工程管理英文翻譯

1、英 文 翻 譯姓 名：王嬋娟學(xué) 號(hào)：1102090218指導(dǎo)教師：白芙蓉專 業(yè)：工程管理班 級(jí)：1102班時(shí) 間：2015年4月25日工 程 管 理 系工程管理系英文翻譯評(píng)價(jià)表學(xué)生姓名王嬋娟性別女學(xué)號(hào)1102090218外文文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)題Do Buyer Incentives Work for Houses during a Real Estate Downturn?外文文獻(xiàn)出處 # Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012以下內(nèi)容由指導(dǎo)教師填寫（打勾“”選擇）評(píng)價(jià)項(xiàng)目評(píng)價(jià)結(jié)論打勾評(píng)價(jià)結(jié)論打勾評(píng)價(jià)結(jié)論打勾是否外文期刊文獻(xiàn)是否與本人論文相關(guān)完全相關(guān)一般

2、不相關(guān)翻譯工作量超負(fù)荷飽和不飽和翻譯態(tài)度認(rèn)真一般不認(rèn)真翻譯進(jìn)度按計(jì)劃執(zhí)行一般未按計(jì)劃執(zhí)行翻譯訓(xùn)練效果優(yōu)良中差綜 合 評(píng) 語（是否完成了規(guī)定任務(wù)、效果是否符合要求等）指導(dǎo)教師簽名： 2015年 4 月 25日 注：此表與翻譯文本一起裝訂英文原文Title：Do Buyer Incentives Work for Houses during a Real Estate Downturn?Kenneth W. Soyeh & Jonathan A. Wiley & Ken H. JohnsonPublished online: 31 October 2012# Springer Sc

3、ience+Business Media New York 2012Abstract The impact of incentives on marketing duration is examined for residential real estate using data from the Multiple Listing Service during a real estate downturn.The focus is on incentives offered directly by sellers to potential homebuyers. The evidence su

4、ggests that incentives are not capitalized into the selling price during the softened market conditions. Alternatively, incentives are found to have a significant reduction in marketing time, however this is found to be true only for closing costs and not for other incentive classifications. The ben

5、efit of reduced expected market time from offering incentives is quickly diminished when the seller initially overprices the listing by a large amount.【Key words】Incentives; Brokerage; Residential;Transactions ;OverpricingIntroduction In mid-2010, the Wall Street Journal reported a nationwide invent

6、ory excess in the U.S. housing markets of approximately 2.4 million units (Whelan 2010). The home ownership vacancy rate at the same point in time was 2.6 % for the nation. This was within 30 basis points of the highest level of vacancy since tracking this statistic began in 1956.1 There is no evide

7、nce that the effects of this recent supply shock have lessened in scale since then. Is it possible that this scale of excess supply of housing units intensifies competition among sellers and limits the potential benefits from aggressive pricing strategies and other buyer incentives? The purpose of t

8、his study is to directly investigate this question. A better understanding of the efficacy of buyer incentives should help significantly as the nations excess housing inventory is cleared from the market. More specifically in this study, the impact of home seller incentives on marketing outcomes is

9、examined using a sample of transactions from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) dataset in Boca Raton, Florida. The focus in this study is on the use of incentives offered by sellers directly to homebuyers, which are individually identified in the data collection. The primary interest is on the effe

10、ctiveness of incentives and their ability to impact both property transaction price and property duration span. The sample period covers 2009 through 2011, which coincides with depressed real estate conditions in the subject market and is similar to market conditions around the country at the same t

11、ime. Incentives for homebuyers come in a number of forms, including financing premiums,closing costs, credits for repairs, homeowner association (HOA) fees, home warranties, and others that include perks which are unrelated to the financing. The expected impact depends on which premium is proposed.

12、Financing premiums include interest rate buy-downs, such as discount points, or below-market financing in the form of assumable mortgages and seller financing. Potential homebuyers who use debt financing may be willing to pay a higher price for a property with financing premiums included, up to the

13、amount of their individual valuation for that premium and subject to constraints of increased cash requirements for settlement at a higher price. An individual valuation of the financing premium will be less than the cost to the seller when the buyer has a household cost of capital that is greater t

14、han the interest cost on the mortgage debt or when the individual does not expect to hold the property for the duration of the mortgage term; both of which are likely to be the case given that mortgage debt is typically the lowest cost source of capital for a household and the expected holding perio

15、d is often less than the term of the standard mortgage instrument. For these reasons, financing premiums are not expected to be fully capitalized into the selling price. If a seller offering financing premiums as incentives does not require a higher price, then the financing premium should result in

16、 a reduction in the expected marketing duration. The required price by the seller can be signaled through the listing price. If the listing price is increased substantially in combination with the financing premium, then the potential impact to the marketing duration is reduced in exchange for an at

17、tempt to capitalize the financing premium into the transaction price. The utility of the financing premium for buyers can be valuable during periods of high interest rates. However, weakened real estate market conditions tend to coincide with periods of low interest rates, which limits the potential

18、 effectiveness of financing premiums during real estate downturns. For the sample considered in this study, financing premiums do not appear to be offered at all as incentives for potential homebuyers. By comparison, when a seller offers to pay some portion of the buyers closing costs, that amount i

19、s delivered at closing and undiscounted so that its valuation does not rely on an individual buyers discount rate. In addition, prospective homebuyers who do not use debt financing in the home purchase can benefit from the cash payment at closing. The benefit from closing costs is immediate and inde

20、pendent of the interest rate environment with appeal to a broader base of potential homebuyers, providing this concession with distinct advantages during weakened market conditions. During healthy market conditions, there is the potential to fully capitalize closing costs paid by the seller into the

21、 selling price when there are buyers who are constrained by the settlement cash required for closing. When the seller does not require that the closing costs are fully capitalized, the immediate cash advantage is available to all potential homebuyers and expected to reduce the marketing duration.Dur

22、ing a downturn, there is increased price competition among sellers and it can be more difficult or impractical to price aggressively in an attempt to capitalize closing cost concessionsin which case the expected impact shifts to shorten the marketing duration for properties that are priced competiti

23、vely. Credits offered for repairs are often associated with deferred maintenance properties and those repairs may be necessary to obtain a competitive selling price. When the repair credits are appropriate to the necessary adjustment, the impact on price should be zero although marketing duration ma

24、y be extended relative to properties that do not suffer from deferred maintenance. HOA fees are similar to financing premiums in the sense that the valuation depends on the individual buyer, however the impact is expected to be much smaller since the offer is typically for the seller to pay HOA fees

25、 over a very short term, for example 1 or 2 years rather than for the life of the mortgage loan. If contributions toward HOA fees are offered in communities where fees are relatively high, then the expected impact is to achieve a similar price relative to competitive properties in communities where

26、HOA fees are lower, rather than to sell at a higher price or reduce marketing durations. Home warranties and many other perquisites, including personal property or vacations, can be classified as unrelated to the monthly mortgage payment and the cash required for settlement. These assets are often q

27、uite small when expressed as a percentage of the purchase price and can easily be purchased in the private market apart from the residential transaction, so the impact on selling price is limited. Incentives that do not directly relax the payment or settlement cash constraints have limited potential

28、 to increase the pool of interested home buyers at a given listing price and would not be expected to significantly reduce marketing duration unless the value of the asset offered is relatively high. To consider the effectiveness of incentives in a depressed real estate market for the impact on both

29、 marketing duration and selling price, a three-stage model is developed to estimate the impact of incentives on price and duration span. In the first stage, the estimation is for the determinants of incentives being offered by sellers, including market conditions. In the second stage, the transactio

30、n price is estimated and the impact from the use of incentives is isolated, controlling underlying conditions relating to incentive selection. The third stage estimates the hazard model for marketing duration effects, if any, including the potential impact from incentives. The interaction between in

31、centives and overpricing by sellers is also explored, and incentives are considered in separate categories to identify individual effectiveness. The contributions of this study are to document that many conventional incentives fail to prove effective during a downmarket, that only closing cost conce

32、ssions have any reliable impact, and that overpricing a property has the potential to entirely cancel the expected benefit from offering incentives. A preponderance of the evidence suggests that incentives are not capitalized into the final transaction price; this is in contrast to the findings of A

33、sabere and Huffman (1997) and Johnson et al. (2000) who conclude that seller paid concessions capitalize into the final transaction price when considering outcomes under favorable market conditions, although marketing mduration was not considered in those studies. Ferreira and Sirmans (1989) appears

34、 to be the only other study to consider the impact of incentives on marketing duration, although the consideration is for financing premiums which does not appear to be offered by sellers in the low interest rate environment considered in our study. Instead, it is closing cost incentives alone that

35、are found to have an impact and their impact is to significantly shorten marketing spans during a downmarket, rather to affect the transaction price. The advantage to closing cost concessions is that it is a lump-sumat closing potentially expanding to the pool of buyers who are constrained by settle

36、ment cash, it potentially benefits all homebuyers including those who do not use debt financing, its valuation does not depend on an individuals discount factor and the effectiveness is independent of the interest rate environment. Finally, the potential benefit from all incentives is quickly dimini

37、shed as property listing price exceeds market expected listed price. The interaction between overpricing and incentives has not been previously considered. The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The next section provides background and additional motivation for the study. This is follow

38、ed with a section on data description and methodology. The last two sections discuss the results and provide concluding comments.Background and Additional Motivation In the very competitive market setting in which most sellers find themselves presently, there are three primary ways of attracting pot

39、ential homebuyers. The first is to price the property competitively. The second method is to offer incentives to brokers. And the third, which remains a relatively unexplored area, is the opportunity for sellers to offer incentives directly to homebuyers. Consideration for the relevance of list pric

40、e has been examined at length in the real estate economics literature. Related studies find that sellers often signal their motivation through many strategies including, but not limited to, setting the initial list price at or below market value for the property (Benjamin and Chinloy 2000). Along th

41、ese lines, Haurin (1988) provides evidence that buyers often constrain their search to consider only properties within a narrowly-defined price range and for specific characteristics. The degree of overpricing thins out the volume of traffic from potential buyers and increases the probability of a l

42、engthy marketing period (Springer 1996). A listing price that is too high also reduces the frequency of offers for a property (Green and Vandell 1994). The empirical evidence on whether selling broker incentives reduce marketing duration is mixed. Zorn and Larsen (1986) conducted a study on the ince

43、ntive effects of flat-fee and percentage commissions for real estate brokers. The authors find that neither a percentage commission nor a flat-flee motivates a broker to increase his or her level of search for a potential buyer. In a related study, Anglin and Arnott (1991) find that the percentage c

44、ommission contract performs poorly by failing to allocate risk and to provide broker incentives efficiently. They note further that a percentage commission influences a broker to expend less effort and bear greater risk. Munneke and Yavas (2001), among others, investigate how the difference in commi

45、ssion structures affects the performance of agents at full-commission firms (i.e., RE/MAX real estate agents) against those in traditional firms. At RE/MAX, brokers pay a fixed fee to the agency for office space, secretarial services and keep the full commission as opposed to splitting the commissio

46、n with the agency in traditionalm firms. They find that the equilibrium selling price and the expected time it takes to sell a listed property through a full-commission agent and a traditional agent do not differ. Alternatively, Johnson et al. (2008) find that after controlling for self-selection is

47、sues properties marketed by full-compensation brokers (i.e. RE/MAX like brokers) sell at a slight premium and in significantly shorter marketing spans. Alternatively, Johnson et al. (2004) find that properties marketed by listing brokers sold at a reduced price and stayed longer on market when the s

48、elling brokers were offered bonus incentives.The influence of non-cash incentives for brokers to close a deal faster has also been the subject of investigation. Geltner et al. (1991) show that under a finiteduration listing contract, the brokers search efforts to find a buyer will increase over time

49、. They note that as the contract term declines, the agents effort level improves while their incentive to provide complete market information becomes weaker.Waller et al. (2010) share a similar view by advocating that a longer listing contract period given to the listing broker to sell a house will

50、diminish broker effort, reduce search intensity and lead to a longer marketing time. A study by Miceli (1989), on the effects of listing contract length, finds that a limit on the duration of the listing contract can be effective in increasing broker effort. However, the author notes that the limita

51、tion brings with it a cost to the seller since the best efforts of the agent might not achieve a sale within the speculated time frame. Brastow et al. (2011) assert that if the listing contract term is too long, the broker may not exert effort until the contract is closer to expiration due to the fa

52、ct that other contract listings that are about to expire soon might be put on the priority list of the broker. The few studies that examine incentives offered to potential purchasers directly from sellers tend to focus exclusively on discount points and/or closing costs and how such concessions are

53、capitalized into the selling price of a house. Ferreira and Sirmans (1989) consider financing premiums only and find that their announcement in the listing has a positive impact on the transaction price under favorable market conditions, and impacts only the marketing duration when conditions are no

54、t favorable to sellers. Asabere and Huffman (1997) consider both discount points and closing costs in a separate analysis and document that discounts points are capitalized into the selling price, but find no evidence that closing costs have an impact on the selling prices. Johnson et al. (2000) fin

55、d that the total seller concessions, including both discount points and closing costs together, are entirely capitalized into the contract price. From the discussion in this section, it is apparent that much of literature on incentives has tended to concentrate on incentives to selling brokers with

56、little consensus on their impact. However, the final decision to purchase a property is 38to establish a more direct linkage for the effectiveness of incentives. For the few studies that have focused on this connection, the evidence is for primarily financing premiums offered by sellers, which have

57、lost favor in the present low interest rate environment. The research reported in the present study contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of modern incentives when they are most needed, including during depressed market conditions and when previously evaluated incentives (i.e., finan

58、cing premiums) are unlikely to work. In addition, this study introduces analysis for the interaction between overpricing and the effectiveness of incentives which previously has not been considered.Data and MethodologyData The data comes from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) in Boca Raton, FL and

59、includes a total of 2,689 observations of sold properties collected from November 15, 2009 through November 15, 2011. The data contains information on property characteristics, location and other seller attributes including, but not limited to, whether the property is a foreclosure, vacant, or the seller