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companiescoveredinMorganStanleyResearch.
212
As761-1009aFebruary
5,
2022
12:42
AM
GMTMORGAN
STANLEY
&
CO.
LLCMatthew
HornbachSTRATEGISTMatthew.Hornbach@Guneet
Dhingra,CFASTRATEGISTGuneet.Dhingra@AndresJaimeSTRATEGISTAndres.Jaime@DavidS.Adams,CFASTRATEGISTDavid.S.Adams@Andrew
MWatrousSTRATEGISTAndrew.Watrous@KelcieGersonSTRATEGISTKelcie.Gerson@+1
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296-5570+1
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212
761-3983MORGAN
STANLEY
&
CO.
INTERNATIONAL
PLC+JamesKLordSTRATEGISTJames.Lord@EricSOynoyanSTRATEGISTEric.Oynoyan@WantingLowSTRATEGISTWanting.Low@GekTengKhooSTRATEGISTGek.Teng.Khoo@JohnKalamarasSTRATEGISTJohn.Kalamaras@AlinaZaytsevaSTRATEGISTAlina.Zaytseva@LorenzoTestaSTRATEGISTLorenzo.Testa@+44
20
7677-3254+44
20
7425-1945+44
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20
7677-0337MORGAN
STANLEY
MUFG
SECURITIES
CO.,
LTD.+KoichiSugisakiSTRATEGISTKoichi.Sugisaki@ShokiOmoriSTRATEGISTShoki.Omori@+81
3
6836-8428+81
3
6836-5466Global
Macro
Strategist
|
GlobalNot
in
Kansas
Anymore
We
think
a
downside
surprise
on
January
US
CPI
inflation
is
all
that
can
save
government
bonds
near
term.We
still
believe
investors
need
more
term
premium
to
protect
against
higher
inflation,hawkish
monetary
policies.Real
rates
to
rise
further.
Toto,I
have
a
feeling
we're
not
in
Kansas
anymore.
GlobalMacroStrategyWe
address
the
topicof
recession
and
why
it's
still
too
early
to
buygovernmentbonds.We
discuss
why
higher
rates
and
a
smaller
balancesheetaren'tall
bad
news,as
well
as
when
we
think
G10
central
bank
QEholdings
will
peak
(August2022).Finally,we
turn
bullish
on
the
EUR.InterestRateStrategyWe
maintain
UST
5s30s
curve
flatteners.We
keep
our
EUR
10y10y
swappayer
and
our
longEUR
5y5y
inflation.We
keep
our
shortEGB
trades:shortOAT
vs
Bund
and
EU,short5y
Bono
ASWand
our
longSep
22FRA/€str
basis.We
enter
a
shortUS
10y
notes
vs
Bund.In
the
UK,we
closeour
GBP1y1y
vs
EUR
4y1y
and
GBP2s10s
steepeners.We
keep
Sep
22MPCreceivers
vs
Sep
23Sonia
future.We
maintain
long20y
JGB
ASWvs
TONAOIS
and
receive
1y1y
vs
pay
5y5y.Currency&ForeignExchangeWe
turn
bullish
the
EUR
amid
ECB
hawkishness,butstay
neutral
on
theUSD
ahead
of
US
CPI.We
recommend
longEUR
versus
GBP,JPY,and
USD,butstay
longUSD/JPY
too.SEKmay
gain
as
hawkish
Riksbank
expectationsrise.Go
shortCHF/SEK.Assetsales
from
the
BoC,RBNZ,and
BoE
may
becomingthis
year.Stay
longAUD/NZD.We
discuss
if
JPY
could
lose
itsfundingcurrency
status
or
not.Inflation-LinkedBondsWe
maintain
short5y
TIPS
vs
longDBRis,and
short5y
TIPS
vs.EDZ3(Dv01
ratio
0.8:1).We
look
atthe
prospects
for
an
upside
surprise
in
January
CPI,
and
explore
two
feedback
loops
for
inflation
in
the
US.We
see
Japan
BEI
continuingto
rise
post-Feb
re-open
auction.We
maintain
longJBI26BEI.
Short-DurationStrategy
We
continue
to
recommend
payingH3SOFR/FFbasis
and
selling12m
T-
bills
vs
OIS.We
consider
how
differentpaths
of
Treasury
coupon
issuance
impactT-bill
issuance,and
in
turn,how
this
could
affectwhether
reserves
or
RRPfall
firstin
QT.Pleaseclick
hereif
you
wouldliketoreceivethedaily
Global
MacroCommentary.MorganStanleydoesMORGAN
STANLEY
&
CO.
LLCFrancescoGrechi
andseekstodobusinesswithSTRATEGISTFrancesco.Grechi@
+1result,investorsshouldbeawarethatthefirmmayhaveaconflictofinterestthatcouldaffecttheobjectivityofMorganStanleyResearch.InvestorsshouldconsiderMorganStanleyResearchasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.Foranalystcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,refertothe
Disclosure
Section,locatedatthe
endofthisreport.+=Analystsemployedbynon-U.S.affiliatesarenotregisteredwithFINRA,maynotbeassociatedpersonsofthememberandmaynotbesubjecttoFINRArestrictionsoncommunicationswithasubjectcompany,publicappearancesandtradingsecuritiesheldbyaresearchanalystaccount.?1Global
Macro
StrategyMORGAN
STANLEY
&
CO.
LLCMatthewHornbachMatthew.Hornbach@DavidS.Adams,CFADavid.S.Adams@AndrewWatrousAndrew.Watrous@+1
212
761-1837+1
212
761-1481+1
212
761-5287TooEarly
toTalk
Recession...The
pastweek
saw
an
uptick
in
news
stories
coveringinflation
and
also…recession
(seeExhibit1
and
Exhibit2).We
fielded
many
questions
aboutrecession
probabilities
andwhatour
models
suggested
for
them.The
US
nonfarm
payroll
reportfor
January
maypreventthese
concerns
from
growingfurther,atleastfor
now.We
think
its
too
early
to
talk
aboutrecession
when
activity
data
is
strong,butespeciallywhen
many
central
banks
have
yetto
even
begin
tighteningmonetary
policy.Financialconditions
may
be
tighter
than
lastyear,true,butthey
are
only
tighter
on
the
margin.They
are
far
from
tightwhen
placed
into
any
historical
context.Sowhyhaveinvestorsbeenaskingaboutrecession?First,yields
curves
have
beenflatteningas
central
banks
have
turned
more
hawkish
–
both
in
rhetoricand
in
policyaction.As
yield
curves
flatten
and
eventually
invert,models
thatimpute
the
probabilityof
recession
from
yield
curves
startflashingred.Exhibit3shows
the
New
York
Fed's
probitmodel
output,which
relies
on
the
shape
ofthe
Treasury
yield
curve.While
the
Treasury
curve
is
far
from
inverting,other
curves
likereds-greens
and
greens-blues
Eurodollar
futures
curves
are
almostinverted
(Exhibit4).6,5626,0004,0002,000
0Feb-20Aug-20Feb-21Aug-21Feb-221MMAExhibit1:
Dailystorycount
onthetopicof"inflation"fromallmediasources
Dailystorycount
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
Inflationstorycountfromallsources*Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
Bloomberg*NT<GO>
functiononBloomberg4,0003,0002,0001,000
0Feb-20Aug-20Feb-21Aug-21Feb-221MMAExhibit2:
Dailystorycount
includingtheword"recession"fromallmediasources
Dailystorycount
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
Recessionstorycountfromallsources*Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
Bloomberg*NT<GO>
functiononBloomberg26.010
0Feb-02Feb-06Feb-10Feb-14Feb-18Feb-22RecessionProbabilityofrecessionin12monthsExhibit3:
ProbabilityofaUSrecessionin12months
%
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
FRB
NewYork,
Bloomberg0.130.02-Feb-02Feb-06Feb-10Feb-14Feb-18Feb-22Reds-GreensGreens-BluesExhibit4:
Reds-GreensandGreens-BluesEurodollarfuturescurves
%
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
BloombergWe
don'tthink
investors
should
worry
aboutyield
curve
flattening–
atleastnotyet.The
yield
curve
simply
tells
whether
Fed
policy
is
in
restrictive
territory
(an
invertedcurve)or
in
accommodative
territory
(a
positively
sloped
curve).And
justbecause
policy
is
restrictive
doesn'tmean
the
economy
is
close
to
a
recession.The
intentof
restrictive
policy
is
to
weigh
on
demand
and
economicactivity.Whetherthatputs
an
economy
into
recession
depends
on
how
quickly
the
economy
is
growing.Restrictive
policy
applied
to
an
economy
growingat4.6%Y/Y
in
real
terms
-
whatoureconomists
envision
for
the
US
economy
in
2022-
is
differentthan
restrictive
policyapplied
to
an
economy
growingat2%Y/Y
-
the
economy
thatexisted
pre-pandemic.Second,consumer
confidence
appears
under
stress.Consumers
neither
have
enjoyedhigher
prices
for
goods
nor
the
constantthreats
posed
by
COVID-19.Our
model
for
theUS
consumer
suggests
they
should
be
more
confidentthan
the
indexes
indicate.132.2113.8
30
10-105070130110
90-30
Jan-97Jan-02Jan-07Jan-12Jan-17Jan-22ConferenceBoardconsumerconfidence2-FactorModelExhibit5:
USconsumerconfidenceand2-factormodelestimate
Index
150Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
ConferenceBoardNote:Linearregressionmodeluses
U-3unemploymentrate,
2yreturnoftheS&P
500index-18.4-20-4004020-60
Jan-97Jan-02Jan-07Jan-12Residual+/-1StdevExhibit6:
USconsumerconfidenceresidualfrom2-factormodelestimate
Residual,consumer
confidence
points
60>0=confidencehigherthanmodelestimate<0=confidencelowerthanmodelestimate
Jan-17
Jan-22Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
ConferenceBoardNote:Linearregressionmodeluses
U-3unemploymentrate,
2yreturnoftheS&P
500index3-6.6-1.64
0
-5-101163146617691
106
121
136
151
166
181
196
211
226
241
256Business
daysfrom
startofcalendar
year200120082016200220092017200320102018200420112019200520122020200620132021200720152022
While
consumers
may
have
to
deal
with
higher
prices
for
a
while
longer,they
may
not
have
to
deal
with
another
COVID-19variantof
concern.Any
reprieve
from
the
pandemic,
especially
headinginto
the
summertime,should
boostconsumer
confidence,atleast
relative
to
our
model
estimate,we
think.
…AndTooEarly
toBuy
GovernmentBonds
The
upcomingUS
CPI
reportmightbe
the
lasthope
to
save
global
governmentbonds
from
their
worststartto
the
year
since
2009(see
Exhibit7).An
upside
surprise
next
Thursday
would
mean
further
talk
of
the
Fed
raisingrates
50bp
in
March.Ata
minimum,
calls
for
the
Fed
to
hike
atevery
meetingthis
year
will
look
much
less
off-base.Exhibit7:
BloombergGlobalTreasuriesAggregateIndexcalendaryeartotalreturns
Totalreturn,
%
20
15
10
5Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
Bloomberg
Our
economists
continue
to
call
for
4x25bp
rate
hikes
from
the
Fed,as
they
still
don't
see
anythingin
the
data
to
justify
more
than
4hikes
and
the
startof
balance
sheet
normalization.Butthe
consensus
is
at5hikes,and
some
projections
look
for
7
hikes.
Meanwhile,the
marketprices
between
5-6hikes
this
year
(134bp
to
be
exact,or
9bp
more
than
5x25bp
hikes).
With
marketpricingjust9bp
above
consensus
expectations,wecontinuetothink
marketsaren'tpricingenoughrisk
premiumforthechanceofamoreaggressivepolicy
path.Yes,it's
true
thatmarkets
didn'tprice
more
than
the
consensus
expected
in
previous
cycles,as
we
discussed
in
Pricingthe
Pace
of
Rate
Hikes.Butconsensus
expectations
didn'tchange
as
quickly
as
they
are
today.
An
upside
surprise
on
January
US
CPI
nextweek
followed
by
further
strength
in
nonfarm
payrolls
and
even
more
inflation
in
February
could
getexpectations
of
a
50bp
hike
in
March
to
solidify.Thatoutcome
would
certainly
joltexpectations
for
Fed
policy
this
year
-
and
investors
aren'tadequately
protected
againstthat,given
currentmarket
prices,we
think.
The
same
applies
to
the
pricingof
Fed
policy
in
2023and
2024,where
markets
price
Fed
policy
to
remain
below
2.00%.Given:
4Covid-19
1.
the
median
FOMC
participantthinks
2.5%represents
neutral
policy,
2.
Chair
Powell's
claim
earlier
this
year
thatpolicy
belongs
back
atneutral,and
3.
the
median
marketparticipantthinks
the
terminal
rate
in
this
cycle
is
between
2.00-
2.25%;marketpricingin
2023and
2024incorporates
a
negative
term
premium
-
perhapsreflectingfears
of
a
recession
we
discussed
above.We
think
investors
should
demand
apositive
term
premium
instead.Wheremightanegativetermpremiumbejustified?Intheverylong-endoftheyieldcurve.Amore
aggressive
Fed
policy
path
should
weigh
on
longer-dated
inflation-riskpremiums,as
hikingcycles
have
done
in
the
past.Atpresent,we
don'tsee
much
termpremium
-
either
positive
or
negative
-
in
the
longend
(see
Exhibit8and
Exhibit9).Still,historical
cycles
may
notbe
a
helpful
guide
today.The
Fed
changed
its
guidance
onthe
policy
path
(rates
and
balance
sheet)much
faster
than
in
the
pasttwo
cycles.Andeconomicdata
-
firston
inflation,and
now
on
the
labor
market-
has
been
much
morevolatile
relative
to
expectations.Realtermpremiums(thebedfellowofinflationriskpremiums)shouldbehigherthanbefore,asaresult.Exhibit8:
UST30y1mimpliedforwardyieldvs.thelongerrunneutralratepertheSMP2.022.002.52.01.54.03.51.0
Feb-16
Feb-17
Feb-18
Feb-19
Feb-20
Feb-21
Feb-22UST30y1mLongerrunneutralratefromSMP%Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
FRB
NewYork
SurveyofMarketParticipants
(SMP),BloombergExhibit9:
UST30y1mimpliedforwardyieldlessthelongerrunneutralratepertheSMP
0.0-0.5
0.53.01.0DifferencebetweenmarketrateandFRB
NYSMP%LasthikingcycleTrumpelection
0.02LDIDelta
Omicron-1.0
Feb-16
Feb-17
Feb-18
Feb-19
Feb-20
Feb-21
Feb-22V-shapedrecovery,ARPA
stimulusSource:MorganStanleyResearch,
FRB
NewYork
SurveyofMarketParticipants
(SMP),BloombergUS
Treasuries
offer
even
less
value
to
FX-hedged
buyers
nowIn
mid-January,we
discussed
the
value
proposition
of
US
Treasuries
for
euro
and
yen-based
investors.We
suggested
investors
should
assess
value
by
using12-month
FXforwards,instead
of
the
typical
3-month
versions,given
how
hawkish
markets
pricedcentral
bank
policies.Since
then,the
value
proposition
of
Treasuries
has
worsened.Exhibit10
and
Exhibit11
show
the
annualized
currency-hedged
yield
thata
EUR-basedinvestor
and
JPY-based
investor
mightgetfor
buyinga
10y
US
Treasury
note.The
timeseries
shows
the
annualized
currency-hedged
yield
using3-month
FXforwards,as
wellas
the
annual
yield
the
investor
would
getusinga
12-month
FXforward.
5Aeuro-based
investor
would
only
pick
up
26bp
and
a
yen-based
investor
would
giveup11bp
to
buy
a
10y
US
Treasury
note.As
a
result,wethink
theonlymajorsourceofoverseasdemandforTreasurieswillcomefrominvestorswillingtotakecurrencyrisk.And,given
the
ECB
has
become
more
hawkish
-
threateningto
strengthen
the
euro,wethink
thatdemand
for
Treasuries
withoutan
FXhedge
would
mostlikely
come
frominvestors
in
Japan
-
keepingusbullishonUSD/JPY,andturningusbullishonEUR/JPY(see
Turningbullish
EUR).0.760.50.0Exhibit10:
Yieldpick-upofferedby10yUSTover10yDBRforaEUR-basedinvestor
%
1.5
1.0
0.27Using12minstead
-0.5
-1.0
'13
'14
'15
'16
'17
'18
'19
'20
'21
'22
UST10ypick-upforEURinvestor
rolling3mfwdSource:MorganStanleyResearch,
Bloomberg0.57
0.0-0.5-1.00.5Exhibit11:
Yieldpick-upofferedby10yUSTover30yJGBsforaJPY-basedinvestor
%
1.5
1.0
-0.11Using12minstead
-1.5
-2.0
'13
'14
'15
'16
'17
'18
'19
'20
'21
'22
UST10ypick-upforJPYinvestor
rolling3mfwdsSource:MorganStanleyResearch,
BloombergSeasonality
unkind
to
global
government
bonds
until
later
in
FebruaryNo
letup
is
in
sightfor
the
governmentbond
market,in
partbecause
seasonality
isn'tsetto
help
until
the
2nd
half
of
February.That's
when
supply
dynamics
in
the
UKand
alarge
indexextension
in
US
Treasuries
has
helped
boostreturns
in
the
past.Even
then,the
supportis
modestatbest,and
notwith
the
type
of
confidence
interval
for
whichyou
would
hope
(see
Exhibit12and
Exhibit13).Given
January
US
CPI
reports
on
February
10,a
strongnumber
could
push
governmentbond
prices
lower
once
more.Forinvestorslookingtoputmoneytowork
ingovernmentbonds,wethink
aJanuaryUSCPIupsidesurprise-drivenriseinyieldswouldpresentanopportunity.We
doubtlevered
investors
would
have
more
duration
to
sell
after
a
strongCPI
report(they
would
likely
be
maximum
short).Likewise,we
doubtinvestors
who
have
beensittinglongduration
would
be
able
to
hold
on.As
such,astrongJanuaryCPIreportmightseebondmarketpositioningreachpeak
bearishness,near-term.
6Apr1HJan
1HJan
2HApr2HMay1HMay2HJun1HMar1HJan
1HJan
2HMay1HMay2HMar1HMar2HJun1HJun2HFeb1HFeb2HMar2HApr
1HApr
2HJun2HFeb1HFeb2HHigherRates,
SmallerBalanceSheetNotAllBadNewsFor
decades
now,savers
in
the
developed
world
have
complained
aboutlow
interestrates,understandably.Borrowers,meanwhile,have
been
silenton
the
issue
-
alsounderstandably.Whatis
good
for
one,can
be
bad
for
the
other.Savers
have
placed
theblame
squarely
on
the
Fed,and
their
complaints
have
some
merit(see
Exhibit14andExhibit15).0.610.00-0.540.32-0.040.400.030.77-0.510.39-0.070.41-0.2-0.4-0.61.00.20.0Exhibit12:
Globalgovernment
bonds(unhedged)totalreturnsbyhalf-monthperiodthroughJune
%
-0.8
Median
half-monthreturn(last20years)Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
Bloomberg7353828567905096887862876050100
90
80
70Exhibit13:
Confidenceintervalforhalf-monthlyreturnsinglobalgovernment
bondsthroughJune
%
40
ConfidenceintervalSource:MorganStanleyResearch,
Bloomberg7.668Jan-82Jan-92Jan-02Jan-12Jan-22Netinterestincomeas%oftotalincomeTrendExhibit14:
USpersonalnet
interest
incomeasa%oftotalpersonalincome
%
20
18
16
14
12
100.2520Jan-82Jan-92Jan-02Jan-12Jan-22FedfundstargetrateTrendExhibit15:
Target
fedfundsrate
%
16
14
12
10
8
6
4Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
FederalReserveSource:MorganStanleyResearch,
BEA
Atthe
same
time,in
nominal
terms,personal
netinterestincome
has
increased
(see
Exhibit16).The
dramatica
rise
in
aggregate
US-dollar
denominated
debtoutstanding
goes
a
longway
to
explainingwhy,despite
the
decline
in
yields,personal
netinterest
income
has
risen
(see
Exhibit17).
7Naturally,US
Treasury
securities
have
contributed
significantly
to
the
increase
in
overallUS
debtoutstanding,even
after
removingFed
purchases
(see
Exhibit18).As
a
result,when
the
Fed
raises
or
lowers
its
policy
rate
relative
to
trend,and
debtmarkets
respondwith
higher
yields,netinterestincome
relative
to
its
trend
follows
(see
Exhibit19).1.11.01.4Jan-82Jan-92Jan-02Jan-12Jan-22TrendExhibit16:
USpersonalnet
interest
income
US$trillions
NetinterestincomeSource:MorganStanleyResearch,
BEA25.525201510
5
030Jan-82Jan-92Jan-02Jan-12Jan-22Exhibit17:
BloombergUSAggindexdebt
outstanding
US$trillions
USAggregateindexdebtoutstandingSource:MorganStanleyResearch,
BloombergExhibit18:
TotalmarketableUSTreasurydebtoutstanding22.61510
5
0
Jan-82
Jan-92
Jan-02
TotalUSTmarket
outstanding…
14.4Jan-12
Jan-22
...ex-FedholdingsUS$trillions
25
20Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
BEA,
FederalReserveExhibit19:
Deviationofthetarget
fedfundsrateandnetinterest
incomefromtrend500-50-100-150-200
2
1
0-1-2-3-4
Jan-82
Jan-92
Jan-02
Jan-12
Jan-22FedfundsdeviationfromtrendNetinterestincomedeviationfromtrend(rhs)%6543US$billions
200
150
100Source:MorganStanleyResearch,
BEA,
FederalReserveHigher
Fed
policy
rates
should
then
boostpersonal
netinterestincome
this
year.Inaddition,the
publicwill
earn
additional
intereston
the
securities
no
longer
purchased
bythe
Fed.In
thatsense,rate
hikes
and
balance
sheetnormalization
aren'tuniformly
badfor
the
economy.Still,netinterestincome
only
makes
up
7.6%of
personal
income
in
the
US.So
highershort-term
rates
-
which
will
putupward
pressure
on
longer
term
borrowingrates
forhouseholds
and
corporations
-
and
more
Treasury
issuance
-
which
will
drain
broadliquidity
-
should
have
a
net-negative
impacton
the
economy.
8Speakingof
SmallerBalanceSheetsAs
central
banks
wrap
up
their
assetpurchases
and
embark
on
their
post-COVIDtighteningcycles,we
expecta
key
area
of
investor
debate
will
be
the
future
of
theirassetholdings.Of
the
eightG10
central
banks
with
QE-related
holdings,we
expectsixcentral
banks(Fed,BoE,Riksbank,RBNZ,BoC,and
RBA)to
end
2025with
fewer
holdings.Some
of
these
central
banks
may
choose
to
allow
their
QE
holdings
to
roll
of
theirbalance
sheetas
they
mature;others
(like
the
Fed)are
likely
to
limitthe
pace
of
runoffthrough
the
use
of
"caps."Still
other
central
banks
may
accelerate
the
pace
of
roll-off
by
actively
sellingtheassets
they
acquired
through
QE
programs.For
example,the
Bank
of
Canada
has
notedthat"sellingcertain
assets"is
an
action
itmay
take
to
"normalize"its
balance
sheet.Likecaps,active
sales
may
also
be
used
to
smooth
the
pace
of
balance
sheetshrinkage
byoffsettinglumpy
maturities.Our
economists
currently
projectthatthe
ECB
will
conclude
assetpurchases
in
thecomingquarters,butatthis
time
do
notanticipate
the
GoverningCouncil
thatwill
allowPEPPand
APPassets
to
roll
off
the
balance
sheet.Similarly,our
Japan
economistsexpectthe
BoJto
continue
purchasingassets
atleastuntil
the
end
of
2023.Exhibit20:
Weexpect
QE-relatedholdingstoshrinkatvariedpacesuntil2025...-20%-30%-40%-50%-60%202220232021
Fed
BoCBoERBA
2024RiksbankBoJ2025
RBNZ
ECB
%ofCurrentQEHoldings
10%
0%-10%Source:CentralBanks,
Bloomberg,
MorganStanleyResearchExhibit21:
...but
inaggregate,QEholdingswillpeakduringsummer2022191817
20212022202320242025USDtn2120G10CentralBankQEHoldings(Aggregate)
August2022Source:CentralBanks,
Bloomberg,
MorganStanleyResearchExhibit22shows
the
pace
atwhich
we
expecteach
central
bank's
QE
holdings
to
declinein
the
comingyears.We
do
notinclude
Norges
Bank
or
the
SNB,which
did
notconducttraditional
QE-like
purchase
programs
duringthe
pasttwo
years.Similarly,since
weinclude
only
traditional
QE
assets,we
do
notinclude
the
substantial
TLTRO
repaymentsthatwe
expectto
shrink
the
ECB's
overall
balance
sheetover
the
nexttwo
years.
9SomeconclusionsstandoutfromthisexerciseAggregate
G10
central
bank
QE
holdings
are
setto
continue
expandingthrough
thissummer
and
peak
around
August.Unless
central
banks
announce
plans
to
actively
selltheir
QE
assets
in
the
comingquarters
(or
the
ECB
concludes
its
assetpurchasessubstantially
earlier
than
our
economists
currently
expect),aggregate
G10
central
bankQE
holdings
will
end
2022atroughly
the
same
levels
atwhich
they
currently
stand.Also,the
maturity
structure
of
the
Bank
of
Canada's
QE
holdings
stands
outamongG10central
banks.BoC
QE
holdings
will
mature
(as
a
proportion
of
the
currentlevel)fasterthan
other
central
banks'balance
sheets.The
BoC
may
choose
to
smooth
the
course
of
this
runoff
by
usingcaps
(if
itis
inclined
tobringthe
pace
of
balance
sheettighteningcloser
in
line
with
the
Fed)or
by
usingactivesales
(if
itis
inclined
to
return
fairly
quickly
to
conductingits
monetary
policy
through
acorridor
system).The
BoC's
relevantframework
notes
thatin
the
case
of
assetsales,such
sales
"would
be
carried
outan
appropriately
measured
pace."Turningbullish
EURThe
ECB,in
our
view,sets
up
an
attractive
opportunity
to
turn
bullish
the
EUR
and
werecommended
buyingEUR/USD
in
the
wake
of
the
meeting.We
also
maintain
longEUR/GBPand
look
to
add
longEUR/JPY
(in
addition
to
longUSD/JPY)and
shortCHF/SEK,as
we
think
SEKmay
be
the
"nextshoe
to
drop"as
investors
look
for
a
hawkishpivotfrom
the
remainingdovish
central
banks.For
more
see:EUR
|Bullish
EUR.EUR/USD
has
become
increasingly
correlated
to
front-end
rate
differentials
(Exhibit22).EUR/USD
weakness
in
recentmonths
was
explained
by
risingfront-end
US
rates.So
toocould
we
see
EUR/USD
strength
driven
by
a
catch-up
from
the
front-end
in
Europe.Positioning,seasonality,and
the
equity
rotation
narrative
outof
growth
and
into
valueall
supportEUR/USD
too.Exhibit22:
EUR/USDhasbeenchieflydrivenby2yratedifferentials,reflectingmonetarypolicydifferentialsSource:Macrobond,
MorganStanleyResearchExhibit23:
Market
expectationsforECBhawkishnesshavebeenbuildingrelativetothat
oftheFed
FSource:Macrobond,
MorganStanleyResearch10The
hawkish
response
of
the
ECB
fits
nicely
into
our
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