講義四 織架構(gòu)與公司戰(zhàn)略定位(長(zhǎng)江商學(xué)院 陶志剛)

1、Strategies and Organizations組織架構(gòu)與公司戰(zhàn)略定位管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)1The field of business strategy is to explain sustained differences in the performance of firms that compete with one another in delivering products and in developing the ability to do so more effectively over time.在劇烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)中，企業(yè)如何獲得并保持高于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的盈利管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)2Source:

2、 Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates AnalysisAverage Economic Profits of U.S. Industry Groups, 1978-19961978至1996年美國(guó)各行業(yè)平均經(jīng)濟(jì)利潤(rùn)率Value Line Industry Groups管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)3The “Five Forces Framework for Industry Analysis “五種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力量的行業(yè)分析框架潛在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手供給商行業(yè)現(xiàn)有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者替代品競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者購(gòu)置者管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)4Source: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Ass

3、ociates AnalysisROE-Ke Spread(30%)(20%)(10%)0%10%20%30%40%$0$1$2$3$4$5$6$7$8$9$10$11$12$13$14$15Great Northern IronWorthington IndsNucorSteel TechnologiesOregon MillsCommercial MetalsCarpenterBirminghamBritish Steel PLCCleveland-CliffsQuanexLukensACME MetalsAmpcoUSX-US SteelInland SteelArmcoWHXBethl

4、ehemAverage Invested Equity ($B)Average Economic Profits of Individual Firms in the Steel Industry, 1978 1996 1978至1996年美國(guó)鋼鐵行業(yè)中各企業(yè)的平均利潤(rùn)率管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)5Source: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates AnalysisROE-Ke Spread(80%)(60%)(40%)(20%)0%20%40%60%$0$5$10$15$20$25$30SmithKlineGlaxoAmericanHomeProductsAm

5、genMerckSchering PloughWatsonBristolMyersRhone-PoulencMylan LabsWarner LambertEli LillyPfizerPerrigoPharmacia & UpjohnForest LabsAlzaICNSchererIvaxGenetechBiogenRobertsGenzymeDuraChironCephalonGensiaCygnusImmunexAverage Invested Equity ($B)Average Economic Profits of Individual Firms in the Drug Ind

6、ustry, 1978 -19961978至1996年美國(guó)制藥行業(yè)中各企業(yè)的平均利潤(rùn)率管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)6Competitive Advantages競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)Competitive Advantage競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)Lower Cost低成本Differentiation差異化管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)7How to achieve competitive advantages?如何獲得競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)A firm obtains cost advantage (or achieves product differentiation) through efficient organization of activities invo

7、lving units within the firm, suppliers, customers, and even competitors. 有效地組織生產(chǎn)，包括與公司內(nèi)各部門、供給商、客戶及競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的關(guān)系，是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的來(lái)源管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)8Three examples三個(gè)例子Airbus v. Boeing 空中客車 對(duì) 波音Toyota v. GM 豐田 對(duì) 通用汽車McDonalds 麥當(dāng)勞管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)9Two approaches for organizing production activities兩種組織生產(chǎn)的方式the organizational approach and the

8、 contractual approach 自造及外包What are the tradeoffs between the organizational approach compared with the contractual approach? 兩種方法的比較管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)10Holdup套牢verticalIntegration縱向整合externalContractor外部合同加工者moral hazardinternal monopolylack of scale economies鼓勵(lì)問(wèn)題內(nèi)部壟斷缺乏規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)Make or buy?自造還是外包?管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)11Organization

9、s and business strategies組織形式和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的關(guān)系Make production differentiation自造 差異化道路Buy cost advantage外包 低本錢優(yōu)勢(shì)管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)12Holdup套牢 Conflict of interest 利益沖突 Contractual incompleteness 不完全合同 Relationship-specific investment 專用投資 Renegotiation 重新談判管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)13Resolving Holdup如何防止被套牢avoid specific investments 防止專用投資writ

10、e more detailed contracts 合同要具體詳細(xì)管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)14Moral Hazard鼓勵(lì)問(wèn)題conflict of interest 利益沖突asymmetric information about effort 不了解具體努力程度管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)15Resolving Moral Hazard如何解決鼓勵(lì)問(wèn)題incentive scheme 鼓勵(lì)機(jī)制conditional payment 有條件的付款Quota 指標(biāo)monitoring system 監(jiān)督系統(tǒng)管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)16Incentive vs Risk鼓勵(lì)對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)Efficient scheme balances 有效的鼓勵(lì)

11、方案會(huì)平衡:benefits of more effort 積極性的提高 costs of risk bearing 承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的本錢管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)17Motivating Dennis Rodman如何使美國(guó)職業(yè)籃球界的壞孩子變好1996: under guaranteed contract, he played only 55 of 82 regular season contests, and got paid $2.96m for games he didnt play in.1997: a new contract of $10.5m, but only $4.5m guaranteed

12、/ $0.5m for winning NBA rebounding title / $185,000 per game after the 59th game / In the end, he played 80 of the 1997s 82 games, and got $10.1m.管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)18AT&T Incentive SchemeAT&T的總裁鼓勵(lì)方案1995: AT&T awarded CEO Robert E. Allen options for 108,000 shares at $43.94 exercise price 1995年: AT&T(美國(guó)電報(bào)及 公司)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)總

13、裁Robert E. Allen 108000股的期權(quán)管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)19Relative Performance相對(duì)績(jī)效employment - promote the best worker 雇用提拔最正確雇員sports - gold, silver, bronze 體育金銀銅牌管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)20Incentive Pay for Portfolio Managers at Harvard Management Company哈佛大學(xué)資產(chǎn)管理公司采用相對(duì)績(jī)效鼓勵(lì)方案Case Study 案例管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)21Introduction回報(bào)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高過(guò)基準(zhǔn)回報(bào)Founded in 1974 to manage

14、 the endowment of Harvard UniversityAs of the end of 2000, this endowment totaled about $19 billion. Jack Meyer, the president, oversaw 185 employees, of which 45 were portfolio managersIn the five (ten) year period ending in 2001, the annual return on Harvards endowment was 16.9% (16.5%) while the

15、annual median performance of large institutional funds was 11.0% (11.9%).管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)22HMC compensation plan薪酬方案三局部：根本工資、中性獎(jiǎng)金、浮動(dòng)獎(jiǎng)金The compensation structure for internal managers of public securities at HMC consisted of three components:Basic salary ($200K, not-a-risk)Neutral bonus ($100K, at-risk)Incentiv

16、e bonus (at-risk,based on performance, relative to the benchmark. Could be positive or negative)管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)23Neutral bonus ($100,000)管理不善，中性獎(jiǎng)金可扣除The neutral bonus was netted against the incentive bonus for annual payment. If the incentive bonus was zero or positive, the FULL neutral bonus would be paid. I

17、f the incentive bonus was negative, the neutral bonus would be reduced accordingly, down to a minimum of zero. 管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)24Incentive bonus超過(guò)基準(zhǔn)回報(bào)一個(gè)百分點(diǎn)可獲50萬(wàn)美金浮動(dòng)獎(jiǎng)金The parameters for the incentive bonus included a pre-set, upside limit (a cap of $2,000,000) and an incentive bonus rate of $500,000 (or charged

18、 to the manager) for each 1% of performance above (or below) the specified benchmark. 管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)25Carryforward of incentive bonus超過(guò)上限的浮動(dòng)獎(jiǎng)金暫放在蓄水池里If the incentive pay earned in a particular year exceeded the cap, the excess was carried forward, i.e., invested in the endowment and payable at the end of the

19、 next fiscal year. The carryforward bonus and the endowment return on the carryforward were subject to a clawback for underperformance and were also subject (along with the currently payable portion of the current years incentive) to the maximum incentive cap. 管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)26Withholding on incentive bonus低于

20、上限的浮動(dòng)獎(jiǎng)金,其中30%也放在蓄水池里Thirty percentage of any positive incentive bonus (post-carryforward) was withheld, invested in the endowment, and payable at the end of the next fiscal year. The withheld bonus and the endowment return on the withheld bonus were subject to a clawback for underperformance but wer

21、e not subject to the maximum cap. 管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)27Negative incentive bonus假設(shè)回報(bào)低于基準(zhǔn)回報(bào)，需從蓄水池及本年度中性獎(jiǎng)金中扣除Negative incentive bonuses were netted against carryforward bonuses, endowment returns on carryforward bonuses, withheld incentive bonuses, endowment returns on withheld bonuses, and the neutral bonus in the

22、order listed. Negative incentive bonuses in excess of these bonuses and endowment returns were not carried forward.管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)28Multiple Responsibilities I多重責(zé)任 IExamples: high-school teachers, university professors, Hong Kong mini bus drivers例如: 中學(xué)老師, 大學(xué)教授, 香港小巴駕駛員管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)29Multiple Responsibilities II多重責(zé)任II

23、strong incentive induces more effort on that dimension but less effort on other dimensions 假設(shè)有強(qiáng)烈的鼓勵(lì)機(jī)制引導(dǎo)某一個(gè)方面責(zé)任, 那么其他責(zé)任會(huì)被無(wú)視equal incentive principle 對(duì)等鼓勵(lì)的原那么low-powered contracts 采用較弱的績(jī)效指標(biāo)OWNERSHIP 所有權(quán)變化管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)30Big Macs Pay Plans麥當(dāng)勞自營(yíng)店經(jīng)理的薪酬方案Case Study 案例管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)311963 Plan 1963年的薪酬方案Bonus based on sales

24、 increase獎(jiǎng)金基于銷售額的增加independent of managers control不可控制的因素lack of concern for cost control對(duì)本錢控制的忽略管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)321964-67 Plan 1964至1967年的薪酬方案Bonus based on subjective evaluations獎(jiǎng)金基于主觀評(píng)估管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)331967 Plan1967年的薪酬方案Basic salaries tied to the satisfaction of QSC standards滿足QSC(產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量,優(yōu)質(zhì)效勞,店堂清潔)是獲得根本工資的必要條件Quarterl

25、y bonus for profit contribution, which depends more on increased revenue (volume) than on cost control. 季度獎(jiǎng)金取決于利潤(rùn)的增加管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)341972 plan 1972年的薪酬方案Three ranges of fixed salary depending on the cost of living根本工資與生活本錢指數(shù)掛鉤Quarterly bonuses forlabor costs (5% of base salary)food and paper costs (5% of base

26、 salary)QSC objectives (up to 10% of base salary)2.5% of sales increase (up to 10% of base salary)季度獎(jiǎng)金基于勞工本錢、食物及紙張本錢、QSC指標(biāo)及銷售額的增加管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)35Questions 思考問(wèn)題Whats McDonalds business strategy? 麥當(dāng)勞的經(jīng)營(yíng)策略對(duì)自營(yíng)店經(jīng)理薪酬方案的影響compensation based on QSC and costs alone (“cost centers)? 自營(yíng)店可否成為專注于QSC的本錢中心？compensation for

27、 training of new managers 如何提高自營(yíng)店經(jīng)理培訓(xùn)新經(jīng)理或特許經(jīng)營(yíng)者的積極性?compensation based on sales or sales increase? 獎(jiǎng)金是基于銷售額還是銷售額的增加objective performance valuations only? 難道獎(jiǎng)金只能基于客觀評(píng)估？ 管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)36The Goldman Sachs IPO高盛集團(tuán)首次公開(kāi)募股Case Study 案例管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)37A Family Business家族業(yè)務(wù)1869: M. Goldman/commercial paper 1869年：債券1880: $100K

28、capital/$30 million turnover 1880年：10萬(wàn)美元資本/3000萬(wàn)美元營(yíng)業(yè)額1882: teamed up with Sachs (son-in-law) 1882年：與女婿Sachs合伙1896: joined NYSE 1896年：參加紐約股票交易所1900: $2.5 million capital 1900年：250萬(wàn)資本1906: handled first IPO 1906年：第一次接手公司首次公開(kāi)募股業(yè)務(wù)管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)38One Bad Year & 30 Good Years1年差光景與30年好時(shí)光1929: a mutual fund establi

29、shed in 28 fell from a height of $326 in Oct, 29 to $ 1.75 in Nov, 29. 1928年創(chuàng)立的互惠基金從1929年10月326美元下跌到1929Sidney Weinberg Era: 1930-1969 Sidney Weinberg 時(shí)代：1930年-1969年sit on more than 30 boards, and attended 250 board meetings per year for more than 20 years 坐鎮(zhèn)30多個(gè)董事會(huì)，連續(xù)20多年每年參加250個(gè)董事會(huì)議cultivated a fi

30、rst-rate client list, and landed the Ford IPO deal ($650m) in 1956 贏得了一流客戶，1956年幫助福特成功首次公開(kāi)募股6.5億美元管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)39Gus Levy Era: 1969-1976 Gus Levy 時(shí)代：1969年-1976年Risk taker 愛(ài)冒風(fēng)險(xiǎn)one-hour management committee meetings reduced to 15 minutes 管理委員會(huì)會(huì)議從一小時(shí)縮短到15分鐘Penn Central Railways default on $87 million commercia

31、l paper/45 law suits for not disclosing the clients financial information/unlimited liability for 45 partners/settlements Penn Central Railway8700萬(wàn)美元債券拖欠/高盛因不披露客戶財(cái)務(wù)信息而收到45項(xiàng)起訴/45個(gè)合伙人負(fù)擔(dān)無(wú)限責(zé)任/庭外解決管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)40John Weinberg/John Whitehead: 1976-1990management committee 恢復(fù)管理委員會(huì)short-term profit/long-term relati

32、ons 不是考慮短期利潤(rùn)而是長(zhǎng)期關(guān)系reckless risk-taking (making bridge loans, buying junk bonds, and putting capital in takeovers)/cautious business development 莽擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)過(guò)橋貸款，購(gòu)置垃圾債券，公司資金直接參與兼并業(yè)務(wù)/謹(jǐn)慎地開(kāi)展業(yè)務(wù)white-knight strategy in M&A 在企業(yè)并購(gòu)中扮演救難英雄的角色管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)41Partnership合伙人制度Hiring quality people/internal promotion not lateral

33、hires/low turnovers/first 10 years of 14-18 hours with salaries lower than rival public firms for the elusive prize of a partnership (8-figure compensation)/partner selection every two years/partner compensation based on seniority not performance/teamwork and loyalty 聘用高素質(zhì)的員工/高管人員主要來(lái)自公司員工的內(nèi)部提拔/低人員流動(dòng)

34、率/開(kāi)始10年每天工作14-18小時(shí)而工資卻低于同行水平，為的是成為合伙人后難以置信的薪酬/每?jī)赡晏暨x一次合伙人/合伙人的薪金基于資歷而非業(yè)績(jī)/強(qiáng)調(diào)團(tuán)隊(duì)精神和對(duì)公司的忠誠(chéng)度管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)42Friedman and Rubin Era: 1990-1994Not competitive compensation/exodus of talented people/lateral hiring/grading partners/emotional toll/performance pay 93/360 degree review/no risk no return and hence princip

35、al transaction (Rubins idea)/$886 m profit in 90, $1b in 91, and $1.46b by 11/92 薪水不具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力/高素質(zhì)員工大量流失/開(kāi)始從外部招募高管人員/對(duì)合伙人進(jìn)行評(píng)估/士氣低弱/1993年全面使用績(jī)效工資/360度的評(píng)估/沒(méi)有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)沒(méi)有回報(bào)，公司進(jìn)行直接投資/1990年8.86億美元利潤(rùn)，1991年10億美元，1992管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)43Substantial losses in 19941994年巨額虧損departure of 30% of the partnership by 11/94/Goldmans assets d

36、ropped from $115b end of 93 to $95b end of 94 截止1994年11月，30%的合伙人離開(kāi)公司，帶走了大量資金/ 高盛集團(tuán)資產(chǎn)從1993年底的1150億美元跌至1994年底的950億美元“You cant run a multinational global business on partnership capital. “不能僅依靠合伙人資金來(lái)經(jīng)營(yíng)一個(gè)全球化的業(yè)務(wù)管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)44Corzine on Partnership Corzine對(duì)合伙人制的看法An economic system in which 1.5-1.75% of the peop

37、le capture a high percentage of the upside in good times and adjust the other 98.5% of the participants compensation and jobs on the downside is selfish. 1.5-1.75% 的人在年景好時(shí)占有大局部盈利，效益差時(shí)那么對(duì)其他98.5%的員工減薪或解雇，這種制度太自私The number of partners increased from 120 in 90 to 180 in 95/the average share per partner

38、decreased significantly. 合伙人數(shù)目從1990年的120人增長(zhǎng)到1995年的180人/ 每個(gè)合伙人的平均股權(quán)份額大幅下跌管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)45Mary Kay Cosmetics:Sales Force Incentives美琳凱傳銷團(tuán)隊(duì)的鼓勵(lì)機(jī)制Case Study 案例管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)46An Overviewset up in 1963 with a unique concept /listed, and then management buyout ($315m) by Mary Kay and her son in 12/85 /headquartered and manu

39、factured in Dallas, plus 5 regional distribution centers (1,436 employees) /175,000 independent salespersons in U.S. in 88 /$406m sales in 881988年公司員工僅1,436人，而獨(dú)立銷售人員傳銷人員高達(dá)175,000人；銷售額為億美元管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)47Sales Force Incentives獨(dú)立銷售人員的鼓勵(lì)機(jī)制Entry-level: difference between retail and wholesale prices /a 4-12% comm

40、ission on the sales of personal recruits/sales director: 9-13% on the entire unit, extra bonuses for total sales and recruits/senior directors: 4% on offsprings and 5% for more than 8 offsprings/national directors: 5-8% and 2% on first-line and second-line offsprings, respectively 層層剝削管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)48Car Pro

41、grams 汽車獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)方案Pink Cadillac (69) and Pink Buick (lower standards) for directors/VIP for non-directors/1,000 Cadillacs, 1,000 Buicks, and 3,000 leased cars for VIP program (89)管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)49Questions 思考問(wèn)題Multiple responsibilities (sales and recruiting) 多重責(zé)任銷售及招募獨(dú)立銷售人員difference between Mary Kays incentive sys

42、tem from Goldman Sachs partnership 美琳凱鼓勵(lì)機(jī)制與高盛合伙人制度的差異why car programs 為何引入汽車鼓勵(lì)方案管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)50The debate Over Unbundling General Motors:關(guān)于分拆通用汽車的討論The Delphi Divesture and Other Possible Transactions剝離Dephi及其他運(yùn)作Case Study 案例管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)51Undervalued GMGM股票被低估90 years of vertical integration: GM (70%), Ford (50%),

43、 and Chrysler (30%) 長(zhǎng)達(dá)90年的垂直一體化：GM(70%), Ford (50%), Chrysler (30%) The difference between benchmark investment strategy and actual value created is equal to $89 billion between 12/31/89 and 12/31/98 1989年12月31日到1998年12月31日之間，實(shí)際創(chuàng)造的價(jià)值比投資基準(zhǔn)少890億美元。管理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)52A Breakup of GMGM的分拆1996: GM decided to spin off its shares in Electronic Data Systems (a computer business acquired in