【精品文檔】56中英文雙語會(huì)計(jì)信息披露外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯成品：債券市場參與者對信息披露質(zhì)量的關(guān)注：來自中國上市公司的證據(jù)

外文標(biāo)題：Are Participants in Bond Market Concerned about the Quality of Information Disclosure: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies外文作者：Huan Luo, Changhai Yu, Ran Su文獻(xiàn)出處: Modern Economy,2018,5,1031-1045 (如覺得年份太老，可改為近2年，畢竟很多畢業(yè)生都這樣做) 英文2089單詞， 11789字符(字符就是印刷符)，中文3608漢字。此文檔是畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)外文翻譯成品（ 含英文原文+中文翻譯），無需調(diào)整復(fù)雜的格式！下載之后直接可用，方便快捷！本文價(jià)格不貴,也就幾十塊錢！一輩子也就一次的事！原文：Are Participants in Bond Market Concerned about the Quality of Information Disclosure: Evidence from Chinese Listed CompaniesIntroductionAlthough the bond market develops rapidly in recent years, Chinas bond market is still far behind the stock market (Bottelier, 2003) 1. As a comprehensive measure of corporate credit risk, the quality of corporate disclosure should be important for corporate credit rating. However, due to the ineffectiveness of Chinas bond market, credit ratings have always been questioned. There is no conclusion about whether the information disclosure quality would affect the level of bond credit rating and whether credit rating agencies are concerned about the disclosure quality. Moreover, there is also no research on whether bond investors are concerned about the information disclosure quality.High quality of information disclosure can help to solve the problem of asymmetric information and reduce the moral and speculation risk. This plays a very important role in protecting the investors interests and promoting the development of capital market. However, as Chinas bond market development is relatively lagged, Chinese academics tend to study stock market rather than bond market. Whether improving the quality of in- formation disclosure could reduce the bond financing cost is inconclusive. This article explores whether the Chinas bond market participants are concerned about the information disclosure quality, trying to make up for the lack of related research and making some policy suggestions for the development of Chinas bond market.Literature ReviewThe most two important theories studying information disclosure are the efficient market theory and signaling theory. Both of the two theories agree that the disclosure of information plays a very important role in the capital market. About the relationship between the information disclosure quality and credit rating, there are some theories and empirical literature show that the high information disclosure quality will bring a high credit rating. Currently theres no direct literature in china studying such relationship, related researches focus on information disclosure status of the bond market, and whether credit rating could reflect the corporates financial condition. Theres also no direct literature studying the relationship between the information disclosure quality and bond financing cost. Relevant research focuses on the relationship between information disclosure quality and the cost of equity financing, and relationship between corporates financial condition and bond financing cost.Information disclosure plays a very important role in corporate governance. For internal governance, the information disclosure quality may reflect the level of management control; for external governance, improving the disclosure quality helps to protect investors and maintain a healthy development of the market. High quality of information disclosure can solve the information asymmetry problem to a certain extent, which is very important to the effective operation of the capital market. Bond credit rating, as a comprehensive measure of corporate credit risk, should consider a lot of factors such as the bond issuing companys economic environment, industry characteristics, competitive situation, management capabilities and financial conditions, etc. Thats why the corporate disclosed information should be an important source for bond credit rating. Barry, Brown (1985) 2, Coles and Loewenstein (1988) 3, and Clarkson et al. (1996) 4 find that high information disclosure quality can reduce the chance of mistake when investors estimating corporate credit risk. Heflin et al. (2011) 5 did an empirical research with the U.S. bond market data to test the relationship between information disclosure quality and credit rating, they found that the higher quality of information disclosed in the annual report, the higher credit rating.Improving the quality of information disclosure will help to reduce the capital cost. The first reason is high information disclosure quality will increase the corporate stock and bond liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia,1991) 6. The Second reason is the high information disclosure quality is good for reducing the investors estimating risk of future earnings (Handa and Linn, 1993) 7. Heflin et al. (2011) 5 did an empirical research on the relationship between the information disclosure quality and credit rating with the U.S. bond market data, they found the higher quality of information disclosed in the annual report, the lower the bond financing cost.HypothesisIn recent years, as the Chinas bond market continues to mature and develop, the bond market regulation is more stringent and the investors become more rational, the Chinas credit rating system is gradually improving. Several Chinese major rating agencies started to cooperate with foreign rating authorities, such as Moodys acquisition of China Chengxin Credit Rating Group with absolute control in 2006. Also in 2006, Xinhua Finance (con- trolled by U.S.) acquired Shanghai Far East. In 2007, Standard & Poors cooperated with Shanghai New Century, the two sides also took joint venture into consideration. By cooperating with foreign rating agency authorities, Chinas credit rating agencies improved their rating techniques and reputation. Zhu (2013) 8 found that credit ratings after 2005 reflect differences on corporates profitability, debt levels, scale factors, and ownership structures. Moreover, the signal theory also works in Chinas bond market. The quality of information disclosure as another signal that reflects corporate governance and future risk should be able to get the investors recognition.Due to the information asymmetry, the quality of accounting information and disclosure is often seen as the signal of corporate condition and performance. Wiedman (2000) 9 studied the relationship between voluntary disclosures and issuing stock and found voluntary disclosure can reduce information asymmetry between investors and companies. Barry and Brown (1985) 2, Coles and Loewenstein (1988) 3 and Clarkson et al. (1996) 4 found high information disclosure quality can reduce mistake when investors estimating credit risk. Heflin et al. (2011) 5 found the higher information quality corporate disclose, the higher credit rating it will get.Based on above analysis, we believe that credit rating agencies in the bond market are concerned about the information disclosure quality. Therefore, we come up with Hypotheses 1.Hypotheses 1: The corporate information disclosure quality has a positive impact on the credit rating, the higher information disclosure quality, the higher credit rating.Hypotheses 2: The corporate information disclosure quality has a negative impact on corporate bond financing cost, the higher information disclosure quality, the lower bond financing cost.Research Design Models and VariablesSince rating agencies sequence the corporate credit ratings in order, we use sequencing logic model (Ordered Logit) in our empirical analysis. Based on previous research on credit rating (Elton et al., 2004; Perraudin and Taylor, 2004) 10 11, our model to test Hypotheses 1 is as follows:When credit rating agencies are rating a corporates credit, they also give a rating of the bond issued by the corporate. But in the practice of credit rating in China, the rating standards of short-term financing bond are different from other types of bond, thus research often uses the corporate credit rating directly, namely the credit rating for issuing corporates. This article also directly uses the corporate credit rating, and in order to make the results more robust, we also use the bond rating1 as the robustness test by eliminating the sample of short-term financing bond.Empirical ResultsDescriptive StatisticsQuality of information disclosures (DisSz, Shenzhen Stock Exchange score) mean is 3.0932, median is 3, the minimum value is 2, indicating information disclosure quality of listed companies which issued bonds in the bond market is higher than the overall average. The interest rate spreads (Spread) mean is 0.3215, median is 0.5, showing bond financing cost is lower than bank loan. The mean of bond issuing corporate credit rating (Credit) is 3.9492, and the median is 4, showing the average credit rating in the sample is AA. Rating is the bond rating (due to various rating standards, this data does not include short-term bond), its mean is 3.4358, median is 3, indicating the average bond rating is AA.AccQuality is characterized by three variables: Big 4, Conserv, VarRoe. We noticed only 11.30% companies in the sample choose Big 4 to do the financial report audit. Conserv has a mean with 0.0420 and median with 0.0152, which means the reports are robust in general, but the 0.2601 deviation shows huge differences among companies. VarRoe, earnings volatility, is relatively small; its standard deviation also shows big differences. We can also see big difference among samples in Roe, Size, Lev, CFO, CR, QR, and LLR. About the company type, the 48.02% of the samples were state-owned. From the bond features, 23.73% of the sample has guarantee. The average bond duration is 3.9442 years, the median is 0.4932, and standard deviation is 2.2444, which shows huge differences in bond durations.Regression AnalysisCredit Rating and Information Disclosure QualityFrom Model 1s result, we can see the coefficients of Roe and Size (7.206, 2.725) are significantly positive at 1% level, indicating high profitability and big size can lead to high credit rating. The coefficient of Lev (8.192) is significantly negative at 1% level, showing high liability-asset ratio will bring low credit rating. All these prove that the signal effect does exist in the Chinas bond market, corporates financial condition will affect its credit rating. The coefficient of GDPgrow (0.455) is significantly negative at 1% level, indicating the credit rating agencies tend to give higher credit rating at the time of macroeconomic recession, known as the “counter- cyclical” phenomenon, which is consistent with previous studies. The States coefficient is 0.935 and significantly positive, indicating state-owned corporate gets a higher credit rating. The coefficients of accounting in- formation quality variables (Big4, Conserv and VarRoe) are not significant, indicating credit rating agencies are not concerned about the accounting information quality, this collides with previous studies. The coefficient of DisSz is not significant, indicating the information disclosure quality doesnt has significant impact on the corporate credit rating, and this doesnt support Hypothesis 1. There might be 2 explanations: One is DisSz may not be a proper indicator; the other is as credit rating agencies often collect information from various kinds of channels, they dont pay much attention on the corporates information disclosure quality. Well find out in the robustness test. Model 2s result is almost the same with Model 1, except it has more variables. However, Model 2 also doesnt support Hypothesis 1.Robustness Test Selection of the Information Disclosure Quality IndicatorConsidering the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges data is simply divided into four levels, it does not distinguish between voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure, and the evaluation index system is also not announced. More importantly, the data doesnt cover companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, so there might be some problem. In order to make the results more robust, we use the Chinese listed companies information disclosure index (Gao Minghua, Beijing Normal University, 2010, 2012) 17 18 as the indicator to do another test. CCDI measures the integrity of the information disclosure (including mandatory and voluntary), although it only has 2 years data, but it covered more listed companies. The regression results of CCDI partly supported the hypothesis of this paper, but there are some differences. The reason for this result might be that although investors are concerned about the quality of corporate information disclosure, usually they cannot assess the disclosure quality themselves, so they often use the authorities evaluation result. Clearly, Shenzhen Stock Exchange data has much more influence than CCDI.ConclusionAs a signal, information disclosure plays an important role in the capital market, although many studies sup- ported the signal theory from the theoretical and empirical level, but researchers in China found only participants of the stock market are concerned about information disclosure quality. This article assumes signal theory also applied in China and participants of the bond market should be concerned about information disclosure quality. But our empirical results only support Hypothesis 2: investors and corporates who have issued bonds are concerned about information disclosure quality and credit rating agencies are not. The reason for this result may be that credit rating agencies have a lot of channels to access information and the disclosed information doesnt gain enough attention. The main contribution of this article is to make up for the lack of research of the information disclosure quality in Chinas bond market.債券市場參與者對信息披露質(zhì)量的關(guān)注：來自中國上市公司的證據(jù)引言盡管近幾年債券市場發(fā)展迅速，但中國債券市場仍遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于股市（波特利爾，2003）1。作為企業(yè)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的綜合衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，企業(yè)信息披露的質(zhì)量對企業(yè)信用評級至關(guān)重要。但是，由于中國債券市場效率低下，信用評級一直受到質(zhì)疑。信息披露質(zhì)量是否會(huì)影響債券信用評級水平以及信用評級機(jī)構(gòu)是否關(guān)注信息披露質(zhì)量尚無定論。此外，還沒有關(guān)于債券投資者是否關(guān)注信息披露質(zhì)量的研究。高質(zhì)量的信息披露有助于解決信息不對稱問題、降低道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和投機(jī)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這在保護(hù)投資者利益和促進(jìn)資本市場發(fā)展方面起著非常重要的作用。然而，由于中國債券市場發(fā)展相對滯后，中國學(xué)者傾向于研究股票市場而不是債券市場。提高信息披露質(zhì)量能否降低債券融資成本尚無定論。本文探討了中國債券市場參與者是否關(guān)注信息披露質(zhì)量，試圖彌補(bǔ)中國債券市場發(fā)展缺乏相關(guān)研究的缺陷并提出一些政策建議。文獻(xiàn)綜述研究信息披露最重要的兩個(gè)理論是有效市場理論和信號理論。兩種理論都認(rèn)為信息披露在資本市場中起著非常重要的作用。關(guān)于信息披露質(zhì)量與信用評級之間的關(guān)系，有一些理論和實(shí)證文獻(xiàn)研究表明，高信息披露質(zhì)量會(huì)帶來較高的信用評級。目前我國尚無直接研究這種關(guān)系的文獻(xiàn)，相關(guān)研究主要集中在債券市場的信息披露狀況，信用評級是否能反映企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)狀況。也沒有直接的文獻(xiàn)研究信息披露質(zhì)量與債券融資成本之間的關(guān)系。相關(guān)研究主要集中在信息披露質(zhì)量與股權(quán)融資成本之間的關(guān)系，以及公司財(cái)務(wù)狀況與債券融資成本之間的關(guān)系。信息披露在公司治理中起著非常重要的作用。對于內(nèi)部治理、信息披露質(zhì)量可能反映了管理控制水平;對于外部治理而言，提高披露質(zhì)量有助于保護(hù)投資者利益和保持市場健康發(fā)展。高質(zhì)量的信息披露能夠在一定程度上解決信息不對稱問題，這對資本市場的有效運(yùn)行是非常重要的。作為企業(yè)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的綜合衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，債券信用評級應(yīng)考慮債券發(fā)行公司的經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境、行業(yè)特征、競爭態(tài)勢、管理能力和財(cái)務(wù)狀況等諸多因素。因此，公司披露的信息應(yīng)該是債券信用評級的重要來源。 巴里、布朗（1985）2，科爾斯和勞溫斯坦恩（1988）3以及克拉克森等人（1996）4發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)投資者估計(jì)企業(yè)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)時(shí)，高信息披露質(zhì)量可以減少錯(cuò)誤發(fā)生的幾率。 Heflin等人（2011）5用美國債券市場數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究，檢驗(yàn)信息披露質(zhì)量與信用評級之間的關(guān)系，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)信息披露質(zhì)量較高的年報(bào)信息披露較高，信用等級較高。提高信息披露的質(zhì)量將有助于降低資本成本。第一個(gè)原因是信息披露質(zhì)量高會(huì)增加公司股票和債券的流動(dòng)性（戴蒙德和韋爾奇，1991）6。 第二個(gè)原因是高信息披露質(zhì)量有利于降低投資者對未來收益的估計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)（漢達(dá)和林，1993）7。 Heflin等人 （2011）5對信息披露質(zhì)量與信用評級與美國債券市場數(shù)據(jù)之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)年報(bào)披露的信息質(zhì)量越高，其債券融資成本較低。假設(shè)近年來，隨著中國債券市場的不斷成熟和發(fā)展，債券市場監(jiān)管越來越嚴(yán)格，投資者越來越理性，中國的信用評級體系逐步完善。多家中國主要評級機(jī)構(gòu)開始與外國評級機(jī)構(gòu)合作，例如穆迪于2006年收購中國誠信信用評級集團(tuán)，并于2006年完全控股。同樣在2006年，新華財(cái)經(jīng)（由美國控制）收購上海遠(yuǎn)東。 2007年，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾與上海新世紀(jì)合作，雙方也考慮合資。通過與國外評級機(jī)構(gòu)合作，中國的信用評級機(jī)構(gòu)提高了評級技術(shù)和信譽(yù)。 朱（2013）8發(fā)現(xiàn)2005年以后的信用評級反映了企業(yè)盈利能力、債務(wù)水平、規(guī)模因素和所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的差異。此外，信號理論也適用于中國債券市場。信息披露的質(zhì)量作為反映公司治理和未來風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的另一個(gè)信號應(yīng)該能夠得到投資者的認(rèn)可。由于信息不對稱，會(huì)計(jì)信息和披露質(zhì)量往往被視為企業(yè)狀況和業(yè)績的信號。 懷德門（2000）9研究了自愿披露和發(fā)行股票之間的關(guān)系，發(fā)現(xiàn)自愿披露可以減少投資者和公司之間的信息不對稱。巴里和布朗（1985）2，科爾斯和勒溫斯坦（1988）3和克拉克森等人。 （1996）4發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)投資者估計(jì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)時(shí)，高信息披露質(zhì)量可以減少錯(cuò)誤。 Heflin等人（2011）5發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)信息披露質(zhì)量越高，信用等級越高。基于上述分析，我們認(rèn)為債券市場信用評級機(jī)構(gòu)對信息披露質(zhì)量的關(guān)注度較高。因此，我們提出了假設(shè)1。假設(shè)1：企業(yè)信息披露質(zhì)量對信用評級有正面影響，信息披露質(zhì)量越高，信用等級越高。假設(shè)2：企業(yè)信息披露質(zhì)量對企業(yè)債券融資成本有負(fù)面影響，信息披露質(zhì)量越高，債券融資成本越低。研究設(shè)計(jì)模型和變量由于評級機(jī)構(gòu)是按順序來排列企業(yè)信用評級，我們在實(shí)證分析中使用了排序邏輯模型（Ordered Logit）。根據(jù)之前關(guān)于信用評級的研究（埃爾頓等，2004; Perraudin和Taylor，2004）10 11，我們的假設(shè)1測試模型如下：當(dāng)信用評級機(jī)構(gòu)對公司的信用評級時(shí)，