美國經濟評論英文

1、american economic review美國經濟評論volume 100, issue 4，20101. title: morally motivated self-regulation.authors: baron, david p.abstract: self-regulation is the private provision of public goods and private redistribution. this paper examines the scope of self-regulation motivated by altruistic moral pref

2、erences that are reciprocal and stronger the closer are citizens in a socioeconomic distance. the focus is on the role of organizations in increasing self-regulation by mitigating free-rider problems. social label and certification organizations can expand the scope of self-regulation but not beyond

3、 that with unconditional altruism. enforcement organizations expand the scope of self-regulation farther, and for-profit enforcement is more aggressive than non-profit enforcement. enforcement through social pressure imposed by ngos also expands the scope of self-regulation.2. title: identifying the

4、 elasticity of substitution with biased technical change.authors: león-ledesma, miguel a; mcadam, peter; willman, alpo.abstract: the capital-labor substitution elasticity and technical biases in production are critical parameters. the received wisdom claims their joint identification is infeasi

5、ble. we challenge that interpretation. putting the new approach of 'normalized' production functions at the heart of a monte carlo analysis we identify the conditions under which identification is feasible and robust. the key result is that jointly modeling the production function and first-

6、order conditions is superior to single-equation approaches especially when merged with 'normalization.' our results will have fundamental implications for production-function estimation under non-neutral technical change, for understanding the empirical relevance of normalization and variabi

7、lity underlying past empirical studies.3. title: social comparisons and contributions to online communities: a field experiment on movielens.authors: chen, yan; harper, f. maxwell; konstan, joseph; li, sherry xin.abstract: we design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to incre

8、ase contributions to an online community. we find that, after receiving behavioral information about the median user's total number of movie ratings, users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings, while those above the median decrease their rati

9、ngs by 62 percent. when given outcome information about the average user's net benefit score, above-average users mainly engage in activities that help others. our findings suggest that effective personalized social information can increase the level of public goods provision.4. title: are healt

10、h insurance markets competitive?authors: dafny, leemore s.abstract: to gauge the competitiveness of the group health insurance industry, i investigate whether health insurers charge higher premiums, ceteris paribus, to more profitable firms. such 'direct price discrimination' is feasible onl

11、y in imperfectly competitive settings. using a proprietary national database of health plans offered by a sample of large, multisite firms from 1998-2005, i find firms with positive profit shocks subsequently face higher premium growth, even for the same health plans. moreover, within a given firm,

12、those sites located in concentrated insurance markets experience the greatest premium increases. the findings suggest health care insurers are exercising market power in an increasing number of geographic markets.5. title: wage risk and employment risk over the life cycle.authors: low, hamish; meghi

13、r, costas; pistaferri, luigi.abstract: we specify a life-cycle model of consumption, labor supply and job mobility in an economy with search frictions. we distinguish different sources of risk, including shocks to productivity, job arrival, and job destruction. allowing for job mobility has a large

14、effect on the estimate of productivity risk. increases in the latter impose a considerable welfare loss. increases in employment risk have large effects on output and, primarily through this channel, affect welfare. the welfare value of programs such as food stamps, partially insuring productivity r

15、isk, is greater than the value of unemployment insurance which provides (partial) insurance against employment risk.6. title: the law of the few.authors: galeotti, andrea; goyal, sanjeev.abstract: empirical work shows that a large majority of individuals get most of their information from a very sma

16、ll subset of the group, viz., the influencers; moreover, there exist only minor differences between the observable characteristics of the influencers and the others. we refer to these empirical findings as the law of the few. this paper develops a model where players personally acquire information a

17、nd form connections with others to access their information. every (robust) equilibrium of this model exhibits the law of the few.7. title: technology capital and the us current account.authors: mcgrattan, ellen r; prescott, edward c.abstract: the us bureau of economic analysis (bea) estimates that

18、the return on investments of foreign subsidiaries of us multinational companies over the period 1982-2006 averaged 9.4 percent annually after taxes; us subsidiaries of foreign multinationals averaged only 3.2 percent. bea returns on foreign direct investment (fdi) are distorted because most intangib

19、le investments made by multinationals are expensed. we develop a multicountry general equilibrium model with an essential role for fdi and apply the bea's methodology to construct economic statistics for the model economy. we estimate that mismeasurement of intangible investments accounts for ov

20、er 60 percent of the difference in bea returns.8. title: sovereign risk and secondary markets.authors: broner, fernando; martin, alberto; ventura, jaume.abstract: conventional wisdom says that, in the absence of default penalties, sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade. we show that this co

21、nventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets. without this assumption, foreign asset trade is possible even in the absence of default penalties. this result suggests a broader perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remed

22、ies. sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade only if default penalties are insufficient and secondary markets work imperfectly. to reduce its effects, one can either increase default penalties or improve the working of secondary markets.9. title: pavlovian processes in consumer choice: the physic

23、al presence of a good increases willingness-to-pay.authors: bushong, benjamin; king, lindsay m; camerer, colin f; rangel, antonio.abstract: this paper describes a series of laboratory experiments studying whether the form in which items are displayed at the time of decision affects the dollar value

24、that subjects place on them. using a becker-degroot auction under three different conditions-(i) text displays, (ii) image displays, and (iii) displays of the actual items-we find that subjects' willingness-to-pay is 40-61 percent larger in the real than in the image and text displays. furthermo

25、re, follow-up experiments suggest the presence of the real item triggers preprogrammed consummatory pavlovian processes that promote behaviors that lead to contact with appetitive items whenever they are available.10. title: determinants of redistributive politics: an empirical analysis of land refo

26、rms in west bengal, india.authors: bardhan, pranab; mookherjee, dilip.abstract: we investigate political determinants of land reform implementation in the indian state of west bengal. using a village panel spanning 1974-1998, we do not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that land reforms were p

27、ositively and monotonically related to control of local governments by a left front coalition vis-à-vis the right-centrist congress party, combined with lack of commitment to policy platforms. instead, the evidence is consistent with a quasi-downsian theory stressing the role of opportunism (re

28、election concerns) and electoral competition.11. title: monopoly price discrimination and demand curvature.authors: aguirre, iñaki; cowan, simon; vickers, john.abstract: this paper presents a general analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare and output

29、 when all markets are served. sufficient conditions-involving straightforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the different markets-are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive effects on social welfare and output.12. title: strategic redi

30、stricting.authors: gul, faruk; pesendorfer, wolfgang.abstract: two parties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a majority in the house of representatives. in the unique equilibrium, parties maximally segregate their opponents' supporters but pool their own support

31、ers into uniform districts. ceteris paribus, the stronger party segregates more than the weaker one, and the election outcome is biased in the stronger party's favor and against the party whose supporters are easier to identify. we incorporate policy choice into our redistricting game and find t

32、hat when one party controls redistricting, the equilibrium policy is biased towards the preferences of the redistricting party's supporters.13. title: a price theory of multi-sided platforms.authors: weyl, e. glen.abstract: i develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks. platforms us

33、e insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, implementing any desired allocation. profit maximization distorts in the spirit of a. michael spence (1975) by internalizing only network externalities to marginal users. thus the empirical and prescriptive content of the popular jean-charles roche

34、t and jean tirole (2006) model of two-sided markets turns on the nature of user heterogeneity. i propose a more plausible, yet equally tractable, model of heterogeneity in which users differ in their income or scale. my approach provides a general measure of market power and helps predict the effect

35、s of price regulation and mergers.14. title: consumption taxes and redistribution.authors: correia, isabel.abstract: this study considers replacing the current us tax system with only a flat tax consumption tax, showing, in contrast to the literature, that such a reform leads to a decline in inequal

36、ity and increase in welfare for the welfare-poor. the results are obtained from a simple model that identifies the main channels through which the reform affects the economy. it is shown also that these novel results depend on the distribution of wealth and earnings, and that they hold for the relev

37、ant empirical distributions.15. title: when does communication improve coordination?authors: ellingsen, tore; Östling, robert.abstract: we study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beli

38、efs, we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2×2 games. one-way communication weakly increases coordination on nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes decrease. two-way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental

39、in others. moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 × 2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination.16. title: kinship

40、, incentives, and evolution.authors: alger, ingela; weibull, jörgen w.abstract: we analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings. the siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty, and they may transfer ou

41、tput to each other. with equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degree of altruism, and it depends on the harshness of the environment. we define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower th

42、an the kinship-relatedness factor. numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment, and how this affects economic outcomes.17. title: elections, capital flows, and politico-economic equilibria.authors: chang, roberto.abstract: we study an open economy where a pro-labor and a pro

43、-business candidate compete in an election. the winner chooses taxes, which affect investment returns. electoral outcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt, but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election. the resulting interaction is novel and has several implications. elections a

44、re associated with increased volatility. politico-economic crises can occur. inefficiencies vanish if the candidates commit to an appropriate tax policy, but such commitments have predictable effects on the election. empirical evidence supporting the theory is discussed.18. title: preemption games:

45、theory and experiment.authors: anderson, steven t; friedman, daniel; oprea, ryan.abstract: several impatient investors with private costs c_i face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value v is governed by geometric brownian motion. the first investor i to

46、seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, v-c_i. we characterize the symmetric bayesian nash equilibrium for this game. a laboratory experiment confirms the model's main qualitative predictions: competition drastically lowers the value at which investment occurs; us

47、ually the lowest-cost investor preempts the other investors; observed investment patterns in competition (unlike monopoly) are quite insensitive to changes in the brownian parameters. support is more qualified for the prediction that markups decline with cost.19. title: watta satta: bride exchange a

48、nd women's welfare in rural pakistan.待添加的隱藏文字內容2authors: jacoby, hanan g; mansuri, ghazala.abstract: can marriage institutions limit marital inefficiency? we study the pervasive custom of watta satta in rural pakistan, a bride exchange between families coupled with a mutual threat of retaliation

49、. watta satta can be seen as a mechanism for coordinating the actions of two sets of parents, each wishing to restrain their son-in-law. we find that marital discord, as measured by estrangement, domestic abuse, and wife's mental health, is indeed significantly lower in watta satta versus 'c

50、onventional' marriage, but only after accounting for selection bias. these benefits cannot be explained by endogamy, a marriage pattern associated with watta satta.20. title: self-interest through delegation: an additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship.authors: hamman, john r; l

51、oewenstein, george; weber, roberto a.abstract: principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. however, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior. we report three labo

52、ratory experiments in which principals repeatedly either decide how much money to share with a recipient or hire agents to make sharing decisions on their behalf. across several experimental treatments, recipients receive significantly less, and in many cases close to nothing, when allocation decisi

53、ons are made by agents.21. title: the gender wage gap and domestic violence.authors: aizer, anna.abstract: three quarters of all violence against women is perpetrated by domestic partners. this study exploits exogenous changes in the demand for labor in female-dominated industries to estimate the im

54、pact of the male-female wage gap on domestic violence. decreases in the wage gap reduce violence against women, consistent with a household bargaining model. these findings shed new light on the health production process as well as observed income gradients in health and suggest that in addition to

55、addressing concerns of equity and efficiency, pay parity can also improve the health of american women via reductions in violence.22. title: constrained school choice: an experimental study.authors: calsamiglia, caterina; haeringer, guillaume; klijn, flip.abstract: the literature on school choice as

56、sumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. however, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate

57、 their preferences. including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. competitiveness across schools plays an important role. constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. remarkably, the constraint reduces s

58、ignificantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy23. title: financing development: the role of information costs.authors: greenwood, jeremy; sanchez, juan m; wang, cheng.abstract: to address how technological progress in financial intermediation affects the economy, a costly-state

59、 verification framework is embedded into the standard growth model. the framework has two novel ingredients. first, firms differ in the risk/return combinations that they offer. second, the efficacy of monitoring depends upon the amount of resources invested in the activity. a financial theory of firm size results. undeserving firms are over-financed, deserving ones under-funded. technological advance in intermediation leads to more capital accumulation and a redirection of funds away from unproductive firms toward productive o