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LiteratureReviewReport
ResearchontheCoordinationofFashionClothingDual-channel
SupplyChain
Introduction
Internetisthegreatestrevolutioninthe20thcentury.Notonlychangespeoplessocialcontactmannerofworkingandlifestyles,butalsoitchangesthemodelofproduction?Withthehelpofinternettechnology,e-commercedevelopsarapidgrowth.Thesellercanmakeuseofnetworktodisplayproductsbythewaysofimages,video,andcharacter.Thebuyercanmakeuseofnetworktotakecomparisonofseveralproducts,choosingproductsinthehighestutilityvalue.Aftermakingthedecision,consumersusingonlinepaymentsoftwaretobuytheproducts.Consumersreceiveproductsbyexpressdelivery.Thentheprocessofpurchaseiscompleted.Inthisprocess,Consumersdon*thavetochooseproductsfacetoface.Consumerscansavetimecostandtravelcost>improvetheconvenienceexpandthescopeoftheproductstochoose.Thisisthenetworkmarketingchannel.
Withtherapiddevelopmentofinformationtechnology,thenetworkismakingmoreandmoreinfluenceonthepeople.WiththedevelopmentandapplicationoftheInternet,e-commerceisboomingasanewbusinessmodel.Nomatterfromtheperspectiveofenterprise'sowndevelopmentorfromtheperspectiveofmeetingcustomerneeds,theimplementationofthedual-channelstrategyisamustforenterprisestocompeteandsurvive.Theenterprisesoftheimplementationofdoublechannelmodel,successbeyondcount.Manyenterpriseshasexploredthemethodtoeasetheconflictbetweenelectronicchannelsandtraditionalchannels,andtakeaseriesofeffectivemeasurestoachievecoordinationandbalancebetweenchannels,suchasEsteeLauderCo,IBM,CISCOandNike.Itnotonlyimprovesthemarketshareandpenetration,butalsoprovidesasuccessfulexampleforthenewvaluetransfermodebroughtbytheelectroniccommerce.
However,theintroductionofelectronicchannelswillbringaseriesofproblems.Themainsourceoftheseproblemsliesinthedamagetotheinterestsofmembersofotherchannels,sotraditionalretailerstendtoagainstthemanufacturertointroduceelectronicchannels,andwilltakemeasurestopreventtheintroductionofelectronicchannels,leadingtocontradictionbetweensupplychainmembers.
Singlesupplychaincontracthasbeenunabletosolvethecoordinationproblemofdualchannelsupplychain.Onlyaccordingtotheactualsituation,usingacombinationofbuybackcontract,revenuesharingcontractandwholesalepricecontract,onlythentobeabletoachievealongtimeofdualchannelsupplychaincoordination,toimprovetheoverallbenefitofthesupplychain,tomakemanufacturersandretailerstoachieveawin-winsituation.
Inthispaperthecharacteristicsoffashionclothingareanalyzedincludingseasonal>personalized>fashionandsensitivetofashiontrends.Acceptanceoffashionclothingfornetworkchannelsareanalyzedinthispaper.Puttingforwardthethecoordinationoffashionclothingdual-channelsupplychainissue.Dependingonthesubjectofthenetworkmarketingchannel,Therearethreestructures:thestructureofdual-channelsupplychainbytheleadingofmanufacturexthestructureofdual-channelsupplychainbytheleadingofretailer^thestructureofdual-channelsupplychainbytheleadingofe-commerceretailer.Inthispaperwediscussthestructureofdual-channelsupplychainbytheleadingofmanufacture.Namely,onthebasisoftraditionalretailchannels,manufacturersestablishthenetworksaleschannels.Thispaperestablishesthemodelsofmanufacturersandretailersandanalyzedthemodels.Thenthispaperdiscusseshowtogainmoreprofitformanufacturersandretailersinthecoordinationofdual-channelsupplychain.
ResearchStatusofOverseasandDomestic
Therearethreekindsofdualchannelsupplychainstructure,accordingtothedifferentchannelsofelectronicchannels.Inthispaper,wemainlydiscussthestructureofdual-channelsupplychainbytheleadingofmanufacture.Thestructureisbasedontheoriginaltraditionalchannels,establishtheself-onlinedirectmarketingchannels,toformatadual-channelstructure.
Dual-channelSupplyChain
Theearlyresearchonthedual-channelsupplychainhastwodecisionmakers,themanufacturerandtheretailer.Retailersandmanufacturersinaccordancewiththe
Stackelberggamemodeltomakedecisions.Inearlytwenty-firstCenturyKevinChiangWei-yuputforwardtheearlypricingmodelofdualchannelsupplychain.Inordertobeclosertotherealityofthemarketsituation,inthemathematicalmodeling,KevinChiangWei-yutointroducecustomerstothedegreeofacceptanceofdirectmarketingchannels.Themathematicalmodelofcentralizeddecisionmakingandthemathematicalmodelofdistributeddecisionmakingundertheconditionofsupplier'sleading.Throughtheanalysisoftheresultscanbefoundthatregardlessofthelevelofcustomeracceptance,theintroductionofdirectmarketingchannelsareabletointroducecompetitionmechanism,topreventretailerstosettheretailpricetoohigh.
Whenmanufacturersintroducedirectsaleschannels,competitionwillbeintroduced.Thismakenotonlytherelationshipbetweenmanufacturersandretailers,alsocompetitionbetweenthem.TsayAexaminesthemainfactorsthatleadtochannelconflict,andfindsthatchannelconflicthasledtoareductionintheprofitsofmanufacturersandretailers.Manufacturersandretailerscanincreasetheirmarginalprofitsbycoordinatingthepricesymmetrybetweenchannels.
Kay?Yutunderstandsthatthecompetitionbetweenmanufacturersandretailersismainlyduetothehomogeneityoftheproducts.Becauseoftheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofdirectmarketingchannelsandretailchannels,retailersandmanufacturersusedifferenttypesofservicestoreducetheimpactofthechannels.
Kay-Yutismainlyfromtheperspectiveofservicecompetitiononthedualchannelsupplychainanalysis.
ZhongMingusedtheexpectedvariancemodeltostudythedecisionmodelofthedualchannelsupplychainundertheconditionofriskaversion.Hefoundthattheriskaversionofthedualchannelsupplychainproductpriceswillbelowerthantheriskofneutraldualchannelsupplychainproductprices.Comparedwiththecentralizeddecision-makingsupplychain,verticalandhorizontalcompetitionindecentralizeddecision-makingsupplychaincanleadtoinefficientchannel.
PengJingetal.Studytheinfluenceofthedemandchangeonthedual-channelsupplychain.Theresultsshowthatthesizeofthedemanddisturbanceandthedegreeofconsumeracceptanceoftheelectronicchannelhaveimportantinfluenceonthepricing,productiondecisionandcoordinationcontractofthedual-channelsupplychainsystem.Inaddition,thegreaterthemagnitudeofthechangeofdemanddisturbancemomentum,thegreaterthedifferenceinprofitbeforeandaftertakingmeasures.
ZhouYongweifsstudywasbasedontheretailer(Q,R)andreplacedthestockreplenishmentdual-channelsalesmodelofsupplychain.ThroughtheestablishmentoftheMarkovprocessmodel,theincomefunctionofcentralizedcontroltypesupplychainanddecentralizedcontrolsupplychainisobtained.Heprovedthattheremustbeanoptimalstandardstockleveltomakethesupplychainbenefittothebest.
TheCoordinationofDual-channelSupplyChain
Channelcompetitionbetweenmanufacturersandretailerswillreducetheprofits.Therefore,withthedevelopmentofsupplychainmanagement,channelcoordinationinsupplychainmanagementhasbecomeanimportantdirectionofsupplychainmanagementresearch.Contractcoordinationstrategyofsupplychainsystemisthecorecontentofsupplychainmanagement.Pasternack(1985)proposedtheconceptofsupplychaincontractforthefirsttime,andprovidedtheoptimalwholesalepricepolicyandthebuybackstrategyofperishableproducts.Thecommonsupplychaincontractsincludewholesalepricecontract,buybackcontract,revenuesharingcontractandelasticquantitycontract.
Pricecompetitionhasalwaysbeenthecoreandfundamentalofsupplychaincompetition.Gangshu(George)CaiwereanalyzedandcomparedwiththeretailerledSteinberggame,themanufacturerledSteinberggameandNashequilibriumgame.Hefoundthattherewasapricediscountwhenthecontractwasbetterthanwhentherewasnocontract.Thisismainlybecausethemanufacturerandtheretailusepricecontracttocarryonthecooperationtobeabletoreducethecompetitioncostwhichthechannelcompetitionproduces.Thisarticleshowsthatstrengtheningcooperationbetweenmanufacturersandretailerscanincreasetheirprofits.
LinQiangconsiderthemarketdemandisnonlinearandrandomandthegeneralsituationoftheretailer'sefforts,theintroductionoftheobjectiveexistenceofthechannelmembersofthepsychologicalcharacteristicsofthefairnesspreference.Hedesignthebuybackcontracttoimprovetheimplementationofdualchannelsupplychaincoordination?Becausethetraditionalbuybackcontractcan'tcoordinatethesupplychainthatdependsontheretailefseffort,theeffortcostsharingparameterisintroducedinthebuybackcontractmodel,whichistheeffortcostofthemanufacturertosharethepartoftheretailer.Theresultsshowthatthedualchannelsupplychaincoordinationcanbeachievedwiththeimprovementofthebuybackcontractaslongastheparametersareproperlyvalued.
LiXiangxiangetal.Studyonthestrategyofthemanufacturertoimplementthepricedifferencecompensationtotheretailerdirectly,inordertomakethewholesupplychaintoachievetheoptimal.Butthisapproachhasharmedtheinterestsofthemanufacture匚Sotheextraprofitthatcanbemadebytheretailertoimplementthecontractistomakeupforthelossofthemanufacturer'sprofits,andthengivebacktothemanufacturerforacertainproportionoftheproceeds.Thisapproachcanimproveboththeretailerandthemanufacturersprofit,andfinallyrealizethecoordinationofthedualchannelsupplychain.
TanYanhuafsresearchresultsshowthat:thepricereferenceeffectnotonlyaffectsthepricingstrategyofitsownchannel,butalsoaffectsthepricingstrategyofthedualchannelsupplychain.Theconclusioncanprovidereferenceandreferenceforhowtoeffectivelypricethedual-channel.Dual-channelsupplychaincannotachievecoordinationundernormalcircumstances,buttheuseofthetwocontractcanachievecoordination.
DanBinetal.Constructedadual-channelsupplychainmodelconsistingofasinglemanufacturerandasingleretailer,andstudiedtheoptimalpriceofthedualchannelsupplychainunderthecentralizeddecisiomakinganddecentralizeddecision?making.Fromthepointofviewofcooperationbetweenelectronicchannelandtraditionalchannel,thecompensationstrategyofsupplychaincoordinationisdiscussed.Heprovedthatthiscompensationstrategycanpromotethecoordinationofdual-channelsupplychain,andcanguaranteethesupplychainmembersofawin-winsituationinacertainrange.Finally,anumericalexampleisanalyzedtofurtherverifytheeffectivenessofthecompensationstrategyforthecoordinationofdual-channelsupplychain.
Double-channelcoexistencewillappearthefreeriderphenomenonbasedontheinformation.Informationservicesneedcost,andanyoneofthechannelsofinformationserviceshaveapositiveexternalityforotherchannel.Sowhenthetraditionalchannelsandelectronicchannelstogethertosellthesamemanufacturersproducts,whichprovidesopportunitiesforotherchannelsoffreeriders.MaKai,ZhaoQianrudiscussedthenfreerider1'problemcausedbythecompetitionofservice,andestablishedthe"freeridernmodelafterthetra
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