfrombrownones.Therefore,greenassetsareunderpricedandsoprovidehigherexpectedreturnsforinvestorswhoholdthem.Inthisscenario,mandatoryESGreportingmightbejustifiedaslongasfirmscanprovidebetterandmoreESGinformationtoinvestorsundertheman-datoryregime.
Inthisessay,wefindthattheresultsofempiricalstudiesexaminingtherelationshipbetweenESGinvestingandassetreturns(costofcapital)areinconclusive.Manystudiesfindpositiveornegativerelationships,whilemanydonotfindanysignificantrelationship.ThisresultcanshedlightontheclaimthatmandatingESGreportingcanhaveapositivesocialimpactbysystematicallychangingfirms’costsofcapital.IfthereisnoagreementonhowESGinvestingisassociatedwithrisk-adjustedinvestmentreturns(costofcapital),advocatesofmandatingESGreportingfaceaburdenofprooftoshowthatthispolicycanhaveanetpositivesocialimpact.
1.Introduction
ESGinvestingisaninvestmentstrategythatincorporatesenvironmental,social,andgov-ernance(ESG)informationintheinvestmentdecision-makingprocess.InvestorscanfindinformationabouttheESGactivitiesofthefirmsmainlythroughESGratingagencies,aswellasreportsissuedbycompanies.RatingagenciesprovideinformationtothepublicabouttheESGperformancesofthefirms.Forexample,firmswithlowercarbonemissions(E),ahigherregardforemployees’healthandsafetyintheworkplace(S),andmorediversityinleadership(G)havebetterESGratings.
Assetmanagersareincreasinglyapplying1ESGinvesting2tobuystocksandbondsoffirmsthatarealignedwithESGgoals.Asaresult,thereisalargeandgrowingempiricalliteratureexaminingthereturnstoESGinvesting.Investorscanhavedifferentincentivestoincorpo-rateESGinformationintheirinvestmentdecision-making.SomeinvestorsmayfindESG
ESGInvestingandAssetReturns3
informationfinanciallymaterial.This
materialinformationcanhelpinves-
torsbetterevaluatethefinancialrisks
andreturnsofafirm.Someinvestors
mayhavesocialobjectivesinaddition
tofinancialincentivesandwouldliketo
buythestocksandbondsoffirmswith
betterESGperformance.Bothgroups
ofinvestorswouldliketohaveaccess
torelevantinformationabouttheESG
activitiesofthefirms.
WithgrowinginterestinESGinvestinganddemandformoreandbetterinformationaboutfirms’ESGactivities,manyjurisdictions(e.g.,theU.S.SecuritiesandExchangeCommission)areconsideringESGreportingmandatestoencourageESGinvestingbyhelpinginvestorstoidentifyfirmswithbetterESGmetrics(greenfirms)fromtheinferiorones(brownfirms).
Inthisessay,weprovideasummaryofthetheoreticalandempiricalacademicliteratureexaminingthereturnstoESGinvesting.Wethenexplainhowthesefindingscanbeargu-ablyrelevantforevaluatingthepublicpolicyofmandatingmoreexpansiveESGreporting.Acomprehensivecost-benefitanalysisisneededtofullyevaluatethispublicpolicy.Inthisessay,wedonotdoacost-benefitanalysisofmandatedchangestoESGreporting.Rather,wediscussaspecificpotentialsourceofbenefitthatcanarisefrompricechangesofcapitalmarketassets.3
Inapublicpolicydebate,oneshouldidentifythemarketfailurethatallegedlycreatesaneedforregulation,aswellashowtheregulationcansolvetheissue.IntheongoingdiscussionaboutmandatoryESGreporting,themainostensiblemarketfailureisthatfirmsunder-performintheirESGactivitiescomparedtothesociallyoptimallevel.Forexample,itcanbearguedthatfirmsshouldhavelowercarbonemissions(EinESG),orhigherdiversityinleadership(GinESG).Therecanbevarioussourcesofthismarketfailure.ThepotentialsourcefocusedoninthisreportisthatinvestorsarebroadlyuninformedabouttheESGperformanceoffirmsand,therefore,cannotidentifygreenfirmsfrombrownfirms.InvestorscanpotentiallyuseESGratingsthatESGagenciesprovidetoidentifygreenfirms.However,Berg,Koelbel,andRigobon(2019)documentthattheESGratingsfromthemainsixratingprovidersdisagreesubstantially.
HowcanmandatingESGreportingdrivechangebygivingfirmsanincentivetoimprovetheirESGperformance?4ThepotentialchannelthatwefocusonisthatmandatingmoreESGreportingcanmakeinvestorsbetterinformedabouttheESGperformanceofindi-vidualfirmsandtherebychangetheirinvestmentdecisionsinthecapitalmarket.Firmsraisefunds(capital)throughthecapitalmarket,whetherthroughissuingstocks,bonds,orborrowingfromfinancialinstitutions.Ifinvestorscanbetteridentifygreenfirms,theymayinvestmoreingreenfirmsanddivestfrombrownfirms.Thisreallocationininvestors’
4ESG:MythsandRealities
“ThepolicyofmandatingmoreexpansiveESGreportingcandrivechangeandthereforeimprovesocialefficiencythroughassetpricechangesinthecapitalmarket.”
portfolioscanincreasethepricesofthestocksandbondsofgreenfirms.Greenfirmsthereforebenefitfromlowerfinancingcostsinthecapi-talmarket.Hence,greenfirmscaninvestmoreandgrowrelativetobrownfirms.Moreover,brownfirmswillhaveanincentivetoimprovetheirESGpracticestolowertheirfinancingcoststoremaincompetitive.Therefore,thepolicyofmandatingmoreexpansiveESGreportingcandrivechangeandthereforeimprovesocialeffi-
ciencythroughassetpricechangesinthecapitalmarket.
HowcantheempiricalfindingsofreturnstoESGinvestingforinvestors(costofcapitalforfirms)berelevantforevaluatingthepublicpolicyofmandatoryESGreporting?WeexaminethetheoreticalliteratureonESGinvesting.Inparticular,wediscusshowvarioustheoreticalframeworksmightjustifythemandate,andwhattheseframeworkspredictforreturnstoESGinvesting.Iftheempiricaltestsdocumentedintheliteratureareconsistentwiththerelevantconceptualframework,theexistenceofanetsocialbenefittomandatoryESGreportingcouldbepotentiallyjustified.Below,wehighlighttwodominantconceptualframeworksthatcanbeidentifiedintheliterature.
Inthisessay,weprovideasummaryoftheacademicliteraturesurroundingESGinvestingtoassesswhetherthereisconclusiveevidenceontherelationshipbetweenESGinvestingandassetreturns.Inthenextsection,wesummarizethetheoreticalstudiesexaminingtherela-tionshipbetweenESGinvestmentandassetreturns.Thegoalofthissectionisnottoreviewcomplicatedmathematicalmodels.Instead,wewanttosummarizethechannelsthroughwhichESGinvestingcanpotentiallyaffecttheexpectedreturnstoandcostofcapital.Insection3,wediscusstheempiricalstudiesexaminingtherelationshipbetweenESGinvest-ingandreturns.Weconcludethattheempiricalevidenceisinconclusive.InSection4,weprovidesomeexplanationsforwhytheempiricalresultsexaminingtherelationshipbetweenESGinvestingandreturnsfindmixedresults.
InSection5,weconcludefrominconclusiveempiricalresultsexaminingreturnstoESGinvestingthatwedonotknowwhethermandatoryESGreportingcanreducethecostofcapitalforgreenfirms.Assuch,theadvocatesofmandatingESGdisclosuresshouldclarifyhowmandatingESGreportingcanhaveanynetpositivesocialimpact.
2.Theoreticalframeworks
Incontrasttotheargumentmadebysomeprominentinvestmentmanagersthat“GreenInvesting”offershigherrisk-adjustedreturnstoinvestors,manyacademicsassertthatthereturntoESGinvestingisnegative(e.g.,HongandKacperczyk,2009).5Themainconceptualframeworkthatsupportsthisclaimisthatinvestorshavenon-pecuniarypreferencesforgreenfirms,andthustheyarewillingtoacceptlowerreturnsforholdingstocksandbonds
ESGInvestingandAssetReturns5
thatareissuedbygreenfirms(Berkandvan
Binsbergen,2021).Infact,investorsshould“Ifinvestorscanmaterially
Inthisframework,ESGinvestingimpliesbet-greenfirms,thesefirmswill
increasetheassetpricesof
tersocialoutcomesonlyifinvestorstilttheirfacelowerfinancingcosts
investmentportfoliotowardgreenfirmsso(lowercostofcapital)sothat
thattheycanmateriallyincreasethestockandtheycaninvestmoreandgrow
assetpricesofgreenfirms,thesefirmswillfaceoutcomes.”
more,whichdrivesbettersocial
lowerfinancingcosts(lowercostofcapital)so
thattheycaninvestmoreandgrowmore,whichdrivesbettersocialoutcomes.Ifthechannelthroughinvestors’preferencesworks,ESGinvestingmayhavepositivesocialoutcomesaslongasempiricalevidenceconfirmsthatESGinvestingisassociatedwithsignificantlylowerexpectedreturns(lowercostofcapitalforfirms).Inthisscenario,mandatingESGreportingmaybejustifiedifinvestorscannotdistinguishgreenfirmsfrombrownfirms,andiffirmsprovidebetterESGinformationtoinvestorsunderthemandatoryregime.
Second,manyESGadvocatesclaimthattheoutperformanceofESGstrategiesisbeyonddoubt;thereisnotrade-offbetweenESGinvesting(doinggood)andassetreturns(doingwell)(Kynge,2017,September3).Themainconceptualframeworkthatcansupporttheirclaimisthatgreenfirmshavehigherprofitabilityand/orlowerESG-relatedrisks,whilethesefirmsdonotinformtheirinvestorsofthismaterialinformation.Therefore,greenassetsareunderpricedandsoprovidehigherexpectedreturnsforinvestorswhoholdthem.Inthisscenario,mandatoryESGreportingmightbejustifiedaslongasfirmscanprovidebetterandmoreESGinformationtoinvestorsunderthemandatoryregime.
ThestandardconceptualframeworktoanalyzetheinteractionbetweenESGinvestingandassetreturnsisbasedonthesingle-periodCapitalAssetPricingModel(CAPM)developedbySharpe(1964)andMossin(1966).CAPMdescribestherelationshipbetweentheexpectedreturnandtheriskofinvestinginasecurity.Themodelshowsthattheexpectedreturn,orsimplytheaveragereturn,onasecurityisequaltotherisk-freereturnplusamarketriskpremium.Themarketriskmainlyexistsbecauseeconomiccyclesareunpredictable.Iftheeconomyisinaboom,dividendsandstockpricesarehigher;iftheeconomyisinareces-sion,thedividendsandpricesarelower.Aninvestorwhobuysawell-diversifiedportfolioofstocks(e.g.,anS&P500indexfund)expectstoreceiveanexcessreturncomparedtoholdinggovernment-issuedbonds,whichprovideguaranteedcouponsregardlessofeconomiccycles.Notethatmarketriskexistseveninawell-diversifiedportfolio.TheimplicationofCAPMisthatiftheexpectedreturnofthestockoffirmA(say7percent)ishigherthanthatoffirmB(say6percent),itmeansthatfirmAisriskierwithhigherpricevolatility.BecauseoftheextrariskinstockA,theinvestorswhobuythosestocksexpecttogetanextra1percentreturn.Therefore,otherthanriskpremium,stockAshouldnotprovideanexcessreturn(Alpha).
6ESG:MythsandRealitiesAlphaisatermwidelyusedbyinvestors.Itisameasureoftheperformanceofaninvestmentafterremovingtheriskpremium.BasedonCAPM,thealphaofallstocksshouldbezero.TheextensionstoCAPM(e.g.,thethree-factorpricingmodel)incorporateriskfactorsinadditiontothemarketrisktoexplaintheexpectedreturns.Theintuitionbehindalltheseextensionsisthesame.Aslongasthereisaknownriskfactor,itisalreadyreflectedinthepriceandreturnofthestockasahigherriskpremium.Adjustingforalltheserisks,thestockshouldnotbeabletooutperformthebenchmarkindex(zeroalpha).
InthissectionwediscusstwomainchannelsthroughwhichESGinvestingcanaffect
expectedreturns:1)investors’preferencesand2)ESG-relatedrisks.ThenwediscussunderwhatconditionstheorypredictsthatESGinvestingcanprovidehigherexpectedreturns.
Investors’preferences
Investors’tasteforESGcriteriaistheprimarychannelinthetheoreticalmodelstorational-
izehowESGinvestingcanaffectexpectedreturns.Heinkel,Kraus,andZechner(2001)isthefirstpaperthatincorporatestastesforESGinanassetpricingmodel.Theauthorsassume
investmentsense…brownfirms
“Greeninvestorsboycott,inanthatgreeninvestorsdonotlikethefirmswith
Inthisenvironment,therearebrownfirms.Inthisenvironment,thereare
fewerinvestorsavailable(lessfewerinvestorsavailable(lessdemand)tohold
demand)toholdthestockofthestockofbrownfirms,causingthoseshare
brownfirms,causingthosepricestofall.Thisimpliesalowercostofcapital
sharepricestofall.”
Thiscreatesincentivesforthebrownfirmsto
followpracticestobecomegreen,whichresultsinpresumedpositivesocialoutcomes.Thelowercostofcapitalmeanslowerexpectedreturnsforgreeninvestorsinequilibrium.Yetgreeninvestorsarenotunhappybecausetheyenjoynon-pecuniaryreturns,i.e.,increasedpersonalsatisfactionfromholdinggreenstocks.
Theclaimthatgreeninvestorsgetalowerexpectedreturninequilibriumwhilegreenstocks’pricesincreasetohigherlevelscanbeconfusing.Toclarify,Iprovideasimpleexample.Sup-posethattherearetwofirms:agreenfirm(sayabatterymaker),andabrownfirm(afossilfuelfirm).Forsimplicity,supposethatbothareinitiallytradingattheidenticalstockpriceof$100.Moreover,let’sassumethattheexpectedreturnofbothisidenticalat6percent.NowassumethatinvestorsbecomeconcernedaboutESGissuesandwouldliketoholdfirmswithbetterESGratings.Theshort-termeffectofthischangeisthatthestockpriceofthegreenfirmincreasesasinvestorsbidupthepriceofthegreenfirm’ssharesinordertobuythem,andthestockpriceofthebrownfirmdropsasdemandforthosesharesdeclines.Supposethatthegreenfirmisnowpricedat$105andthebrownfirmispricedat$95.Duringtheperiodoverwhichthepriceofgreenisrisingandthepriceofbrownisfalling,investors’returnwillbehigherforthegreencompanythanforthebrowncompany.However,after
ESGInvestingandAssetReturns7
thetransitionperiod,theexpectedreturn
ofthegreenfirmfallsbelow6percent,say
to5percent,andtheexpectedreturnto
thebrownfirmrisesabove6percent,say
to7percent.
Whywillthegreenfirmhavealower
futureexpectedreturninthenewequilib-
rium?Thereasonisthat,inthenewequi-
librium,investors’desiretoholdgreen
firmsforreasonsbeyondtheirexpected
monetaryreturn.Sotheinvestorswho
holdgreenstocksarefinewithalower
monetaryreturnof5percentbecausethey
gettheequivalentofa1percentnon-monetaryreturnfrombeingsociallyresponsible.Sim-ilarly,theinvestorswhoholdbrownstocksexpecttoreceiveahighermonetaryreturnof7percenttocompensateforthenon-monetarylossof1percent.6Sobothgroupsofinvestorsgetatotalreturnof6percentinequilibrium(i.e.,afterthetransitionperiod)ifweconsiderbothmonetaryandnon-monetaryreturns.Therefore,duringtheperiodoftransitioninwhichthepreferencesofinvestorsarebeingreflectedinchangingstockprices,greenstocksoutperformbrownstocks.Afterthetransitionperiod,greenstockswillunderperformthebrownstocks.Thiscanbeoneexplanationforwhytheresultsofempiricalstudiesinvesti-gatingtheeffectofESGinvestingonassetreturnsaremixed.Wediscussthisfurtherinalatersection.
BerkandvanBinsbergen(2021)arguethatESGinvestingimplieslowerexpectedreturns(costofcapital).TheyarguethatforESGinvestingtohaveanimpactitmustchangethecostofcapitalmaterially.TheyfindasimpleexpressionforthechangeinthecostofcapitalfromESGinvesting:(1)thefractionofESGinvestors,(2)thefractionofgreenstocks,and(3)thecorrelationbetweentheassetreturnsofthegreenandbrownstocks.Theycarefullyestimatetheseparametersfromdata.Theyfindthattheeffectonthecostofcapitalissmall,and,hence,theexpectedreturnsforgreeninvestorsandbrowninvestorsarealmostequal.Theyarguethattheriskandreturnofthegreenstocksandbrownstocksarehighlysimilar,sotheyarehighlysubstitutable.Aninvestorcaneasilygetthesameexpectedreturnandriskinaportfoliowithorwithoutbrownstocks.Anotherreasonforfindingasmalleffectistheirclaimthatonly2percentoftheinvestorsaregreeninvestors,whichisaverysmallfraction.
ExpectedESG-relatedrisks
Inadditiontoinvestors’preferences,riskcanalsoaffecttheexpectedreturnsforgreenorbrownfirms.IfESGisariskfactor,itcanaffecttheexpectedreturnofthestocksinadditiontootherriskfactorslikemarketrisk.Forexample,fossilfuelproducersmayfacerisksassociatedwithclimateorregulatoryshockstowhichrenewableenergyproducersareimmune.Cornell(2021)arguesthatifESGisariskfactor,brownstocksshouldhaveahigherriskpremiumcomingfromESG-relatedrisk.Investorsthatbuygreenstockswillget
8ESG:MythsandRealities
lowerexpectedreturns.YettheyarehappybecausetheyhaveaportfoliothathedgesthemagainstESG-relatedrisks.IfthereareESG-relatedrisksandinvestorsdonotknowaboutthem,thegreenstocksareunderpriced.Sothosewhoholdthemcanenjoyhigherrisk-adjustedexpectedreturns(posi-tivealpha).IfinvestorslearnthatthereareESG-relatedrisksandgreenstockscanreducethatrisk,theystartbuyingthosestockswhichimpliesanincrease
intheirstockprices.Asinthecaseofthetransitionperioddiscussedforpreferences,greeninvestorsenjoytemporaryhigherreturns.However,inthenewequilibrium,theexpectedreturnsofthegreeninvestorsarelower.YettheyarehappybecausetheyhaveaportfoliothatinsuresthemagainstESG-relatedrisks.
LuoandBalvers(2022)studythetheoreticaleffectofdivestmentinbrownstocks.Theyidentifyaboycottfactorriskpremiumandshowthatthisispositive.Pastor,Stambaugh,andTaylor(2020)alsoprovideamodelfeaturingagentswithESGpreferencesandESGinvest-ingasastrategyforahedgeagainstclimaterisk.Inequilibrium,greenassetshavenegativeCAPMalphas,whereasbrownassetshavepositivealphas.Greenassets’negativealphasstemfrominvestors’preferenceforgreenholdingsandfromgreenstocks’abilitytohedgeclimaterisk.Therefore,theexpectedreturnsofgreeninvestorsarelowerinequilibrium.
Isthereanytheorythatshowsgreenstockscanoutperformbrownstocks?
Sofar,wehavearguedthatbothinvestors’preferencesandESG-relatedrisksimplylowerexpectedreturnstoESGinvestinginequilibrium.Wealsoarguedthatduringatransitionperiodwhengreenstockpricesincrease,greenstocksoutperformbrownstocks,butthere-after,brownstocksoutperformgreenstocks.Beyondthischannel,fewotherstudiestrytorationalizehowgreenassetscanoutperformbrownassetsexceptunderspecific,usuallytransitory,conditions.
UnexpectedESG-relatedrisks
Pastor,Stambaugh,andTaylor(2020)arguethatifESGconcernsstrengthenunexpectedly,greenassetscanoutperformbrownonesdespitehavinglowerexpectedreturns.Forexample,ifthegovernmentsurprisesinvestorsbyintroducingnewregulationsthatpenalizefirmswithhighcarbonemissions,thedemandforfirmswithlowcarbonemissions(goodperformanceofEinESG)increases.Thisresultsinhigherpricesforthosestocks,soduringtheperiodthatnewinformationisincorporatedintotheassetprices,greenstocksoutperformbrownstocks.Notethattheshockshouldbeunexpected.Ifitisanexpectedshock,itisalreadyreflectedinassetpricesandanESG-relatedriskpremium.Moreover,notethatthischannelagainprovideshigherreturnsforgreenassetsonlyduringatransitionperiod.
ESGInvestingandAssetReturns9
ESG,profitability,andmis-pricing
Pedersen,Fitzgibbons,andPomorski(2020)deriveamodelthatincludesinvestorswhosepreferencesdependonESGscores.Moreover,ESGscorescanbeusedasasignalforprofit-abilityofthefirms.Theyassumetherearethreetypesofinvestors:ESG-unaware,ESG-aware,andESG-motivated.ESG-unawareinvestorsarethosewhodonotknowthatESGscoresareasignalfortheprofitabilityofthefirm,sotheydonotconsiderESGscoresintheirinvestmentdecision-making.ESG-awareinvestorsknowthatthereisalinkbetweenprofitabilityandESGscores,sotheyusethisinformation.ESG-motivatedinvestorsareawareinvestorswhoalsoenjoynon-pecuniaryutilityfromholdingstockswithhighESGscores.Likepreviousstudies,iftheeconomyincludesESG-awareandESG-motivatedinvestors,ESG-motivatedinvestorsbidupthepriceofhighESG-scoringstocks.Inequilibrium,theaverageESGscoreoftheESG-motivatedinvestorsishigher,andtheirexpectedreturnsarelowercomparedtoESG-awareinvestors.IftheeconomyonlyincludesESG-awareinvestors,theexpectedreturnofstocksisindependentofESGscores.ThereasonisthatESGscoresareassumedtobeasignalofprofit,notrisk.IffirmswithhighESGscoreshavehigherprofitscomparedtothelowESGscoreones,thestockpricesoffirmswithhighESGscoreswillbehighersuchthattheexpectedreturnsoffirmswithanyESGscoreareequal.TheyarguethatthereisacaseinwhichhighESG-scoringstocksoutperformlowESG-scoringstocks.ThisisthecasewheretheeconomyhasalargeenoughfractionofESG-unawareinvestorsandESGisapositivesignalforprofitability.Iftheseassumptionshold,highESG-scoringstocksdeliverhighexpectedreturns.ThisisbecausehighESG-scoringstocksareprofitable,yettheirpricesarelowerthantheyshouldbe,leadingtorelativelyhighfuturereturns.
DisagreementinESGratings
“ThereisasubstantialliteraturedocumentingthedivergenceofESGratingsforthesamefirms.TheratingorganizationsdiffernotonlyinhowtomeasurethevariousESGcriteriabutalsoonthecriteriathataredeemedworthyofmeasurement.”
TherelationshipbetweenESGinvestment
andperformancecanalsobeambiguous
duetouncertaintyinESGratings.When
attemptingtoassesstheimpactofESGinfor-
mationoninvestmentperformanceitshould
beclearwhatismeantby“ESGinformation.”
Therearealargenumberoforganizations
attemptingtoanswerthatquestion.Liand
Polychronopoulos(2020)reportthatasof
year-end2019theyhadidentified70dif-
ferentfirmsthatprovidesomesortofESG
rankingsystem.Thisproblemwouldnotbe
sobadifalltheratingswereeffectivelysimilar,butthisisnotthecase.ThereisasubstantialliteraturedocumentingthedivergenceofESGratingsforthesamefirms.Theratingorga-nizationsdiffernotonlyinhowtomeasurethevariousESGcriteriabutalsoonthecriteriathataredeemedworthyofmeasurement.
Howdoesdisagreementam
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