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StateofEnergyPolicy
2024
INTERNATIONALENERGYAGENCY
TheIEAexaminesthefullspectrumofenergyissuesincludingoil,gasandcoalsupplyanddemand,renewableenergytechnologies,
electricitymarkets,energyefficiency,accesstoenergy,demandsidemanagementandmuchmore.Throughitswork,theIEAadvocates
policiesthatwillenhancethereliability,
affordabilityandsustainabilityofenergyinits31membercountries,13associationcountriesandbeyond.
Thispublicationandanymapincludedhereinarewithoutprejudicetothestatusoforsovereigntyoveranyterritory,tothedelimitationof
internationalfrontiersandboundariesandtothenameofanyterritory,cityorarea.
Source:IEA.
InternationalEnergyAgencyWebsite:
IEAmembercountries:
AustraliaAustria
BelgiumCanada
CzechRepublic
DenmarkEstonia
Finland
France
GermanyGreece
HungaryIrelandItaly
Japan
Korea
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Mexico
NetherlandsNewZealand
NorwayPolandPortugal
SlovakRepublic
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
RepublicofTürkiyeUnitedKingdom
UnitedStates
TheEuropeanCommissionalsoparticipatesintheworkoftheIEA
IEAassociationcountries:
ArgentinaBrazil
China
Egypt
India
IndonesiaKenya
MoroccoSenegal
Singapore
SouthAfricaThailand
Ukraine
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Keyfindings
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|1
Keyfindings
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Keyfindings
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|2
Keyfindings
Thelastfouryearsunleashedawaveofnewenergypoliciesthataddressedpressingenergysecurityconcernsandacceleratedtheuptakeofcleanenergy.TheglobaleconomiccrunchtriggeredbytheCovid19pandemicpromptedgovernmentstolaunchnewrecoveryandreliefpackages,withmanyprioritisingcleanenergytransitions.Closeto150countries-coveringcloseto95%ofglobalgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionssetforthnew,moreambitiousclimatecommitments,leadingabout50governmentstotightenenergyefficiency,renewablesandemissionsstandardsalongsidethesenewincentivesforcleanenergy.Since2020,cleanenergyinvestmentgrew60%globally.
Energysecurityhasprominentlyreemergedasapriorityforpolicymakers.Russia’sinvasionofUkrainein2022ledtoenergypricespikesglobally,highlightingtherisksposedtointerconnectedenergysystems.Countrieswereremindedanewoftraditionalenergysecurityconcerns,whiletheshifttocleanenergybroughtforthnewones,particularlyintermsofsupplychainconcentrationofkeytechnologiesandthecriticalmineralsessentialtotheirproduction.Disruptionstotraderoutesamidgrowinggeopoliticaltensionsandclimate-inducedextremeweatherarecomplicatingthesituation,exposingenergysystemstonewvulnerabilities.Morethanever,countriesarehavingtoconsiderandadoptnewapproachestobalancetheinterconnectedgoalsofsustainability,affordability,competitivenessandsecurity.
Againstthisbackdrop,theIEAhasproduceditsinauguraleditionofStateofEnergyPolicy.Intendedasa‘first-of-its-kind’globalinventory,thisannualpublicationprovidesuserswiththemostcomprehensiveup-to-dateenergypoliciesbycountriesandsectors,highlightingthemostsubstantialchangesinthepreceding12months.Itdrawsupontheexpertise,insights,andreviewofnumerousinternationalexperts,tocompilemorethan5000policyrecordsacross50keypolicytypesfrommorethan60countries,allavailableinapublicdatabase,the
EnergyPolicyInventory.
Distincttrendsemergefromthiscomprehensivereviewastothetypesofpolicygovernmentsusetobridgethegapstotheirlong-termpledgeswhileensuringenergysecurity,andwherethesepolicieshavegainedtraction.
Governmentincentivesforcleanenergygrewtounprecedentedlevels,andarenowamajordriverforrisingcleanenergyinvestment.Since2020,governmentshaveearmarkedalmostUSD2trillionindirectinvestmentsupportforcleanenergy–nearlytripletheamountcommittedtocleanenergyinresponsetothe2007-08financialcrisis.Some80%ofthisearmarkedfundingisconcentratedinjustthreeregions:China,theEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedStates.Manymeasuresareframedaseffortstoboostcleantechnologydeploymentandtosecurepositionsinemergingindustriesthatpromisetobemajorfuturesourcesofgrowthand
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Keyfindings
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|3
employment.Newspendingmeasurescontinuetobeapproved.Inthefirsthalfof2024alone,morethan40countriesearmarkedcleanenergysupport,totallingtoUSD290billion.
Governmentinterventionstomanageenergypricespeakedin2022,butaffordabilityremainsakeyconcern.PricespikespromptedbyRussia’sinvasionofUkrainepushedtotalend-useexpenditureonenergytoarecordhighin2022–USD10trillion.Short-termconsumersupportdirectlyfromgovernmentstotalledUSD940billion,mainlyconcentratedinEurope,whileotherpricingregulationsinstitutedbygovernmentsamountedtoUSD2.4trillionworthoffossilfuelsubsidiesaccruingsince2022.Priceshavesincedeclinedandgovernmenthaverolledbackmostemergencyprovisions.Still,allG20countriesmaintainprogrammesthatprovideaffordabilitysupporttocertainconsumers.Suchprogrammesbenefitfromtargetinghouseholdsmostinneedtomanagefiscalburdensandensureafairdistributionofcostsandbenefits–ataskthatonlyone-thirdoftheemergencymeasuresachieved.
Securingcleanenergysupplychainshasbecomeakeypriority,promptinguseofdiversepolicymeasures–fromdirectincentivestotradepolicy.Geographicalconcentrationswithincleanenergysupplychainsremainshigherthanfossilfuelsupply.Acrosskeytechnologies–solarPV,wind,battery,andelectrolyser–atleast80%ofmanufacturingcapacityisconcentratedwithinthetopthreeproducingcountries.Thisrendersglobalsupplychainsvulnerabletodisruptions,whetherduetopolicychangesinindividualcountries,naturaldisasters,technicalfailuresorcorporatedecisions.
Recentpoliciesandstrategieshavedesignatedkeycleanenergytechnologiesandrelatedcommoditiestobeofstrategicimportance,proposingrequirementsortargetsforminimumsharesofdomesticmanufacturing.RecentnotableexamplestheUnitedStatesDefenceProductionActandtheEuropeanUnion’sNetZeroIndustryAct,howeverothercountrieshaveintroducedsimilarpoliciesandtargets.Additionally,governmentdirectsupportavailabletodomesticmanufacturersofthesetechnologiesclimbedtoUSD170billiongloballyinthelastfouryears–nearly10%oftotalgovernmentenergyspendingmobilisedacrossthatperiod.Thelargestportionoftheseincentivesisgoingtoelectricvehicles(EVs),followedbyhydrogenandbatteriesproduction,alongwithcriticalmineralsrefiningandproduction.Since2020,around70%ofthisearmarkedsupportwasconcentratedinadvancedeconomiesandChina,althoughnewspendingisbeingmobilisedinotheremergingmanufacturinghubs,suchasBrazil,IndiaandMalaysia.
Since2020,sharpriseisevidentintrademeasuresrelatingtocleantechnologysupplychains.Overthepast25years,thenumberofnewtrademeasurestargetingbatteries,solarPV,EVs,windturbinesandelectrolysershasincreasedsteadily.Since2020,countriesimplementednearly200tradepoliciestargetingcleanenergytechnology,whereasonly40suchinitiativeswereimplementedinthepreceding5years.Often,thelargestimportersandexportersofthesetechnologiesareattheforefrontofthesechangesintraderules,whichmaywellhaveimplicationsforcleantechnologysupplychains,innovation,competitionandeconomicefficiency.Tariffadjustments,anti-dumpingdutiesandcountervailing
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Keyfindings
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|4
measures(includingthoserecentlyannouncedbytheEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedStates),accountforcloseto40%ofpolicychangessince2020.Inthatsameperiod,around50newfreetradeagreementsweresigned,ofwhichnearly90%stillextendedpreferentialtariffstocleanenergytechnologies.
Energyperformanceregulationsnowcoverthree-quartersofglobalenergy-relatedemissions.Asof2024,fifteenG20countrieshaveenergyperformanceregulationsinplacecoveringeachkeyenergysector—power,industry,buildingstransportation,andfuelsupply.Thisisasubstantialchangefromjustafewdecadesago.In2000,only5%ofindustrialmotorswerecoveredbyenergyperformancestandards;nowover50%are.Since2020,halfofG20countrieshaveupdatedbuildingenergycodes,affecting70%oftheirsectoremissions.
Since2023,35countries–representingone-fifthofenergy-sectorCO2emissions–passednewenergyregulations.Amongthemostimpactfulupdatestoenergyregulationsincludethelatestfuel-economyandemissionsstandardsforpassengercarsandtrucks,aswellasnewregulationsforGHGemissionsfromfossilfuel-firedpowerplantsintheUnitedStates.Severalmajorfirstsalsowarrantmention:Australiaaddeditsveryfirstfuelefficiencystandardforvehicles,theEuropeanUnionintroducedregulationsonclimate-forcingrefrigerantsusedinappliances(so-calledfluorinatedgreenhousegases[F-gas]regulations);andUkraineestablisheditsfirst-everbiofuelblendingmandate,settostartin2025.
Somepolicieswererolledbacksince2020,buttheirimpactwassmallerthantheincreasedstringencyelsewhere.Notablerollbacksordelayswereappliedtoproposedregulationsbanningthesaleofnewfossilfuelboilersinbuildingsandofinternalcombustionengines(ICE)vehicles,andonphase-outofunabatedcoal.Suchadjustmentswerelargelymotivatedbytheenergycrisisandpublicconcerns.Thereplacementregulationseitherdelayedthestartdateforcomplianceorrelaxedtheproposedpolicystringency.Regulationsthatwererollbackedanddelayedpoliciesin2023coveredaround1%ofcurrentglobalemissions.
Still,substantialleewayexiststoadvancecoverage,stringencyandenforcementofthesepolicies.Aroundone-quarterofglobalenergygrowthto2030isprojectedtooccurinunregulatedsectors,andinmostcountries,theleastefficientapplianceslegallysoldareatleast40%lessefficientthanthe“best-in-class”equivalentinthatregion.Additionally,risingpolicycoveragedoesnotnecessarilyimplynear-termimpact.Somepoliciesnaturallycomewithsometime-lag—mostfueleconomystandardsareupdatedevery4–5yearsandaimtogiveindustrya10–15-yeartimehorizontocomply—butalackofenforcementofthesestandardscanalsodiminishtheirimpact.Forinstance,while90%offossilfuelproductionisnowsubjecttooneormoreregulationstargetingfugitivemethane,energy-sectormethaneemissionsstillclimbedby3%lastyear.
CurrentNationallyDeterminedContributionstargetreducingenergy-sectorCO2emissionsto32Mtby2030,withupdatedNDCsexpectedin2025.TheIEA’s
ClimatePledgesExplorer
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Keyfindings
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|5
assessestheenergycomponentofallNDCsandlong-termclimateambitionsandfindsthatcurrentNDCsfallshortofwhatisneededtohitlong-termclimateobjectives.WithParisAgreementsignatoriessettosubmitnewNDCstargetsin2025—StateofEnergyPolicy2024canhelphighlightwhichpolicieshaveproveneffective,andwheretheycanbeexpanded.Manyrecentenergypoliciesshowclearpotentialtoadvanceclimatemitigationintheenergysector.Buttheymustalsofitlocalcontexts,andensuresecurity,competitivenessandaffordability.TheIEAremainscommittedtomonitoringandprovidingthelatestenergypolicydatatogovernmentsandthepublic,aswecollectivelychartapathtoasecureandsustainableenergyfuture.
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Keyfindings
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|6
Countriescoveringone-thirdofenergy-relatedCO2emissionsearmarkednewcleanenergy
spendinglastyear;thoserepresentingone-fifthofemissionsadoptednewenergyregulations
GlobalCO2emissionscoveredbychangesinpolicybetweenJune2023andSeptember2024(%)
ClimateambitionGovernmentspendingonCETsRegulations
Legend:
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
11%
12%
13%
14%
15%
16%
17%
18%
19%
20%
11%
12%
13%
14%
15%
16%
17%
18%
19%
20%
11%
12%
13%
14%
15%
16%
17%
18%
19%
20%
Nochangeinexistingpolicies
21%
22%
23%
24%
25%
26%
27%
28%
29%
30%
21%
22%
23%
24%
25%
26%
27%
28%
29%
30%
21%
22%
23%
24%
25%
26%
27%
28%
29%
30%
31%
32%
33%
34%
35%
36%
37%
38%
39%
40%
31%
32%
33%
34%
35%
36%
37%
38%
39%
40%
31%
32%
33%
34%
35%
36%
37%
38%
39%
40%
Changesettodecreaseemissions
41%
42%
43%
44%
45%
46%
47%
48%
49%
50%
41%
42%
43%
44%
45%
46%
47%
48%
49%
50%
41%
42%
43%
44%
45%
46%
47%
48%
49%
50%
51%
52%
53%
54%
55%
56%
57%
58%
59%
60%
51%
52%
53%
54%
55%
56%
57%
58%
59%
60%
51%
52%
53%
54%
55%
56%
57%
58%
59%
60%
Withdrawalorpostponement
61%
62%
63%
64%
65%
66%
67%
68%
69%
70%
61%
62%
63%
64%
65%
66%
67%
68%
69%
70%
61%
62%
63%
64%
65%
66%
67%
68%
69%
70%
71%
72%
73%
74%
75%
76%
77%
78%
79%
80%
71%
72%
73%
74%
75%
76%
77%
78%
79%
80%
71%
72%
73%
74%
75%
76%
77%
78%
79%
80%
Noknownpolicyornotcovered
81%
82%
83%
84%
85%
86%
87%
88%
89%
90%
81%
82%
83%
84%
85%
86%
87%
88%
89%
90%
81%
82%
83%
84%
85%
86%
87%
88%
89%
90%
91%
92%
93%
94%
95%
96%
97%
98%
99%
100%
91%
92%
93%
94%
95%
96%
97%
98%
99%
100%
91%
92%
93%
94%
95%
96%
97%
98%
99%
100%
IEA.CCBY4.0.
Note:CET=cleanenergytechnology.Onetilerepresents1%ofglobalenergy-relatedCO2emissions.ChangeinclimateambitionreflectschangesinstringencyofNDCsorofnet-
zerotargets.ChangeinCETgovernmentspendinghighlightscountriesthatincreased(between2023and2024)theirearmarkedspendinglinkedtoenergy-relatedemissions.ChangeinregulationtracksachangeinpolicytoaddresssectoralCO2emissions,withmoredetailsprovidedinthesectoralscorecardslaterinthisreport.
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Keyfindings
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|7
Governmentscontinuetoallocatemorelong-terminvestmentsupporttocleanenergy,withoverUSD2trillioninfreshallocationssince2020
Earmarkedgovernmentsupportforcleanenergyinvestmentandconsumerenergyaffordabilitymeasuresbybudgetallocationyear
BillionUSD(2023,MER)
600
500
400
300
200
2020202120222023
Earmarkedplanneddisbursments
2024202520262027202820292030
Indicativeforward-lookingspending
100
CleanenergyinvestmentsupportShort-termaffordabilitysupport
IEA.CCBY4.0.
Note:Earmarkedgovernmentspendingshowsplanneddisbursementsandindicativeforward-lookingspendingacrossbudgettimelinesasvalidatedbetween2020andH1/2024.
Theseestimatesdonottranslateintodisbursementprojectionsupto2030,asitisexpectedthatgovernmentswillroutemorespendingpackagesthroughannualapprovalprocesses.
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Keyfindings
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|8
Tradepoliciesrelatedtokeycleanenergytechnologiessharplyincreasedintheearly2020s
Cumulativenewtradepoliciescoveringcleantechnologies,2015-H1/2024
250
200
150
100
50
2015201620172018201920202021202220232024
SolarPVWindturbinesBatteriesElectricvehiclesHeatpumpsElectrolysers
IEA.CCBY4.0.
Note:EachcountindicatesasingleinstanceofatrademeasureimpactingsolarPV,windturbines,batteries,EVs,heatpumpsorelectrolysers,andtheircomponents.Thisincludes
EVsandbatterycells,anodeandcathode;solarPVmodules,cells,wafersandpolysilicon;windnacellesandblades;heatpumpsandelectrolysers.Anymeasurethatincludes
severalofthesetechnologiesiscountedonceperprovision.Tradepoliciesconsideredincludechangesinimportorexporttariffs,anti-dumpingdutyandcountervailingmeasures,
importorexportcontrolandbans,andothernon-tariffmeasures,suchasimportorexportlicensingandquotas.ThescopeofFTAsisinvestigatedseparatelyandisnotincludedinthechart.
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|9
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|10
UnderstandingtheStateofEnergyPolicyreport
StateofEnergyPolicy2024isafirst-of-its-kindpublicationfromtheIEA,whichexploreshowtheglobalenergypolicylandscapehasevolvedoverthepastyear—specifically,betweenJune2023andSeptember2024.Withinputfromcountryofficialsandawiderangeofinternationalexperts,thereportcoversover50policytypesacrossmorethan60countries,and,intotal,cataloguesover5000energypolicies,allavailableonapubliclyaccessibledatabase—the
IEA’s
EnergyPolicyInventory.
Thereportoffersasynthesisofthiscomprehensivedataset,helpinguserstomakesenseoflatesttrendsandcompareenergypolicypositionsacrossdifferentcountries.
Eachyear,StateofEnergyPolicywillprovideupdates,buildingontheIEA’scomprehensiveannualreviewofpoliciestoinformitsGlobalEnergyandClimatemodelling.Futureeditionswillcontinuetoexpandonthetypesofpoliciescovered.
Scope
TheStateofEnergyPolicyreportanditsassociateddatasetexaminekeymeasuresthathavebeenadoptedwidelyacrossseveralcountriesorregionsandshowpotentialtomeaningfullyaccelerateandsecurecleanenergytransitions.Theinventoryfor2024includes:
Internationalcommitmentsandclimatepledges,whichencompassNationallyDeterminedContributions(NDCs)andnet
zeroemissionstargets,asinventoriedinthe
IEA’sClimatePledges
Explorer.
Governmentenergyspending,whichbuildsontheannualcollectionofthe
IEA’sGovernmentEnergySpendingTracker
Database,
coveringcleanenergyinvestmentsupportandconsumerenergyaffordabilitymeasures.ThepresentreportsupersedestheGovernmentEnergySpendingTrackeranalysis,whichisnowcoveredinitsownsectionofthisreport.
Tradepoliciesencompassanalysisoftariffsandnon-tariffmeasures,aswellasfreetradeagreements(FTAs)thatimpactkeycleanenergytechnologiesandcommodities.ItisanewareaofanalysisbytheIEA,takenupasof2024.Thedetailedglobalimpactsofthesetradepoliciesarefurtheranalysedintheforthcomingpublication
EnergyTechnologyPerspectives2024.
Regulationscoverstopicssuchasminimumenergyperformancestandards(MEPS),standards,pricinginstruments,supplychainsresilience,andplanstoexpandenergynetworks,aswellasthephase-outoffossil-fuelbasedorinefficienttechnologies.
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Internationalcommitmentsandclimatepledges
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|11
Internationalcommitmentsandclimatepledges
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|12
Fewnewupdatesorannouncementsoflong-termclimategoalsoccurredinthepast12months
EvolutioninmitigationtargetsinNationallyDeterminedContributions(NDCs)andcoverageofnetzeroemissionstargets
GlobalenergyCO2emissions
2030NDCtargets
MtCO2
40
35
30
25
20
First???Current
NDCs202120222023NDCs
ConditionalityEvolutioninmitigation
Source:IEA,
ClimatePledgesExplorer
Netzeroemissionstargets
80%
60%
40%
20%
100%
0%
2018202020222024InlawProposedlegislationInpolicydocumentOralpledge
IEA.CCBY4.0.
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Internationalcommitmentsandclimatepledges
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|13
Allsightsarenowseton2025toupdateNationallyDeterminedContributionsandlong-termstrategiesinadvanceofCOP30
Netzeropledgesin2024
AsofSeptember2024,98countriesandtheEuropeanUnionhavecommittedtoreachcarbonorclimateneutrality.Around87%ofglobalenergy-relatedCO2emissionsareeventuallycovered,althoughnotallaresupportedbyatleastonepolicydocumentoralaw.
Onlyafewadditionalcountriespledgednewtargetsoverthepast12months.Switzerlandenshrinedits2050climateneutralitygoalinlaw(June2023)throughits
ClimateandInnovationLaw.
Ethiopia
and
Georgia
bothsetgoalstoreachnetzeroby2050,asoutlinedintheirLong-TermLowEmissionDevelopmentStrategies(LT-LEDS)(publishedinJuneandJuly2023,respectively).Ghanarecentlyincreaseditsambitiontoachievecarbonneutralityby2060,throughits
updatedEnergyTransitionandInvestmentPlan.
Ugandaunveiledits
EnergyTransitionPlan
(supportedbytheIEA),settingatargettoreachenergy-sectornetzeroCO2emissionsby2065.Regionally,theincreaseincoverageofnetzeropledgesismostnoticeableinEurope,where
Türkiye’s2053climateneutralitygoal
raisedtheshareofregionalemissionscoveredbyanetzeropledgeto95%.
RegionalCO2emissionscoverageofnetzeropledges
EMDEsAdvanced
economies
AsiaPacific
EuropeNorthAmerica
EurasiaDevelopingAsia
MENASub-SaharanAfrica
Netzerotargetsupportedbyastrategy
Oralpledges
NoNZEtarget
0%20%40%60%80%100%
ShareofregionalCO2emissions
IEA.CCBY4.0.
Note:NZE=netzeroemissions.EMDEs=emergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies.MENA=MiddleEastandNorthAfrica.AdvancedeconomiesinAsiaPacificincludeAustralia,Japan,KoreaandNewZealand.
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Internationalcommitmentsandclimatepledges
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|14
TheuptickinnetzerocoverageisalsonoticeableinEurasia,withtheapprovalof
Kazakhstan’sNetzeroStrategy
inFebruary2023.Todate,however,mostoftheregion’semissionsarenotyetcoveredbyaclimateneutralitypledgethatissupportedbyastrategyorlaw.Asofthefirsthalfof2024,mostoftheglobalemissionsnotyetcoveredbyanetzerotarget–roughly10%–areconcentratedintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA)andEurasia.
NationallyDeterminedContributionsin2024
OnlyahandfulofnewNDCs(14)havebeensubmittedsinceJanuary2023,collectivelyimplyinganadditionalcumulativereductionof240Mtofenergy-relatedCO2emissionsby2030.Amongthoseupdated,the
UnitedArabEmirates2023SecondNDC
isthemostnotable.Itaimsforaneconomy-wide,absoluteemissionsreductionof19%by2030(comparedto2019levels),movingawayfromthebusiness-as-usualtrajectorysetinits2020SecondNDC.
Brazilalso
updateditsNDC,
movingfromatargetof50%below2005levelsby2030toanabsoluteannualemissionslimitof1.2GtCO2-eq,consistentwitha53.1%reductiontarget.TheEuropeanUnionalsosubmittedanupdatedNDC,butwithoutanyoverallenhancementofitsmitigationcomponent.
Ifpledgesaremetontimeandinfull,currentNDCsimplyatrajectoryinwhichemissionspeakinthisdecadeandstabiliseataround32MtCO2in2030.Thistrajectory,however,isstillmisalignedwiththelong-termstrategiesofmostcountriesandfallsshortofa1.5°Ccompatiblepathway.Strengthenedsubmissions(beforeCOP30in
Brazil)willlargelyset2035targets.Tocomplywithcountries’ownlong-termgoalsaccordingtotheIEA’sAnnouncedPledgesScenario(APS),inaggregate,NDCswouldneedtocutemissionsbyabout1GtCO2everyyearfrom2023to2035–approximately400Mtmorethantheamountcurrentlypledged.Annualglobalmitigationwouldneedtorisetoroughly2Gtto2035toalignwiththeIEANetZeroEmissionsby2050Scenario(NZEScenario),whichachievesthetargetstotriplerenewablescapacityanddoubleenergyefficiencyimprovements,inlinewiththeCOP28UAEConsensus.
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Governmentenergyspending
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|15
Governmentenergyspending
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Governmentenergyspending
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|16
Advancedeconomiesearmarkedthreetimesmoresupportforcleanenergythaninemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies,withgreaterfocusonboostinglong-terminvestorcertainty
Earmarkedannualgovernmentsupportforcleanenergyinvestmentbybudgetallocationyear
BillionUSD(2023,MER)
300
250
200
150
100
50
Advancedeconomies
202020222024202620282030Planneddisbursedspending
Emergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies
202020222024202620282030Indicativeforward-lookingspending
IEA.CCBY4.0
Note:Earmarkedgovernmentspendingshowsplanneddisbursementsandforward-lookingdirectspendingthroughbudgettimelinesvalidatedbetween2020andH1/2024.Theseestimatesdonottranslateintodisbursementprojectionsupto2030,asitisexpectedthatgovernmentswillroutemorespendingpackagesthroughannualapprovalprocesses.
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Governmentenergyspending
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|17
80%ofearmarkedgovernmentspendingisconcentratedinthreeregions:theUnitedStates,theEuropeanUnionandChina
Earmarkedgovernmentspendingoncleanenergybysectorandregion,2020-H1/2024
Low-emissionselectricity
Energy-efficientbuildingsandindustry
Massandalternativetransit
Low-emissionsvehicles
Low-emissionsfuelsandtechnologyinnovation
Electricitynetworks
100200300400
UnitedStates
EuropeanUnion
China
Restoftheworld
500
BillionUSD(2023,MER)
IEA.CCBY4.0
StateofEnergyPolicy2024
Governmentenergyspending
IEA.CCBY4.0.
PAGE|18
Newlyearmarkedgovernmentsupportforcleanenergyin2024bringstotalsincetheCovid-19
pandemictoUSD2trillion
Cumulativegovernmentsupportforcleanenergyreach
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