社會工作畢業(yè)論文之外文翻譯

1、本科生畢業(yè)設(shè)計 (論文)外 文 翻 譯原 文 標(biāo) 題Pension Puzzle譯 文 標(biāo) 題養(yǎng)老金問題作者所在系別文法系作者所在專業(yè)社會工作作者所在班級作 者 姓 名作 者 學(xué) 號指導(dǎo)教師姓名指導(dǎo)教師職稱完 成 時 間2013年12月北華航天工業(yè)學(xué)院教務(wù)處制譯文標(biāo)題養(yǎng)老金問題原文標(biāo)題Pension Puzzle作 者Craig Harris譯 名 克雷格·哈里斯國 籍加拿大原文出處2012年11月加拿大保險公司 在20008年經(jīng)濟危機后，贊助養(yǎng)老金計劃的私人公司或組織成了主要受害者之一。而房地產(chǎn)市場和金融服務(wù)行業(yè)受到了多方的關(guān)注，與此同時，養(yǎng)老金也受到了大幅的沖擊。2008年，在3

2、6個國家的私人養(yǎng)老金計劃中，包括經(jīng)濟合作與發(fā)展組織總損失了23%的真實價值或者一個驚人的5.4萬億美元。即使在今天，養(yǎng)老金計劃都在努力籌資水平。去年八月份公布的一份報告中顯示，評級機構(gòu)DBRS審查了養(yǎng)老金計劃以前定義的451條好處，并顯示了在2011年年底，聯(lián)合資金赤字為3890億美元?；仡欉^去一年，有超過三分之二的計劃由于一個顯著的保證金而弄得資金不足。DBRS在該報告中指出，“為了讓公司能夠解決這一資金差距，雇主將保持高之供款，現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)有許多計劃進入了資金狀況的危險區(qū)域”。這種“危險地帶”有一些影響。其中一個重要方面就是那些有可能參與既是“雇主”，又是與退休金計劃有關(guān)的“管理員”的董事和高

3、級職員的責(zé)任。在普通法的訴訟演變中，只是進一步暴露了高級管理人員和董事會潛在的養(yǎng)老責(zé)任。理查德·約翰斯頓，一個加拿大銘德律師事務(wù)所多倫多辦事處的合伙人說，“我認(rèn)為養(yǎng)老金暴露并不是董事或官員一致贊賞關(guān)于養(yǎng)老基金的決定”。約翰斯頓說，“有一系列復(fù)雜的關(guān)于公司怎樣解決這一問題的依據(jù)”。一些人認(rèn)為這些問題使董事的迅速出現(xiàn)在雷達屏幕上和高級職員因為高度的激進主義計劃而獲得利益。風(fēng)險管理者和律師越來越意識到養(yǎng)老金負(fù)債的風(fēng)險，他們建議伊恩·金，托馬斯黃金Pettingill 律師事務(wù)所的創(chuàng)始合伙人?！坝捎谧罱慕?jīng)濟結(jié)果低迷以及面臨的金融問題退休金計劃：受益人是越來越審議政府的計劃，所以養(yǎng)

4、老金治理贏了的更多的關(guān)注?！狈闪x務(wù)有一些責(zé)任，就是董事和高級職員在面對有關(guān)私人養(yǎng)老金的計劃時，應(yīng)該要闡明是通過法規(guī)還是普通法。許多省和聯(lián)邦養(yǎng)老保險法讓董事們?yōu)樗麄児痉赶碌淖镄谐袚?dān)責(zé)任，比如，罪行可能包括沒有提交所需供款的養(yǎng)老基金，或者是對信任的員工代表舉行捐款。董事可以被追究的個人責(zé)任有巨額罰款，以及計劃要求償還的金額。金指出，在安大略省，一個計劃管理者在初次違反使用養(yǎng)老金法規(guī)時，可以被罰十萬美元。普通法也看到了最近的事態(tài)發(fā)展?！霸谧詈笏哪昀?，董事和高級職員們驚奇地發(fā)現(xiàn)潛在的個人法律責(zé)任，他們可能會因為習(xí)慣法而招致，”注意瑪麗·皮卡德，是多倫多費雷澤米爾卡斯格蘭律師事務(wù)所的合伙人

5、?！斑@是一個正在進行，不斷發(fā)展的領(lǐng)域，特別是對于那些處于“破產(chǎn)地帶”的公司。如果他們有一個明確的退休計劃，那么，當(dāng)它涉及到董事和高級職員時，我們會發(fā)現(xiàn)這是一個重要的問題之一。在這一領(lǐng)域的主要案件涉及到了斯萊特剛的破產(chǎn)。在2008年，安大略省上訴法院決定，本質(zhì)上允許對公司董事及與公司的固定福利養(yǎng)老金計劃短缺有關(guān)的高級職員進行索賠起訴。這樣，Morneau Sobeco有限公司的合作伙伴美國怡安保險咨詢公司也涉及到了關(guān)于精算假設(shè)用于養(yǎng)老金計劃的管理上的爭端?！霸诎泊舐允∩显V斯萊特剛的這一決定暴露了10名董事、高級職員和雇員可能沒有因為個人債務(wù)為2000萬美元而對資不抵債的斯萊特剛或其大部分資產(chǎn)進行

6、有意義的追索，”約翰斯特在對此案進行解說筆記?！斑@是一個對于不承認(rèn)和履行受托義務(wù)退休金計劃可以向主要義務(wù)人（董事和高級職員們）公開的提醒”。管理者和/或雇傭者在這種情況下，其中一個關(guān)鍵問題是作為斯萊特剛養(yǎng)老金計劃的“管理員”而不是“雇主”的董事和高級職員的受信問題。約翰斯頓指出，安大略省和加拿大其他省份在退休金計劃的指定管理員方面實行受托人職責(zé)。但是對于大多數(shù)的計劃，指定管理者也是雇傭者。這種所謂“兩頂帽子”的方法通過了法院的區(qū)別，那就是雇主在確定退休金福利的職責(zé)并改變那些好處可以免費受托。然而，當(dāng)雇傭者（董事及高級職員）充當(dāng)計劃管理人時，它就接受了受托義務(wù)。例如斯萊特剛可以模糊雇主與管理者之

7、間的界線，制造其潛在的利益沖突和責(zé)任?！捌渲幸粋€斯萊特剛帶來的問題就是當(dāng)涉及到管理養(yǎng)老金計劃時，董事及高級職員們就會產(chǎn)生內(nèi)部矛盾，”皮卡德說。“他們對利益相關(guān)者有責(zé)任，也對退休金計劃的成員有責(zé)任。在日常水平上，那么沖突可能會非常的困難，”她補充道。一些發(fā)起人建議，對與退休金負(fù)債不斷曝光這一潛在問題，應(yīng)由全面的風(fēng)險管理計劃來處理。金說，風(fēng)險管理是關(guān)于教育及聲音程序的執(zhí)行。他建議，“董事及參與養(yǎng)老金計劃管理的人員應(yīng)該通過加拿大年錦監(jiān)理協(xié)會管理局的管治指引及在關(guān)于他們法律責(zé)任的相關(guān)法律上的自我教育來熟悉自己”。亞歷山德拉北，費雷澤米爾卡斯格蘭律師事務(wù)所的合伙人說，“對于養(yǎng)老金，董事及高級管理人員在正

8、式文件里應(yīng)要堅持一個明確的管理方針來概述”?！岸乱鄳?yīng)檢討任何精算評估，審計報告和養(yǎng)老金委員會會議的會議記錄”。保險的作用保險，在董事會和高級職員（D&O）責(zé)任與受托責(zé)任的形式里，在解決養(yǎng)老金負(fù)債難題上也能起到一定的作用。D&O政策在保險提供者給予的承保范圍、條件及不包括的項目的條款之間有著顯著的變化。例如，常見的排斥，即在D&O涉及到賠償下，根據(jù)規(guī)約或普通法對利用養(yǎng)老金信托而造成的與養(yǎng)老金負(fù)債相關(guān)的法律責(zé)任的董事或職員進行起訴。金說，“一般情況下，D&O政策排除了退休金負(fù)債，因此，受托責(zé)任政策是一個更適合的選項?！薄叭欢?，所有政策將包含那些將影響保險項目的除外

9、責(zé)任。例如，不太可能故意處理不當(dāng)或者罰款會被覆蓋在保險政策之下”。受托責(zé)任保險為組織提供具體保護及為養(yǎng)老金和福利計劃的治理、管理和實施提供個人負(fù)責(zé)。關(guān)鍵是要獲得正確的咨詢，即關(guān)于組織所規(guī)定的覆蓋范圍性質(zhì)“有可能被附加到受托義務(wù)的D&O保單上或者有可能需要去購買獨立的受托責(zé)任保險。無論是哪種方式，當(dāng)著眼于保險范圍是，受托人需要將其至于首位或中心位置上?！奔s翰斯頓說，“對于組織所規(guī)定的保險范圍的性質(zhì)，我們有必要去得到適當(dāng)?shù)囊庖姟！薄坝锌赡鼙桓郊臃秶紻&O受托義務(wù)政策或者有可能需要去購買獨立的受托責(zé)任保險。無論是哪種方式，當(dāng)看到保險范圍時，受托人都應(yīng)將其置于首位和中心位置來對待?！?/p>

10、皮卡德報道，在最近幾個月，對于受托責(zé)任保險的要求，她看到了一個上升的趨勢。她評論，“那似乎沒有任何明確的答案或者關(guān)于覆蓋面存在或所需保護的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)做法”?！斑@是隨著經(jīng)濟人的。一個客戶問我他們應(yīng)該能從金融保險上得到多少錢。我說，對于整個養(yǎng)老金計劃的金額來說，這是一個潛在的風(fēng)險”。受教育約翰孫說，當(dāng)談到退休金負(fù)債時，他認(rèn)為對于保險范圍以及來自保險公司和其經(jīng)紀(jì)人方面的風(fēng)險和條款，人們有必要接受更多的教育。他說，“我覺得應(yīng)該有更多關(guān)于承保范圍下的那些政策的信息?！薄澳切I銷保險的人應(yīng)該明白董事及高級職員在養(yǎng)老金計劃下是存在風(fēng)險的以及他們是如何被牽扯或不被牽扯進來的”。這些需求在未來幾年可能會變得更加迫切，

11、因為養(yǎng)老金計劃發(fā)展與資金不足的問題仍存在著矛盾。約翰斯頓說，養(yǎng)老金訴訟的焦點傳統(tǒng)上一直是固定收益養(yǎng)老金，但定額供款計劃在其中增加了較為受歡迎計劃管理員并且為受益人提供了更多的投資選擇，這樣就可以創(chuàng)建更為顯著的風(fēng)險展望未來。約翰斯頓說，“當(dāng)你看到的這些計劃時，它已是很多年以后，人們看到的關(guān)于他們自己的投資了，到那時候，那些人要么接近或者已退休了?！薄八麄兛赡軙|(zhì)疑自己選擇投資的項目，特別是那些默認(rèn)即已提供的投資項目沒有選項被受益人給采取。與過去相關(guān)的投資決定已做出并且該決定將會暴露在公眾眼下。到了那時，你就會希望有一個成文的政策和適當(dāng)?shù)某绦蛄??！绷硪恍┤藙t認(rèn)為，在今后的實踐當(dāng)中，養(yǎng)老金負(fù)債和正在

12、進行的訴訟可能會起到一定的作用，即提高人們的認(rèn)識和形成一個更好的管理方式。皮卡德說，“我覺得我們會因為這種混論和不確定性而將會看到一個更好的養(yǎng)老金治理計劃?！彼a充道，“最終。養(yǎng)老金計劃的成員將會得到更好的服務(wù)”。金說，“但愿，在加拿大崛起的養(yǎng)老金訴訟會激勵董事們密切關(guān)注計劃受益人自己的法律義務(wù)?！薄案玫酿B(yǎng)老金治理將意味著對于管理員來說責(zé)任更少了，而對于計劃受益人來說卻有一個好的結(jié)果”。 One of the prime casualties in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis was the sponsored pension plan

13、 of a private company or organization. While the housing market and financial services industry received much of the attention during that period, pensions also took a sharp hit.In 2008, private pension plans in the 36 countries that comprise the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developmen

14、t lost 23% of their real value on aggregate, or a staggering $5.4 trillion Even today, pension plans are struggling with funding levels. In a report released last August, ratings agency DBRS reviewed 451 defined benefits pension plans in North America and showed a combined funding deficit of $389 bi

15、llion at the end of 2011. More than two-thirds of plans reviewed in the past year were underfunded by a significant margin. "In order for companies to address this funding gap, employers will have to maintain high levels of contributions, as many plans have now entered the danger zone of funded

16、 status," DBRS noted in the report. This "danger zone" has several ramifications. One key facet is the liability of directors and officers, who may be involved as both "employers" and "administrators" related to the pension plan. Evolving litigation in common law h

17、as only served to further expose senior managers and Boards of Directors to potential pension liability. "I don't think the pension exposure is uniformly appreciated by directors or officers making decisions about pension funds," says Richard Johnston, a partner in Fasken Martineau LLP

18、's Toronto office. "There is a range of sophistication in terms of how this issue is addressed by companies," Johnston says. Some argue that these concerns are rapidly emerging onto the radar screen for directors and officers because of the heightened activism of plan beneficiaries. Ri

19、sk managers and lawyers are becoming increasingly aware of the risk of pension liability," suggests Ian Gold, founding partner of Thomas Gold Pettingill LLP "Pension governance is more of a concern as a result of the recent economic downturn and the financial troubles facing pension plans:

20、 beneficiaries are increasingly scrutinizing the administration of the plan."OBLIGATED BY LAW There are several obligations that directors and officers face regarding private pension plans, spelled out by statute or common law. Many provincial and federal pension laws make directors liable for

21、offences their corporations commit. For example, offences may include failure to submit required contributions to the pension fund or to hold contributions in trust on the employees' behalf Directors can be held personally liable for substantial fines, as well as amounts required to reimburse th

22、e plan. As Gold points out, in Ontario a plan administrator can be fined $100,000 for a first offence in breaching an applicable pension statute. The common law has also seen several recent developments. "In the last four years, directors and officers have been surprised to see potential person

23、al liability they might incur due to common law," notes Mary Picard, a partner with Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP in Toronto. "This is an ongoing, evolving area of litigation, particularly for companies that are in the 'zone of insolvency' If they have a defined pension plan, that is

24、one of the top questions we see when it comes to directors and officers." A leading case in this area involves the insolvency of Slater Steel. In a 2008 decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario essentially allowed a claim to proceed against corporate directors and officers related to a shortfa

25、ll in the company's defined benefits pension plan. The case, Morneau Sobeco Ltd. Partnership v.Aon Consulting Inc., also involved disputes regarding actuarial assumptions used in the administration of the pension plan "The decision in the Ontario Court of Appeal in Slater Steel exposed 10 d

26、irectors, officers and employees to possible personal liability of $20 million with no meaningful recourse against the insolvent Slater Steel or its assets," Johnston notes in a commentary on the case. "This is a reminder that failure to recognize and fulfill fiduciary obligations for a pe

27、nsion plan can expose (directors and officers) to substantial personal liability."ADMINISTRATOR AND/OR EMPLOYER One of the critical issues in this case was the fiduciary obligation of the directors and officers as "administrators" of Slater Steel's pension plan, as opposed to &quo

28、t;employers." As Johnston notes, Ontario and other Canadian provinces impose fiduciary duties on the designated administrator of a pension plan. But for most plans, the designated administrator is also the employer. This so-called "two hats" approach adopted by the courts distinguishe

29、s that an employer may be free of fiduciary duties in determining pension benefits and changing those benefits. However when the employer (directors and officers) acts as a plan administrator, it accepts fiduciary obligations. Cases such as Slater Steel can blur the lines between employer and admini

30、strator, creating potential conflicts of interest and liability. "One of the issues that Slater brought out is that directors and officers have an inherent conflict when it comes to administering a pension plan," Picard says. "They owe a duty to the stakeholders of the corporation and

31、 also a duty to members of the pension plan. On a day-to-day level, that conflict can be very difficult," she adds.The potential for increased exposure to pension liability should be met with a comprehensive risk management program, several sources recommend. "Risk management is about educ

32、ation and the implementation of sound procedures," Gold says. "Directors and officers who are involved in the administration of a pension plan should be familiarizing themselves with the Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authority's governance guidelines and educating themsel

33、ves on the relevant law with respect to their legal duties," he advises. "With respect to pensions, directors and officers should insist on a clear governance policy outlined in a formal document," says Alexandra North, an associate with Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP. "Directors sho

34、uld also review any actuarial evaluations, audit reports and minutes of pension committee meetings."ROLE OF INSURANCEInsurance, in the form of directors and officers (D&O) liability and fiduciary liability, can also play a role in addressing the pension liability puzzle. D&O policies ca

35、n vary significantly among insurance providers in terms of coverage, terms and exclusions. For example, a common exclusion under D&O involves claims against a director or officer in relation to pension liability caused by a breach of duties imposed on a pension fiduciary under statute or common

36、law."In general, D&O policies exclude pension habifity and, therefore, a fiduciary liability policy is a more appropriate option," says Gold. "However, all policies will contain exclusions that will affect coverage. For example, it is unlikely that willful misconduct or a fine wou

37、ld be covered under an insurance policy."Fiduciary liability insurance provides specific protection for organizations and individuals responsible for the governance, management and administration of pension and benefit plans.It is essential to obtain proper advice with regard to the nature of t

38、he coverage required by an organization. 'There may be add-on coverage to a D&O policy for fiduciary obligations or there may be a need to purchase separate fiduciary liability insurance. Either way, the word fiduciary' needs to be front and centre when looking at insurance coverage.&quo

39、t;"There is a need to get proper advice as to the nature of the coverage required by an organization," Johnston says. "There may be add-on coverage to a D&O policy for fiduciary obligations or there may be a need to purchase separate fiduciary liability insurance. Either way, the

40、word 'fiduciary' needs to be front and centre when looking at insurance coverage." Picard reports she has seen an upswing in requests for fiduciary liability insurance in recent months. "There does not seem to be any clear answers or standard practices regarding what coverage exist

41、s or the amount of protection required," she comments. "This has to be worked out with the broker. One client asked me how much financial coverage they should get. I said, 'for the entire amount of the pension plan' that is the potential exposure."GET EDUCATEDJohnson says he b

42、elieves there is a need for more education regarding coverage, risk and terms from insurers and brokers when it comes to pension liability. "I think there should be more information about what is covered under these policies," he argues. "Those marketing insurance should understand th

43、e exposures directors and officers have under pension plans and how they may or may not be covered."That need may become more pressing in the years ahead, as pension plans evolve and continue to struggle with underfunding issues. The focus of pension litigation traditionally has been on defined benefit pensions, Johnston says, but defined contribution plans, which are increasing in popularity among plan administrators and offer m