影響的績(jī)效管理的評(píng)論：以一個(gè)能源供應(yīng)公司為依據(jù)外文翻譯

影響的績(jī)效管理的評(píng)論：以一個(gè)能源供給公司為依據(jù)外文翻譯外文翻譯原文ImpactofperformancemanagementreviewsEvidenceformanenergysupplierMaterialSource:MangementServicesAuthor:DrVeronicaMartinezandDrMikeKennerleyAbstractOrganisationalresearchersandmanagersalikehavelongheldtheviewthatperformancereviews,basedonperformancemeasurementsystems,haveapositiveimpactonbusinessperformance.Nevertheless,hereisrelativelylittleresearchtosupportthishypothesis.ThisstudysetsouttotacklethisgapbytestingtheeffectofperformancereviewsonbusinessperformanceinaUKenergysupplier,usingagencytheories.Ourevidenceshows33positiveeffectsofperformancereviews;12ofthemareidentifiedasthemostcitedbyourinterviewees.Sevenfactorsthatmoderatethefirm'sresultsareidentified;the'localleadership'onperformancereviews,whichisacontributiontoknowledgefromthisresearch,stoodoutasoneofthemostpowerfulfactorsthatmoderateperformancereviews.Twonegativeeffectsofperformancereviewsarehighlightedbythisresearch.Finally,thisresearchdiscussestheimplicationstothebodyofknowledgeandpractice.IntroductionCompetitivepressuresintheglobalbusinessenvironmentareforcingorganisationstore-engineerInordertobecomemorecompetitiveinthemarketplace.Towardthatend,organisationsareplacingstrongemphasisonperformancemanagementsystemsFrigoandKrumwiede,1999.Evidencesuggeststhat44%oforganisationsworldwideuseperformancemeasurementsystemsasamechanismtorevieworganisationalperformanceMarretai,2004;Rigby,2001;Silk,1998;Francoetal,2004;KaplanandNorton,1992.Whileinteresting,littleresearchsuggeststhatperformancereviewsbenefitorganisationalperformance.Ourresearchexaminestworesearchquestions.Firstly,whataretheeffectsofperformancereviewsonbusinessperformance?Secondly,whatfactorsmoderatetheeffectofperformancereviews?Therestofthearticleisorganisedasfollows:Itstartsdiscussingthebodyofliteratureontheagencytheoryandperformancereviews;thus,itintroducestheresearchmethodsusedinthisresearchitcontinueswithadiscussionoftheresearchfindingsandconclusions.Finally,thepaperconcludeswithsomeimplicationsforpracticeandknowledge.Thisexploratoryresearchshedssomelightontheexplanationoftheeffectsandfactorsthatmoderateperformancereviews;howeverasapartofthisresearchproject,morecasestudieswillbecarriedouttoincreasethegeneralisationofthesefindings.theagencytheoryandperformancereviewsTheagencymodelofthefirmsuggeststhattheprincipalinvestsinaproductionprocessunderthecontrolofanagent.Theagentisprivatelyinformedastothefirm'scapitalproductivity.Theagentcanreporttotheprincipalontheproductivityrealisationandcandivertsomeoftheprincipal'sinvestmentfromproductiontopersonalnon-pecuniaryconsumptionBaiman,1990.Firmsinvestinperformancereviews'tomonitorandcontrolthegents'opportunismandbehaviourEisenhardt,1989.Performancereviewsputinactionandbringhefirm'sperformancemeasurementsystemstolife,suchasbalancedscorecards,performanceprisms,budgetingsystemsandaccountingsystems.Acriticaldecisionfortheprincipalistodesignthefirm'sperformancemanagementreview.Theprincipalhastwobasicoptionstocontrolthefirm'soutcomes.Thefirstoption,andmostwidelyusedistheprincipalinvestsinperformancereviews,includingaperformancemeasurementsystem.Suchinvestmentsrevealtheagent'sbehaviourtotheprincipal.Thesecondoptionistocontractontheoutcome-basedcontractwhichmotivatesbehaviourbyco-alignmentoftheagent'spreferenceswiththoseoftheprincipals,eg,linkperformancemeasurementsystemstoagent'scompensations.Theproblemwiththissecondoptionisthatoutcomeswouldbesubjecttofactorssuchasgovernmentpolicies,economicclimate,competitors'actions,etc,Eisenhardt,1989.Baiman1990reportsthatbyincreasing'theperformancereviewsandagents'rents',theprincipalisabletoreducetheproductiondistortionsbyagreateramountthanjustusingperformancereviews.althoughinpractice,thebenefitsofthiscorrelationareindiscussion.ResearchbyKumar1989andSuhandKim1989showsacorrelationbetweenafirm'sproductivityandperformancereviewsBaiman,1990,ie,theprincipalwillinvestmoreinperformancereviewswhentheagentcommunicateslowproductivityandoutcomes.Themoremoneyisspentonreviewingtheagent'saction,themoreaccuratetheperformancereviewsare.Onthecontrary,whentheagentreportshighproductivity,theprincipalwillinvestlessinthefirm'sperformancereviews,thereforethereviewsarelessaccurate.Somepractitionersaddthatprincipalsincreasetheinvestmentonperformancereviewswhenthefirm'scapitalinvestmentsarelimitedand/orwhenthefirm'sobjectivesbecomemoreambitious.Performancemeasurementsystemsandqualitymanagementliteratureshowsomeeffectsofperformancereviewonthewaybusinessoperates.IsmailandTrotman'sexperimentalresearchIsmailandTrotman,1995showsapositivecorrelationbetweenthenumberofperformancereviews,thenumberofplausiblehypothesesandgenerationofideas.Theirquasi-experimentalanalysisonSingaporeanfirmsshowsthatwhenfirmsincreasethenumberofperformancereviews,thefirm'sperformanceincreases.Theyfoundthatduringtheperformancereview,thequalityofdiscussionsandtheemployees'participationaretwofactorsthatmoderatetheeffectsoftheperformancereviews.ThestudyofTrotman1985onAustralianfirmsshowsthatperformancereviewsincreasetheaccuracyofjudgementsanddecreasethevarianceofindividualjudgements;asaresult,thefirm'slevelofsystematicbiasisminimised.Marien'sresearch1992suggeststhatthemainbenefitsofaperformancereviewhappenduringthediscussiontime,whenthestrengths,goals,improvementsandactionsareidentifiedandnegotiated.Hisresearchhighlightsthatperformancereviewsmakeagentsfeelincontroloftheirownperformance.Differenttheoriessuggestthatperformancereviewsimprovethefirms'managementcontrolandfirms'performance,althoughmoreresearchshouldaddressthenatureofthebenefitsonthewayfirmsoperate.MethodsThesocialconstructionismapproach,basedonanin-depthcasestudy,isregardedasappropriateforourresearchinquiryVossetal,2002;BurrelandMorgan,1979;Yin,1994.Inparticular,wearguethatabetterunderstandingoftheeffectsofperformancereviewsonthewayorganisationsoperateshouldbedeveloped.Thisapproach,basedoncasestudies,drivesustothefundamentalpointwherethephenomenontakesplaceinrealtimeEasterby-5mithetal,1999.Itprovidesaccesstodifferenttypesofperformancereviewsatdifferentorganisationallevels,firms'reportsandactionplans.methodologicalprocessOurmethodologicalprocessconsistedoffivesteps:1Pointofdeparture--Weselectedrelevantlinesofenquiriesanddevelopedourresearchquestionbasedonliteratureandempiricalexploratoryresearch.2Researchprotocol--Weestablishedkeydecisionstodriveourresearch,ie,definitionofintervieweesandperformancereviewsatdifferentorganisationallevels.3Datacollection--Wedevelopedastructurequestionnaireconsistingoftwobroadareas,ie.understandingofareviewprocessesandassociatedperformancemeasurementtools,andbeffectofperformancereviewsonmanagerialandoperationallevels.Weinterviewedtheenergysupplier'schiefoperatingofficerCOO,12executivemanagers,eightbusinessunits'managersand15employees.Interviewslastedfromtwotofourhoursandwereconductedovertheperiodofeightmonthsduring2004and2005.Weusedmultipledatacollectiontoolstoincreasethereliability,constructandinternalvalidityofourresearchVossetal,2002;Easterby-Smith,1999.4DataanalysisWedevelopedstandarddatacollectiontablestocomparethedatagatheredfromdifferentinformantsandsourcesofinformationMilesandHuberman,1984.Weanalysedatotalof:aAttheexecutivelevel,12strategymaps,12scorecards,threequarterlyreports,firms'ambitions,corporateobjectives,regulators'objectives,surveyemployeesatisfactions,bAttheoperationalobjective,eightstrategymaps,16scorecards,15coachingforperformancereports.5Datainterpretation-Usingdifferenttechniquessuchascognitivemaps,highleveloftheanalytichierarchyprocess,decompositionandcategorisationtechniquesarrivedatthefindingsandconclusionsdiscussedinthefollowingsectionsSaaty,1983;Pidd,2001;MilesandHuberman,1984EnergyandperformancemanagementsystemsCurrently,Energyusesthebalancedscorecardattheexecutivelevel,businessunitlevel,teamandindividuallevel.Eachlevelhasstandardisedprocesses,toolsandpracticestodesign,implementandreviewtheirscorecards.Thestrategymapattheexecutivelevelcapturesthefirm'sambitions,corporateobjectives,andgovernmentregulatorsobjectives;itisthereferencepointforthedevelopmentofstrategymapsatlowerlevels.EnergyhasfivemainperformancereviewsbasedonthescorecardTable1,whichareusedtomanagethefirm'sperformance.FindingsOurresearchquestionasks:whataretheeffectsofperformancereviewsonbusinessperformance?Ourevidenceshows33positiveeffectsofperformancereviewsonbusinessperformanceTable2.Basedonthose,12effectswereidentifiedasthemostcitedbyourintervieweesTable3andtwomainnegativeeffects.EffectsofperformancemanagementreviewsonEnergyEnergyhasfiveperformancereviews,ie,strategymeeting,quarterlymeeting,regionalmeeting,teambriefingsandcoachingforperformance.Eachperformancereviewhasspecificobjectives,adifferentfrequencyofthereviewandadifferentreviewpanelTable1.OuranalysisshowsthateachperformancereviewcreatesdifferenteffectsonthewayEnergyperforms,andeacheffectaffectsdifferentareasofthebusinessTable2.strategymeetingThestrategymeetingisakeycomponentofEnergy'sperformancereviews;itprovidesformalitytotheoverallperformancereviewprocess.Itreflectsthecommitmentofthetopleadershipofthecompany.Itaffectsthemanagementleadershipbyfocusingdirectors'andmanagers'attentiononthefirm'sstrategicobjectivessetbythecorporation,governmentthroughregulatorsandshareholders.Thisreviewistheenginewhichempowersacultureofcontinuousimprovement.Itcreatesanddiffusesanewsetoforganisationalbehavioursanditstrengthenspositivevaluesofthefirm.QuarterlymeetingThequarterlymeetingaimstoreviewtheperformanceoftheregionalbusinessunits.Thisreviewincreasesthecompetitionbetweenregionalunits.Ourevidencesuggeststhatregionalmanagersaredrivenbythisfriendlycompetitiontoperformbetterthanotherregions,generateinnovativepracticesandbecomeareferenceunitwithinthefirm.Quarterlymeetingshavebecomeanegotiationplacewheremanagersanddirectorsdiscussresourcesfornewprojects.Discussionsonabusinessunit'sperformanceincreasesseniormanagers'supportforimplementingnewprojectsandactionplans.Thequarterlymeetingsenhancetheachievementtargetsandobjectivesofeachbusinessunit.Aseniormanagersaid'whatgetsmeasured,getsmanagedandwhatgetscontinuouslymanaged,getsachieved'.coachingforperformanceCoachingforperformanceisaface-to-facereviewbetweenadirectmanagerandanemployee.Ittraducesthebusinessstrategytoemployees'operations;Itclarifiesthecontributionofindividualemployeestothebusiness.Thisreviewincreasestheaccountabilityofemployeesandbetteralignsthecurrentemployees'skillswiththeiroperations.Itimprovesthedefinitionofnewtraining.Thus,itensuresthatemployeeshavetherightskillstoperformtheiroperations.譯文影響的績(jī)效管理的評(píng)論:以一個(gè)能源供給公司為依據(jù)資料來(lái)源:管理效勞作者:VeronicaMartinez博士和MikeKennerley博士文摘組織研究人員和經(jīng)理們都長(zhǎng)期持有一個(gè)觀念,認(rèn)為基于績(jī)效評(píng)估系統(tǒng)的績(jī)效考核會(huì)對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)產(chǎn)生積極的影響。雖然如此,我們只有有相對(duì)少的研究結(jié)果來(lái)支持這個(gè)假設(shè)。本研究使用代理理論,通過(guò)測(cè)試一個(gè)英國(guó)的能源供給商的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效考評(píng),從此出發(fā)去解決這些差距的影響。我們的證據(jù)顯示33人有績(jī)效考核的積極效應(yīng);其中的12人通過(guò)成為我們的訪問(wèn)者從而被確認(rèn)為被引用者。7個(gè)因素適量公司的結(jié)果被確定:“當(dāng)?shù)氐念I(lǐng)導(dǎo)人才〞業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)估,這是從這項(xiàng)研究中一種對(duì)知識(shí)的奉獻(xiàn),突出其中最重要的因素:適量業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)估。在研究中,兩個(gè)績(jī)效考核的消極影響是突出的。最后,本研究探討了知識(shí)和實(shí)踐的本身的含義。介紹全球業(yè)務(wù)環(huán)境的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)壓力也迫使組織重新整合,目的是在市場(chǎng)交易上更具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。為此,組織把重點(diǎn)放在績(jī)效管理系統(tǒng)(Frifo和Krumwiede,1999)。有證據(jù)說(shuō)明,世界上有44%的組織使用績(jī)效管理系統(tǒng)作為一種機(jī)制來(lái)審查組織的績(jī)效(Marretai2004;Rigby,2001;Silk,1998;Francoetal,2004;KaplanandNorton,1992)。而有趣的是,一些研究結(jié)果說(shuō)明,績(jī)效考核使組織的績(jī)效受益。我們的研究將調(diào)查兩個(gè)研究課題。首先,是什么影響了經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的績(jī)效考核?其次,是什么因素造成了績(jī)效考核的效果的減退?這篇文章的其余局部組織如下:它開(kāi)始討論關(guān)于代理理論和績(jī)效評(píng)估的文獻(xiàn)本身,因此,它介紹應(yīng)用于該研究的研究方法。它還將繼續(xù)對(duì)研究結(jié)果和結(jié)論的討論。最后,本文推斷出一些實(shí)踐和知識(shí)的啟示。這種探索性研究揭示了一些關(guān)于適度績(jī)效考核的影響和因素的解釋。然而,作為這個(gè)研究工程的一局部,更多的案例研究將被實(shí)行,以增加這些理論的推廣。代理理論的研究和績(jī)效評(píng)估該公司的代理模型建議委托人,在代理人的控制下,投資于生產(chǎn)方法。代理人被私下告知公司主要的生產(chǎn)力代理人可以向委托人報(bào)告生產(chǎn)能力的實(shí)現(xiàn),也可以從生產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移委托人的投資到個(gè)人(非金錢)的消費(fèi)(Baiman,1990)?？?jī)效考核公司的投資是為了監(jiān)督和控制人們的時(shí)機(jī)主義和行為(Eisenhardt,1989)?？?jī)效考核只有實(shí)用工具,例如平衡記分卡、績(jī)效棱鏡、預(yù)算制度和會(huì)計(jì)系統(tǒng),才能使公司的績(jī)效衡量系統(tǒng)起效。對(duì)委托人來(lái)說(shuō),關(guān)鍵的決定是設(shè)計(jì)公司的績(jī)效管理評(píng)估。委托人有兩個(gè)根本選擇來(lái)控制公司的結(jié)果。第一個(gè)選擇,也是最廣泛使用的,是委托人投資績(jī)效考核,包括績(jī)效管理體系。這樣的投資向委托人展現(xiàn)了代理人的行為。第二種選擇是以成果為根底的鼓勵(lì)合同,通過(guò)代理人和委托人的協(xié)商,例如,把績(jī)效衡量系統(tǒng)和代理人的報(bào)酬聯(lián)系起來(lái)。第二種選擇的問(wèn)題是結(jié)果會(huì)受到諸如政府政策,經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的行動(dòng)等因素的管制(Eisenhardt,1989)。Baiman(1990)報(bào)告說(shuō)通過(guò)增加的績(jī)效管理和代理人的薪資,委托人可以比只使用績(jī)效考核降低了大量的生產(chǎn)扭曲?？v使有實(shí)踐,