國(guó)際法-北海大陸架

SummaryoftheJudgmentof20February1969NORTHSEACONTINENTALSHELFCASES(FederalRepublicofGermanyvDenmark;FRGvNetherlands)Judgmentof20February1969TheCourtdeliveredjudgment,by11votesto6,intheNorthSeaContinentalShelfcases.Thedispute,whichwassubmittedtotheCourton20February1967,relatedtothedelimitationofthecontinentalshelfbetweentheFederalRepublicofGermanyandDenmarkontheonehand,andbetweentheFederalRepublicofGermanyandtheNetherlandsontheother.ThePartiesaskedtheCourttostatetheprinciplesandrulesofinternationallawapplicable,andundertookthereaftertocarryoutthedelimitationsonthatbasis.TheCourtrejectedthecontentionofDenmarkandtheNetherlandstotheeffectthatthedelimitationsinquestionhadtobecarriedoutinaccordancewiththeprincipleofequidistanceasdefinedinArticle6ofthe1958GenevaConventionontheContinentalShelf,holding:

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thattheFederalRepublic,whichhadnotratifiedtheConvention,wasnotlegallyboundbytheprovisionsofArticle6;

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thattheequidistanceprinciplewasnotanecessaryconsequenceofthegeneralconceptofcontinentalshelfrights,andwasnotaruleofcustomaryinternationallaw.Non-ApplicabilityofArticle6ofthe1958ContinentalShelfConvention(paras.21-36oftheJudgment)TheCourtthenturnedtothequestionwhetherindelimitingthoseareastheFederalRepublicwasunderalegalobligationtoaccepttheapplicationoftheequidistanceprinciple.Whileitwasprobablytruethatnoothermethodofdelimitationhadthesamecombinationofpracticalconvenienceandcertaintyofapplication,thosefactorsdidnotsufficeofthemselvestoconvertwhatwasamethodintoaruleoflaw.Suchamethodwouldhavetodrawitslegalforcefromotherfactorsthantheexistenceofthoseadvantages.Thefirstquestiontobeconsideredwaswhetherthe1958GenevaConventionontheContinentalShelfwasbindingforallthePartiesinthecase.UndertheformalprovisionsoftheConvention,itwasinforceforanyindividualStatethathadsigneditwithinthetime-limitprovided,onlyifthatStatehadalsosubsequentlyratifiedit.DenmarkandtheNetherlandshadbothsignedandratifiedtheConventionandwerepartiestoit,buttheFederalRepublic,althoughoneofthesignatoriesoftheConvention,hadneverratifiedit,andwasconsequentlynotaparty.ItwasadmittedonbehalfofDenmarkandtheNetherlandsthatinthecircumstancestheConventioncouldnot,assuch,bebindingontheFederalRepublic.ButitwascontendedthattherégimeofArticle6oftheConventionhadbecomebindingontheFederalRepublic,because,byconduct,bypublicstatementsandproclamations,andinotherways,theRepublichadassumedtheobligationsoftheConvention.Itwasclearthatonlyaverydefinite,veryconsistentcourseofconductonthepartofaStateinthesituationoftheFederalRepubliccouldjustifyupholdingthosecontentions.WhenanumberofStatesdrewupaconventionspecificallyprovidingforaparticularmethodbywhichtheintentiontobecomeboundbytherégimeoftheconventionwastobemanifested,itwasnotlightlytobepresumedthataStatewhichhadnotcarriedoutthoseformalitieshadneverthelesssomehowbecomeboundinanotherway.Furthermore,hadtheFederalRepublicratifiedtheGenevaConvention,itcouldhaveenteredareservationtoArticle6,byreasonofthefacultytodosoconferredbyArticle12oftheConvention.OnlytheexistenceofasituationofestoppelcouldlendsubstancetothecontentionofDenmarkandtheNetherlands

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ie.,iftheFederalRepublicwerenowprecludedfromdenyingtheapplicabilityoftheconventionalrégime,byreasonofpastconduct,declarations,etc.,whichnotonlyclearlyandconsistentlyevincedacceptanceofthatrégime,butalsohadcausedDenmarkortheNetherlands,inrelianceonsuchconduct,detrimentallytochangepositionorsuffersomeprejudice.Ofthistherewasnoevidence.Accordingly,Article6oftheGenevaConventionwasnot,assuch,applicabletothedelimitationsinvolvedinthepresentproceedings.TheEquidistancePrincipleNotaRuleofCustomaryInternationalLaw(paras.

60-82oftheJudgment)Thequestionremainedwhetherthroughpositivelawprocessestheequidistanceprinciplemustnowberegardedasaruleofcustomaryinternationallaw.RejectingthecontentionsofDenmarkandtheNetherlands,theCourtconsideredthattheprincipleofequidistance,asitfiguredinArticle6oftheGenevaConvention,hadnotbeenproposedbytheInternationalLawCommissionasanemergingruleofcustomaryinternationallaw.ThisArticlecouldnotbesaidtohavereflectedorcrystallizedsucharule.ThiswasconfirmedbythefactthatanyStatemightmakereservationsinrespectofArticle6,unlikeArticles1,2and3,onsigning,ratifyingoraccedingtotheConvention.WhilecertainotherprovisionsoftheConvention,althoughrelatingtomattersthatlaywithinthefieldofreceivedcustomarylaw,werealsonotexcludedfromthefacultyofreservation,theyallrelatedtorulesofgeneralmaritimelawveryconsiderablyantedatingtheConventionwhichwereonlyincidentaltocontinentalshelfrightsassuch,andhadbeenmentionedintheConventionsimplytoensurethattheywerenotprejudicedbytheexerciseofcontinentalshelfrights.Article6,however,relateddirectlytocontinentalshelfrightsassuch,andsinceitwasnotexcludedfromthefacultyofreservation,itwasalegitimateinferencethatitwasnotconsideredtoreflectemergentcustomarylaw.IthadbeenarguedonbehalfofDenmarkandtheNetherlandsthatevenifatthedateoftheGenevaConventionnoruleofcustomaryinternationallawexistedinfavouroftheequidistanceprinciple,sucharulehadneverthelesscomeintobeingsincetheConvention,partlybecauseofitsownimpact,andpartlyonthebasisofsubsequentStatepractice.InorderforthisprocesstooccuritwasnecessarythatArticle6oftheConventionshould,atalleventspotentially,beofanorm-creatingcharacter.Article6wassoframed,however,astoputtheobligationtomakeuseoftheequidistancemethodafteraprimaryobligationtoeffectdelimitationbyagreement.Furthermore,thepartplayedbythenotionofspecialcircumstancesinrelationtotheprincipleofequidistance,thecontroversiesastotheexactmeaningandscopeofthatnotion,andthefacultyofmakingreservationstoArticle6mustallraisedoubtsastothepotentiallynorm-creatingcharacterofthatArticle.Furthermore,whileaverywidespreadandrepresentativeparticipationinaconventionmightshowthataconventionalrulehadbecomeageneralruleofinternationallaw,inthepresentcasethenumberofratificationsandaccessionssofarwashardlysufficient.Asregardsthetimeelement,althoughthepassageofonlyashortperiodoftimewasnotnecessarilyabartotheformationofanewruleofcustomaryinternationallawonthebasisofwhatwasoriginallyapurelyconventionalrule,itwasindispensablethatStatepracticeduringthatperiod,includingthatofStateswhoseinterestswerespeciallyaffected,shouldhavebeenbothextensiveandvirtuallyuniforminthesenseoftheprovisioninvokedandshouldhaveoccurredinsuchawayastoshowageneralrecognitionthataruleoflawwasinvolved.Some15caseshadbeencitedinwhichtheStatesconcernedhadagreedtodraworhaddrawntheboundariesconcernedaccordingtotheprincipleofequidistance,buttherewasnoevidencethattheyhadsoactedbecausetheyhadfeltlegallycompelledtodrawtheminthatwaybyreasonofaruleofcustomarylaw.Thecasescitedwereinconclusiveandinsufficientevidenceofasettledpractice.TheCourtconsequentlyconcludedthattheGenevaConventionwasnotinitsoriginsorinceptiondeclaratoryofamandatoryruleofcustomaryinternationallawenjoiningtheuseoftheequidistanceprinciple,itssubsequenteffecthadnotbeenconstitutiveofsucharule,andStatepracticeuptodatehadequallybeeninsufficientforthepurpose.ThePrinciplesandRulesofLawApplicable(paras.

83-101oftheJudgment)ThePartieswereunderanobligationtoactinsuchawaythatintheparticularcase,andtakingallthecircumstancesintoaccount,equitableprincipleswereapplied.TherewasnoquestionoftheCourt'sdecisionbeingexaequoetbono.Itwaspreciselyaruleoflawthatcalledfortheapplicationofequitableprinciples,andinsuchcasesasthepresentonestheequidistancemethodcouldunquestionablyleadtoinequity.Othermethodsexistedandmightbeemployed,aloneorincombination,accordingtotheareasinvolved.AlthoughthePartiesintendedthemselvestoapplytheprinciplesandruleslaiddownbytheCourtsomeindicationwascalledforofthepossiblewaysinwhichtheymightapplythem.Foralltheforegoingreasons,theCourtfoundineachcasethattheuseoftheequidistancemethodofdelimitationwasnotobligatoryasbetweentheParties;thatnoothersinglemethodofdelimitationwasinallcircumstancesobligatory;thatdelimitationwastobeeffectedbyagreementinaccordancewithequitableprinciplesandtakingaccountofallrelevantcircumstances,insuchawayastoleaveasmuchaspossibletoeachPartyallthosepartsofthecontinentalshelfthatconstitutedanaturalprolongationofitslandterritory,withoutencroachmentonthenaturalprolongationofthelandterritoryoftheother;andthat,ifsuchdelimitationproducedoverlappingareas,theyweretobedividedbetweenthePartiesinagreedproportions,or,failingagreement,equally,unlesstheydecidedonarégimeofjointjurisdiction,user,orexploitation.問(wèn)題：為什么國(guó)際法院在本案中沒(méi)有適用1958年日內(nèi)瓦《大陸架公約》第六條？本案中，哪個(gè)國(guó)家是《大陸架公約》的第三方？為什么國(guó)際法院認(rèn)為等距離原則（theequidistanceprinciple）不是國(guó)際習(xí)慣法規(guī)則？試評(píng)價(jià)國(guó)際法院的這一觀點(diǎn)。國(guó)際法院認(rèn)為在本案中應(yīng)當(dāng)適用什么法律原則和規(guī)則？為什么？的爭(zhēng)議，這是向法院提交了對(duì)1967年2月20日，涉及到一方面是德國(guó)和丹麥聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)之間的大陸架劃界，而德意志聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)和荷蘭兩者之間。締約方要求法庭陳述的國(guó)際法原則和規(guī)則的適用，此后著手進(jìn)行劃界的基礎(chǔ)上。法院駁回了丹麥和荷蘭對(duì)有問(wèn)題的劃界必須進(jìn)行按照等距的原則，在1958年的日內(nèi)瓦公約關(guān)于大陸架第六條規(guī)定，持有效的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)：

-那聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)，尚未批準(zhǔn)該公約，是沒(méi)有法律第六條規(guī)定的約束;

-這等距離原則是沒(méi)有的大陸架權(quán)利的一般概念的必然結(jié)果，而不是習(xí)慣國(guó)際法的規(guī)則。不適用1958年大陸架公約第6條（第判決書(shū)21-36）法院隨后轉(zhuǎn)向問(wèn)題，無(wú)論是在界定這些地區(qū)的聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)是在法律上有義務(wù)接受的等距離原則的適用。雖然它可能是真實(shí)的劃界沒(méi)有其他方法具有方便實(shí)用的應(yīng)用程序，并確定相同的組合，這些因素并不足以自己轉(zhuǎn)換什么方法成為法律的規(guī)定。這種方法將不得不從其他因素比這些優(yōu)勢(shì)的存在，畫(huà)出它的法律效力。要考慮的第一個(gè)問(wèn)題是1958年日內(nèi)瓦公約關(guān)于大陸架是否綁定的所有締約方的情況。根據(jù)該公約的正式規(guī)定，那是在為曾提供的期限內(nèi)簽署的，只有當(dāng)該國(guó)也隨后批準(zhǔn)的任何單個(gè)國(guó)家的力量。丹麥和荷蘭已經(jīng)簽署并批準(zhǔn)該公約，并為當(dāng)事人，但聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)，雖然該公約的簽署國(guó)之一，從來(lái)沒(méi)有批準(zhǔn)它，并因此不是一個(gè)政黨。它被錄取代表丹麥和荷蘭，在這種情況下該公約不能，因此，要對(duì)聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)的結(jié)合。但有人爭(zhēng)辯說(shuō)，該公約第6條的政權(quán)成為聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)的結(jié)合，因?yàn)?，通過(guò)行為，通過(guò)公開(kāi)聲明和宣言，而在其他方面，該共和國(guó)承擔(dān)的公約義務(wù)。很明顯，只有一個(gè)非常明確的，非常一致的行為在一國(guó)聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)形勢(shì)的一部分，當(dāng)然可以證明堅(jiān)持的論點(diǎn)。當(dāng)一些國(guó)家制定了專門的公約規(guī)定由有意成為受本公約的政權(quán)要表現(xiàn)一個(gè)特定的方法，它是不會(huì)輕易被推定其沒(méi)有進(jìn)行這些手續(xù)一個(gè)國(guó)家不過(guò)，曾莫名其妙地成為必然以另一種方式。此外，有聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)批準(zhǔn)了日內(nèi)瓦公約，它可能已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了一個(gè)保留第6條，因教師對(duì)這樣做的公約第12條所賦予的。的禁止反言的情況下，只有存在可以借給物質(zhì)丹麥和荷蘭的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)-也就是說(shuō)，如果聯(lián)邦共和國(guó)是現(xiàn)在否認(rèn)傳統(tǒng)制度的適用范圍排除，因過(guò)去的行為，聲明等，這不僅明確和一貫明證接受這一制度，也造成了丹麥或荷蘭，在依賴這種行為，不利改變位置或遭受某種偏見(jiàn)。這一點(diǎn)沒(méi)有任何證據(jù)。因此，日內(nèi)瓦公約第6條是不是，因此，適用于參與本議事劃界。等距離原則（判決書(shū)第60-82）不是規(guī)則的國(guó)際習(xí)慣法現(xiàn)在的問(wèn)題仍然是能否通過(guò)實(shí)證法處理等距離原則，現(xiàn)在必須被視為習(xí)慣國(guó)際法的規(guī)則。拒絕丹麥和荷蘭的爭(zhēng)論，法院認(rèn)為，等距的原則，因?yàn)樗谌諆?nèi)瓦公約第6條想通，尚未提出國(guó)際法委員會(huì)作為國(guó)際習(xí)慣法的一個(gè)新興的統(tǒng)治。本文不能說(shuō)已經(jīng)反映或結(jié)晶這樣的規(guī)則。這是由于一個(gè)事實(shí)，即任何國(guó)家可以預(yù)約就第6條，不像第1，第2和第3，在簽