On carbon emissions in the international political and economic game（碳排放的國際政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)的游戲）

1、 On carbon emissions in the international political and economic gameAbstract: <<Kyoto Protocol>> effect of the road twists and turns to the proposed carbon tariffs, while in the environmental, economic and political penetration of national interests, contains a complex game between coun

2、tries, indicating that the future international climate change dispute will be more intense, and may even lead to future climate negotiations more serious international trade disputes. In this paper, the introduction of the game model to analyze the various countries in the process of policy choices

3、, with a view to future climate negotiations and emissions reduction mechanism design game help. Keywords: carbon emissions carbon tariffs Game For a long time, carbon emissions around the world are engaged in intense political and economic negotiation and bargaining, <<Kyoto Protocol>>

4、a promise is about to expire in 2009 in Copenhagen <<United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change>> the 15th Party Congress signed <<Copenhagen tentative agreement>> has failed to resolve substantive issues. Today, carbon emissions are no longer limited to the field

5、of environmental protection, and to become a fierce political and economic game, whatever the outcome, Carbon political and carbon economy will become the next few decades the worlds major theme of development strategy. Carbon tariffs was first proposed by France proposed that the EU countries for n

6、on-compliance <<Kyoto Protocol>> countries imposed import duties of goods in order to avoid carbon emissions trading system running EU countries suffer unfair competition, was precisely because the United States not signed <<protocol>> one of the countries firmly opposed to t

7、his proposal in France, while in the June 22, 2009, the United States Clean Energy Security Act>> access to the House of Representatives passed, the bill stipulates that from 2020 onwards emission reduction measures are not taken from the countrys iron and steel, cement, glass and paper produc

8、ts such as the implementation of border adjustment measures that impose carbon tariffs to avoid unfair competition into the U.S. manufacturing sector. From <<the Kyoto Protocol>> effect of the road twists and turns to carbon tariffs proposed in the environmental protection while, permeat

9、es the countrys political and economic interests, which contains a complex game between countries, indicating that the future international climate change dispute will be more intense, and may even lead to future climate negotiations more serious international trade dispute. One of the major interes

10、t groups can be attributed to the game to the European Union-led coalition (EU, Japan, etc.), the US-led coalition (the United States, Canada, Australia, etc.), Russia and developing countries. A <<Kyoto Protocol>> before the formation of the initial allocation of emission rights: the ga

11、me developed and developing countries Greenhouse gas emissions space is non-exclusive use of public resources, to which individual countries will lead to excessive emissions of rational choice, a huge negative externalities, lead to tragedy of the commons. Therefore, there is no leadership beyond th

12、e sovereign state those circumstances, the absence of effective international coordination mechanism, global greenhouse gas emissions game Nash equilibrium solution is the prisoners dilemma, the design mechanism to lead mankind out of the Prisoners Dilemma is a priority, while in the process, identi

13、fy the most excellent overall reduction in the size and distribution in different countries, the initial greenhouse gas emissions is the key. In reality, $ 1 of consumer goods to residents of the effectiveness of the developed countries to developing countries is less than the utility of residents,

14、and 1 unit of emissions to the residents of the negative effect in developed countries than to the residents of developing countries bring negative effect, so the trade-offs in environment and development in developing countries than in developed countries are more inclined to economic development.

15、Thus, in a bid to turn indefinitely bargaining dynamic game framework, the Nash equilibrium outcome is: other conditions unchanged, the effectiveness of both bargaining discount factor depends on each other in developing and developed countries to reduce emissions game, this discount factor can be r

16、egarded as national emissions reached agreement on the degree of patience, although indefinite bargaining disadvantage to anyone, but who is more patient, whoever can get more revenue because of the objective function in different developed and developing countries, developing countries than in deve

17、loped countries is clearly more patient, which can learn from history responsibility to explain why a different angle than the developed countries finally accepted the principle of common but differentiated, reached the first emission reduction commitments <<Kyoto Protocol>>, the initial

18、 emissions of developing countries in the game to win their rights . Second, the <<Kyoto Protocol>> effective process: the game between the developed countries (A) US-Russia game U.S. and Russia are among the typical deer hunting game, deer is emissions trading. Russia has a lot of carbo

19、n emissions, if the United States to join <<Kyoto>> for the realization of emission reduction commitments, compared to other carbon supply and demand balance of emission quotas in Annex 1 countries, the United States needs to purchase a large number of emission rights, so the United Stat

20、es is Russias main customers. U.S. withdrawal from the <<Kyoto Protocol>> Russia can not get the expected benefits, so there has been reluctant to sign < <Kyoto>>. <<Kyoto Protocol>> as a greenhouse gas reduction cooperation framework to provide not less than 55 &

21、lt;<United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change>> Parties, including its total carbon dioxide emissions account for at least 1990 Parties included in Annex 1 In 55% of total carbon dioxide emissions of Annex 1 Parties have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, a

22、pproval or accession after the date of entry into force, so that each countrys emissions constitute a national vote Wi.1990, the United States greenhouse gas emissions account for Annex 1 countries, 34.12% of total emissions, Russia accounted for 17.45%, 50.57% of the total can be regarded as the ri

23、ght to vote if the United States and Russia have refused to sign the <<Kyoto>>, it can not take effect. At this time, if the United States launched its own emission reduction program, through the emissions trading market, Russia could profit. But this would offend the European Union and

24、other signatory countries, while Russia can not be <<Kyoto Protocol>> caused by carbon emissions trading interests. Links to free download In this line of analysis, the United States and Russia there are three possible outcomes: United States and Russia have signed <<protocol>&g

25、t; United States and Russia are not signed <<protocol>> Russia and the United States has not signed signed the first two trade-offs As mentioned above analysis, while the third case involves the following mentioned Eou Bo Yi. (B) E Oubo Yi In fact, if the United States withdraws, Russia

26、signed <<protocol>> after the benefit is not large, but it is the key entrants in the Unions position to want to adopt the chief game strategy, the first oral refusal, to create tension, EU and other signatories to blackmail to get the pre-interest, and then agreed to sign at the critica

27、l moment, and then waiting for the U.S. to change its position. (C) the United States and Europe game United States and Europe can be regarded as a quitting brave victory bridge game. The EU is the moving party and the emission reduction plan <<Kyoto Protocol>> an active supporter of, an

28、d the first approved <<protocol>>, but the United States The exit is indeed a great loss to the international emission reduction plan, the United States signed the agreement on account of their great cost reduction, may affect some domestic industries, it hopes to launch its own emission

29、 reduction plan will draw other countries into the internal, conducive to the formation of their own chief game situation, but because few countries have responded, bent on the United States no good in this case, perhaps there will be a new game with both sides to compromise. Third, the Kyoto Protoc

30、ol>> effect: carbon tariffs the United States and around the game Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol, a commitment to take effect, but the US-led part of the countrys performance so that the results of the climate negotiations compromised U.S. policy considerations can act as gunmen battle game model

31、to be simplified. There are four gunmen to carry out the final showdown, shooting each other, they are shooting: A 80% B 70% C 60% D 50% according to game theory, the gunmen are rational people, then the worst marksmanship d most likely survive. First, because all the gunmen would choose the greates

32、t threat to their opponents to kill the gunmen small threat to other peoples smallest, least likely to become a target shooting, and marksmanship was first a best man most likely to kill if the 4 major interest groups in carbon emissions compared to four gunmen, the United States is undoubtedly the

33、number one shooting target, followed by China, Russia, the least likely to become targets. It is based on theoretical analysis, in China, the United States as the preferred target, United States to China as the preferred target. U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab in Bali in early December 2007 m

34、eeting of trade ministers pointed out that, in response to climate change as an excuse to take unilateral trade measures will lead to trade protectionism, but it is interesting that Schwab speech voice I hear, already in the U.S. Congress trying to bring the EU carbon tariff policy proposals into pr

35、actice in their national legislation in the U.S. policy shift is not the product of whim. In fact, from <<the Kyoto Protocol>> 2009 Copenhagen UNFCCC 15th Conference of the Parties, developed out of the economic impact of emission reduction and adjustment of the global political landscap

36、e concerns, has been trying to common but differentiated responsibilities fuzzy, and that China, India and other major developing countries with the developed countries take measurable, reportable and verifiable binding emission reduction targets. Through the evolution of U.S. policy analysis is not

37、 difficult to see that the U.S. launched its own emission reduction measures are actually trying to domestic economic development, without prejudice to the conditions, to enhance its international political and economic development pattern of control over the world: one with a formal commitment to b

38、inding targets to break with the European Union, led by Annex 1 countries and between developing countries led by China, the negotiations impasse, to wrest back from the EU response to global climate change, international leadership, the second is the implementation of like the threat of carbon tari

39、ffs policy to force China, India and other major developing countries assume responsibility for emissions reductions as soon as possible, then use its accumulated energy in the new technological advantages and to reduce emissions in developing countries face pressure to find a new round of economic

40、growth points. Kagan U.S. strategists in the U.S. and Europe on the issue of carbon emissions performance summed up as: Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus. Emphasized the strength of the former, while the latter emphasizes the construction of the rules of dialogue and consultation. This d

41、istinction represent two different political ideologies, but also represent the interests of two different European countries are in a leading position in the new energy, emission reduction costs are relatively low, and the carbon finance in Europe in euros in circulation, may birth of the euro repl

42、ace the dollar in international currency status, the rules in line with European interests. Dependence on the U.S. domestic oil industry, because of higher carbon emissions, greenhouse gas emissions in deliberately shirk responsibility in this point, you can see, the U.S. and the EU on this issue of

43、 the behavior is consistent with its national interests. Share for free download In fact, in the international climate negotiations, there are two unavoidable problems will always exist for a long, one of common but differentiated responsibilities, the second is reduction policy has resulted in the loss of competitive