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1、Chapter Twenty-Five,Monopoly Behavior 壟斷行為,How Should a Monopoly Price?,So far a monopoly has been thought of as a firm which has to sell its product at the same price to every customer. This is uniform pricing. Can price-discrimination (差別定價)earn a monopoly higher profits?,Structure,First-degree pr
2、ice discrimination Second-degree price discrimination Third-degree price discrimination Bundling Two-part tariff,Types of Price Discrimination,1st-degree: Each output unit is sold at a different price. Prices may differ across buyers. 2nd-degree: The price paid by a buyer can vary with the quantity
3、demanded by the buyer. But all customers face the same price schedule. E.g. bulk-buying discounts.,Types of Price Discrimination,3rd-degree: Price paid by buyers in a given group is the same for all units purchased. But price may differ across buyer groups.E.g., senior citizen and student discounts
4、vs. no discounts for middle-aged persons.,First-degree Price Discrimination,Each output unit is sold at a different price. Price may differ across buyers. It requires that the monopolist can discover the buyer with the highest valuation of its product, the buyer with the next highest valuation, and
5、so on.,First-degree Price Discrimination,p(y),y,$/output unit,MC(y),Sell the th unit for $,First-degree Price Discrimination,p(y),y,$/output unit,MC(y),Sell the th unit for $ Later onsell the th unit for $,First-degree Price Discrimination,p(y),y,$/output unit,MC(y),Sell the th unit for $ Later onse
6、ll the th unit for $ Finally sell the th unit for marginal cost, $,First-degree Price Discrimination,p(y),y,$/output unit,MC(y),The gains to the monopoliston these trades are:and zero.,The consumers gains are zero.,First-degree Price Discrimination,p(y),y,$/output unit,MC(y),So the sum of the gains
7、tothe monopolist on all trades is the maximumpossible total gains-to-trade.,PS,First-degree Price Discrimination,p(y),y,$/output unit,MC(y),The monopolist gets the maximum possible gains from trade.,PS,First-degree price discriminationis Pareto-efficient.,First-degree Price Discrimination,First-degr
8、ee price discrimination gives a monopolist all of the possible gains-to-trade, leaves the buyers with zero surplus, and supplies the efficient amount of output.,Examples of 1st-degree Price Discrimination,Auction of antique Car sales Financial aid in universities May not be practical do not know wil
9、lingness to pay too costly,Non-linear pricing Unit price depends on quantity purchased Bulk discount Setting A seller does not know the willingness to pay by each individual buyer Consumers marginal willingness to pay declines with quantity,Second-degree Price Discrimination,Setting a uniform price
10、is not optimal Too high a price would lose high volume consumer. Too low a price would lost revenue from low volume consumer. Coke example. Mechanism: Set price for different volumes to let consumers identify themselves,Second-degree Price Discrimination,Two consumers Person 1 has low willingness-to
11、-pay Person 1 has high willingness-to-pay Assume 0 MC,An Example,A,quantity,$/output unit,x10,x20,C,B,Charge A for x10 hoping to get person 1 Charge A+B+C for x20 hoping to get person 2 But person 2 is better off buying x10 and receiving a cs=B Fail to let consumers self-select themselves Profit=2A
12、Can alternatively charge A+C for x20 to identify person 2 profit=2A+C,Second-degree Price Discrimination,A,quantity,$/output unit,x10,x20,C,B,Reduce x10 so A is reduced by a little but C can be increased by a lot。Persons 1 and 2 are still identified Profit is higher,Second-degree Price Discriminatio
13、n,A,quantity,$/output unit,MC(y),x1m,x20,C,B,Profit is maximized at x1m,Second-degree Price Discrimination,2nd-degree discrimination can also occur in the dimension of quality Different prices for different seats in a theater Different prices for economy class vs. business class seats in airplanes,S
14、econd-degree Price Discrimination,Third-degree Price Discrimination,Price paid by buyers in a given group is the same for all units purchased. But price may differ across buyer groups. Quality of goods is the same across groups. Can identify groups but no further identification within that group.,Th
15、ird-degree Price Discrimination,A monopolist manipulates market price by altering the quantity of product supplied to that market. So the question “What discriminatory prices will the monopolist set, one for each group?” is really the question “How many units of product will the monopolist supply to
16、 each group?”,Third-degree Price Discrimination,Two markets, 1 and 2. y1 is the quantity supplied to market 1. Market 1s inverse demand function is p1(y1). y2 is the quantity supplied to market 2. Market 2s inverse demand function is p2(y2).,Third-degree Price Discrimination,For given supply levels
17、y1 and y2 the firms profit is What values of y1 and y2 maximize profit?,Third-degree Price Discrimination,The profit-maximization conditions are,Third-degree Price Discrimination,and,so,the profit-maximization conditions are,and,Third-degree Price Discrimination,MR1(y1) = MR2(y2) says that the alloc
18、ation y1, y2 maximizes the revenue from selling y1 + y2 output units. E.g. if MR1(y1) MR2(y2) then an output unitshould be moved from market 2 to market 1to increase total revenue.,Third-degree Price Discrimination,The marginal revenue common to bothmarkets equals the marginal production cost if pro
19、fit is to be maximized.,Third-degree Price Discrimination,MR1(y1),MR2(y2),y1,y2,y1*,y2*,p1(y1*),p2(y2*),MC,MC,p1(y1),p2(y2),Market 1,Market 2,MR1(y1*) = MR2(y2*) = MC,and p1(y1*) p2(y2*).,Third-degree Price Discrimination,Recall that,and,In which market will the monopolist set the higher price?,But,
20、Third-degree Price Discrimination,So,Therefore, only if,The monopolist sets the higher price in the market where demand is least own-price elastic.,Examples of 3rd-degree Price Discrimination,Discounts to students, senior citizens Business travelers and vacationers Government and private-sector purc
21、hasers Coupons and rebates First-run movies and dollar movie Hardcover books and paperback books,Bundling,Willingness to pay for software components,Two Marketing Policies,Sell separately: Word processor: p=100, revenue=200 Speadsheet; p=100, revenue=200 Bundling Set p=220 for the bundle Revenue=440
22、,Two-Part Tariffs,A two-part tariff is a lump-sum fee, p1, plus a price p2 for each unit of product purchased. Thus the cost of buying x units of product isp1 + p2x.,Two-Part Tariffs,Should a monopolist prefer a two-part tariff to uniform pricing, or to any of the price-discrimination schemes discus
23、sed so far? If so, how should the monopolist design its two-part tariff?,Two-Part Tariffs,p1 + p2x Q: What is the largest that p1 can be? A: p1 is the “entrance fee” so the largest it can be is the surplus the buyer gains from entering the market. Set p1 = CS and now ask what should be p2?,Two-Part
24、Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,MC(y),Should the monopolistset p2 above MC?,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,CS,Should the monopolistset p2 above MC?p1 = CS.,MC(y),Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,CS,Should the monopolistset p2 above MC?p1 = CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),PS,Two-Part Tarif
25、fs,p(y),y,$/output unit,CS,Should the monopolistset p2 above MC?p1 = CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),PS,Total profit,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = MC?,MC(y),Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = MC?p1 = CS.,CS,MC(y),Two-Part Tarif
26、fs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = MC?p1 = CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),CS,PS,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = MC?p1 = CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),CS,Total profit,PS,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = M
27、C?p1 = CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),CS,PS,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = MC?p1 = CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),CS,Additional profit from setting p2 = MC.,PS,Two-Part Tariffs,The monopolist maximizes its profit when using a two-part tariff by setting its per unit price p2 at marginal cost and setting its lump-sum fee p1 equal to Consumers Surplus.,Two-Part Tariffs,A profit-maximizing two-part tariff gives an efficient ma
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