DownloadI股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)金流與資本投資

Law,CorporateGovernance,andCorporateScandalinChinaYiZhangPekingUniversityInternationalConferenceonCorporateGovernanceShanghaiMarch2005I.IntroductionIthasbeenovertenyearssincestockmarketsestablishedinChina.Chinastocksmarkethasbeenplayingarole.thereexistsomanylistedfirmscommittedfraudandscandalSince1992,about200listedfirmsamong1200havebeensubjecttosecurityenforcementactionbyChinaSecuritiesRegulationCommission(CSRC),ShenzhenStockExchange(SZSE)andShanghaiStockExchange(SSE).TheratiooffirmswithscandalisfarabovethelevelofothercountriesMotivationWhatcontributestofirm’sscandal?DoescorporategovernancematterinChina? Isthereasoundcorporategovernancemechanismcouldpreventscandal?Doeslegalandeconomicdevelopmentmatter? -Isthereadifferencebetweenfirmsinregionswithvariouslegaleffectiveness? -economicdevelopment?II.IssuesandHypothesis:

-Corporategovernance-legal-economic-finance1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipOneofthemostessentialfeatureoftheownershipofChineselistedfirmsisthedominanceofthelargestshareholderTherehasnoeffectivemechanismtomonitorandrestrictthelargeshareholdersThelargeshareholdercanexpropriatetheminorityshareholdersforprivatebenefit1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipJensen(1976)Stulz(1988)H1A:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesfromzero,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalEntrenchmentoflargeshareholdersExpropriationbylargeshareholderLaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(1999)LaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(2002)Claessens,Djankov,Fan,andLang(2002)FanandWong(2002)H1B:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesovercertainlevel,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.2

FirmControllerThereisfundamentaldifferencebetweenstateandnon-stateshareholdersThereishugedifferenceamongstateshareholdersininternalmonitoring,etc. -centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）LiandZhang（2005）LiandZhang（2004）LinandZhang（2004）1.2

FirmController-centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）centralgovernmentcontrolledlocalgovernmentcontrolledlocalStateEnterprises(SOE)controlledNon-statelegalpersoncontrolledNaturalpersonothers1.2

FirmControllerCentralgovernmentcontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithclearerownership,(alittle)moretransparency,moremonitoringmoresocialresponsibility， (maybe)betterprotectionofminorityshareholdersNon-centralSOEandnon-statelegalpersoncontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithlesstransparencyandlackofmonitoring uptolesssocialresponsibility lackofprotectionofminorityshareholdersH2:Firmscontrolledbycentral(/local)governmentarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal

1.CorporateGovernance1.3BoardFamaandJensen(1983)theorizethattheboardofdirectorsisthehighestinternalcontrolmechanismresponsibleformonitoringtheactionsoftopmanagement.-thecompositionofindividualswhoserveontheboardofdirectorsisanimportantfactorincreatingaboardthatisaneffectivemonitorofmanagementactionsFama’’s(1980)andFamaandJensen’s(1983)theorywouldpredictthathigherpercentagesofindependentdirectorsincreasetheboard’seffectivenessasamonitorofmanagement.Jensen(1993)arguesthatboardsofdirectorareineffectivemonitorswhentheboardistoolarge,whentheboard’sequityownershipissmall,andwhentheCEOisalsotheChairmanoftheBpositionoftheboardofdirectorsdeterminesitseffectivenessDeFondandJiambalvo(1991)Beasley(1996)Dechow,SloanandSweeney(1996),etc.BoardcompositionanddisclosureChenandJaggi（2000）TheboardsizeH3A:FirmwithalargerboardsizeismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalTheboard-managementrelationshipTheCEO/ChairmanH3B:FirmwithaseparateCEOandChairmanislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalIndependentdirectorsIndependentdirectors,comparedwithinsidedirectors,arelesslikelytocolludewithmanagementH3C:Firmswithlowerproportion(seats)ofindependentdirectorontheboardofdirectorsaremorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorholdingsH3D:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofdirectorsholdfirmstockarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalChairmanHoldingH3E:FirmswithhigherChairmanstockholdingarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorCompensationH3F:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofdirectorpaidarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-監(jiān)事會)SupervisoryCommitteesizeH4A:FirmswithalargerSupervisoryCommitteesizeismore(less?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-監(jiān)事會)SupervisoryCommitteememberholdingsH4B:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofsupervisorsholdfirmstockislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalSupervisoryCommitteememberCompensationH4C:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofSupervisoryCommitteememberpaidisless(ormore?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandal4．Institutioninvestors機構(gòu)投資資者能夠夠降低公公司內(nèi)部部的代理理成本，，減少公公司管理理層的不不良行為為JarrellandPoulsen(1987)Brickley,Lease,andSmith(1988)機構(gòu)投資資者更傾傾向于反反對減少少股東財財富的行行為機構(gòu)投資資者相比比其他類類型的投投資者而而言更需需要透明明度和信信息的披披露Healyetal.(1999)Bushee和Noe(2000)機構(gòu)投資資者更偏偏好購買買那些持持續(xù)披露露信息的的公司的的股票長期持有有公司股股票的機機構(gòu)投資資者，很很可能出出于自身身的利益益而合謀謀進行不不法行為為機構(gòu)投資資者可以以從中得得到的益益處財務(wù)性的的收益，，如低于于市價的的轉(zhuǎn)讓價價格，阻阻止封閉閉式基金金的贖回回以及承承銷、財財務(wù)顧問問方面的的合同（（Barclay,Holderness,和和Pontiff(1993)）非財務(wù)性性的收益益，如影影響公司司在政治治、經(jīng)濟濟或社會會方面的的政策就我國的的實際情情況而言言，基金金、證券券等機構(gòu)構(gòu)重倉持持有上市市公司的的股票，，利用內(nèi)內(nèi)部信息息進行炒炒作、牟牟取暴利利已不是是秘密因此，在在我國機機構(gòu)投資資者的持持股比例例同公司司違規(guī)行行為是正正相關(guān)還還是負(fù)相相關(guān)或不不相關(guān)需需要實證證檢驗。。H4：InstitutionholdingsarerelatedtothelikelihoodforfirmtocommitscandalFinancialdistressFirmsconfrontingwithfinancialdistressaremorelikelytocommitfinancialstatementfraudNeedcontrolforfinancials3.EconomicdevelopmentFirmsinmoreeconomydevelopedregionarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal4.LawWrittenlawLLSV(1998)Allen,Qian,Qian(JFE,forthcoming)EffectivenessoflawismoreimportantthanthewrittenlawinatransitioneconomyBerkowitzetal(2003)Alford(2000)LuandYao(2004)China’sprovincessignificantlydiffersintermsoflegaldevelopment.Whetherlaweffectivenessintheregionaffectsfirm’sdecisiontocommitfraud?MaybelawdoesnotmattersincelawisnoteffectiveoverallinChina?四、實證研究究方法（i）變量SCANDAL，公司司是否被被監(jiān)管機機構(gòu)認(rèn)定定為違規(guī)規(guī)并公開開批評,譴責(zé)或或處罰控制變量量DEBT：公司司的資產(chǎn)產(chǎn)負(fù)債率率ROA：：公司的的資產(chǎn)收收益率LIQUIDITY：：公司的的流動比比率2．實證回回歸模型型Matchingscandalfirmswithnon-scandalfirmsLogisticregressionExaminefirm’’spropensitytocommitscandalSCANDAL=f(β0+β1GOVERN+β2INSTITUTE+β3BOARD+ββ4FSIZE+β5DEBT+ββ6ROA+β7LIQUIDITY+（OtherControls）)（（1））五、樣本與數(shù)數(shù)據(jù)（一）數(shù)數(shù)據(jù)Inordertoidentifyfirmsthatcommitscandal,werefertotheChinaSecuritiesJournal,ShanghaiSecuritiesJournalandtheGuotaianDatasetforfinancialscandals.ThetotalnumberoffirmssubjecttoenforcementactionsbytheCEC,SSE,andSZSEbetween1993and2003is178.Weeliminate12firmswhosegovernanceinformationinandbeforethefraudperiodarenotavailable,2firmslistedonB-StockMarketofChina,and4firmsthatcannotbematchedbyindustrycode,andthenthesamplesizeisreducedto160虛構(gòu)利潤潤虛列資產(chǎn)產(chǎn)虛假陳述述重大遺漏漏擅自改變變資金用用途大股東占占用資產(chǎn)產(chǎn)違規(guī)擔(dān)保保五、樣本與數(shù)數(shù)據(jù)Eachofthescandalfirmismatchedwithano-scandalfirm,creatingachoice-basedsampleof160scandaland160no-scandalfirms.Thecontrolfirmisobtainedbythefollowingfour-stepprocess:(i)StockExchange(ii)Industry.3-digitindustrialcode.Ifthere’snofirmmatchingthethreedigits,thenselectthatofthesameprimarytwodigits(iii)FirmSize.53of160committedscandalinaperiodlasting2ormoreaccountingyears,andwedefinethefraudperiodofthesefirmsasthefirstdateoftheirfinancialstatementfraudWhenfirmscommittedscandalandwasdenounced/criticized/punishedmorethanonce,weonlyrecordthefirsttimeSampledescriptionlogistic回歸分析析GovernanceandfinancialsAddmarketizationindexProxyforeconomicsdevelopmentProxyforlegaldevelopmentProxyforfinancialdevelopmentCorporateGovernanceOwnershipLARGEST回歸系數(shù)數(shù)為負(fù),在5%水平上顯顯著,LARGESTSQ的回歸系系數(shù)為正正，在10%水平上顯顯著第一大股股東持股股比例從從零開始始增大,公司司越不會會commitscandal;當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蟠蠊蓶|持持股比例例達(dá)到一一定水平平,持股股比例越越高,公公司越可可能commitscandal;LOCAL和LEGALP的回歸系系數(shù)為正正，LOCAL在5%水平上顯顯著，LEGALP在0.1%水平上顯顯著非國有法法人和地地方政府府控制的的公司更更有可能能違規(guī)董事會BOARDSIZE,INDEPENDENT均不顯著著董事會規(guī)規(guī)模和獨獨立董事事席位（（比例））CHAIRCEO不顯顯著CEO是是否兼任任董事持股董事事人數(shù)（（比例））和付報報酬董事事人數(shù)（（比例））均不顯顯著CHAIRHOLDING為為負(fù)，在在10％％水平上上顯著董事長持持股比例例越高，，公司越越不會commitscandal監(jiān)事會監(jiān)事會規(guī)規(guī)模不顯顯著持股監(jiān)事事人數(shù)（（比例））不顯著著付報酬監(jiān)監(jiān)事比例例顯著為為正(10%水水平)取得報酬酬的監(jiān)事事比例越越高，公公司越可可能commitscandal機構(gòu)投資資者機構(gòu)投資資者持股股比例不不顯著分拆上市市或整體體上市分拆上市市或整體體上市沒沒有顯著著影響Controls流動比率率的回歸歸系數(shù)顯顯著為負(fù)負(fù)流動比率率越高的的公司，，financialdistress的可能能較小,違規(guī)可可能較小小DEBT的回歸系系數(shù)為正正，但統(tǒng)統(tǒng)計上不不顯著ROA的回歸系系數(shù)顯著著為負(fù)資產(chǎn)收益益率較高高的公司司違規(guī)可可能較小小RegiondevelopmentNortheast顯顯著為正正,公司發(fā)生生丑聞的的可能性性較高midyangtz顯顯著為正正,公司發(fā)生生丑聞的的可能性性較高Economicdevelopmentlgdppc，該省人人均GDP對數(shù)數(shù)值為負(fù)負(fù)，并在在統(tǒng)計上上顯著經(jīng)濟越發(fā)發(fā)達(dá)，公公司發(fā)生生丑聞的的可能性性越小LegaldevelopmentMeasureoflegaleffectiveness檢察院(procuratorialsystem)ProcuratorialCases_per_capita:立立案經(jīng)經(jīng)濟案件件ProcuratorialCases_gdpLoss_to_GDP:TheratioofsavedlossbyprocuratorialsuitstolocalGDPCadre_In_procurate:Thismeasuresthecorruptnessofofficials.Thenumberofcadresatcountylevelorabove(縣處級級以上)involvedinprocuratatedividedbythepopulationLegaldevelopment法院(courtsystem)Case_Close_RateRCMP:Thenumberofcommercialcasesreceivedbythecourtpermillionofpopulation律師協(xié)會(lawyerassoc