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adePolicyImplicationsiffsandImportMarketAdamJakubik,AlexanderKeckandRobertaPiermartiniWP/23/5Thisisaworkingpaper,andhenceitrepresentsresearchinprogress.ThisresearchpaperisnotmeanttorepresentthepositionsoropinionsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,IMFmanagement,theWTO,orWTOMembers,northeofficialpositionofanyWTOstaff,andiswithoutprejudicetoMembers'rightsandobligationsundertheWTO.Anyerrorsareunintentionalandourown.2023?2023InternationalMonetaryFundWP/23/5IMFWorkingPaperStrategy,PolicyandReviewDepartmentTradePolicyImplicationsofaChangingWorld:TariffsandImportMarketPowerPreparedbyAdamJakubik,AlexanderKeck,andRobertaPiermartiniAuthorizedfordistributionbyMartinSommerJanuary2023Thisisaworkingpaper,andhenceitrepresentsresearchinprogress.ThisresearchpaperisnotmeanttorepresentthepositionsoropinionsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,IMFmanagement,theWTO,orWTOMembers,northeofficialpositionofanyWTOstaff,andiswithoutprejudicetoMembers'rightsandobligationsundertheWTO.Anyerrorsareunintentionalandourown.ABSTRACT:Economictheorysuggeststhatcountries’tariffcommitmentsintradeagreementsreflecttheirimportmarketpoweratthetimeofnegotiations.However,ascountriesgrow,theirmarketpowerindifferentsectorscanchangeinunforeseenwaysandtheircommitmentsmaynolongerreflectchangedeconomicconditions.Usinganewlybuiltdatasetofpre-UruguayRoundappliedtariffsandrelyingonthetheoreticalframeworkoftheterms-of-trademotivefortradeagreements,weestimatehypotheticaltariffcommitmentsundercurrentlevelsofmarketpowerandcomparethemwithactualtariffcommitments.Wefindthatlowertariffcommitmentsrequiredtoreflectcurrenteconomicconditionswouldamounttoareductioninannualtariffcostsofupto$26.4billion–equivalenttonearly10%ofglobaltariffcosts.Ourresultsrevealsubstantialheterogeneitybetweencountriesandsectors.Thesectorswiththelargestpotentialtariffcostreductionsarevehicles(HS87)andmachineryandappliances(HS84-85).Product-leveltariffreductionswouldrangefrom0to18.5percentagepointsandareonaveragelargestforChina.Inthepast,theGATT/WTOsystemhasupdatedtariffcommitmentsthroughperiodicroundsofnegotiations,andourfindingssupporttherevivaloftheWTO'snegotiationfunctioninthisarea.JELClassificationNumbers:F11;F13;F53Keywords:tradeagreements;tradepolicy;termsoftradeAuthor’sE-MailAddress:ajakubik@,alexander.keck@,roberta.piermartini@WORKINGPAPERSOLICYIMPLICATIONSOFACHANGINGWORLD:TARIFFSANDIMPORTMARKETPOWERPreparedbyAdamJakubik,AlexanderKeck,andRobertaPiermartiniIMFWORKINGPAPERSTRADEPOLICYIMPLICATIONSOFACHANGINGWORLD:TARIFFSANDIMPORTMARKETIMFWORKINGPAPERSINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND2ContentsIntroduction 3LiteratureReview 5DataandEmpiricalStrategy 6EstimationResults 8CounterfactualExercise 10ConcludingRemarks 12References 13AppendixA 15AppendixB 16INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND3IntroductionThemainmotivationforcountriestojointheWTOistheirconvictionthatWTOmembershipwillincreasetrade,helptheireconomicdevelopmentandfostereconomicgrowth.TheWTOwascreatedin1995basedontermsnegotiatedbetween128originalmembers.Subsequently,36newmembershaveaccededunderindividualtermsandconditionsnegotiatedwithexistingmembers.Countries'importmarketpowerhasbeenshowntobeakeydeterminantofthesetermsandconditions(BagwellandStaiger,2011;Beshkar,Bond,andRho,2015;BeshkarandLee,2022).WhileGATT-WTOroundsofnegotiationareseeminglystatic,theworldisdynamic.Ascountriesdevelop,theirshareofworldtradeindifferentproductswillinevitablychange,andsowilltheirabilitytoaffectworldprices.Thiswouldimplythatrecurringroundsoftradenegotiationswouldbehelpfultomaintaincommitmentsatmutuallyacceptablelevelsorthatcommitmentsbeconditionedonsomemeasureofimportmarketpower.Toourknowledge,wearethefirsttomakethispointintheeconomicpolicyliterature,whichhasimportantimplicationsforhowmultilateralroundsorcommitmentsshouldbedesigned,andfromatheoreticalperspective,howthesenegotiationsshouldbemodelled.RelyingonamodelbyBagwellandStaiger(2011)–arguablythemostrigoroustheoreticalframeworkexplainingcountries'participationininternationaltradeagreements–weprovidenovelestimatesontheextenttowhichimportmarketpowerhasinfluencedtariffcommitmentsforasetoforiginalandaccededWTOmembers.Wemakeuseofanewdatasetofpre-UruguayRoundappliedtariffsinadditiontostandarddatasources.Basedontheseestimates,wepredictthecommitmentsthatmighthavebeennegotiatedundercurrentlevelsofmarketpower.Weestimatethattariffcutsrequiredtoreflectcurrenteconomicconditionswouldamounttoareductioninannualtariffcostsofupto$26.4billion.Ourresultsrevealsubstantialheterogeneitybetweencountriesandsectors.Thesectorswiththelargestpotentialtariffcostreductionsarevehicles(HS87)andmachineryandappliances(HS84-85).Product-levelreductionswouldrangefrom0to18.5percentagepoints,withChinafeaturingthelargestaveragereductions.Giventhestrongsupportintheliteraturefortheimportanceofimportmarketpowerindeterminingtariffbindings,wefurtherarguethatcontinuousroundsoftradenegotiationsarenecessaryowingtoshiftsinmarketpowerovertimethat,inpart,maybeendogenouslydeterminedbyearlierroundsofliberalisation.Openinguptotradechangesacountry'spatternofspecialisationandopensuppotentialforstructuraltransformationatapaceandmannerwhichareoftendifficulttopredict.Thisimpliesthatterms-of-tradeexternalitiescanariseinproductswheretariffswereinitiallysetatacooperativelevel.ManycountrieshavebenefittedgreatlyfromexpandedmarketaccessopportunitiesafterjoiningtheWTOandtheirrapideconomicgrowthanddevelopmenthasexceededexpectations(TangandWei,2009;Larchet.al,2019).Astheyhavedeveloped,theirimportmarketpowerhasincreasedforcertainproducts,whiledomesticproductionexpandedforothers.Givenmembers'evolutionofmarketpower,existingcommitmentsmayceasetoadequatelyreflectpotentialterms-of-tradeexternalities.Absentfurtheradjustments,tradetensionsandpolicyuncertaintymayincrease,reflectinggrowingincentivesbyallcountriestodeviatefromthecooperativeequilibrium.Thosewithincreasedmarketpowermaywishtoraisetariffstoenjoygreaterterms-of-tradeimprovements,althoughinpracticethisismitigatedbyrelativelyhighexistingtariffs;therestmaywishtousehighertariffsasleverageinnegotiations.SomeobservershaveviewedtheTrumpadministration’sunilateraltariffincreasesin2018asbargainingtariffs,withthegoalofinducingtradingpartnerstoreducetheirtariffs(MattooandStaiger,2020;Sheldon,2022).Interestingly,ourestimatedreductioninUStradingpartners’INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND4annualtariffrevenuenecessarytoneutralizeterms-of-tradeexternalitiesisofcomparablemagnitudetoUSannualtariffrevenueincreasesbetween2018and2019.TheGATT/WTOsystemhasusuallyaddressedsuchsituations(andthepossiblebuild-upoftradetensions)throughperiodic"rounds"ofnegotiationsseekingtoreflectnewmarketrealities(BaldwinandRobert-Nicoud,2015).SevenroundspriortotheUruguayRoundprincipallyinvolvedlike-mindeddevelopedcountriesandhadastheirobjectivetosubstantiallyreducetariffsandtoeliminatepreferences(WTO,2007).Table1showstheresultingincrementaltariffreductions.Theseroundsofnegotiationshavehelpedtorebalancecommitments.However,nonewroundshavebeenconcludedsince1995.TheWTOhasaddedmembersthroughtherigorousArticleXIIaccessionsprocess,creatingpossibleasymmetriesbetweenthetariffsofthesenewmembersandthosethatjoinedbefore(SubramanianandWei,2007;TangandWei,2009).Atthesametime,thelasttwodecadeshavewitnessedsignificantandunforeseenchangesinthesharesofworldtradeacrosscountries.ThispaperprovidesfurtherempiricalsupportforthecontinuingimportanceoftheWTO'snegotiatingfunctioninlightofrecentdevelopments.Table1:PastroundsoftariffreductionsGATTWTOyearsoftariffreductionsMFNtariffreductionofindustrialcountriesforindustrialproducts(excl.petroleum))mentationioddcoveredtarifftiononMFNmportsyearenevaAnnecy49)Torquay1950-51)Geneva6)lonRoundnnedyRoundTokyoRound1973-79)guayRoundNoteTariffreductionsforthefirstfiveroundsrefertotheUnitedStatesonly.ThecalculationofaverageratesofreductionsareweightedbyMFNimportvalues.Source:WTO(2007).Therestofthepaperisorganisedasfollows:Section2reviewstherelevantliterature,Section3describesthedata,includinganew,unpublisheddatabaseonappliedtariffsbeforetheconclusionoftheUruguayRound.Wealsoprovidedescriptivestatisticsofthemainvariablesusedintheregressionanalysis.InSection4,wepresentourempiricalmodelandestimationresults.Section5presentstheresultsofourcounterfactualexerciseonwhattariffbindingsmighthavelookedlikeunderpresentdaymarketpowerconditions.Section6concludes.IMFWORKINGPAPERSTRADEPOLICYIMPLICATIONSOFACHANGINGWORLD:TARIFFSANDIMPORTMARKETIMFWORKINGPAPERSINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND5LiteratureReviewWhyisimportmarketpowerimportantfortradepolicy?AsWTOmembersgrowtheireconomies,theymaybecomesignificantbuyersofcertainproductsontheworldmarketandabletoinfluencetheworldprice.Thiscreatesanincentivetousetradepolicytotakeadvantageofpotentialterms-of-tradegains(Johnson,1953;GrossmanandHelpman,1995;BagwellandStaiger,1990,2002,2010,2011).Alargeenoughimportingcountrymayapplytariffstodrivedowntheworldpricenetoftariffs,astheburdenoftradetaxesissharedbetweentheconsumersintheimportingcountryandtheproducersinexportingcountries.Thiscanbenefitthecountryimposingthetariffattheexpenseofexportingcountries,asitisabletoimportmoreforthesameamountofexports.Inotherwords,itstariffactionhasanegativeexternalityonitstradingpartners'terms-of-trade.However,ifallcountriesactedonthisimpulse,terms-of-tradegainswouldcanceleachotherout,leavingeveryoneworseoff,withhighertariffsandlessoveralltrade.Itfollowsthatcooperationtoescapethisprisoner’sdilemma,intheshapeoftradeagreements,ismutuallybeneficial.Indeed,BagwellandStaiger(2002,2010)arguethisistheprincipalpurposeoftradeagreements:theydefineacooperativeequilibriumwheremutuallyagreedmaximumor"bound"tarifflevelsacttointernaliseterms-of-tradeexternalities.1OnemightthenaskwhydoGATT/WTOnegotiationsplacetheemphasisonmarketaccessratherthanterms-of-trade.Bagwell,Mavroidis,andStaiger(2002)pointoutthenegativeexternalitygeneratedbyanimporttariffcanbeequivalentlyinterpretedasaterms-of-tradelossorarestrictionofmarketaccess;concernabouttheimpactofforeignmarketaccessrestrictionsonthepricereceivedbydomesticexportingfirmsisinfactconcernabouttheirterms-of-tradeeffects.Buthowexactlyisimportmarketpowerrelatedtoboundtariffs?BagwellandStaiger(2011)startbyshowingthatinasettingwithoutpoliticaleconomymotives(eventhoughnotquiterealistic),atradeagreementfullyinternalisesimportmarketpowerbasedterms-of-tradeexternalitiesandpoliticallyoptimalbindingsarezero(i.e.uncorrelatedwithmarketpower).However,whengovernmentshavepoliticaleconomymotives,theirmodelimpliesthatthereductionfrompre-negotiationtarifflevelsisproportionaltopre-negotiationimportlevels,2withnew(generallynon-zero)boundlevelsbeingalsoinverselycorrelatedwiththelatterwhencontrollingfortheformer.3Theauthorsthenshowempirically,usingasampleof16accededWTOmembers,thatinlinewiththeirmodel,bindingsaredeterminedbypre-accessionimportsandtarifflevels.Otherstudieshaveconfirmedtheroleofterms-of-tradefortariffsetting.Broda,Lim?o,andWeinstein(2008)showthatimportersthathavemarketpoweruseitinsettingnoncooperativetradepolicy,likeinthecaseoftariffspriortoWTOorinareasnotcoveredbycooperation.Beshkar,Bond,andRho(2015)confirmforasampleof108WTOmembersthatbothoptimalbindingsandflexibility(thedifferencebetweenbindingsand1Beyondneutralisingterms-of-tradeexternalities,othereconomicrationalesfortradepolicycommitmentsininternationalagreementsincludepoliticaleconomyconsiderations,makingcrediblecommitmentsvis-à-visdomesticconstituencies,internalisingproductionrelocationandenvironmentalexternalities,andreducingtradepolicyuncertainty.2Whendemandandsupplyarenon-linear,thisbecomesamoregeneraltermcapturinginternationalcost-shiftingmotives.3Thereasoningisthatwithpoliticaleconomyfactorsatplay,governmentsfaceadditionalresistanceinreducingtariffs,andsomutuallyagreedreductionsaremoreconcentratedinsectorswheretheexternalities(duetoimportmarketpower)arelargest.INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND6appliedtariffs)areinverselyrelatedtoimportermarketpower.4Intheirmodel,countriesnegotiateceilingbindingsabovetheirappliedtariffstoretainacertainflexibilitytoaddressshocksinaworldwithasymmetricinformationacrosscountries.DataandEmpiricalStrategyWetakedataontradeflowsfromtheUNComtradedatabase.DataonappliedtariffratesandWTObindingcommitmentsaretakenfromvariousWTOsources.5WTObindingsaretakenfromtheWTOCTSdatabaseandarebasedonmembercountries'schedulesofaccession.AppliedtariffsinforcebeforetheconclusionoftheUruguayRoundaretakenfromahithertounreleaseddatabaseavailabletous,butnotyetprocessedorincludedintheWTO'sIDBdatabase.Thesedataareavailableattarifflinelevelfor74GATTmembersforvariousyearsbetween1988and1996.AppliedtariffsinforcepriortoWTOaccessionofmembersthatjoinedaftertheUruguayRoundaretakenfromtheWTOIDBdatabase,asareappliedtariffscurrentlyinforce.DataindifferentHSversionsareconcordedusingconversiontablesfromUNStatisticsDivision.Ouranalysisisatthesix-digitHSsubheadinglevel,theclosestavailableproxyforproductmarkets.WereferthereadertoAppendixAfortheyearsusedforeachmemberinourestimationsamples.Ourfinalsample,determinedbytheavailabilityofdatafromthefourabovementioneddatabases,includes31UruguayRoundparticipantsand10subsequentaccessions,coveringallG20economiesexceptArgentina.Ourdataalsorevealssubstantialheterogeneityacrosscountriesandindustriesintermsoftheirevolutionofworldimportshares,andhenceofchangesinimportmarketpower.Whileitisreasonabletoanticipatechangesfromtradeliberalisation,theexactpathandtimingofthesechangesaredifficulttoforesee.Figure1usesemergingmarketssuchasBrazil,China,MexicoandVietNamasexamplestoillustratehowworldimportsharesmayshrinkorgrowasacountrydevelops.Forexample,asBrazil’sagriculturaloutputhasexpanded,ithasgainedsignificantmarketsharesinkeyfertilizerimports.MeanwhileChina’sshareofsoybeanimportshasrisenfromaround5%to70%injusttwodecades,notablyalsoduetoanincreaseddemandforanimalfeedasmeatconsumptionhasrisen.Likewise,VietNam’sshareofmaizeimportshasrisenfromaround0%toover6%sinceitsWTOaccession.OthersignsofChina’sdevelopmentandagrowingmiddleclassareitsshareofcarimports,whichhasrisenfromaround0%to15%anditsshareofheavyaircraftimports,upfrom5%to20%.Chinesemanufacturinghasalsogrownintechnologicalsophisticationanditsshareofindustrialrobotimportshasgrownfromaround0%toover25%.Mexico,ontheotherhand,hasbecomeincreasinglyactiveinassemblystagesofglobalvaluechains,itsshareofcomputerpartsimportsupfromunder1%toaround6%.However,asdomesticindustriesdevelop,importsharesmayshrink.Forexample,China’sshareofrailwaycoachimportshasrisenfirstfrom2.5%to15%beforeshrinkingto0%overthesameperiod,withasimilarpatternfoundforcomputersystems.4Theintuitionforthisistwofold.First,thereisademandforflexibilityintheagreementtoaccommodatepreferenceshocks,butasterms-of-tradeexternalitiesarehigherinsectorswithgreaterimportermarketpower,flexibilityentailscumulativelygreaterexternalitiesasshocksariseinthesesectors.Therefore,anoptimalagreementwillbalancethedemandforflexibilitywiththeneedtointernalisehigherexternalitiesthroughlowerbindingsinthesesectors.Second,foranygivenlevelofbindings,unilateraloptimalappliedtariffsarehigherforgreaterimportermarketpower,implyinglessflexibility.5Non-advaloremtariffsareexcludedfromthedataset.IMFWORKINGPAPERSTRADEPOLICYIMPLICATIONSOFACHANGINGWORLD:TARIFFSANDIMPORTMARKETIMFWORKINGPAPERSINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND7Figure1:Evolutionofsharesoftotalworldimports(1995?2017)Source:Authors’calculationsbasedonUNComtradeDatabase.VerticallinedenotesWTOaccessionyear.IMFWORKINGPAPERSTRADEPOLICYIMPLICATIONSOFACHANGINGWORLD:TARIFFSANDIMPORTMARKETIMFWORKINGPAPERSINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND8Ourbenchmarkempiricalspecificationisequivalenttoequation(15a)inBagwellandStaiger(2011)6:TTO=F0+F1Tre?wTO+F2V+6HS2(i)+入c+uic(1)InthisspecificationcrepresentsaWTOmember,iatarifflineattheHSsixdigitlevel,TTOistheWTObinding,Tre?wTOisthepre-WTOappliedtariff,Visthepre-WTOvalueofimports,6HS2(i)isanHSchapterlevelfixedeffect,入cisacountryfixedeffectanduicistheerrorterm.Theupshotofterms-of-tradetheory(seeSection2)isthepredictionthat,givenaproduct'spoliticaleconomyanddemandandsupplyslopeparameters,themagnitudeofthenegotiatedtariffreductionTre?wTO?TTOisproportionaltothepotentialforgeneratingaterms-of-tradeexternality,alsoreferredtoasinternationalcost-shiftingmotives,whichinthelinearcaseiscapturedbytheratioofpre-negotiationimportvolumetoworldprice,proxiedbyVRearrangingtermsyields(1),wherethesignofF2,ourmainparameterofinterest,isexpectedtobenegative.8ThesignofF1isexpectedtobepositiveifthepre-WTOpoliticaleconomyconsiderationsthatdeterminedTre?wTOprevail.EstimationResultsTable2presentsresultsforUruguayRoundparticipantsbyWTOdevelopmentstatusandproductcategoriesagriculture(AG)andnon-agriculturalmarketaccess(NAMA).TherationaleisthatpoliticaleconomyanddemandandsupplycharacteristicscapturedbythemodelparametersmaydifferandnegotiationsforAGandNAMAfollowedseparatetrackswithdifferentmodalitiesandobjectives.Ournovelfindingisthattheterms-of-trademotivewasasignificantdeterminantofdevelopingcountryNAMAtariffcommitmentsduringtheUruguayRound(Column6).9Wedonotfindasignificantrolefortheterms-of-trademotiveinthecaseofdevelopingcountryAGproductsorinthecaseofdevelopedeconomiesduringtheUruguayRound.Thesefindingsareconsistentwiththefactthatdevelopedcountrieshaddecreasedtheirtariffsalreadyoversevenpriorroundsofnegotiations,whiledevelopingcountriesacceptedtheirfirstmeaningfultariffbindingsintheUruguayRound–andthisonlyinNAMA,asthemainpurposeofAGnegotiationswasthe"tariffication"ofquantitativerestrictionsandnotactualtariffconstraints.SinceWTObindingscannottakevalueslessthanzero,wealsoconfirmthattheseresultsarerobusttousingTOBITestimation(seeAppendixB).Evaluatedatthesamplemeansaceterisparibusincreaseinpre-WTONAMAimportsbyonestandarddeviationispredictedtolowerboundtarifflevelsbyabout0.5%basedonthefullsampleofdevelopingcountries.However,therearelargedifferencesacrossthecountriesinthesample,rangingfrom0.0%to3.7%.6BagwellandStaiger(2011)presentresultsoftheirbenchmarkspecification(15a)inTable3A.7Seeequation(11)inBagwellandStaiger(2011).8EquivalentlyinBagwellandStaiger(2011),rearrangingequation(11)yieldsequation(12)(andequation(13)inthenon-linearcase),theparametersofwhichcanbeestimatedusingregressionequations(14a)and(14b),andversionsoftheformerwithfixed-effects,(15a)and(15b).Wefocusouranalysisonthebenchmarkspecification(15a)sinceelasticitydataisnotavailableatsufficientdisaggregationandcountry-yearcoveragetoestimate(14b)andworldpricesarenotavailableatsufficientdisaggregationtoestimate(15b).9Thiscoefficientiscomparableto-0.0044foundbyBagwellandStaiger(2011)foraccededmembers.IMFWORKINGPAPERSTRADEPOLICYIMPLICATIONSOFACHANGINGWORLD:TARIFFSANDIMPORTMARKETIMFWORKINGPAPERSINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND9Table2:OLSregressionresultsforthesampleofcountriesparticipatingintheUruguayRound(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)DependentDevelopedDevelopedAGDevelopedNAMADevelopingAllDevelopingAGDevelopingVariable:WTObindingAllGoodsGoodsNAMAPre-WTOtariff*****Pre-WTOimport*valueConstant161**2***ObservationsR-squaredCountryFEesesesesesesSectorFEesesesesesesRobuststandarderrorsinparentheses;***denotesp<0.01,**p<0.05and*p<0.1Table3presentsresultsformembersthataccededaftertheUruguayRound.UsingasamplewithlittleoverlapwiththatofBagwellandStaiger(2011)wealsofindthattheterm-of-trademotivewasasignificantdeterminantoftheirWTOcommitments.10Inlinewiththeirresults,ourcoefficientforAGproductsisanorderofmagnitudelargerinabsolutevaluecomparedtoNAMAproducts,withaggregateresultsdrivenbythelatter.ThesefindingsarealsorobusttousingTOBITestimation(seeAppendixB).Evaluatedatthesamplemeansaceterisparibusincreaseinpre-WTOimportsbyonestandarddeviationispredictedtolowerboundtarifflevelsbyabout1.0%basedonthefullsample,5.5%forAGand0.8%forNAMA.Giventheheterogenoussample,therearelargedifferencesacrosscountries,rangingfrombelow0.1%to25.0%forAGand0.0%and2.6%forNAMA.11Whilethesequantificationsprovideausefulcomparisonofournovelfindingswiththeexistingliterature,theyconcernahypotheticalonestandarddeviationdifferenceinimports.Inthenextsection,wefocusonthepossibleimplicationsofactualobservedchangesinmarketpowerwhichexhibitsubstantialvariationacrosscountriesandsectors.10Oursampleof10accededmembersisdeterminedbytheavailabilityofpre-accessiontariffsintheWTOIDBdatabasewhicharenotifiedbyeachmember.Ourdatahasonlythreecountries(China,Nepal,andNorthMacedonia)incommonwiththe16accededmembersinBagwellandStaiger(2011),whorelyontheUNCTADTRAINSdatabasefortariffs.11InBagwellandStaiger(2011)theequivalentfigureatthefullsamplemeanis1.7%.IMFWORKINGPAPERSTRADEPOLICYIMPLICATIONSOFACHANGINGWORLD:TARIFFSANDIMPORTMARKETIMFWORKINGPAPERSINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND10Table3:OLSregressionresultsforthesampleofcountriesthataccededtoWTOafter1995(1)(2)(3)DependentVariable:WTObindingAllProductsAGNAMAPre-WTOtariff0.455***(0.008)0.526***(0.027)0.451***(0.006)Pre-WTOimportvalue-0.001**(0.000)-0.019***(0.003)-0.001**(0.000)Constant5.023***(0.720)(0.886)3.466***(0.287)Observations41,1604,54236,618R-squared0.6760.6190.720CountryFEesesesSectorFEesesesRobuststandarderrorsinparentheses;***denotesp<0.01,**p<0.05and*p<0.1CounterfactualExerciseWesimulateacounterfactualscenariotopredictthelevelofWTObindingsthatwouldhavebeennegotiatedhadcurrentimportmarketpowerconditionsprevailedatthetimeofcreationof/entryintoWTO,usingthesampleofcountrieswhereimportmarketpowerturnedouttobeasignificantpredicto
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