單邊貿(mào)易自由化的不受歡迎的趨勢(shì)

1、21-6 The Unappreciated Trend Toward Unilateral Trade LiberalizationINTRODUCTIONA frequently voiced complaint from the trade specialists in the Trump administration was that US firms have faced a competitive disadvantage in exports because the US market is open and US tariffs are low but US trading p

2、artners protect their markets with high tariffs. One example cited often was that the United States applies a 2.5 percent tariff on automobile imports, whereas Canada charges 10 percent, China 15 percent, and India 125 percent.1 The Trump administration used this concern to justify raising US tariff

3、s whenever it could.2This Policy Brief argues that these claims need to be more nuanced and should take account of the extensive unilateral liberalization that many countries have undertaken over the past 30 years and that the grievances that motivated the Trump trade policies are increasingly mispl

4、aced. The norm of loweringtariffs has spread not because of externally imposed constraints but because the opportunities of participating in global value chains have convinced many countries that trade liberalization is beneficial.Many developing countries have reduced their tariffs unilaterally to

5、rates that are far lower than they applied three decades ago and far less than thebound rates reflected in their World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations. Their attachment to their applied rates could be seen when on average global tariffs were not raised during the global financial crisis in 2008

6、and continued to decline through at least 2018. Even when shocks from imports resulted in serious injury to domestic industries, several developing countries temporarily provided safeguard protection but at levels that were lower than their WTO bound rates.See “ HYPERLINK /gazette/story/2019/04/at-h

7、arvard-peter-navarro-defends-trump-on-trade/ A ringing defense of Trump on trade,” Harvard Gazette, April 26, 2019.Actually, the Trump administration tended to cherry-pick their examples. For instance, President Trump HYPERLINK /blog/comparing-countries-tariff-levels pointed to Canadas 250 percent t

8、ariff on dairy products but not the US tariff of 187 percent on sour cream.1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW | Washington, DC 20036-1903 USA | +1.202.328.9000 | HYPERLINK / This evidence of import liberalization also suggests that rising protectionism was not responsible for the slow growth in world tra

9、de that has been evident since 2011. It remains uncertain whether countries will now respond to disruptions to global supply chains since 2018 caused by Trumps trade policies and the COVID-19 pandemic by reversing these policies, but the sustained enthusiasm for new megaregional trade agreements sug

10、gests many countries will not.Why Trumps Trade Policies Were MisplacedFor over eight decades, in the aftermath of its disastrous Smoot-Hawley tariffs, the United States tried to persuade other countries to lower their tariff barriers on a reciprocal basis.3 But since average US tariffs are still bel

11、ow those in most other countries, many Americans believe these efforts have not been successful. They complain that the playing field of international competition is not level and that Uncle Sam has become Uncle Sucker (Fletcher 2020). The Trump administration not only complained about the much high

12、er tariffs in many developing countries but also singled out the tariffs of the European Union as egregiously violating reciprocity with the United States.The statements and trade policies of the Trump administration reflected a profound sense of grievance over these disparities. As observed by Pete

13、rNavarro (2019), former White House advisor on trade, “Whether youre a pure free trader or a fair, reciprocal and balanced trader like the president, if you live in a relatively low-tariff country like the U.S. you should oppose an international trading system that helps institutionalize nonreciproc

14、al tariffs.”4Trumps trade policies were designed to redress this situation. Regardless of whether they were compatible with the rules agreed to by his predecessors or the norms they had adhered to, Trump used every pretext available to raise US tariffs.5 He broke the unwritten WTO understanding agai

15、nst using national security exceptions by raising US tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum on even his closest allies. He used his (legal) discretion to invoke the safeguard rules to raise tariffs on imports of washing machines and solar panels. He used the unfair treatment of US firms and the fa

16、ilure to protect intellectual property in China as reasons to raise tariffs unilaterally on US imports from China, and he even threatened tariffs on Turkey when it arrested a US priest and on Mexico when it failed to prevent immigrants crossing their country from entering theUnited States. Although

17、it was never implemented, Trump also initiated a nationalThis approach was embodied in the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, which transferred the power to set tariffs from Congress and instead authorized the president to negotiate tariff reductions on a reciprocal basis.Ironically, given comp

18、laints that the WTO has been insufficiently constraining with respect o national trade policies, Dani Rodrik (2017) has raised the opposite concern: that, since the 1990s, the WTO has been excessively limiting the policy space available to its members.Robert Lighthizer, the US Trade Representative,

19、has HYPERLINK /ielpblog/2017/09/lighthizer-on-trade.html claimed that “the years of talking about these problems has not worked, andwe must use all instruments we have to make it expensive to engage in non-economic behavior, and to convince our trading partners to treat our workers, farmers, and ran

20、chers fairly. We must demand reciprocity in home and in international markets.”security investigation on automobiles, motivated by the desire to impose higher tariffs on automobiles produced by the United Statess European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).6It is true that US ex

21、ports face many trade barriers and on average US barriers are still lower than those of most of its trading partners. It is also true thattariffs are only the most visible of the constraints on trade; the many behind- the-border policies that impact trade and investment have become the central focus

22、 of trade negotiations. Nonetheless, unilateral changes in applied tariffs remain the best indicator of the direction in which countries believe their trade policies should move.This Policy Brief demonstrates the growing revealed preference for freer trade evidenced by tariffs applied over the past

23、three decades. While not yet at US levels, there is clear convergence toward those levels. Raising US tariffs in the name of compelling other countries to reduce theirs (or achieving reciprocity) would be counterproductive because tariffs in the rest of the world have already been moving strongly in

24、 the direction sought by the United States. Indeed, itis noteworthy that while China has been raising its tariffs against US producers in response to US bullying, it has been lowering its tariffs on imports from other countries.7Changing minds is the most potent weapon for changing behavior. And the

25、 reason for more open markets has not been the persuasion of US power but the power of persuasion. Ultimately, effective and sustainable trade liberalizationis achieved not when other countries are bludgeoned with tariffs but when they decide for themselves that they benefit from freer trade. Broadl

26、y, certainly until recently, trade liberalization in the form of lower tariffs has become more widely accepted as an important aspect of economic reform. As international transportation and communication costs have declined, both domestic and foreign firms have found that access to imported componen

27、ts and assembly can be the key to improving competitive performance. And as countries have turned away from import substitution policies toward export promotion, they have discovered that they become more competitive when they can join global supply chains by reducing imported input costs (Amiti et

28、al. 2020). Given thepreferences of global supply chain operators, more intense competition to attract foreign investors has promoted liberalization.Former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy (2013) observed that, globally, the import content of exports has steadily increased and that “enacting protecti

29、onist measures in the modern world to protect jobssuch as raising import barrierscan have an inverse reaction in economies that are increasingly reliant on imports to complete their exports.” He added, “In effect, we are seeing the end of the centuries-old doctrine of mercantilism, which proclaimed

30、that a countrys economic strength depended on it being able to export more than it imported.”For a more detailed description of the policies, see Bown and Kolb (2021).China began the trade war with the United States with average tariffs of 8.0 percent. But as shown by Bown, Jung, and Zhang (2019), i

31、n 2018 China reduced its import tariffs on other countries to 6.7 percent while raising them to 20.7 percent on US goods.PERVASIVE LIBERALIZATION TRENDSThe evidence of international trends in support of trade liberalization is sustained and substantial. The following sections present illustrative da

32、ta in average trade- weighted global tariffs, lower applied than bound tariff rates, use of safeguards, and the lack of raised tariffs during the 2008 financial crisis.Average Trade-Weighted Global Tariffs Are DecliningThe growing commitment to reducing trade barriers in Americas trading partners ca

33、n be seen in table 1, which shows the World Banks data on trade- weighted average most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs applied by major countries and regions since 1990.8 Although these are imperfect measures because tariff structures are complex and high tariffs may impact the volume of trade used as

34、weights, trade-weighted measures are useful to illustrate trends. And what they reveal is remarkable.As late as 2000, the Trump view had some merit. Average trade-weighted global tariffs were 2.5 times higher than those in the United States, and in large emerging markets such as Brazil, China, and I

35、ndia they were five or more times greater than those of the United States. And these ratios had been even higher in 1990. Some of the declines, especially in the 1990s, reflected the impact of the WTO negotiations; and some of the declines in the Chinese rates reflected the impact of its WTO accessi

36、on agreement in 2001. But most of the declines reflected unilateral liberalization.By 2018, applied tariffs were still higher in developing than developed countries but, clearly, despite the failure of market access negotiations in the WTOs Doha Round, the trend toward tariff convergence was strong.

37、 Moreover, these data understate the liberalization that occurred in the trading system as a whole because they do not take account of reductions achieved through the many free trade agreements negotiated since 2000.9Some tariff rates in the European Union are higher than those in the United States

38、for the same products; in particular, the Trump administration complained about the difference between the 2.5 percent US tariff on auto imports andthe 10.0 percent EU tariff. However, as is shown in table 1, since 2000 the EU- US differences in average trade-weighted tariffs have been small, with U

39、S rates lower than EU rates by just 0.2 percentage points in 2000 and 0.1 percentage points in 2018.I have used trade-weighted average tariffs to measure protection, but simple averages fail to take account of the value of trade in each tariff heading, and if high tariffs discourage imports, import-

40、weighted measures may be biased to understate protection. In addition, the responsiveness of trade volumes (trade elasticities) to tariffs may differ by industry. For anexample of a more sophisticated “trade restrictiveness index” that combines tariff rates, trade volumes, and elasticities, see Kee,

41、 Neagu, and Nicita (2013). For a broader discussion of tariff measures see Tariff Aggregation Methods: What Are the Implications? HYPERLINK /english/res_e/statis_e/wtp2006_special_topic_e.pdf WTO Tariff Profiles 2006 (accessed on February 28, 2021).See the HYPERLINK /?lang=1 WTO Database on Preferen

42、tial Trade Arrangements.Table 1Trade-weighted average applied most-favored-nation tariffs (all products), percentChange(percentage points)Country/region1990a200020172018199020002000201719902017United States3.92.11.71.61.80.42.3European Union4.82.31.81.72.50.53.0Europe & Central Asia (excluding high-

43、income)11.93.93.1n.a.8.00.78.7Latin America & Caribbean19.013.03.5n.a.6.09.415.4East Asia & Pacific (excluding high-income)14.910.33.4n.a.4.76.811.5Middle East & North Africa25.914.34.9n.a.11.59.521.0Sub-Saharan Africa14.19.75.7n.a.4.44.18.4Brazil19.012.78.68.06.34.110.4China32.214.73.83.417.510.828

44、.3India56.423.45.84.933.017.650.6World6.85.02.6n.a.1.92.44.2n.a. = not availablea. 1991 data for Europe and Central Asia and 1992 data for China.Source: HYPERLINK /indicator/TM.TAX.MRCH.WM.AR.ZS World Bank staff estimates using the World Integrated Trade Solution system, based on data from United Na

45、tions Conference on Trade and Developments Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database and the World Trade Organizations (WTO) Integrated Data Base (IDB) and Consolidated Tariff Schedules (CTS) database.Applied Rates Are Much Lower than Bound RatesIn the WTO, many developing countries ha

46、ve agreed not to exceed maximum or so-called bound tariff rates that are often very high. But these rates give a false impression of the rates that they believe serve their interestsi.e., those that they apply at the border. As shown in table 2, according to WTO data on simple averages (rather than

47、trade-weighted averages), applied rates are far lower than bound rates, suggesting that the resistant WTO negotiation stances of developing countries over bound rates are more about exercising political pushback than avoiding reductions that really matter.10The negotiations over agricultural tariffs

48、 in the Doha Round were highly contentious. Yet David Laborde (2014) calculated average applied tariff rates for agricultural import protection by both high and low middle-income countries in 2012 and found that applied rates on imports (including those in preferential regimes) averaged 13.3 percent

49、 in low middle-income countriesless than the15.5 percent average rate for agriculture applied by high-income countries! By contrast, the bound rates in the poor countries were 20 percentage points higher than in the high-income countries.Table 2Simple average bound and applied most-favored-nation (M

50、FN) tariff rates, selected developed and developing economies, 2019, percentEconomyBound rateApplied MFN rateAustralia9.72.4Brazil31.413.4Chile25.26.0China10.07.5Costa Rica43.15.6Egypt36.619.0European Union5.15.1India50.817.6Indonesia37.18.1Israel23.13.6Japan4.74.3Korea16.513.6Malaysia21.05.6Mexico3

51、6.27.1New Zealand9.72.0Nigeria120.912.1Norway20.26.0Peru29.52.4Philippines25.76.1Singapore9.50South Africa19.27.7Switzerland8.06.0Tanzania120.013.1Turkey28.910.0United States3.43.3Average29.87.5Source: HYPERLINK /english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles20_e.pdf World Trade Organization, World Tariff P

52、rofiles 2020.Safeguards Are Used Even When Applied Rates Are Much Lower Than Bound RatesThe WTO rules for safeguards allow countries to implement temporary protection and raise their tariffs even higher than their bound rates if import causes significant injury. But even when free to raise tariffs f

53、or any reason becausetheir applied rates are much lower than their bound rates, many developing countries still use formal safeguard disciplines when their firms seek higher tariffs on the grounds of injury from imports. As the agreement on safeguards formally requires, industries must demonstrate s

54、erious injury from imports due to unforeseen circumstances in order to qualify. And governments respond to these findings of injury with tariffs that are required to be reduced over time.Homa Taheri (2020) has undertaken painstaking research assembling data on safeguard actions that shows that count

55、ries such as India, Indonesia, and Turkey have provided safeguard protection. Given that in most cases their appliedrates were far lower than their bound rates, one might have expected that the response to findings of injury would have resulted in these countries raising their levels of protection t

56、o their bound rates; indeed, maintaining the leeway to do this is often given as the reason why countries maintain their bound rates at high levels in the first place. But as shown in the appendix for India and Indonesia, which unlike Turkey are not part of an EU customs union, they have not. This s

57、uggests that these countries generally set their applied tariff schedules at rates they determine as being in their interest and then provide additional protection only to industries that can meet the demanding requirements of safeguard provisions. This revealed preference for disciplining their tar

58、iff-granting process underscores their commitments to their applied tariff schedules.11Tariffs Were Not Raised Globally During the Financial CrisisDuring the 2008 financial crisis, the volume of world trade initially plummeted by more than it had during the Great Depression in the 1930s (Eichengreen

59、 and ORourke 2010). Since many developing countries could legally raise theirapplied tariffs without violating their WTO commitments, there were widespread fears that the protectionist responses that had occurred during the Great Depression were likely to be repeated. Yet the system displayed remark

60、able resilience. Undoubtedly the disastrous experience of the 1930s served as an important consideration motivating the G20 countries to issue statements pledging their opposition to protectionism.12 But their actions spoke even louder than their words.When it comes to safeguards, high bound rates s