關(guān)于技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的世界貿(mào)易組織協(xié)定

1、本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯外文題目： The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 出 處： CONSUMER POLICY REVIEW 作 者： Dr James Mathis 原 文：As one of the Mulitlateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement is subscribed to by all World Trade Organization members. The Agreement's provi

2、sions apply to the technical regulations and standards of the characteristics of products. This article looks at the implications of this Agreement and the development of a set of international standards for standards bodies, how they can govern themselves and the possible implications for consumers

3、Efforts by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-47 Contracting Parties to harmonize product regulations and standards and address more subtle forms of nontariffbarriers, led to the conclusion of the original GATT Tokyo Round Standards Code (1980). This plurilateral (limited membership) agre

4、ement was updated and concluded in the course of the Uruguay Round as the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).As one of the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, the TBT is subscribed to by all WTO members and fully subject to the provisions o

5、f the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The DSU allows for panel and Appellate Body (AB) reviews for any dispute between WTO Members. The TBT Agreement applies to all products including industrial and agriculture products, but not for government purchasing requirements and sanitary and phy

6、tosanitary measures designed to protect food, plant and animal health, covered by the The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). Its provisions apply to product technical regulations (mandatory) and product standards (non-mandatory) for requirements

7、that deal with the characteristics of products, including their contents, appearance and labelling. The prevailing view appears to be that the agreement does not cover standards describing product processes that are not directly incorporated or related to the end product, except possibly for product

8、 labels that designate production processes.The original Standards Code extended the reach of GATT law in two ways, both of which continue on as part of the WTO single undertaking:Firstly, it established a new legal theory for complaints based on unnecessary obstacle to trade' which focuses on t

9、he inherent trade restrictiveness of a regulation. (This is not the same as GATT national treatment that requires nondiscrimination between domestic and imported like products.)Secondly, it obliged signatories to use applicable and relevant international standards as a basis for their own domestic p

10、roduct regulations.The first standard above has yet to be examined in a WTO case. The second has received treatment in the European Commission (EC) Sardines case.In a more procedural sense, the WTO TBT Agreement encourages WTO members to: participate in international standard setting; ensure their c

11、onformity systems are open to the products of all Members on an equal basis; and ensure the transparency of technical regulations.It also requires members to notify their technical regulations to the TBT Committee: if they have a significant effect on trade; if no international standard exists; and

12、when a domestic a domestic regulation is not 'in accordance' with an existing international standard. This notification process allows for other member review and consultation.There is no obligation for any country to establish any national product requirements but when regulating, countries

13、 are encouraged to adopt an international standard. This is done by the 'safe harbour' provision found in TBT Article 2.5. Members are presumed to not be creating unnecessary obstacles to trade when they enact their domestic regulations in accordance with an existing international standard.

14、This only available for the national objectives of: ensuring the quality of exports; the protection of human, animal or plant life or health; protection of the environment; or for the prevention of deceptive practices. WTO cases have ruled that 'in accordance' means conformity with the inter

15、national standard.EC Sardines The EC Sardines case concerned a claim by Peru that the EC failed to apply a Codex standard for its labelling regulation. The European regulation only permitted pilchards to carry the name 'sardines' on the label. The Codex standard allows other varieties to als

16、o be labelled called sardines if they also state the variety or a geographical designation (for example, 'Peruvian Sardines', 'Eastern Pacific Sardines', and so on). The case provides a first substantive ruling on a TBT case and also the first ruling on the stated requirement for Mem

17、bers to use international standards as a basis for their own domestic regulations. Although much commentary on the TBT Agreement tends to emphasise the TBT provisions that 'encourage' the use of international standards, like the safe harbour provision noted above, this ruling is far more dir

18、ect in applying the rather unambiguous and obligatory text of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement in order to resolve the dispute. This subparagraph reads:'Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their completion is imminent. Members shall use them, or

19、 the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical fact

20、ors or fundamental technological problems.Not all implications are negative for international standards. This case is notable for the value added contributed by a consumer organization letter attached to the Peru submission. The organization argued strongly against the value of the EC regulation and

21、 the panel used this resource to assess whether or not the EC's deviation from the international Codex standard served any legitimate objective in protecting consumer interest. In this case, the international standard and the WTO rule obliging its use as a 'basis' would have to be said t

22、o be within the European consumer interest overall.Since standards generated by international bodies have an otherwise non-binding legal character, the TBT provisions, as interpreted by the panel and the Appellate Body, generate implications for global governance issues. While participation legitima

23、cy in rule making should be of interest to States and standard bodies, it is of particular importance to the ultimate consumers of products and to the organisations that seek to secure their interests before domestic and international rule-making bodies.International standardsDevelopment of internat

24、ional standardsThe term 'international standard' is a WTO creation for the purpose of the TBT Agreement, Since legal obligations flow from the term, there has to he some sort of criteria to determine what qualifies as an international standard. For the SPS Agreement, international bodies are

25、 designated. The TBT Agreement only has a single provision that defines an international body or system as one 'whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members.The clear emphasis throughout is to ensure that all WTO members have rights of participation in those bodies, an

26、d to raise the participation of developing members in particular. Given the focus on 'WTO members' in the TBT definition, one would not expect to see any particular accommodation in the decision for non-state actors and there is nothing in the decision that can be read to suggest that an int

27、ernational body should elevate the participation of a consumer organisation (or any other non-governmental actor). Since this document controls the definitional gateway of what may or may not qualify as an international standard, what is not considered in the recommendations raises as many questions

28、 as what has been included. Similar, the committee process of consultation and from whom it did or did not receive comment, also raises process considerations for what is an example of WTO committee rulemaking. These are governance issues. The value of the Committee decision as a source of law for i

29、nterpretation in a dispute settlement case is recognised even though the language of the decision uses the term 'should' rather than 'shall'. The issue of whether a standard qualifies as an international standard can definitely be raised in a case and the Committee decision would be

30、used to assess whether a standard meets the enunciated criteria. The EC referred to the decision in the Sardines case for its (unsuccessful) argument that a consensus was required in the standard body process in order to qualify as an international standard.'Unfortunately, the decision does not

31、require that the members actually solicit and receive comments from interested parties, just that they be given time to do so. This is a significant deference to sovereignty, especially as it is combined with an obligation on draft standards to give notice to members only. Receiving input from inter

32、ested parties is completely the choice of a member and any requirements for members to take up comments remains a matter between the members and the standard bodies. One single point of reference in the Triennial Report does however refer to the larger community of interest, here in the context of d

33、eveloping countries.Even though this democracy issue has not fallen within the field of interest of the TBT Committee, the manner by which states and international bodies respond to the gap will have an impact on the longer term credibility of the TBT Agreement's obligation to use international

34、standards irrespective of the decision. This suggests that further enhancements and evolution in the criteria are possible and perhaps likely.Governance and consumer implicationsThe implications for consumers and consumer organisations are complex and in some cases appear contradictory. Where intern

35、ational standards facilitate trade, consumers are offered some consistency in information and the benefits of lower prices generated by competitive imports. At the same time, where consumers of the importing country support a variation from international standard, as their national choice, the benef

36、its of diversity may be at risk. Given the obligation to review and amend national requirements, the entire field of existing technical regulations is open for consideration. This presents a myriad of challenges and opportunities for consumers seeking to affect the outcome of national regulations.St

37、ates have their own systems for passing laws and regulation and vary in the degree of democratic participation and procedural due process they adopt. These domestic procedures are probably eroded, even where participation guarantees are given, when a binding rule is established by a body beyond a st

38、ate's domestic rule making system.To the extent that the TBT Agreement has upgraded international standards to obligations, it is also apparent that this has raised the profile of trade interests in standard setting processes. If standards are designed to reflect only trade interests then the ob

39、jectives of health and safety are challenged. There is a need, therefore, for consumers to be engaged at the institutional level of standard bodies to ensure diversity of representation and ensure that objectives remain balanced. States are aware that WTO claims can be filed against non-conforming r

40、egulations and many will seek to avoid even minor non-conformities if there is a chance that they will be accused of barriers to trade. The tendency would be to ensure that their own trade interests are reflected in standard body delegations. While the legitimate objectives incorporated in standard

41、body preambles remain in place, the constitutional realities on the ground suggest a more trade-oriented disposition in the process and probably more trade-sensitive substantive outcomes as well.If consumer organisations want to have more input into this process and a seat at the table when internat

42、ional standards are being set, then they have to be able to understand these governance issues and coordinate their focus at their national levels, at the international standard bodies . and at the WTO.譯 文： 關(guān)于技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的世界貿(mào)易組織協(xié)定 作為在貨物貿(mào)易多方協(xié)定之一，技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘協(xié)定被所有世貿(mào)組織成員簽署并高度關(guān)注。這個協(xié)定的規(guī)定適用于產(chǎn)品的技術(shù)法規(guī)和特點標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。本文著眼于本協(xié)定的影響

43、和一項國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，它們是如何管理自己并有可能的去影響消費者。貿(mào)易和關(guān)稅的總協(xié)定的努力(GATT)-47締約方統(tǒng)一產(chǎn)品法規(guī)和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和地址，更微妙的形式非關(guān)稅障礙，導(dǎo)致了原來關(guān)貿(mào)總協(xié)定東京回合的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)守則的結(jié)論（1980年）。諸邊（限會員）協(xié)議的更新，并在烏拉圭回合世界貿(mào)易組織（WTO）有關(guān)貿(mào)易技術(shù)壁壘協(xié)定（TBT協(xié)定）進(jìn)行總結(jié)。作為在商品的多邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定之一，技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘是所有世貿(mào)組織簽署成員和充分受該規(guī)定世貿(mào)組織的爭端處理機構(gòu)（DSU）。在爭端處理機構(gòu)中允許專家組和上訴機構(gòu)（AB公司）世貿(mào)組織成員之間的任何爭端評論。貿(mào)易技術(shù)壁壘協(xié)定適用于所有產(chǎn)品包括工業(yè)和農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)品，但沒有政府采購的要求和衛(wèi)生與植物衛(wèi)

44、生措施，以保障食品，植物和動物的健康，覆蓋了WTO協(xié)定中的應(yīng)用衛(wèi)生與植物衛(wèi)生措施（SPS的協(xié)定）。其應(yīng)用產(chǎn)品的技術(shù)愿景法規(guī)（強制性）和產(chǎn)品標(biāo)準(zhǔn)（非強制性）的要求，處理著產(chǎn)品的特點，包括其內(nèi)容，外觀和標(biāo)簽。當(dāng)時看法似乎是，該協(xié)議不包括標(biāo)準(zhǔn)流程，描述產(chǎn)品成立或沒有直接關(guān)系到年底產(chǎn)品，可能除了產(chǎn)品標(biāo)簽指定的生產(chǎn)流程。 關(guān)貿(mào)總協(xié)定的原始標(biāo)準(zhǔn)代碼范圍擴大在兩方面，兩者都繼續(xù)作為世貿(mào)組織的一攬子承諾的一部分：首先，它基于不必要的障礙投訴貿(mào)易的于固有的貿(mào)易限制的重點的規(guī)例建立了一個新的法律理論。（這是不一樣的關(guān)貿(mào)總協(xié)定的國民待遇，要求非歧視國產(chǎn)與進(jìn)口同類產(chǎn)品。）其次，它必須簽署使用適用和有關(guān)國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)他們自己

45、國內(nèi)的產(chǎn)品法規(guī)為基礎(chǔ)。第一個標(biāo)準(zhǔn)上面還有待研究在世貿(mào)組織的情況。第二個有在歐共體沙丁魚接受治療的案件。在一個更程序意義上說，世貿(mào)組織技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘協(xié)議鼓勵世貿(mào)組織成員：參與國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定;確保其符合系統(tǒng)是開放的在平等基礎(chǔ)上的所有成員的產(chǎn)品;確保技術(shù)法規(guī)的透明度。它還要求成員國通知其技術(shù)在TBT委員會規(guī)定：如果他們有一個對貿(mào)易產(chǎn)生重大影響，如果沒有國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)存在，而當(dāng)國內(nèi)的國內(nèi)調(diào)控不是'根據(jù)'與現(xiàn)有的國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。那么此通知程序允許其他成員的審查和協(xié)商。沒有義務(wù)對任何國家建立任何國家的產(chǎn)品需求，但是當(dāng)調(diào)節(jié)，鼓勵各國采取國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這是由安全港區(qū)在TBT規(guī)定符合第2.5條。議員被推定為不造成

46、不必要的貿(mào)易障礙時，他們制定了按照與現(xiàn)有的國內(nèi)法規(guī)的國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這僅適用于國家目標(biāo)：確保質(zhì)量出口；人類，動物或植物保護(hù)生命或健康，保護(hù)環(huán)境；或?qū)Ψ乐蛊墼p行為。 WTO案例已經(jīng)作出裁決，根據(jù)是指符合國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的。歐共體沙丁魚案件歐共體沙丁魚案件涉及秘魯索賠，歐共體未能應(yīng)用的法典標(biāo)準(zhǔn)標(biāo)簽規(guī)例。歐洲只規(guī)管允許非魚類進(jìn)行命名為“沙丁魚”的標(biāo)簽。食品法典委員會標(biāo)準(zhǔn)允許其他品種也可稱為沙丁魚標(biāo)簽，如果他們還規(guī)定品種或地理標(biāo)志（為例如，'秘魯沙丁魚'，'東太平洋沙丁魚'，等等）。案件提供了第一技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的實質(zhì)性裁決一案，也是第一裁決規(guī)定的向議員要求使用國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來作為他們自己國

47、內(nèi)法規(guī)的基礎(chǔ)。雖然很多在技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘協(xié)定的評論傾向于強調(diào)技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘規(guī)定'鼓勵'的國際使用。如安全港規(guī)定的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，指出以上，這項裁決是哎應(yīng)用更為直接而明確的和強制性的貿(mào)易技術(shù)壁壘協(xié)定2.4文字條款式為了解決爭議。本項內(nèi)容： “在哪里的需要技術(shù)法規(guī)，有關(guān)國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)已經(jīng)存在或完成已迫在眉睫。各成員應(yīng)使用它們，或其中的相關(guān)部分作為其技術(shù)法規(guī)的基礎(chǔ)，除非這些國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)或有關(guān)部分將是無效的或為履行不適當(dāng)?shù)暮戏ㄊ侄巫非鬄槟繕?biāo)，因為基本氣候或地理因素或基本技術(shù)問題。” 并非所有的國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)有負(fù)面影響。這一案例由消費者在秘魯提交的信件上顯著價值貢獻(xiàn)。該組織主張強烈反對歐共體規(guī)則的價值，監(jiān)管和利用這

48、一資源來評估是否歐共體國際食品法典委員會標(biāo)準(zhǔn)送達(dá)的任何合法的保護(hù)消費者利益的目標(biāo)出現(xiàn)偏差。在這情況下，國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和WTO規(guī)則迫使其作為一個基礎(chǔ)的使用將不得不說是在歐洲消費者的利益整體當(dāng)中。由于所產(chǎn)生的國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)機構(gòu)有一本不具約束力的法律性質(zhì)，技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的規(guī)定，由解釋小組及上訴機構(gòu)，產(chǎn)全球治理問題生的影響。當(dāng)參加在制定規(guī)則的合法性應(yīng)感興趣的國家和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)機構(gòu)，它對于最終消費者產(chǎn)品特別重要的意義和尋求以確保他們的利益在國內(nèi)和國際制定規(guī)則的機構(gòu)的組織。國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)術(shù)語國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是世界貿(mào)易組織建立了貿(mào)易技術(shù)壁壘協(xié)定的目的，因為法律義務(wù)從術(shù)語中流出，他一定要對標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行排序來確定哪些有資格成為國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

49、對于衛(wèi)生和植物檢疫協(xié)議，國際機構(gòu)指定。技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘協(xié)定是只有一個單一的條款一個國際機構(gòu)，它定義為一個國際身軀或系統(tǒng)其成員是有關(guān)機構(gòu)至少所有議員開放的。這明確的重點是確保確保整個所有世貿(mào)組織成員都有權(quán)參與這些機構(gòu)，并提高特別是發(fā)展中成員的參與率。鑒于關(guān)注關(guān)于世貿(mào)組織成員在技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的定義，一個不希望看到任何特別的在非國家住宿的行為者和決策決定中有沒有設(shè)立一個國際機構(gòu)參與消費者組織（或任何其他非政府演員）。由于這文件控制網(wǎng)關(guān)的定義是什么可能會或可能不符合國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，什么是已經(jīng)提出了很多問題包括在內(nèi)的建議。類似的，咨詢委員會的程序和誰做了或沒有收到評論，也引起了對于那些什么是世貿(mào)組織的規(guī)則制定委員會的例子的注意事項的過程。這些都是管理問題。該委員會決定，作為法律的起緣在爭端解決案件中是被公認(rèn)的，盡管決定語言使用的是應(yīng)該應(yīng)這些術(shù)語。使用術(shù)語'應(yīng)該'而不是'應(yīng)'。這一個標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的問題是否有資格作為國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)一定能夠提出一個案例，委員會決定將用于評估是否符合標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的闡述標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。教統(tǒng)會的決定中提到的沙丁魚案在ITS（不成功）的說法，一個共識在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的機構(gòu)進(jìn)程中被要求，以有資格作為國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。不幸的是，這個決定并不要求實