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2September2024|6:01PMEDT
CommodityViews
GoforGold
nMoreselective,lessconstructive.Whileour2024De?citsBasketperformed
wellthisyear,asofteningofcyclicalsupporttocommoditiesleadsustowardsamoreselectivetacticalapproachtocommodityinvesting.Tobeclear,westronglybelieveinthediversifyingroleofcommoditiesininvestmentportfoliosbasedonseveralstructuraldrivers,includingcommodities’hedgingroleagainstsupply
disruptions,notanuncommonoccurrenceinenergy.Thatsaid,tacticallywe
closeour2024De?citsBasketrecommendationwithapotential8%gainand
focusonourhighestconvictionviewsinthecurrentenvironment,namelyhigherimpliedoilvolatility,longgoldandshortlong-datedEuropeannaturalgas.
nOilcaution.Chinadatathissummersuggestweakeningcyclicalsupportto
commoditydemand,andtooil/copperinparticular.Inoil,whileDMdemandhasbeenmodestlystrongerthanweexpected,itisdif?culttobuildde?citswithoutstrongChinademand,especiallywhensupplyissurprisingtotheupside.Asa
result,we’vetakenamorecautiousstanceonoilandwerecommendthatoilproducershedgetheirexposurebybuyingputs.
nCopperrallydelayed.Incopperwe’veobservedsigni?cantpriceelasticityofbothsupplyanddemandthissummer.Asaresult,thesharpcopperinventorydepletionwehadexpectedwilllikelycomemuchlaterthanwepreviously
thought.Accordingly,wedelayourend-2024coppertargetof$12,000/tto
_
post-2025,implyinga2025copperforecastof$10,100/t,stillabovethisYTD’s$9231/t,butwellbelowourprevious$15,000expectation.
nGoforgold.Ourpreferrednear-termlongisgold.Itremainsourpreferredhedgeagainstgeopoliticaland?nancialrisks,withaddedsupportfromimminentFed
ratecutsandongoingEMcentralbankbuying.Wemaintainour2025targetof$2,700/tozandopenalonggoldtradingrecommendation.
nShortlong-datedTTF.Inenergy,weseeacleardirectionalviewinglobalgas,
thoughtothedownside.Speci?cally,weexpecttheupcomingwaveofglobal
LNGsupplytodriveEuropeannaturalgasprices(TTF)belowligniteeconomicstomanagestoragelevels,suggestingpricesbelow20EUR/MWh.ThisisnotyetfullypricedinTTFforwards,andweopenashort3Q27TTFtrading
recommendation.
SamanthaDart
+1(212)357-9428|
samantha.dart@
GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC
DaanStruyven
+1(212)357-4172|
daan.struyven@
GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC
LinaThomas
+44(20)7051-3062|lina.thomas@GoldmanSachsInternational
CallumBruce,CFA
+1(212)902-3053|callum.bruce@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC
YuliaZhestkovaGrigsby
+1(646)446-3905|yulia.grigsby@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC
HongcenWei
+1(212)934-4691|
hongcen.wei@
GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC
AureliaWaltham
+44(20)7051-2547|
aurelia.waltham@
GoldmanSachsInternational
LaviniaForcellese
+44(20)7774-9243|
lavinia.forcellese@
GoldmanSachsInternational
Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegAC
certi?cationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto/research/hedge.html.
GoldmanSachsCommodityViews
GoforGold
1.Moreselective,lessconstructive.Latelastyearwerecommendeda2024De?citsBasketthatweexpectedtobene?tfromsolidglobaleconomicgrowth,Fedinterestratecutsandsigni?cantbackwardationintheoilcurve.SolidUSgrowth,imminentFedcuts,andstrongoilcarryYTDhavedrivenasolid8%potentialgainonthisbasket.However,softer-than-expectedChinacommoditydemand,aswellasdownsideriskstoChina’s
forwardeconomicoutlook,leadustoamoreselective,lessconstructivetacticalviewofcommodities.Morespeci?cally,Chinaoildemandgrowthhasslowedonstructuralroadfuelswitchingandonpetrochemicaldemandweakness.Incopper,Chinainventories,
whichtypicallydrawfrom2Q,builtinstead,asaresultofaprice-drivenYoYdeclineinapparentChinademand.Fromamacroperspective,China’sJulydatawere
disappointing,withourGSChinaCurrentActivityindicatorshowingonly3.6%
annualizedgrowthinthemonth,wellbelowtheGovernment’stargetof“around5%”.WithChinatypicallyresponsiblefor2/3ofcommoditiesdemandgrowthbeforethe
pandemic,webelieveit’schallengingtobuildsigni?cantde?citsinthesemarketswithoutstrongChinademand.
Tobeclear,westronglybelieveinthediversifyingroleofcommoditiesininvestment
portfoliosbasedonseveralstructuraldrivers,includingcommodities’hedgingrole
againstsupplydisruptions,notanuncommonoccurrenceinenergy,andthepotentialforsharpralliesinselectindustrialmetalsdrivenbyacombinationoflongsupplycyclesandstructuralgreenmetalsdemandgrowthassociatedwithenergysecurityand
decarbonizationinvestment.However,giventhecurrentsofteningcyclicalenvironment,
weopttotacticallycloseour2024De?citsBaskettradingrecommendationwithapotentialgainof8%andfocusonourhighestconvictionviewsinthecurrent
environment,namelyhigherimpliedoilvolatility,longgoldandshortlong-datedEuropeangas.
Exhibit1:WithChina’sCAIatJust3.6%(Belowthe5%GovernmentTarget)andItsSigni?cantShareofGlobalCommodityDemandGrowth,BuildingSubstantialDe?citsWithoutStrongerChineseGrowthSeemsUnlikely
_
Source:NBS,EnergyInstitute,WBMS,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
2September20242
GoldmanSachsCommodityViews
WeForecasta12%TotalReturnfortheGSCICommodityIndexin2024,WithaLowerReturnof5%Expectedin2025
GSForecast
S&PGSCICommodityIndex
2024
2024
S&PGSCI
Energy
IndustrialMetalsPreciousMetalsAgriculture
Livestock
BCOM
Totalreturnsaredisplayed.Theseincludethereturnsfromspotpricechanges,thecashreturnfromcollateral,andtherollyield.Givenwedonotcurrentlycoveragriculture,livestock,silverandzinc(justsuspended),weestimatespotreturnsasreturnsimpliedbyforwardsadjustedwiththehistoricalmedianriskpremium.Weestimaterollreturnsbasedonseasonaltimespreadsandthecurrentfuturescurveshapeforagriculture,livestock,naturalgas,andthemetals.
Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
2.Amorecautiousstanceonoil.WehaverecentlyreducedourrangeforBrentpricesby$5/bblto$70-85,andour2025averageBrentforecastto$77/bbl,re?ectingupside
surprisestoOECDinventoriesandalowerfairvalueestimateforlong-datedprices.
OECDcommercialstockshavemovedsidewaysagainstourpreviousexpectationsof
summerdrawsfortworeasons.First,USliquidssupplyisbeatingexpectationson
ongoingef?ciencygainsandaYoYsurgeinNaturalGasLiquids(NGL)supply.Second,
Chinademandgrowthhasslowedonstructuralroadfuelswitchingtowardspower(EVs)
DollarWeight
100
57
12
7
16
7
100
2023
-4
-5
-4
12
-8
0
-8
2022
26
42
-8
0
12
5
16
2025
5
5
16
5
-3
0
4
YTD
6
8
6
21
-9
10
1
12
20
6
23
-11
7
5
HistoricalPerformance
6
11
1
1
-2
-3
4
Balance
andnaturalgas(LNGtrucks)andonpetrochemicaldemandweakness.Speci?cally,ChinaoildemandhasbeendownYoYthissummer,leadingustorecentlyreviseourforecastfor2024globaloildemandgrowthto0.9mb/dfrom1.2mb/dpreviously.Onnet,wenowexpectasmallerde?citthissummerandamarginally
bigger-than-previously-expectedsurplusin2025.Importantly,riskstoouroilpriceviewareskewedtothedownsidegivenhighsupplysparecapacity,potentialtradetensions,andthepossibilitythatOPECmayreturntothemarkethighersupplythanweexpectin2025.Thismorecautiousoutlooksuggeststhatoilpricesdeclinegently-shortofa
sustainablesupplyshock-aswellasless?rmtimespreadsvspreviously,hence
weakeningrollreturnsforoilvswhatwe’veseenthisyear.Wecontinuetorecommendthatoilproducershedgetheirexposurebybuyingputs,whichstilllooksrelativelycheap.
_
2September20243
GoldmanSachsCommodityViews
Exhibit2:TheRoadFuelShiftFromOiltoPowerandLNGExplainstheBulkofSlowdowninChinaDemandGrowthin2024H1vs.2016-2019
kb/d
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2016-2019DemandGrowth
DecelerationinChinaYear-Over-YearOilDemandGrowth:DecompositionbyDrivers
MacroandResidual
Reopening
Mobility
Recovery
PetrochemicalNormalization
RoadFleet
Switch:
EVsandLNG
IncreaseDecreaseTotal
2024H1DemandGrowth
kb/d
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Ourroadoildemandmodelimpliesa50kb/dlowerhitfromEVsgivenslightdifferencesindatasourcesforcarsales.Source:S&PGlobal,WoodMackenzie,IEA,Wind,HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Exhibit3:WeSeeRiskstoOurOilPriceForecastSkewedtoTheDownside
$/bbl
40
30
20
10
0
-10
_
-20
-30
-40
EstimatedPeakImpactonBrentOilPricein2025byRiskScenario
Timespreads
Long-datedpricesRiskpremium
$/bbl
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
Iransupply
Iransupply
China
USimposes
USimposes
Moderate
OPEC
falls1mb/d;
falls1mb/d;
demandflat
10%tariff
10%tariff;
recession;
reversesextra
noOPEC
OPEC
Fedresponds
OPEC
cuts2025
response
responds
responds
UpsidepriceriskDownsidepricerisk
EstimatedpeakimpactisrelativetoourbaselineforecastwithBrentcrudepricesat$77/bblforthe2025averageand$74/bblinDec2025.Fordetailed
de?nitionsoftheIran,tariff,andmoderaterecessionriskscenarios,seeDaanStruyvenandteam,OilAnalyst,\”TrumpScenarios:UpsideRisktoVolatility;DownsideRisktoPrices\”,July25,2024.Thesaturationofthebarsriseswithoursubjectiveprobabilityforeachriskscenario.
Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
3.Copperrallydelayed.Incopperwe’veobservedsigni?cantpriceelasticityofbothsupplyanddemandwhenpricesspikedthispastspring.Speci?cally,re?nedcopperproductionremainedelevateddespiteminesupplyissuesinkeycopperproducing
countries.Onthedemandside,ChinaapparentcopperconsumptiondroppedYoYinMarchanddeepenedthatdropintoearlysummer.Asaresult,evenwithChina
2September20244
GoldmanSachsCommodityViews
(end-user)greenmetalsdemandrealizingstrongerthanweexpected,Chinacopperinventoriesbuiltin2Q24,insharpcontrastwithseasonaltrendsandthecopper
inventorydepletionwehadpreviouslyexpectedfor2024.Asaresult,andgiventhe
continuedweaknessinChina’spropertysector,webelievethatcopperinventory
depletion-anditsaccompanyingpricerally-willlikelycomemuchlaterthanwe
previouslythought.Accordingly,wedelayourend-2024coppertargetof$12,000/tto
post-2025,atimingclosertoourexpectedpeakinglobalcoppermineproduction.Thisimpliesanaverage2025copperforecastof$10,100/t,stillwellabovethisyear-to-date’s$9231/t,butsigni?cantlybelowourprevious$15,000expectation.Further,givenrisingglobalvisiblecopperinventoriessummertodateandtheongoingChinagrowth
concerns,wetakethisopportunitytocloseourlong-standinglongcoppertrading
recommendationwithapotentialgainof41%andwilllooktopotentiallyre-openthis
tradeatalatertime.Wemaintainourstructuralviewthatgreenmetalsdemandgrowthandthelong-cycle’snatureofcoppersupply,alongwithitsdeclininginvestment,will
ultimatelysetthestageforinventorydepletionand,hence,scarcitypricing.
Exhibit4:WithRisingCopperInventories,WeCloseOurLongCopperTradeButMaintainThatGreenMetalsDemandandtheCopperSector’sLongSupplyCycleWillEventuallyLeadtoInventoryDepletionandScarcityPricing
_
Left:GlobalcoppervisiblecathodestocksincludeLMEandCOMEXstocks,Chinasocialstocks,includingSHFE,andstocksinbondedareas.Source:Wind,Bloomberg,SMM,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
4.Less?rmoutlookforotherindustrialmetalsaswell.Thedelayedcopperrally
likelydelaysincrementalsupporttoaluminumdemand.Againstabackdropofalready
elevatedaluminuminventories,sequentiallyrisingChinaproductionanddecliningChinaimports,andgiventhedownsideriskstoChinaeconomicgrowthdiscussedabove,wealsodelayourprevious$2600/tyear-endtargetforaluminumtowardsend-2025.
Accordingly,welowerour2025aluminumforecastto$2540/t,from$2850/tpreviously.UpsideriskstothisforecastcomefromChina’saluminumproductioncapacitycap
ultimatelydrivingareboundinChinaaluminumimports.Onthedownside,mainrisks
arethatweaker-than-expectedWesterndemandforaluminumcontinuestodisappointin2H24,aswellasbroaderChinaGDPgrowthconcerns(weestimatethatglobaldemandgrowthforaluminumtendstoslowby2ppwhenChinagrowthslowsby1pp).Ferrous
2September20245
GoldmanSachsCommodityViews
metalsinventoriesarealsoelevated,withChinaironoreandsteelstockswellabove
year-agolevels.GivenourweakChinapropertysectoroutlook,webelieveChinasteel
demandhaslimitedupside,suggestingachallengingenvironmentforironoreprice
upsidefornow.Wemaintainabearishviewonnickel,andwesuspendforthemomentourzinccoverage.Accordingly,wereplaceour‘LongNewEconomy’(longcopperand
aluminum,shortnickelandzinc)withaversionwithoutzinc(longcopperandaluminum,shortnickel).1
Exhibit5:WeDelayOurAluminum$2600/tTargetto2025DuetoAlreadyElevatedStocksandChinaGrowthRisks,WhichAlsoLimitIronOre’sPriceUpsideAmidHighStockLevels
Left:GlobalvisiblealuminumstocksincludeLMEandCOMEXstocks,Chinasocialstocks,includingSHFE.
Source:Mysteel,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,Wind,SMM,Bloomberg
5.GoforGold.
_
Inthissoftercyclicalenvironment,goldstandsoutasthecommoditywherewehavethehighestcon?denceinnear-termupside.Morespeci?cally,wemaintainourbullish$2,700/toztargetforearly2025andweopenalonggoldtradingrecommendationforthreereasons:
1.Webelievethatthetriplingincentralbankpurchasessincemid-2022onfearsaboutUS?nancialsanctionsandUSsovereigndebtisstructuralandwillcontinue,
reportedorunreported.
2.ImminentFedratecutsarepoisedtobringWesterncapitalbackintothegold
market,acomponentlargelyabsentofthesharpgoldrallyobservedinthelasttwoyears.
3.Goldofferssigni?canthedgingvaluetoportfoliosagainstgeopoliticalshocks
includingtariffs,Fedsubordinationrisk,anddebtfears.Ouranalysissuggestsan
upsideof15%ingoldpricesunderahypotheticalrisein?nancialsanctionsequaltotheriseseensince2021andasimilarupsideifUSCDSspreadswidenby1
1Tobeclear,wecloseourtradewithapotentialgainof13%andopenanewseparatetrade(longcopperandaluminum,shortnickel).
2September20246
GoldmanSachsCommodityViews
standarddeviation(13bps)amidrisingdebtconcerns.
Thatsaid,duetotheparticularlypricesensitiveChinesemarketdigestingtherecentpricerally,wehaveadjustedour$2,700targettoearly2025vsyear-end2024
previously.However,webelievethatthatsamepricesensitivityalsoinsuresagainsthypotheticallargepricedeclines,whichwouldlikelyreinvigorateChinesebuying.2
Exhibit6:WeSeeValueinLongGoldPositionsGivenHigherCentralBankDemandandHedgingValueAgainstGeopolitical/FinancialShocks(Sanctions,DebtFears,Tariffs,FedSubordinationRisk)
Rightpanel:Wequantify?nancialsanctionsastheGDP-weightedcountofrelatedUSexecutiveordersandsimulateariseinourindexby48points,similartotheincreasefrom2021topresent.ThisisakintotwoadditionalsanctionsonChinaorsixonIndia.Inouranalysis,weincludeUS?nancialsanctions-relatedExecutiveOrders(SREOs)effectivebetween2000andApril23,2024.Theexecutive
ordersaresourcedfromOFACandarepubliclyavailableon.Theselectionof?nancialexecutiveordersfollowstheapproachoutlinedinthebook“BuckingtheBuck”byProfessorDanielMcDowell.Sanctionintensitiesarenotdifferentiated;allareweightedequally.WeusetheUS5-yearCDSspreadasaproxyforUSdebtorglobal?nancialdollarsystemfears,andsimulatea
onestandarddeviationincrease,whichcorrespondsto13bps,thatpersistsforoneyear.Thisrisemirrorsthespikein2023Q1aroundtheUSdebtceilingdebate,andwouldleadtoaCDSlevelsimilartotheoneobservedinthe2011debtceilingcrisis.
Source:WorldGoldCouncil,IMF,Companydata,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
6.Abearishcycleforglobalgas.Europe’sscarsfromthe2022energycrisishaveyettofullyheal,asillustratedbyitsstilldepressedindustrialactivity,anditsvulnerabilitytonaturalgasandelectricitypricespikesthiscomingwinter.However,wehavelong
_
arguedthatlowerenergypriceslieinthehorizon.Tobeclear,anupcomingwaveof
globallique?ednaturalgas(LNG)supplycapacityadditionsisabouttohitthemarket
startingin2025,andgrowingsigni?cantlythroughmostofthesecondhalfofthis
decade.Withthescaleofthesesupplyadditions,whichweexpecttoreachmorethan
200mtpaby2029,signi?cantlyaboveAsia’saverageannualLNGdemandgrowthnear20mtpa,itisclearthatthemarketwillneedtoincentivizeincrementaldemandvia
lowergasprices,sothisgrowingLNGsupplycan?ndahome.3Thismeansthat,asLNGsupplygrows,atleastinitially,left-overcargoesunwantedbytherestoftheworldwill
lookforahomeinEurope.AsLNGsupplyavailabilitygrows,Europeangasbalanceswillsoften,pressuringEuropeangasprices(TTF)lowertolookforincrementaldemandin
ordertomanageitsstorageawayfromcongestion.Thisinourviewmeansthat,atthe
2Aswehaverecentlyshown,theChinesemarketremainsstructurallyresilient,drivenbylowerChineseyieldsandfearassociatedwiththeslumpingpropertymarket,whichoffsetthedragongolddemandfromlowerincomeandthusreduceddiscretionaryspendingonjewelry.
3LNGcannotbestoredintankersforalongperiodoftimewithoutlosingcargovalueowingto‘boiloff’.Typically,LNG?oatingstorageonlylastsforuptotwomonthsatatime.
2September20247
GoldmanSachsCommodityViews
veryleast,gaspriceswilllooktomaximizefuelsubstitutionawayfrombothhardcoal
andlignite(wherethemarkethasbalancedforthepasttwosummers)bypricingbelow20EUR/MWh(maxligniteswitchingeconomics)onasustainablebasis.
Importantly,shouldEuropeanbalancesstilllookcongestedevenatsuchlowerprices,
TTFandLNGpriceswilllikelybepressuredfurtherdowntoincentivizeincremental
price-sensitiveLNGdemandelsewhereintheworld.Ifthedemandresponseisnothighenough,TTFandLNGpricesmighthavetofallenoughtoincentivizetemporaryUS
naturalgasexportshut-instobalancetheglobalmarket.Wesawasimilarscenarioplayoutin2020,althoughatthattimethedriverwasacollapseindemand,vsasurgein
supply.Theendgameisthesameinourview,however,withthemarginalLNGexporter(theUS4)asthemainswingsupplier,potentiallyhavingto(temporarily)curtailLNG
exportssharply.
Exhibit7:AnUpcomingWaveofLNGSupplyCapacityisAbouttoHittheMarketStartingin2025
_
SanctionedprojectsareprojectsthathavereachedFID,withsuf?cientfundingtomoveaheadintoprojectconstruction.Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
4ThegastoproduceUSLNGisboughtfromtheUSgrid,typicallyatHenryHub+prices.ThismeansthattheUSvariablecostofLNGproductionishigherthanmost,ifnotall,otherLNGexportersthatpreviously
investedinupstreaminfrastructure,andcurrentlyfaceoperationalcostsmuchclosertoliftingcosts(typicallybelow$1/mmBtu).
2September20248
GoldmanSachsCommodityViews
Exhibit8:AsMoreLNGBecomesAvailable,TTFWillLooktoMaximizeLigniteSubstitutionByPricingBelow20EUR/MWh,WhichIsNotYetFullyPricedIntoTTFForwards
Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
_
2September20249
GoldmanSachsCommodityViews
DisclosureAppendix
RegAC
We,SamanthaDart,DaanStruyven,LinaThomas,CallumBruce,CFA,YuliaZhestkovaGrigsby,HongcenWei,AureliaWalthamandLaviniaForcellese,herebycertifythatalloftheviewsexpressedinthisreportaccuratelyre?ectourpersonalviews,whichhavenotbeenin?uencedbyconsiderationsofthe?rm’sbusinessorclientrelationships.
Unlessotherwisestated,theindividualslistedonthecoverpageofthisreportareanalystsinGoldmanSachs’GlobalInvestmentResearchdivision.
Disclosures
Regulatorydisclosures
DisclosuresrequiredbyUnitedStateslawsandregulations
Seecompany-speci?cregulatorydisclosuresaboveforanyofthefollowingdisclosuresrequiredastocompaniesreferredtointhisreport:managerorco-managerinapendingtransaction;1%orotherownership;compensationforcertainservices;typesofclientrelationships;managed/co-managedpublicofferingsinpriorperiods;directorships;forequitysecurities,marketmakingand/orspecialistrole.GoldmanSachstradesormaytradeasa
principalindebtsecurities(orinrelatedderivatives)ofissuersdiscussedinthisreport.
Thefollowingareadditionalrequireddisclosures:Ownershipandmaterialcon?ictsofinterest:GoldmanSachspolicyprohibitsitsanalysts,professionalsreportingtoanalystsandmembersoftheirhouseholdsfromowningsecuritiesofanycompanyintheanalyst’sareaofcoverage.
Analystcompensation:Analystsarepaidinpartbasedonthepro?tabilityofGoldmanSachs,whichincludesinvestmentbankingrevenues.Analyst
asof?cerordirector:GoldmanSachspolicygenerallyprohibitsitsanalysts,personsreportingtoanalystsormembersoftheirhouseholdsfromservingasanof?cer,directororadvisorofanycompanyintheanalyst’sareaofcoverage.Non-U.S.Analysts:Non-U.S.analystsmaynotbe
associatedpersonsofGoldmanSachs&Co.LLCandthereforemaynotbesubjecttoFINRARule2241orFINRARule2242restrictionsoncommunicationswithsubjectcompany,publicappearancesandtradingsecuritiesheldbytheanalysts.
AdditionaldisclosuresrequiredunderthelawsandregulationsofjurisdictionsotherthantheUnitedStates
Thefollowingdisclosuresarethoserequiredbythejurisdictionindicated,excepttotheextentalreadymadeabovepursuanttoUnitedStateslawsandregulations.Australia:GoldmanSachsAustraliaPtyLtdanditsaf?liatesarenotauthoriseddeposit-takinginstitutions(asthattermisde?nedinthe
BankingAct1959(Cth))inAustraliaanddonotprovidebankingservices,norcarryonabankingbusiness,inAustralia.Thisresearch,andanyaccesstoit,isintendedonlyfor“wholesaleclients”withinthemeaningoftheAustralianCorporationsAct,unlessotherwiseagreedbyGoldmanSachs.In
producingresearchreports,membersofGlobalInvestmentResearchofGoldmanSachsAustraliamayattendsitevisitsandothermeetingshostedbythecompaniesandotherentitieswhicharethesubjectofitsresearchreports.InsomeinstancesthecostsofsuchsitevisitsormeetingsmaybemetinpartorinwholebytheissuersconcernedifGoldmanSachsAustraliaconsidersitisappropriateandreasonableinthespeci?ccircumstancesrelatingtothesitevisitormeeting.Totheextentthatthecontentsofthisdocumentcontainsany?n
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