有關(guān)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的研究外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)

1、有關(guān)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的研究Wooten , Thomas C, Colson , Robert H術(shù)語(yǔ)“審計(jì)質(zhì)量”對(duì)不同的人意味著不同的事情。例如，對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表用戶的 一項(xiàng)調(diào)查(Epstein和Geiger, 1994)表明，有70%的投資者認(rèn)為審計(jì)應(yīng)絕對(duì)保 證財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中不存在重大錯(cuò)報(bào)或欺詐。審計(jì)師可能會(huì)以其他方式考慮審計(jì)質(zhì)量。 除了嚴(yán)格遵守GAAS之外，審計(jì)師還評(píng)估業(yè)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，目的是避免訴訟，最大程 度地減少客戶不滿以及將損害程度限制在可能導(dǎo)致 “不良”后果的聲譽(yù)上。審計(jì)。在這個(gè)連續(xù)體中的某個(gè)地方是法院的觀點(diǎn)。當(dāng)潛在的審計(jì)失敗案件提交法官 或陪審團(tuán)審理時(shí)，沒(méi)人能確定結(jié)果。法院確定的審計(jì)質(zhì)量有時(shí)會(huì)導(dǎo)致比G

2、AAS更為具體的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，有時(shí)則要少得多。衡量審計(jì)質(zhì)量也存在問(wèn)題。審計(jì)質(zhì)量的結(jié)果無(wú)法直接或立即觀察到。審核質(zhì) 量控制程序試圖在審核過(guò)程中保持較高的控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，但是通常在業(yè)務(wù)失敗的情況 下會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)審核失敗。當(dāng)一家大型公司遇到審計(jì)失敗時(shí)，商業(yè)新聞將對(duì)其進(jìn)行廣播。 不可能知道根本未被發(fā)現(xiàn)和公開(kāi)的劣質(zhì)審核的數(shù)量。一家公司可能執(zhí)行的審計(jì)質(zhì) 量很差，但是如果不對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表進(jìn)行實(shí)質(zhì)性的錯(cuò)誤處理，則在沒(méi)有計(jì)劃和現(xiàn)場(chǎng)工作知識(shí)的情況下，就無(wú)法表明這一點(diǎn)。同樣，如果執(zhí)行了質(zhì)量低下的審核并且忽 略了重大錯(cuò)誤陳述，則可能不會(huì)造成負(fù)面影響。由于審計(jì)質(zhì)量是不可觀察的，因此研究人員會(huì)查看審計(jì)質(zhì)量的替代指標(biāo)或指 標(biāo)，例如專家的意見(jiàn)，以確

3、定質(zhì)量審計(jì)的輸入和輸出。 其他研究人員使用更多客 觀的輸出作為確定審計(jì)質(zhì)量的來(lái)源。如果一家公司的訴訟率很低，在同行評(píng)審中 獲得很好的評(píng)價(jià)，并且很少需要重新發(fā)布審計(jì)意見(jiàn)，那么就可以推斷出它執(zhí)行了 高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)。審核質(zhì)量模型DeAngelo在1981年開(kāi)發(fā)了一個(gè)二維的審計(jì)質(zhì)量定義， 為解決該問(wèn)題設(shè)定了 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。首先，必須檢測(cè)到重大錯(cuò)誤陳述，其次，必須報(bào)告重大錯(cuò)誤陳述。審計(jì)質(zhì) 量也受許多其他因素影響。自1981年以來(lái)，會(huì)計(jì)研究人員就試圖定義，衡量和 研究審計(jì)質(zhì)量的多個(gè)維度。展覽中展示的模型總結(jié)了這一理論構(gòu)建和實(shí)證研究的 結(jié)果。與檢測(cè)有關(guān)的因素。重大錯(cuò)報(bào)的發(fā)現(xiàn)受審核團(tuán)隊(duì)執(zhí)行審核的良好程度的影 響，而審核

4、團(tuán)隊(duì)的審核質(zhì)量又受審核公司的質(zhì)量控制體系和管理資源的影響。許多研究已使用公司規(guī)模作為這些審計(jì)公司和審計(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)因素的替代，具發(fā)現(xiàn)存在爭(zhēng)議。審計(jì)公司規(guī)模。最常研究的因素是審計(jì)公司規(guī)模。研究人員通常將大型公司 定義為四大公司(或其前身)。結(jié)果表明，與小公司相比，大公司收取的審計(jì)費(fèi) 用更高。即使在控制了審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，客戶規(guī)模和審計(jì)復(fù)雜性之后，基于審計(jì)人員的 身份也會(huì)有額外的溢價(jià)。嘗試確定此溢價(jià)是否應(yīng)歸因于較高的審計(jì)質(zhì)量幾乎沒(méi)有成功。DeAngelo (1981)從理論上認(rèn)為，較大的公司執(zhí)行更好的審計(jì)是因?yàn)樗鼈?的聲譽(yù)受到威脅。另外，由于較大的公司可以使用更多資源，因此它們可以吸引 更多高技能的員工。其他人則

5、認(rèn)為，大型審計(jì)師之所以會(huì)收取一定的傭金，是因 為他們的更多財(cái)富減少了客戶在訴訟中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)敞口(深囊理論)(Lennox, 1999)。其他人則認(rèn)為沒(méi)有真正的審計(jì)質(zhì)量差異， 但之所以存在這種感覺(jué)，是因?yàn)榇笮凸?司是眾所周知的，并且已經(jīng)獲得了高質(zhì)量的聲譽(yù)。有趣的是， AICPA堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為 審計(jì)質(zhì)量與公司規(guī)模無(wú)關(guān)?？傮w而言，證據(jù)不一，但似乎確實(shí)存在尺寸和質(zhì)量之 問(wèn)的某種關(guān)系。目前尚不清楚該差異是實(shí)際的還是可感知的。實(shí)際質(zhì)量差異。Palmrose (1988)發(fā)現(xiàn)，與非大八國(guó)公司相比，大八國(guó)對(duì)他 們提起訴訟的可能性較小。Deis和Giroux (1992)檢查了審計(jì)工作文件的樣本， 發(fā)現(xiàn)大型公司的工作文件

6、不足。Krishnan和Schauer (2000)研究了非營(yíng)利實(shí)體在公司規(guī)模與遵守報(bào)告要求 之間的關(guān)系。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)合規(guī)性隨著公司規(guī)模的增加而增加。Hardiman等。(1987年)發(fā)現(xiàn)，在審查提交給GAO的審計(jì)報(bào)告時(shí)，較小公司的報(bào)告格式不合規(guī)率較 高，這表明較大公司有適當(dāng)?shù)牧鞒虂?lái)確保財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表符合GAAP。但是，這些研究只是針對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告是否符合現(xiàn)行 GAAP,而不是審計(jì)證據(jù)或其文檔的能力和充分 性。Mutchler等。(1997)發(fā)現(xiàn)六大審計(jì)師比非六大審計(jì)師更有可能發(fā)表持續(xù)經(jīng) 營(yíng)意見(jiàn)。這表明較大的公司愿意在發(fā)表適當(dāng)?shù)囊庖?jiàn)時(shí)采取更激進(jìn)的立場(chǎng)，具有更好的技術(shù)能力來(lái)發(fā)現(xiàn)持續(xù)存在的問(wèn)題，或有更多的客戶解

7、決此類問(wèn)題。感知到的質(zhì)量差異。其他研究發(fā)現(xiàn)更多地涉及用戶對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的理解， 而不 是審計(jì)質(zhì)量的有形指標(biāo)。 Palmrose (1986)和Francis and Simon (1987)發(fā)現(xiàn)八 家公司的審計(jì)服務(wù)要付出高昂的代價(jià)。Menon和Williams (1991)發(fā)現(xiàn)，使用“八強(qiáng)”的公司可以獲得更好的股票 定價(jià)。Jang and Lin (1993)發(fā)現(xiàn)，與八強(qiáng)公司相關(guān)的信息對(duì)于參與 IPO的公司 而言更為可靠。莫里斯和斯特勞瑟(Morris and Strawser, 1999)發(fā)現(xiàn)，接受六 大公司修改后的審計(jì)報(bào)告的銀行比接受非六大公司修改后的審計(jì)報(bào)告的銀行更 容易被監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)關(guān)閉。沒(méi)有

8、質(zhì)量差異。一些研究不支持質(zhì)量差異的存在。 其他研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，八大服務(wù) 和非八大服務(wù)之間沒(méi)有明顯的價(jià)格差異(Sumunic, 1980年)。Nichols和Smith (1983)發(fā)現(xiàn)，從一家小型公司轉(zhuǎn)為八大公司并沒(méi)有給該轉(zhuǎn)換公司帶來(lái)任何股票 收益收益。Wyer, White和Janson (1988)發(fā)現(xiàn)較小的CPA公司發(fā)表不當(dāng)意見(jiàn) 的可能性更大。規(guī)模與質(zhì)量的關(guān)系將由會(huì)計(jì)研究人員繼續(xù)研究。審核公司因素。研究人員已轉(zhuǎn)向?qū)＜倚〗M來(lái)確定公司級(jí)別的特征。能夠投入 足夠資源來(lái)聘用和培訓(xùn)最優(yōu)秀的人才，然后為他們提供完善的審計(jì)方法的公司很 可能在檢測(cè)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中的錯(cuò)誤方面表現(xiàn)出色。人力資源。專家將更高的質(zhì)量與能夠

9、派遣技術(shù)上和專業(yè)上最新的員工的公司 聯(lián)系在一起。這個(gè)方面與招聘和培訓(xùn)有關(guān)。如果公司能夠吸引最優(yōu)秀和最聰明的 人才，他們就有可能成為更熟練的審計(jì)師。 同樣，提供精心計(jì)劃的培訓(xùn)的公司可 以使員工學(xué)習(xí)良好執(zhí)行審計(jì)任務(wù)所需的技能和知識(shí)?？刂七^(guò)程。專家小組還將高質(zhì)量的產(chǎn)品與在審計(jì)過(guò)程中擁有強(qiáng)大控制力的公 司聯(lián)系在一起。GAAS要求公司維持質(zhì)量控制體系，并要求審計(jì)師充分計(jì)劃其審 計(jì)工作。但是，在確定這些系統(tǒng)的形式和規(guī)范性方面還有很多余地。具有更嚴(yán)格的質(zhì)量控制體系和更系統(tǒng)的審計(jì)方法流程的公司，不太可能被審計(jì)程序發(fā)現(xiàn)重大 的錯(cuò)誤陳述。多項(xiàng)研究支持這樣的觀點(diǎn)，即強(qiáng)大的審計(jì)方法與更高的質(zhì)量相關(guān)。Carcello等

10、。（1995年）發(fā)現(xiàn)，結(jié)構(gòu)化的審計(jì)方法與傾向于發(fā)布持續(xù)經(jīng)營(yíng)意見(jiàn)的公司相 關(guān)。GAAS要求審計(jì)師制定適當(dāng)?shù)牧鞒虂?lái)接受和維持客戶。研究表明，六大巨頭不太可能接受有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的客戶（Raghunanda吊口 Rama, 1999年）。研究表明，參與同行評(píng)審過(guò)程的公司更可能正確報(bào)告財(cái)務(wù)披露（Krishnan和Schauer 2000年）。密切監(jiān)視其審計(jì)過(guò)程結(jié)果的公司與更高質(zhì)量相關(guān)。Malone and Roberts （1996）發(fā)現(xiàn)，具有更強(qiáng)質(zhì)量控制體系的審計(jì)師不太可 能參與降低的審計(jì)質(zhì)量行為，例如不適當(dāng)?shù)睾炇饘徲?jì)步驟。因此，強(qiáng)大的質(zhì)量控 制體系可以帶來(lái)更高質(zhì)量的審核。行業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)。在同一行業(yè)中擁有多個(gè)客戶的

11、公司對(duì)特定行業(yè)所帶來(lái)的獨(dú)特審計(jì) 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)有更深入的了解。在特定行業(yè)中，客戶很少的公司可能沒(méi)有足夠的數(shù)量來(lái)跟 上行業(yè)新聞和慣例。研究表明，特定行業(yè)的專業(yè)化趨勢(shì)正在發(fā)展，研究人員發(fā)現(xiàn) 具有專業(yè)化知識(shí)的公司可以節(jié)省資金并提高質(zhì)量 （Hogan和Jeter, 1999） °Craswell 等。（1995年）報(bào)道說(shuō)，行業(yè)專業(yè)公司要求收取一定的傭金，這可能表明質(zhì)量 存在價(jià)格差異。公司在特定行業(yè)中擁有的客戶越多，就可以為該行業(yè)提供服務(wù)而 建立聲譽(yù)。因此，研究人員假設(shè)，在特定行業(yè)中具有較高客戶集中度的公司將具 有更高的質(zhì)量，因?yàn)樗鼈儞p失的更多（Deis和Giroux, 1992）。審核團(tuán)隊(duì)特征專家小組

12、確定的第二組特征專門(mén)與審核團(tuán)隊(duì)成員相關(guān)。在對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)和審計(jì)專家 進(jìn)行調(diào)查時(shí)，他們指出，在確定審計(jì)質(zhì)量時(shí)，審計(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)因素比公司范圍因素更為 重要。聘用良好，執(zhí)行強(qiáng)有力的控制程序并具有行業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的公司很可能會(huì)派遣一 支高素質(zhì)的審計(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)。合作伙伴和經(jīng)理的注意。專家報(bào)告說(shuō)，合作伙伴和經(jīng)理對(duì)參與的關(guān)注與審計(jì) 質(zhì)量有關(guān)。GAAS要求對(duì)審核進(jìn)行適當(dāng)?shù)谋O(jiān)督和分配。在現(xiàn)場(chǎng)工作期間，經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的審核員經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的判斷力可以為技術(shù)和程序問(wèn)題提供權(quán)威性的答案。計(jì)劃和進(jìn)行審核工作。GAAS指出，必須適當(dāng)計(jì)劃和執(zhí)行審核，以合理保證 發(fā)現(xiàn)重大錯(cuò)報(bào)。具有強(qiáng)大的審計(jì)事務(wù)所因素的事務(wù)所可能會(huì)配備適當(dāng)?shù)娜藛T和流程來(lái)確保適當(dāng)?shù)挠?jì)劃和績(jī)效。專業(yè)，

13、執(zhí)著和懷疑。專家小組還確定分配給參與活動(dòng)的個(gè)人的完整性，作為 檢測(cè)重大錯(cuò)報(bào)的一個(gè)因素。具有較高專業(yè)水平的員工更有可能正確執(zhí)行審計(jì)任 務(wù)，而不是在未完成的審計(jì)步驟上簽字。同樣，持懷疑態(tài)度的員工也不太可能接 受不足的證據(jù)。與客戶的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。專家報(bào)告說(shuō)，與特定客戶的經(jīng)驗(yàn)可以帶來(lái)更高質(zhì)量的審核。進(jìn)行重復(fù)審核的員工更有可能更好地了解客戶的業(yè)務(wù)流程如何運(yùn)作以及客戶會(huì) 計(jì)系統(tǒng)中的特殊優(yōu)缺點(diǎn)。他們能夠更輕松地確定與上一年相比存在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和錯(cuò)誤最 多的區(qū)域，然后將更多的時(shí)間投入這些區(qū)域。行業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)。在同一行業(yè)中的多個(gè)客戶上工作可使員工成為該行業(yè)獨(dú)有的流程 和程序方面的專家。通過(guò)了解特定行業(yè)面臨的常見(jiàn)弱點(diǎn)，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和問(wèn)題，審計(jì)

14、師在 評(píng)估客戶提出的證據(jù)時(shí)可以更加自信和執(zhí)著。與報(bào)告有關(guān)的因素正確報(bào)告重大錯(cuò)報(bào)的能力取決于獨(dú)立性。如果審計(jì)師遭受個(gè)人，情感或財(cái)務(wù) 壓力的困擾，那么審計(jì)師的獨(dú)立性就會(huì)受到損害，并且更有可能導(dǎo)致審計(jì)質(zhì)量下 降。從理論上講，審計(jì)定價(jià)，保有權(quán)和提供其他服務(wù)的因素不僅會(huì)影響?yīng)毩⑿裕?還會(huì)影響審計(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)發(fā)現(xiàn)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表錯(cuò)報(bào)的能力。價(jià)錢。為了避免損失未來(lái)的審計(jì)費(fèi)用（從而避免特定客戶的最終獲利能力）， 審計(jì)師可能面臨避免報(bào)告某些會(huì)計(jì)缺陷的壓力。 客戶更換審計(jì)師要比審計(jì)師發(fā)展 新業(yè)務(wù)容易。因此，審計(jì)師有一定的動(dòng)力去做任何保留客戶的工作。研究人員還測(cè)試了價(jià)格壓力（低調(diào)）是否會(huì)影響審計(jì)質(zhì)量。顯然，如果一家 公司收取的費(fèi)用

15、低得多，那么只能通過(guò)減少審計(jì)工作量來(lái)恢復(fù)盈利能力，從而降低審計(jì)師發(fā)現(xiàn)錯(cuò)誤陳述的能力。如果審計(jì)師主要將客戶視為未來(lái)的收入來(lái)源， 則 會(huì)對(duì)審計(jì)師的財(cái)務(wù)獨(dú)立性產(chǎn)生疑問(wèn)。 因此，問(wèn)題變成了定價(jià)和保有權(quán)的結(jié)合， 在 這種情況下，審計(jì)師必須抓住客戶，以收回成本并最終實(shí)現(xiàn)盈利。任期。任期與審計(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)因素和獨(dú)立性有關(guān)。任期短和任期長(zhǎng)時(shí)，審計(jì)失敗似 乎更為常見(jiàn)。審計(jì)員接受新客戶后，需要一些時(shí)間來(lái)了解客戶，這使審計(jì)師容易 遺漏重大錯(cuò)報(bào)。隨著任期的增加，審計(jì)師會(huì)更全面地了解客戶的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及其系統(tǒng)的 運(yùn)行方式，并且審計(jì)師可以調(diào)整審計(jì)程序和流程以發(fā)現(xiàn)錯(cuò)誤陳述。相反，與客戶的長(zhǎng)期任職關(guān)系到審計(jì)質(zhì)量低下。 長(zhǎng)期的協(xié)會(huì)有可能滋生自

16、滿 情緒，不太嚴(yán)格的審核程序以及對(duì)管理層代表的過(guò)多依賴（Shockley, 1982； Deis和Giroux, 1992）。審計(jì)師可能會(huì)與客戶過(guò)分自在，無(wú)法調(diào)整審計(jì)程序以反映不 斷變化的業(yè)務(wù)和相關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。審核員在收集證據(jù)時(shí)變得不再那么懷疑，也不那么勤 奮。額外服務(wù)向?qū)徲?jì)客戶提供其他服務(wù)可能會(huì)影響定價(jià)。當(dāng)一家公司同時(shí)提供審計(jì)和咨詢 服務(wù)時(shí)，很可能會(huì)為客戶節(jié)省某種費(fèi)用。如果公司通過(guò)收取與審計(jì)無(wú)關(guān)的巨額費(fèi)用而與客戶建立經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)系，則可能會(huì)失去獨(dú)立性。止匕外，如果其他服務(wù)與安裝或 維護(hù)會(huì)計(jì)功能有關(guān)，則可以將審核員置于審核自己的工作的位置。直到SEC在2001年2月開(kāi)始要求披露費(fèi)用之前，研究人員一直無(wú)法收

17、集有 關(guān)與非審計(jì)費(fèi)用有關(guān)的審計(jì)費(fèi)用金額的大量數(shù)據(jù)。一項(xiàng)對(duì)4,200家公司的初步研 究初步表明，大量咨詢費(fèi)用會(huì)對(duì)審計(jì)師的獨(dú)立性產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響，并降低審計(jì)質(zhì)量 (Elstein, 2001)?？磥?lái)提供非審計(jì)服務(wù)的公司更有可能在記錄和調(diào)整可用于操 縱未來(lái)收益的可任意分配儲(chǔ)備金方面為客戶提供更大的靈活性。最后，一些審計(jì)師認(rèn)為，審計(jì)質(zhì)量與提供附加服務(wù)之間實(shí)際上存在正相關(guān)關(guān) 系。他們認(rèn)為提供其他服務(wù)可以使他們更好地了解客戶及其業(yè)務(wù)流程。托馬斯 C 沃頓(Thomas C.Wooter)和羅伯特 H 科爾森(Robert H.Thomas C Wooten博士，注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師，注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師，是田納西州納什維爾貝 爾

18、蒙特大學(xué)杰克C.梅西商學(xué)院會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)副教授。RESEARCH ABOUT AUDIT QUALITYWooten , Thomas C, Colson , Robert HThe term "quality audit" means different things to different people. For example, one survey of financial statement users (Epstein and Geiger, 1994) indicated that 70% of investors believe that audits shoul

19、d provide absolute assurancethat there are no material misstatementsor fraud in the financial statements.An auditor is likely to think about audit quality in other ways. In addition to strictly following GAAS, an auditor also assesses business risk with the intention of avoiding litigation, minimizi

20、ng client dissatisfaction, and limiting the damage to a reputation that could follow a "bad" audit.Somewhere within this continuum is the perspective of the courts. When potential audit failure cases are brought before a judge or jury, no one is certain of the outcome. Audit quality as det

21、ermined by the courts sometimes results in standards that are more specific than GAAS, other times less.Measuring audit quality is also problematic. The outcome of audit quality is not directly or immediately observable. Audit quality-control procedures attempt to maintain high standards of control

22、over the process of an audit, but an audit failure usually becomes known in the context of a business failure. When a major company experiencesan audit failure, the business press will broadcast it. It is impossible to know the number of poor-quality audits that simply go undetected and unpublicized

23、. A firm may perform a poor -quality audit but, without knowledge of the planning and fieldwork, there could be no indication of it if the financial statements are not materially misstated. Similarly, if a poor -quality audit were performed and a material misstatement overlooked, there may have been

24、 no negative repercussions.Since audit quality is unobservable, researchers look at surrogates or indicators of audit quality, such as the opinions of experts, to determine the inputs and outputs of a quality audit. Other researchers use more objective outputs as a source of determining audit qualit

25、y. If a firm has a low rate of litigation, gets very good ratings on peer reviews, and seldom has to reissue audit opinions, then one can infer that it performs high-quality audits.Audit Quality ModelDeAngelo developed a two-dimensional definition of audit quality in 1981 that set the standard for a

26、ddressing the issue. First, a material misstatement must be detected, and second, the material misstatement must be reported. Audit quality is influenced by many other factors as well. Since 1981, accounting researchershave attempted to define, measure, and study multiple dimensions of audit quality

27、. The model presented in the Exhibit summarizes the results of this theory building and empirical research.Factors related to detection. Detecting material misstatements is influenced by how well the audit team performs the audit, which in turn is influenced by the quality control system and managem

28、ent resources of the audit firm. Many studies have used firm size as a surrogate for these audit firm and audit team factors, and their findings have been controversial.Audit firm size. The most commonly studied factor has been audit firm size. Most commonly, researchers have defined large firms as

29、the Big Four (or their precursors). Results have shown that larger firms receive larger audit fees than smaller firms. Even after controlling for audit risk, client size, and audit complexity, there is an additional premium based on auditor identity. Attempts to determine whether this premium is att

30、ributable to higher audit quality have been mostly unsuccessful.DeAngelo (1981) theorized that larger firms perform better audits because they have a greater reputation at stake. In addition, because larger firms have more resources at their disposal, they can attract more highly skilled employees.

31、Others have theorized that large auditors attract a fee premium because their greater wealth reduces clients' exposures in litigation (the deep pockets theory) (Lennox, 1999). Others have theorized that there is no real audit quality difference, but the perception exists because large firms are

32、well known and have gained a reputation for high quality. Interestingly, the AICPA has maintained that audit quality is independent of firm size. On the whole, the evidence is mixed, but it does appear that there is some relationship between size and quality. What is unclear is whether this differen

33、ce is actual or perceived.Actual quality difference. Palmrose (1988) found that the Big Eight were less likely to have litigation brought against them than the non -Big Eight national firms. Deis and Giroux (1992) examined a sample of audit work papers and found that larger firms had less deficient

34、work papers than smaller firms.Krishnan and Schauer (2000) studied the relationship between firm size and compliance with reporting requirements by not-for-profit entities. They found that compliance increaseswith firm size. Hardiman et al. (1987) found a higher rate of reporting format noncomplianc

35、e by smaller firms when reviewing audit reports submitted to the GAO, indicating that the larger firms have a process in place to ensure that the financial statements are in compliance with GAAP. These studies, however, address the compliance of financial reports to current GAAP rather than the comp

36、etence and sufficiency of audit evidence or its documentation.Mutchler et al. (1997) found that Big Six auditors are more likely than non -Big Six auditors to issue going concern opinions. This indicates that the larger firms are willing to take a more aggressive stance in issuing the appropriate op

37、inion, have better technical ability to detect the going concern issue, or have more clients with such issues.Perceived quality difference. Other research findings deal more with a user's perception of audit quality rather than tangible indicators of audit quality. Palmrose (1986) and Francis an

38、d Simon (1987) found that a premium price was paid for Big Eight firms' audit services.Menon and Williams (1991) found that companies using the Big Eight get better pricing of stock issues. Jang and Lin (1993) found that information associated with a Big Eight firm is perceived to be more reliab

39、le for firms involved with an IPO. Morris and Strawser (1999) found that banks receiving modified audit reports by Big Six firms were more likely to be closed by regulators than banks receiving modified audit reports by non-Big Six firms.No quality difference. Some studies have not supported the exi

40、stence of a quality difference. Other studies have found that there is no significant price difference between Big Eight and non-Big Eight services (Sumunic, 1980). Nichols and Smith (1983) found that switching from a small firm to the Big Eight did not provide any stock return benefit to the switch

41、ing company. Wyer, White, and Janson (1988) found no greater likelihood that smaller CPA firms would issue inappropriate opinions. The question of size versus quality will continue to be studied by accounting researchers.Audit firm factors. Researchershave turned to panels of experts to identify cha

42、racteristics at the firm level. Firms that are able to devote a sufficient amount of resources to hiring and training the best people and then giving them a wedeveloped audit methodology are likely to excel in detecting errors in the financial statements.Human resources. The experts associated highe

43、r quality with firms able to field employees that are up to date technically and professionally. This dimension is associatedwith hiring and training. If firms can attract the best and brightest, they have the potential to become more proficient auditors. Likewise, firms that provide well-planned tr

44、aining enable their staffs to learn the skills and knowledge needed to perform their audit tasks well.Control processes. Panels of experts also associate high quality with a firm that has strong controls in place over its audit process. GAAS requires a firm to maintain a quality-control system and r

45、equires auditors to adequately plan their audits. There is much leeway, however, in determining how formal and prescriptive these systems need to be. Firms with a more rigorous quality-control system and a more systematic audit methodology process are less likely to have material misstatements go un

46、detected by their audit procedures.Several studies have supported the idea that a strong audit methodology is associatedwith higher quality. Carcello et al. (1995) found that a more structured audit approach is associated with firms that have a higher propensity to issue going concern opinions.GAAS

47、requires the auditor to have processesin place for the acceptanceand continuation of clients. Research indicates that the Big Six were less likely to accept risky clients (Raghunandan and Rama, 1999).Researchindicates that a firm participating in a peer-review process is more likely to correctly rep

48、ort financial disclosures (Krishnan and Schauer,2000). Firms that closely monitored the outcome of their audit process were associated with higher quality.Malone and Roberts (1996) found that auditors with stronger quality control systems were less likely to participate in reduced audit quality beha

49、viors, such as inappropriately signing off on audit steps. Thus, a strong quality control system produces a highe-rquality audit.Industry experience. Firms that have multiple clients in the same industry bring a more in-depth understanding to the unique audit risks presented by a particular industry

50、. Firms that have few clients in a particular industry may not have the critical mass to keep up with industry news and practices. Research indicates that specialization in a particular industry is a growing trend, and researchers have found that firms with specializations have financial savings and

51、 quality gains (Hogan and Jeter, 1999). Craswell et al. (1995) reported that industry specialist firms command a fee premium, which may indicate a price differential for quality. The more clients a firm has in a particular industry, the more it can build a reputation for servicing that industry. Thu

52、s, researchers have hypothesized that firms with a higher concentration of clients in a particular industry will have higher quality because they have more to lose (Deis and Giroux, 1992).Audit Team CharacteristicsThe second group of characteristics identified by the expert panels relates specifical

53、ly to the audit team members. When the accounting and auditing experts were surveyed, they indicated that audit team factors were more important than firm -wide factors in determining audit quality. The firm that hires well, implements a strong control process, and has industry experience will likel

54、y field a high-quality audit team.Partner and manager attention. The experts reported that partner and manager attention to the engagement is associated with audit quality. GAAS requires that audits be properly supervised and assigned. The availability during fieldwork of the seasonedjudgment of an

55、experienced auditor provides authoritative responses to technical and procedural questions.Planning and conduct of the audit work. GAAS states that the audit must be properly planned and performed to have reasonableassuranceof detecting material misstatements. Firms that have strong audit firm facto

56、rs will likely have the people and processes in place to ensure proper planning and performance.Professionalism, persistence, and skepticism. Expert panels also identify the integrity of the individuals assigned to the engagement as a factor in detecting material misstatements. Staff that exhibit a

57、high level of professionalism are more likely to perform their audit tasks correctly and not sign off on uncompleted audit steps. Similarly, staff that maintain persistent skepticism are less likely to accept insufficient evidence.Experience with the client. The experts reported that experience with

58、 a specific client leads to a higher-quality audit. Staff on repeat audits are more likely to gain a better understanding of how the client's business processeswork and the particular strengths and weaknessesin the client's accounting systems.They are able to more readily identify the areas

59、that had the most risk and errors from the previous year and then devote additional time to these areas.Experience in the industry. Working on multiple clients within the same industry allows the staff to become expert in the processes and procedures unique to that industry. By understanding the common weaknesses, risks, and issues faced by a particular industry, an auditor can be more confident and persistent when assessing the evidence presented by the clien