如何看待正在變化的世界秩序

1、CONTENTS1 IntroductionPaul B. Stares6 ChinaQingguo Jia12 The European UnionNathalie Tocci18 IndiaDhruva Jaishankar24 RussiaAndrey Kortunov31 EndnotesAcknowledgmentsAbout the AuthorsAbout the Center for Preventive Action has pursued its interests at the expense of others or defied international insti

2、tutions, the breadth and scope of the Trump administration actions are categorically different. Given the pivotal role the United States plays in maintaining the world order, it can inflict significant damage and has done so.The capacity of Western countries, which have been the strongest supporters

3、 of the current world order, to maintain that order has also declined sharply, especially since the end of the Cold War. Statistics show that the share of the worlds gross domestic product of Group of Seven (G7) countriesthe United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdo

4、m-dropped from 68 percent in 1992 to 47 percent in 2015.1 It dropped again to 30.15 percent in 2018 and is projected to go down to 27.26 percent in 2023.2 Although the decline in military capabilities is more moderate, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) spending has also shrunk from two-third

5、s of global defense spending to little more than half in 2017? On top ofthis, the Trump administrations America First policy has strained the unity of the West. Since the end of World War II, the Wests ability to maintain the world order has never been weaker.Other major countries have become increa

6、singly dissatisfied and frustrated with existing international arrangements as well. Russia begrudges NATO expansion; India is unhappy with the perceived inadequate international recognition of its status as a great power; and China is frustrated that its voice and interests have not received due at

7、tention and respect. Those countries and others are seeking a change in the current international arrangement. Chinas efforts to assert its interests receive the most attention. As the leading rising power, China has created a number of initiatives to improve international cooperation, most notably

8、through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative. These demands, given the sharply increased capabilities of the countries making them, have also strained the extant world order. For those and other reasons, the postwar world order is facing an unprecedented crisis.P

9、ROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORDERSome countries have lamented its decline, but the post-World War II order does have real problems. First, in the absence of effective checks against it, the United States has operated as the indispensableand for many years undisputedleader. This status ha

10、s allowed it to abuse its power, at times even at the expense of its own interests as well as those of others, despite its professed good intentions. Washington has not always been prudent in conducting foreign policy, as evidenced by its decision to fight wars in Iraq and Vietnam, withdraw from int

11、ernational organizations, initiate trade wars despite WTO rules, and drag its feet in reforming international institutions. Power corrupts. This applies not only to domestic politics but also to international politics.Second, the existing world order is excessively West-centric. Although Western cou

12、ntries do advocate certain worthy values, they do not have the right to dictate what other countries should do in their pursuit of political stability and economic development. Because every country faces a unique set of circumstances at home, the Western model does not always apply. That few develo

13、ping countries have made it into the rank of developed countries over the past seven decades, despite the Wests tremendous efforts一from a position of strengthto impose Western models, shows that this model has real problems in catering to the needs of developing countries.Third, although the U.S.-le

14、d system of military alliances has been useful in helping maintain peace and stability, it is also exclusive and divisive. By default, it divides countries into allies and others. This approach has ensured alienation and suspicion on the part of the others and has provided a fertile ground for zero-

15、sum interactions, making security cooperation difficult if not impossible.Fourth, the existing economic order attaches considerable importance to efficiency, sacrificing equality. Under this order, the world has made great strides in liberalizing cross-border trade and investment, yielding an era of

16、 unprecedented prosperity. However, although a freer market has led to increased efficiency, it has also engendered greater inequality. Calls to address inequality are dismissed as calls for socialism and not taken seriously. Consequently, polarization is increasing both within and between countries

17、, along with anti-globalization protests.THE FUTURE OF WORLD ORDERDespite its flaws, the current world order is still the best that humankind has created. Through established institutions, states champion universally accepted values and principles such as sovereignty, nonaggression, nonintervention

18、in the internal affairs of other countries, human rights, rule of law, free trade, and the principle of common and differentiated responsibilities. States generally observe international laws and norms in light of the values and principles espoused by these institutions. Platforms have been created

19、that offer countries an opportunity to air their frustrations with international arrangements and discuss ways and means to address pressing global issues. Another world war has thus far been avoided and unprecedented prosperity has been achieved. As a result, few countries have completely rejected

20、the world order, regardless of any grudges they have against it.Most nations have a stake in the existing order and are therefore more likely to stick with it. Wealthy countries expect that their wealth will be protected and poor countries expect aid when they are desperate. Both strong and weak sta

21、tes expect international laws and norms to protect their interests, one way or another. Most concerns are about perceived injustices in the distribution of benefits than about absolute losses. Some countries could be unhappy with a particular piece of an existing international arrangement but have n

22、o intention of overthrowing the world order as a whole in favor of a nineteenth-century arrangement (might is right). Thus, despite the U.S. withdrawal from some international institutions, most countries have chosen to stick with the existing order, whether by staying in institutions such as UNESCO

23、 and the Universal Postal Union or by observing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Paris Agreement on climate change. Even rising powers such as China and India, which feel that the world order has not given their voices and interests adequate attention and respect, call for reform rathe

24、r than replacement. For example, India wishes to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council and China hopes that its voting shares in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund will increase to reflect its growing economic clout.Furthermore, although tensions between China and the United S

25、tates are increasing, they will likely remain limited. Both are nuclear weapons states, both have stakes in the existing order despite unhappiness with aspects of it, and both are more or less interested in maintaining their shared economic relationship. Under these circumstances, neither fighting a

26、 war nor decoupling their economies is a realistic option. The relationship could become more competitive, but China and the United States have thus far continued to observe the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea in the South China Sea and to negotiate trade agreements, indicating that they know t

27、hey should find a way to coexist. They are still cooperating on many issues, including pressuring North Korea to give up nuclear weapons, fighting international crimes, ensuring international aviation safety, and dealing with pandemic diseases such as COVID-19. Moreover, most other countries have a

28、vested interest in a stable and constructive relationship between China and the United States and refuse to take sides.Finally, given the United States, stake in the existing world order and that it can protect its interests only by maintaining that order, Washington will possibly have second though

29、ts about its current policies. After all, the Trump administration policies thus far are an exception rather than the rule in post-World War II U.S. activities. A future administration could see things differently and adopt a watered-down version of traditional U.S. foreign policy.The world order is

30、 evolving, but most established institutions and norms will likely remain. The United States will stay a leading power but could be less dominant. The West will continue to play a pivotal role but the world order will likely be less West-centric. When power is more diffuse, the world could be less e

31、fficient in addressing global challenges; at the same time, it could also adopt an approach that is more equal and consultative. The rising powers will likely have more power but also more responsibilities. Despite concerns about the decline of world order, countries can choose to transform it for t

32、he better.To turn hope into reality, the major powers, especially China and the United States, should take up their respective responsibilities. They should resist the temptation to blame each other for the problems of existing institutions. Instead, they should carefully assess these institutions a

33、nd identify areas that need improvement. They should consult with each other on that basis and jointly find a way to reform the extant international order in a way that accommodates their respective interests without undermining the interests of others. As the COVID-19 pandemic shows, the world is i

34、nterconnected and mutually dependent. The only way to effectively deal with global issues is to embrace collaboration and cooperation. For a better future, cooperation is not a choice; it is a necessity.THE EUROPEAN UNIONNathalie TocciThe liberal international order, within which the European projec

35、t was established and is embedded, is fraying. This trend has been building up for more than a decade now. As Paul B. Stares argues, the world may have been living through a transitional period akin to those of 191320, 1938-47, and 1988-94. The novel coronavirus has exacerbated, accelerated, and inc

36、reased everything from protectionism and great power rivalry to nationalism and ideological competition. As a result, the pandemic may represent the tipping point from the international liberal order to disorder. This reality should encourage Europeans to realize that rules-based multilateralism is

37、not simply nice to have but essential, especially if they are to maintain their way of life in the years to come. No longer simply driven by the ideal of peace on the continent and the benefits of the single market, today the rationale for the European project is global. Nationalism-driven by nostal

38、gia, the closure of borders, and racism一is being undermined by the creeping realization that size and clout matter more than ever. Only together can Europeans negotiate with China, stand up to Russia, rebuild bridges across the Atlantic, address global pandemics, govern migration, combat climate cha

39、nge, and embrace artificial intelligence and biotechnology while ensuring digital safety. Europeans have precious few alternatives to sticking together ifthey want a fair chance of thriving in the twenty-first century.1 For precisely this reason, Europeans will perish in a world in which the strong

40、(and big) do what they can while the weak (and small) suffer what they cannot avoid. Just as Europeans are bound to one another internally through the European Union (EU), the most radical form of multilateralism worldwide, they also have a stake in the broader world, in which multilateralism is a d

41、efining feature. This bestows on the EU a new and global raison detre, one that poses a unique danger ifthe EU fails to rise to the challenge but that also holds great promise to reenergize the European project.THE END OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDERTodays historical juncture offers few certainti

42、es. However, the postWorld War II liberal international order has certainly ended. The so-called liberal international order rose from the ashes of two world wars. With it came the emergence and consolidation of the United Nations, the proliferation of international organizations, the slow but stead

43、y affirmation of international law, and the mushrooming of regional cooperation and integration initiatives, of which the European Union has been the most successful example. It first crystallized in the West during the Cold War and was extended after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of

44、 the Soviet Union. It was an order some reviled and others embraced.Some mourn, others applaud, and others are not yet willing to accept the end of the liberal international order.2 However, few if any would dispute that the distribution of power within the international system is changing dramatica

45、lly. The distribution of power is complicated.3 Its complexity is derived from concomitant trends: a traditional shift of power away from a global hegemonthe United States toward multiple power centers and a diffusion of power, driven first by globalization and now by the fourth industrial revolutio

46、n.4 Power is not shifting simply from the West to the East but also beyond state boundaries, flowing across air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.The institutions, rules, and regimes built on the previous configuration of power-the liberal international order-will inevitably changeto reflect this pr

47、ofound shake-up of the international system. This does not mean that all of its features, including its rules, regimes, and institutions, will disappear. Some will change, others will wane, and others will acquire renewed salience. In other words, the international order or disorder that follows wil

48、l be non-liberal; shaped by liberal democracies and illiberal or authoritarian states, it will likely feature structured global cooperation on some issues like climate change, and transactional or ad hoc approaches to other issues like digital governance.THE RISK OF GREAT POWER CONFLICTProponents of

49、 realism are quick to point out that, in a sinister repetition of history, the world, and in particular the United States and China, are sleepwalking into a Thucydidess trapthe theory that all rising powers inevitably clash with the predominant powers.5 Although falling into the trap has never been

50、preordained, the structural underpinnings of the power shift, coupled with misperception and miscommunication, have created potent drivers for conflict. This is not to say that history will repeat itself. However, the competition between the United States and China has morphed from commercial to tec

51、hnological rivalry and, during the COVID-19 crisis, has acquired ideological undertones. This competition could, in turn, result in a twenty-first- century military confrontation.Liberal observers would be hard pressed to reach a fundamentally different conclusion as international institutions, rule

52、s, and regimes have been hollowed out and marginalized, or have collapsed outright. These weak or effectively moribund international institutions are no longer capable of creating a controlled setting for the peaceful management of conflict. Russias violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces

53、 Treaty, which the United States met by withdrawing from the agreement, underscores both the fragility of institutional arrangements and how their unraveling heightens the risk of devastatingly violent conflict. Given that the United States is no longer willing and able to sustain an international o

54、rder larger than itself and no other global actor is in a position to fully step into the void, the multilateral rules-based order is at risk. Multipolarity could eventually lead to strengthened multilateralism. But, in the slow and convulsed process of transition from a unipolar to a multi-, inter-

55、, or nonpolar system, multilateralism is taking a hard hit, and, with it, the potential for the peaceful management of international relations has been reduced dramatically.Constructivists, arguing that history is shaped not merely by objective, material forces, but by inter-subjectively defined ide

56、ntities and interests, are pessimistic as well. Because identities are constructed in mutually exclusive ways, the potential for violent conflict escalates. Whether one pits the West against Islam, liberal democracies against authoritarianism, cosmopolitans against nativists, or elites against the p

57、eople, twenty-first-century constructs of identity have set the scene for violent conflict.Some features of a twenty-first-century global confrontation can be discerned. From the Middle East to eastern Europe and from the Balkans to the Korean Peninsula, great power rivalry interlocks with and exace

58、rbates regional power struggles, state fragility, and violent conflict. Other features, though arguably far more consequential一notably the links between economic and technological rivalry and the risk of military confrontation; the trade-offs between public health, political rights, and economic dev

59、elopment; or the nexus between climate change and mass displacement-will be more difficult to predict.ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES:MULTILATERALISM AND THE EUS ROLEIn this changing international environment, the EU has been imbued with a new sense of responsibility to sustain a rules-based multilaterali

60、sm. Doing so requires both hard work and imagination. Part of the approach covers well-trodden ground. The EU should invest more in the UN system, both politically and financially, and spur reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO), notably its dispute settlement system, and of other internationa