哈佛分析框架-外文文獻(xiàn)及翻譯

1、哈佛分析框架外文文獻(xiàn)及翻譯經(jīng)營(yíng)分析與估值克雷沙 G.帕利普保羅 M.希利摘自書籍 “Business Analysis and Valuation ” 第五版第一章節(jié)1 .簡(jiǎn)介本章的目的是勾勒出一個(gè)全面的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表分析框 架。因?yàn)樨?cái)務(wù)報(bào)表提供給公共企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)最廣泛使用 的數(shù)據(jù)，投資者和其他利益相關(guān)者依靠財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告評(píng)估計(jì) 劃企業(yè)和管理績(jī)效率。各種各樣的問(wèn)題可以通過(guò)財(cái)務(wù)狀況及經(jīng)營(yíng)分析解 決，如下面的示例所示：一位證券分析師可能會(huì)對(duì)問(wèn)：“我的公司有多好？這 家公司是否符合我的期望？如果沒有，為什么不呢？鑒 于我對(duì)公司當(dāng)前和未來(lái)業(yè)績(jī)的評(píng)估，該公司的股票價(jià)值 是多少？ ”一位信貸員可能需要問(wèn)：“這家公司貸

2、款給這家公司 有什么貸款？公司管理其流動(dòng)性如何？公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 是什么？公司的融資和股利政策所產(chǎn)生的附加風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是什 么？ “一位管理顧問(wèn)可能會(huì)問(wèn)：“公司經(jīng)營(yíng)的行業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)是什 么？該策略通過(guò)在工業(yè)各個(gè)企業(yè)追求的是什么？不同企 業(yè)在行業(yè)中的相對(duì)表現(xiàn)是什么？ ”公司經(jīng)理可能會(huì)問(wèn)：“我的公司是正確的估值的投資 者嗎？是我們?cè)谕ㄐ懦绦蛑杏凶銐虻耐顿Y者來(lái)促進(jìn)這一 過(guò)程？ ”財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表分析是一項(xiàng)有價(jià)值的活動(dòng)，當(dāng)管理者在一 個(gè)公司的戰(zhàn)略和各種體制因素完成后，他們不可能完全 披露這些信息。在這一設(shè)置中，外部分析師試圖通過(guò)分 析財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)創(chuàng)建“中端信息”，從而獲得有價(jià)值的 關(guān)于該公司目前業(yè)績(jī)和未來(lái)前景的展望。了解財(cái)

3、務(wù)報(bào)表分析所做的貢獻(xiàn)，這是很重要的理解 在資本市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)作，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的作用，形成財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表制 度的力量。因此，我們首先簡(jiǎn)要說(shuō)明這些力量，然后我 們討論的步驟，分析師必須執(zhí)行，以提取信息的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào) 表，并提供有價(jià)值的預(yù)測(cè)。2 .從經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)到財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表企業(yè)管理者負(fù)責(zé)從公司的環(huán)境中獲取物理和財(cái)務(wù)資 源，并利用它們?yōu)楣镜耐顿Y者創(chuàng)造價(jià)值。當(dāng)公司在資 本成本的超額投資時(shí)，就創(chuàng)造了價(jià)值。管理者制定經(jīng)營(yíng) 戰(zhàn)略，實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)，并通過(guò)業(yè)務(wù)活動(dòng)實(shí)施。企業(yè)的經(jīng) 營(yíng)活動(dòng)受其經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境和經(jīng)營(yíng)戰(zhàn)略的影響。經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境包括 企業(yè)的產(chǎn)業(yè)、投入和產(chǎn)出的市場(chǎng)，以及公司經(jīng)營(yíng)的規(guī)章制度。公司的業(yè)務(wù)戰(zhàn)略決定企業(yè)如何定位自己的環(huán)境中 獲得競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。2

4、.1 會(huì)計(jì)制度特點(diǎn)1:權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制會(huì)計(jì)企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的基本特征之一是權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制，它們 是以權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制而不是現(xiàn)金會(huì)計(jì)制備的。 不像現(xiàn)金會(huì)計(jì), 權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制會(huì)計(jì)與經(jīng)濟(jì)交流活動(dòng)和實(shí)際收付現(xiàn)金相關(guān)的 成本和效益的記錄之間的區(qū)別。凈收益是應(yīng)計(jì)制會(huì)計(jì)下 的主要周期性業(yè)績(jī)指標(biāo)。計(jì)算凈收入，生態(tài)影響的經(jīng)濟(jì) 交易記錄的基礎(chǔ)上的預(yù)期，并不一定是實(shí)際的現(xiàn)金支付。 預(yù)期的現(xiàn)金收入交付的產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)被確認(rèn)為收入，和預(yù) 期的現(xiàn)金流出與這些收入被確認(rèn)為費(fèi)用。會(huì)計(jì)的必要性來(lái)自于投資者對(duì)定期財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的需 求。因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)進(jìn)行經(jīng)濟(jì)交易，在持續(xù)的基礎(chǔ)上，在報(bào)告 期導(dǎo)致了一個(gè)有趣的基本測(cè)量問(wèn)題，結(jié)束時(shí)的會(huì)計(jì)帳簿 任意閉合。因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)金會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)告的不完

5、整性，在生態(tài)經(jīng)濟(jì) 帶來(lái)的后果所進(jìn)行的交易。在一定時(shí)期內(nèi)，權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制 會(huì)計(jì)的目的是提供一個(gè)公司的周期性表現(xiàn)更完整的信 廣 后、O2.2 會(huì)計(jì)制度特點(diǎn)2:會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則和審計(jì)采用權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制會(huì)計(jì)是在許多重要的復(fù)雜性企業(yè)財(cái) 務(wù)報(bào)告的中心。由于權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制會(huì)計(jì)處理當(dāng)前事件的預(yù)期未來(lái)現(xiàn)金的后果，它是主觀的，依賴于各種假設(shè)條件。 誰(shuí)應(yīng)該負(fù)責(zé)制定這些假設(shè)條件負(fù)主要責(zé)任？ 一個(gè)公司的 管理者被賦予作出適當(dāng)?shù)墓烙?jì)和假設(shè)編制財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的任 務(wù)，因?yàn)樗麄冇杏H密的了解他們公司的業(yè)務(wù)優(yōu)勢(shì)。經(jīng)理授予的會(huì)計(jì)自由裁量權(quán)可能是有價(jià)值的，因?yàn)?它反映了財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中的內(nèi)部信息。然而，由于投資者認(rèn) 為利潤(rùn)作為衡量管理者的績(jī)效，管理者有動(dòng)機(jī)利用他們

6、 的會(huì)計(jì)自由裁量權(quán)歪曲報(bào)道利潤(rùn)的假設(shè)、偏見。另外， 在公司內(nèi)部和外部之間的合同中使用的會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)字提供了 另一種管理操作的會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)字的動(dòng)機(jī)。在來(lái)管理扭曲了財(cái) 務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)資料，使他們對(duì)前內(nèi)部財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的使用者不值錢。 因此，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的決定，企業(yè)管理者的代表團(tuán)有成本和 收益。許多會(huì)計(jì)慣例已經(jīng)形成，以確保管理者使用他們的 會(huì)計(jì)靈活性來(lái)概括他們對(duì)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)的知識(shí)，而不是 為了自我服務(wù)的目的而偽裝現(xiàn)實(shí)。例如，可測(cè)性和穩(wěn)健 性慣例和會(huì)計(jì)反應(yīng)擔(dān)心扭曲人學(xué)生可能偏向樂(lè)觀。這兩 個(gè)公約都試圖限制管理者對(duì)悲觀偏見的樂(lè)觀偏見。會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則（公認(rèn)會(huì)計(jì)原則），由財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會(huì) （FASB發(fā)布和類似的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)設(shè)定在其他國(guó)家機(jī)構(gòu)，也限

7、制了潛在的扭曲，管理者可以將報(bào)告數(shù)字。統(tǒng)一會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn) 則的嘗試，以降低管理者的能力，以不同的方式記錄類 似的經(jīng)濟(jì)交易，無(wú)論是隨著時(shí)間的推移或跨公司。提高均勻性的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則，然而，是減少管理者反映 他們公司的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表差異真正的業(yè)務(wù)靈活性。嚴(yán)格的會(huì) 計(jì)準(zhǔn)則對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)交易的最佳效果，其會(huì)計(jì)處理不依賴于管 理者的專有信息。然而，當(dāng)有重大的商業(yè)判斷參與評(píng)估 交易的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果，嚴(yán)格的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，防止經(jīng)理利用自己的業(yè) 務(wù)知識(shí)上會(huì)不正常。此外，如果會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則過(guò)于僵化，他 們可能會(huì)促使管理者花費(fèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)資源來(lái)調(diào)整業(yè)務(wù)交易，以 達(dá)到預(yù)期的會(huì)計(jì)結(jié)果。審計(jì)，廣義地定義為一個(gè)對(duì)上報(bào)的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的人比 其他人的完整性驗(yàn)證，確保管理人員利用會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則

8、和慣 例一致，隨著時(shí)間的推移，和他們的會(huì)計(jì)估計(jì)是合理的。 因此，審計(jì)提高會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)的質(zhì)量。第三方審計(jì)也可能會(huì)降低財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的質(zhì)量，因?yàn)樗?限制了會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則和慣例的發(fā)展隨著時(shí)間的推移。 FASBU 為審計(jì)意見在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定過(guò)程中，核數(shù)師很可能會(huì)反對(duì)會(huì) 計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的生產(chǎn)數(shù)據(jù)，這是很難進(jìn)行審計(jì)的，即使擬議的 規(guī)則為投資者提供相關(guān)信息。其中會(huì)計(jì)糾紛經(jīng)理、審計(jì)師的法律環(huán)境，投資者也 可以在裁決報(bào)告數(shù)據(jù)質(zhì)量有顯著的影響。訴訟的威脅和 懲罰的有益效果，證明了信息披露的準(zhǔn)確性。然而，一 個(gè)重要的法律責(zé)任的潛力還有可能阻礙管理人員和審計(jì) 人員從支持會(huì)計(jì)建議重新進(jìn)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)預(yù)測(cè)，如前瞻性信息 披露。2.3 會(huì)計(jì)制度特點(diǎn)3:管理者的

9、報(bào)告策略由于限制管理者對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)失真的能力增加的機(jī) 制，并不是最優(yōu)的利用會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則來(lái)完全消除管理上的靈 活性。因此，現(xiàn)實(shí)世界的會(huì)計(jì)系統(tǒng)給管理者留下相當(dāng)大 的空間來(lái)影響財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表數(shù)據(jù)。一個(gè)公司的報(bào)告策略，即 管理者使用他們的會(huì)計(jì)判斷的方式，對(duì)公司的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表 有重要影響。企業(yè)管理者可以選擇的會(huì)計(jì)和披露政策，使其更或 不難的外部用戶的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告，了解他們的業(yè)務(wù)的真實(shí)經(jīng) 濟(jì)情況。會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則往往提供了一套廣泛的替代品，管理 者可以選擇。止匕外，管理者委托制定一系列的估計(jì)，在 實(shí)施這些會(huì)計(jì)政策。會(huì)計(jì)法規(guī)通常規(guī)定最低披露要求， 但他們不限制經(jīng)理提供額外的披露。一個(gè)卓越的披露策略將使管理者能夠?qū)撛诘纳虡I(yè) 現(xiàn)實(shí)與外部

10、投資者溝通。企業(yè)披露戰(zhàn)略的一個(gè)重要約束 是產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)態(tài)勢(shì)。專有信息的披露有關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)策略 信息和預(yù)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果可能會(huì)傷害公司的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)地位。受 此約束，管理者可以利用財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表提供的評(píng)估公司的真 正的生態(tài)經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績(jī)對(duì)投資者有用的信息。管理者也可以利用財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告策略操縱投資者的感 知。使用自由裁量權(quán)授予他們，管理者可以使投資者難 以及時(shí)識(shí)別性能差。例如，管理者可以選擇交流計(jì)數(shù)的 政策和估計(jì)，以提供一個(gè)樂(lè)觀的評(píng)估公司的真實(shí)表現(xiàn)。 他們也可以讓投資者了解真實(shí)的性能，通過(guò)控制信息自 愿披露程度，性能高。在這種程度上的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表信息對(duì)潛在的商業(yè)性現(xiàn)實(shí) 隨公司在某公司的時(shí)間。這種變化在交流計(jì)數(shù)的質(zhì)量提 供了一個(gè)重要的

11、機(jī)會(huì)和挑戰(zhàn)。3 .從財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的業(yè)務(wù)分析由于管理者的內(nèi)部知識(shí)是會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)的價(jià)值和失真的來(lái) 源，因此財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的外部使用者很難區(qū)分真實(shí)的信息和 失真。無(wú)法撤消會(huì)計(jì)失真，投資者可能“折扣” 一個(gè)公 司的會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)。在這樣做時(shí)，他們做了一個(gè)概率評(píng)估的 程度，一個(gè)公司的報(bào)告數(shù)字反映經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)實(shí)。因此，投資 者只能對(duì)單個(gè)企業(yè)的績(jī)效進(jìn)行不精確的評(píng)估。金融信息 中介可以添加通過(guò)改善投資因素的理解公司的目前的業(yè) 績(jī)和未來(lái)前景價(jià)值。有效的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表分析是有價(jià)值的，因?yàn)樗噲D在管 理者的內(nèi)部信息，從公共財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表數(shù)據(jù)。因?yàn)橹薪闄C(jī)構(gòu) 沒有直接或完全訪問(wèn)這些信息，他們依靠他們的知識(shí)， 該公司的行業(yè)及其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略，以解釋財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表。成功的

12、 中介機(jī)構(gòu)至少有一個(gè)很好的理解，對(duì)行業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)的公司的 經(jīng)理，并合理地了解公司的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略。盡管外界分析人 士與公司的相關(guān)管理者的信息劣勢(shì)，他們更能客觀評(píng)價(jià) 其經(jīng)濟(jì)后果公司的投資管理和經(jīng)營(yíng)決策。我們需要利用 財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表來(lái)完成四個(gè)關(guān)鍵步驟：（1）企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略分析、（2） 會(huì)計(jì)分析、（3）財(cái)務(wù)分析和（4）前景分析。3.1 分析步驟一：戰(zhàn)略分析企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略分析的目的是確定關(guān)鍵利潤(rùn)驅(qū)動(dòng)程序和業(yè) 務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，并在一個(gè)定性的水平評(píng)估公司的利潤(rùn)潛力。業(yè) 務(wù)戰(zhàn)略分析涉及到一個(gè)公司的行業(yè)分析和建立一個(gè)可持 續(xù)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的戰(zhàn)略。這種定性分析是一個(gè)重要的第一 步，因?yàn)樗狗治鰩熌軌蚋玫貙?duì)以后的會(huì)計(jì)和財(cái)務(wù)分 析框架進(jìn)行分析。考試簡(jiǎn)單，

13、識(shí)別關(guān)鍵成功因素和關(guān)鍵 業(yè)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的關(guān)鍵會(huì)計(jì)政策允許的識(shí)別。評(píng)價(jià)一個(gè)企業(yè)的 競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略有利于評(píng)價(jià)評(píng)估是否當(dāng)前的盈利能力是可持續(xù) 的。最后，業(yè)務(wù)分析使分析師能夠做出合理的假設(shè)，在 預(yù)測(cè)公司的未來(lái)表現(xiàn)。3.2 分析步驟二：會(huì)計(jì)分析會(huì)計(jì)分析的目的是評(píng)估一個(gè)公司的會(huì)計(jì)捕捉到的基 本業(yè)務(wù)的真實(shí)程度。通過(guò)確定有帳戶的靈活性，并通過(guò) 評(píng)估公司的會(huì)計(jì)政策的恰當(dāng)性和估計(jì)，分析師可以評(píng)估 在一個(gè)公司的會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)字失真的程度。在財(cái)務(wù)分析中的另 一個(gè)重要的步驟是“撤銷”任何會(huì)計(jì)系統(tǒng)通過(guò)重鑄公司 會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)創(chuàng)建公正的會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)。健全的會(huì)計(jì)分析，提高了結(jié)論的可靠性從財(cái)務(wù)分析系統(tǒng)，為下一步的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表 分析。3.3 分析步驟三：財(cái)務(wù)分析

14、財(cái)務(wù)分析的目的是利用財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)評(píng)估一個(gè)公司的 當(dāng)前和過(guò)去的財(cái)務(wù)狀況和評(píng)估其可持續(xù)性。與財(cái)務(wù)分析 相關(guān)的重要技能。首先，分析應(yīng)是系統(tǒng)和有效的。其次, 分析應(yīng)允許分析師使用財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)，探討業(yè)務(wù)問(wèn)題。比率 分析和現(xiàn)金流分析是最常用的金融工具。比率分析的重 點(diǎn)是企業(yè)的產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)和財(cái)務(wù)政策的評(píng)價(jià)；現(xiàn)金流量 分析公司的變現(xiàn)能力和財(cái)務(wù)彈性。3.4 分析步驟四：前景分析前景分析，專注于預(yù)測(cè)公司的未來(lái)，是業(yè)務(wù)分析的 最后一步。前瞻性分析中常用的技術(shù)是財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表預(yù)測(cè)和 估值。這些工具允許從業(yè)務(wù)分析，研究會(huì)計(jì)分析和財(cái)務(wù) 分析的合成，從而在前期分析出關(guān)于公司的未來(lái)。雖然公司的價(jià)值是其未來(lái)現(xiàn)金流性能的功能，它也 有可能評(píng)

15、估公司的價(jià)值基礎(chǔ)上的公司目前的賬面價(jià)值的 股票，其未來(lái)的回報(bào)率（凈資產(chǎn)收益率）和增長(zhǎng)。戰(zhàn)略 分析、會(huì)計(jì)分析和財(cái)務(wù)分析，在這里討論的框架的前三 個(gè)步驟，提供一個(gè)公司的內(nèi)在價(jià)值估算前良好的基礎(chǔ)。 戰(zhàn)略分析，除了有利的會(huì)計(jì)和財(cái)務(wù)分析，也有助于評(píng)估 潛在的變化，企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)和他們對(duì)公司未來(lái)的凈資 產(chǎn)收益率和增長(zhǎng)的影響。會(huì)計(jì)分析提供了一個(gè)公司的現(xiàn) 行賬面價(jià)值和凈資產(chǎn)收益率的無(wú)偏估計(jì)。財(cái)務(wù)分析讓你 獲得了 一個(gè)深入了解什么推動(dòng)了公司目前的資產(chǎn)收益 率。從一個(gè)健全的業(yè)務(wù)分析的預(yù)測(cè)是有用的各種當(dāng)事 人，可以應(yīng)用在不同的環(huán)境中。分析的確切性質(zhì)將取決 于上下文。我們將探討包括證券分析、信用評(píng)估的情況 下，兼并和

16、收購(gòu)，債務(wù)和股利政策評(píng)估，評(píng)估公司率通 信策略。上面描述的四個(gè)分析步驟是有用的，在每一個(gè) 這些上下文中。然而，適當(dāng)?shù)厥褂眠@些工具，需要熟悉 的經(jīng)濟(jì)理論和體制因素相關(guān)的背景。4 .總結(jié)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表提供的公共企業(yè)生態(tài)經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的最廣泛使 用的數(shù)據(jù)；投資者和其他利益相關(guān)者依靠他們來(lái)評(píng)估計(jì) 劃與企業(yè)和企業(yè)管理者績(jī)效。在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中的權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生 制會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)是嘈雜的，和沒有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的投資者可以評(píng)估企 業(yè)績(jī)效不僅是準(zhǔn)確的。財(cái)務(wù)分析師誰(shuí)理解管理者的披露 策略有機(jī)會(huì)從公開數(shù)據(jù)中創(chuàng)建內(nèi)部信息，他們發(fā)揮了寶 貴的作用，使外部各方評(píng)估公司的當(dāng)前和未來(lái)的表現(xiàn)。本章概述了對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)狀況及經(jīng)營(yíng)分析的框架，使用的 四個(gè)關(guān)鍵步驟：企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略分析、

17、會(huì)計(jì)分析、財(cái)務(wù)分析和前景分析。本書中的其余章節(jié)詳細(xì)描述了這些步驟，并 討論了它們?nèi)绾卧诟鞣N業(yè)務(wù)環(huán)境中使用附：Business Analysis and Valuation KG Palepu , PM Healy From the literature of the first chapter of the Fifth Edition Business Analysis and Valuation ” 1. IntroductionThe purpose of this chapter is to outline a comprehensive framework for financial

18、statement analysis. Because financial statements provide the most widely availabl e data on public corporations ' economic activities, investors and other stake- holders rely on financial reports to assess the plans and performance of firms and corpo- rate managers.A variety of questions can be

19、addressed by business analysis using financial state- ments, as shown in the following examples:? A security analyst may be interested in asking:“ How well is the firm I am follow - ing performing? Did the firm meet my performance expectations? If not, why not? What is the value of the firm ' st

20、ock given my assessment of the firm ' scurrent and future performance? ”? A loan officer may need to ask: "What is the credit risk involved in lending a certain amount of money to this firm? How well is the firm managing its liquidity and sol- vency? What is the firm ' s business risk?

21、What is the additional risk created by the firm ' s financing and dividend policies?”? A management consultant might ask: "What is the structure of the industry in which the firm is operating? What are the strategies pursued by various players in the in- dustry? What is the relative perform

22、ance of different firms in the industry?”? A corporate manager may ask: "Is my firm properly valued by investors? Is our in- vestor communication program adequate to facilitate this process? ”Financial statement analysis is a valuable activity when managers have complete in- formation on a firm

23、 ' s strategies and a variety of institutional factors make it unlikely that they fully disclose this information. In this setting, outside analysts attempt to create “in side information from analyzing financial statement data, thereby gaining valuable in- sights about the firm ' s current

24、performance and future prospects.To understand the contribution that financial statement analysis can make, it is im- portant to understand the role of financial reporting in the functioning of capital markets and the institutional forces that shape financial statements. Therefore, we present first

25、a brief description of these forces; then we discuss the steps that an analyst must perform to extract information from financial statements and provide valuable forecasts.2 .From business activities to financial statementsCorporate managers are responsible for acquiring physical and financial resou

26、rces from the firm ' s environment and using them to create value for the firm ' s investors. Value is created when the firm earns a return on its investment in excess of the cost of capital. Managers formulate business strategies to achieve this goal, and they implement them through busines

27、s activities. A firm ' business activities are influenced by its economic environment and its own business strategy. The economic environment includes the firm' s indus its input and output markets, and the regulations under which the firm operates. The firm ' business strategy determine

28、s how the firm positions itself in its environment to achieve a competitive advantage.2.1 Accounting System Feature 1: Accrual AccountingOne of the fundamental features of corporate financial reports is that they are prepared using accrual rather than cash accounting. Unlike cash accounting, accrual

29、 accounting distinguishes between the recording of costs and benefits associated with economic activities and the actual payment and receipt of cash. Net income is the primary periodic performance index under accrual accounting. To compute net income, the effects of eco- nomic transactions are recor

30、ded on the basis of expected, not necessarily actual, cash re- ceipts and payments. Expected cash receipts from the delivery of products or services are recognized as revenues, and expected cash outflows associated with these revenues are recognized as expenses.The need for accrual accounting arises

31、 from investors demand for financial reports on a periodic basis. Because firms undertake economic transactions on a continual basis, the arbitrary closing of accounting books at the end of a reporting period leads to a fundamental measurement problem. Since cash accounting does not report the full

32、eco- nomic consequence of the transactions undertaken in a given period, accrual accounting is designed to provide more complete information on a firm ' s periodic performance.2.2 Accounting System Feature 2: Accounting Standards and AuditingThe use of accrual accounting lies at the center of ma

33、ny important complexities in cor- porate financial reporting. Because accrual accounting deals with expectations of future cash consequences of current events, it is subjective and relies on a variety of assumptions. Who should be charged with the primary responsibility of making these assump- tions

34、? A firm s managers are entrusted with the task of making the appropriate estimates and assumptions to prepare thefinancial statements because they have intimate knowledge of their firm ' s businessThe accounting discretion granted to managers is potentially valuable because it al- lows them to

35、reflect inside information in reported financial statements. However, since investors view profits as a measure of managers ' performance, managers have incentives to use their accounting discretion to distort reported profits by making biased assump- tions. Further, the use of accounting number

36、s in contracts between the firm and outsiders provides another motivation for management manipulation of accounting numbers. Income management distorts financial accounting data, making them less valuable to ex- ternal users of financial statements. Therefore, the delegation of financial reporting d

37、ecisions to corporate managers has both costs and benefits.A number of accounting conventions have evolvedto ensure that managers use their accounting flexibility activities, and not to disguise reality for self-serving purposes. For example, the measurability and conservatism conventions are accoun

38、ting responses to concerns about distortions from man- agers ' potentially optimistic bias. Both these conventions attempt to limit managers ' optimistic bias by imposing their own pessimistic bias.to summarize their knowledge of the firmbsusinessAccounting standards (Generally Accepted Acco

39、unting Principles), promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and similar standard-setting bodies in other countries, also limit potential distortions that managers can introduce into reported numbers. Uniform accounting standards attempt to reduce managers ; ability to record s

40、imilar economic transactions in dissimilar ways, either over time or across firms.Increased uniformity from accounting standards, however, comes at the expense of reduced flexibility for managers to reflect genuine business differences in their firm sfi - nancial statements. Rigid accounting standar

41、ds work best for economic transactions whose accounting treatment is not predicated on managers proprietary information. However, when there is significant business judgment involved in assessing a transac- tion ; economic consequences, rigid standards which prevent managers from using their superio

42、r business knowledge would be dysfunctional. Further, if accounting standards are too rigid, they may induce managers to expend economic resources to restructure business transactions to achieve a desired accounting result.Auditing, broadly defined as a verification of the integrity of the reported

43、financial statements by someone other than the preparer, ensures that managers use accounting rules and conventions consistently over time, and that their accounting estimates are reasonable. Therefore, auditing improves the quality of accounting data.Third-party auditing may also reduce the quality

44、 of financial reporting because it constrains the kind of accounting rules and conventions that evolve over time. For ex- ample, the FASB considers the views of auditors in the standard-setting process. Auditors are likely to argue against accounting standards producing numbers that are difficult to

45、 audit, even if the proposed rules produce relevant information for investors.The legal environment in which accounting disputes between managers, auditors, and investors are adjudicated can also have a significant effect on the quality of reported numbers. The threat of lawsuits and resulting penal

46、ties have the beneficial effect of improving the accuracy of disclosure. However, the potential for a significant legal liability might also discourage managers and auditors from supporting accounting proposals re- quiring risky forecasts, such as forward-looking disclosures.2.3 Accounting System Fe

47、ature 3: Managers ' Reporting StrategyBecause the mechanisms that limit managers ability to distort accounting data add noise, it is not optimal to use accounting regulation to eliminate managerial flexibility completely. Therefore, real-worldaccounting systems leave considerable room for manage

48、rs to influence financial statement data. A firm reporting strategy, that is, the manner in which managers use their accounting discretion, has an important influence on the firm' s financial statementsCorporate managers can choose accounting and disclosure policies that make it more or less dif

49、ficult for external users of financial reports to understand the true economic picture of their businesses. Accounting rules often provide a broad set of alternatives from which managers can choose. Further, managers are entrusted with making a range of estimates in implementing these accounting pol

50、icies. Accounting regulations usually prescribe minimum disclosure requirements, but they do not restrict managers from vol- untarily providing additional disclosures.A superior disclosure strategy will enable managers to communicate the underlying business reality to outside investors. One importan

51、t constraint on a firm disclosure strategy is the competitive dynamics in product markets. Disclosure of proprietary information about business strategies and their expected economic consequences may hurt the fir m s competitive position. Subject to this constraint, managers can use financial statem

52、ents to provide information useful to investors in assessing their firm tsrue eco- nomic performance.Managers can also use financial reporting strategies to manipulate investors percep- tions. Using the discretion granted to them, managers can make it difficult for investors to identify poor perform

53、ance on a timely basis. For example, managers can choose accounting policies and estimates to provide an optimistic assessment of the firm ' frue performance. They can also make it costly for investors to understand the true perfor- mance by controlling the extent of information that is disclose

54、d voluntarily.The extent to which financial statements are informative about the underlying busi- ness reality varies across firms and across time for a given firm. This variation in ac- counting quality provides both an important opportunity and a challenge in doing business analysis. The process t

55、hrough which analysts can separate noise from informa- tion in financial statements, and gain valuable business insights from financial statement analysis, is discussed next.3 . From financial statements to bussiness analysisBecause managers ; insider knowledge is a source both of value and distorti

56、on in account- ing data, it is difficult for outside users of financial statements to separate true information from distortion and noise. Not being able to undo accounting distortions completely, investors a discount a firm ' sreported accountin g performance. In doing so, they make a probabili

57、stic assessment of the extent to which a firm ' seportednumbers reflect economic reality. As a result, investors can have only an imprecise assessment of an individual firm ' s performance. Financial and info rmation intermediaries can add value by improving inves- tors understanding of a fi

58、rm csurrent performance and its future prospects.Effective financial statement analysis is valuable because it attempts to get at managers ' inside informationfrom public financial statement data.Because intermediaries do not have direct or complete access to this information, they rely on their

59、 knowledge of the firm insdustry and its competitive strategies to interpret financial statements. Successful intermediarieshave at least as good an understanding of the industryeconomics as do the firm good understanding of the firms managers, and a reasonablycsompetitive strategy.Although outside analysts have an information disadvantage relative to the firm- erss,mthaenyagare more objective in evaluating the economic consequences of the firm ' sivest- ment and operating deci