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1、Law, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Scandal in ChinaYi ZhangPeking UniversityInternational Conference on Corporate Governance Shanghai March 2005I.IntroductionIthasbeenover tenyearssincestockmarkets established in China.Chinastocksmarket hasbeen playingarole .thereexistsomany listedfirmscommitt

2、edfraud andscandalSince1992,about200listed firms among 1200havebeen subjecttosecurityenforcementaction by China SecuritiesRegulationCommission (CSRC),ShenzhenStockExchange(SZSE)and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE).Theratiooffirmswithscandal is farabovethelevelofothercountriesMotivationWhat contributes

3、to firmsscandal?Does corporategovernance matterinChina?Istherea sound corporategovernance mechanismcouldprevent scandal?Does legal andeconomicdevelopmentmatter?- Is there adifferencebetween firms in regionswithvarious legal effectiveness?- economic development?II.Issues andHypothesis:-Corporate gove

4、rnance-legal-economic-finance1.CorporateGovernance1.1.ownershipOneofthe mostessential featureofthe ownershipofChinese listedfirmsisthedominance of thelargest shareholderTherehasnoeffective mechanismtomonitor andrestrictthelargeshareholdersThelargeshareholdercan expropriate theminorityshareholdersfor

5、 privatebenefit1.CorporateGovernance1.1.ownershipJensen(1976)Stulz(1988)H1A:Astheownership of thelargest shareholder increasesfrom zero, afirmismore likelytobeassociated withscandalEntrenchmentoflargeshareholdersExpropriation by large shareholderLaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(1999)LaPorta, Lopez

6、-De-Silanes,Shleifer(2002)Claessens,Djankov, Fan,and Lang(2002)Fanand Wong(2002)H1B:Astheownership of thelargest shareholder increasesover certainlevel, afirmismore likelytobeassociated withscandal1.2Firm ControllerThereisfundamentaldifference betweenstateand non-stateshareholdersThereishuge differe

7、nceamongstateshareholders in internal monitoring, etc.-centralgovernment (bu/wei,中央部部委）和和-non-centralgovernment(非部委委）LiandZhang（2005）LiandZhang（2004）Linand Zhang（2004）1.2Firm Controller-centralgovernment (bu/wei,中央部部委）和和-non-centralgovernment(非部委委）central governmentcontrolledlocalgovernment controll

8、edlocalStateEnterprises(SOE)controlledNon-statelegalperson controlledNatural personothers1.2Firm ControllerCentral governmentcontrolledfirmsareassociatedwith clearerownership,( alittle)more transparency,moremonitoringmore socialresponsibility，(maybe) betterprotection of minority shareholdersNon-cent

9、ralSOEand non-statelegalpersoncontrolledfirmsareassociatedwith lesstransparency andlack of monitoringuptoless socialresponsibilitylack of protectionofminorityshareholdersH2: Firms controlledbycentral(/local) governmentarelesslikelytobeassociatedwith scandal1.CorporateGovernance1.3BoardFamaandJensen

10、(1983)theorizethat theboardofdirectorsisthe highestinternalcontrolmechanismresponsiblefor monitoringthe actionsoftop management.-the composition of individuals whoserveontheboardofdirectors is an importantfactorincreatingaboardthat is an effectivemonitor of managementactionsFamas(1980)andFamaandJens

11、ens(1983) theorywouldpredict thathigher percentages of independent directorsincreasetheboardseffectiveness as amonitorofmanagement.Jensen(1993) arguesthat boardsofdirectorareineffectivemonitorswhentheboardistoo large,when theboards equityownershipissmall, andwhen theCEOisalsotheChairmanofthe Bpositi

12、onoftheboardofdirectors determinesits effectivenessDeFondandJiambalvo(1991)Beasley (1996)Dechow, Sloan andSweeney (1996),etc.BoardcompositionanddisclosureChen andJaggi（2000）TheboardsizeH3A:Firm withalargerboardsizeismore likelytobeassociated withscandalTheboard-managementrelationshipTheCEO/ChairmanH

13、3B:Firm withaseparateCEOand Chairman is lesslikely to be associatedwithscandalIndependentdirectorsIndependentdirectors, compared withinside directors,are lesslikely to colludewithmanagementH3C:Firmswith lower proportion(seats)ofindependentdirectorontheboardofdirectors aremore likelytobeassociated wi

14、thscandalDirectorholdingsH3D:Firmswith ahigher ratio(number)ofdirectors holdfirmstockarelesslikelytobeassociatedwith scandalChairmanHoldingH3E:Firmswith higherChairmanstockholding areless likelytobeassociated withscandalDirectorCompensationH3F:Firm withhigher ratio(number)ofdirectorpaidarelesslikely

15、tobeassociatedwith scandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee (BoardofSupervisors-監(jiān)事會(huì))SupervisoryCommitteesizeH4A:Firmswith alargerSupervisoryCommitteesizeismore(less?)likelytobeassociatedwith scandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee (BoardofSupervisors-監(jiān)事會(huì))SupervisoryCommitteememberholdingsH4B:Firmswith ahigher ratio(nu

16、mber)ofsupervisorsholdfirm stock is lesslikely to be associatedwithscandalSupervisoryCommitteememberCompensationH4C:Firm withhigher ratio (number) ofSupervisoryCommitteememberpaidisless (ormore?)likely to be associatedwithscandal4Institutioninvestors機(jī)構(gòu)投資資者能夠夠降低公公司內(nèi)部部的代理理成本，減少公公司管理理層的不不良行為為Jarrell an

17、dPoulsen(1987)Brickley, Lease,andSmith(1988)機(jī)構(gòu)投資資者更傾傾向于反反對(duì)減少少股東財(cái)財(cái)富的行行為機(jī)構(gòu)投資資者相比比其他類類型的投投資者而而言更需需要透明明度和信信息的披披露Healyetal.(1999)Bushee和Noe(2000)機(jī)構(gòu)投資資者更偏偏好購(gòu)買買那些持持續(xù)披露露信息的的公司的的股票長(zhǎng)期持有有公司股股票的機(jī)機(jī)構(gòu)投資資者，很很可能出出于自身身的利益益而合謀謀進(jìn)行不不法行為為機(jī)構(gòu)投資資者可以以從中得得到的益益處財(cái)務(wù)性的的收益，如低于于市價(jià)的的轉(zhuǎn)讓價(jià)價(jià)格，阻阻止封閉閉式基金金的贖回回以及承承銷、財(cái)財(cái)務(wù)顧問問方面的的合同（Barclay,Hol

18、derness,和Pontiff (1993)）非財(cái)務(wù)性性的收益益，如影影響公司司在政治治、經(jīng)濟(jì)濟(jì)或社會(huì)會(huì)方面的的政策就我國(guó)的的實(shí)際情情況而言言，基金金、證券券等機(jī)構(gòu)構(gòu)重倉(cāng)持持有上市市公司的的股票，利用內(nèi)內(nèi)部信息息進(jìn)行炒炒作、牟牟取暴利利已不是是秘密因此，在在我國(guó)機(jī)機(jī)構(gòu)投資資者的持持股比例例同公司司違規(guī)行行為是正正相關(guān)還還是負(fù)相相關(guān)或不不相關(guān)需需要實(shí)證證檢驗(yàn)。H4：Institutionholdingsare relatedtothe likelihoodfor firmtocommit scandalFinancialdistressFirmsconfrontingwith financia

19、ldistressaremorelikelytocommit financialstatementfraudNeed controlfor financials3.EconomicdevelopmentFirmsinmore economydeveloped regionarelesslikelytobeassociatedwith scandal4.LawWritten lawLLSV (1998)Allen,Qian,Qian(JFE,forthcoming)Effectiveness of lawismore importantthan thewritten lawina transit

20、ioneconomyBerkowitzetal(2003)Alford(2000)LuandYao(2004)Chinas provincessignificantly differsintermsoflegaldevelopment.Whether laweffectiveness in theregionaffectsfirmsdecisiontocommit fraud?Maybelawdoesnotmatter since lawisnoteffective overall in China?四、實(shí)證研究究方法（i）變量SCANDAL，公司是否否被監(jiān)管管機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)認(rèn)定為違違規(guī)并公公開批評(píng)評(píng)

21、,譴責(zé)責(zé)或處罰罰控制變量量DEBT：公司的資資產(chǎn)負(fù)債債率ROA：公司的資資產(chǎn)收益益率LIQUIDITY：公司的流流動(dòng)比率率2實(shí)證回回歸模型型Matchingscandal firms withnon-scandalfirmsLogisticregressionExamine firmspropensity to commitscandalSCANDAL=f(0+1GOVERN+2INSTITUTE+3BOARD+4FSIZE+5DEBT+6ROA+7LIQUIDITY+（Other Controls）)（1）五、樣本與數(shù)數(shù)據(jù)（一）數(shù)數(shù)據(jù)Inordertoidentifyfirmsthat co

22、mmitscandal,werefertotheChinaSecurities Journal, Shanghai SecuritiesJournalandtheGuotaianDataset forfinancialscandals.Thetotalnumber of firms subjecttoenforcementactionsbytheCEC,SSE, andSZSE between1993and2003is178.Weeliminate12firmswhosegovernanceinformationinandbefore thefraudperiodare notavailabl

23、e, 2firmslisted on B-StockMarket of China,and4firmsthat cannotbematched by industry code, andthen thesamplesizeisreduced to 160虛構(gòu)利潤(rùn)潤(rùn)虛列資產(chǎn)產(chǎn)虛假陳述述重大遺漏漏擅自改變變資金用用途大股東占占用資產(chǎn)產(chǎn)違規(guī)擔(dān)保保五、樣本與數(shù)數(shù)據(jù)Each of thescandalfirmismatched withano-scandal firm, creating achoice-based sampleof160scandaland160 no-scandalfirms.The

24、controlfirm is obtained by thefollowingfour-step process:(i)StockExchange(ii)Industry. 3-digitindustrialcode.Iftheres no firmmatchingthe three digits,thenselectthatofthesameprimary twodigits(iii)Firm Size.53of160committedscandalina periodlasting 2ormoreaccounting years,andwedefine thefraudperiodofth

25、esefirmsasthe first dateoftheirfinancial statementfraudWhen firms committedscandal andwasdenounced/criticized/punishedmorethan once, we onlyrecord thefirsttimeSampledescriptionlogistic回歸分析析Governance andfinancialsAddmarketizationindexProxyforeconomics developmentProxyforlegaldevelopmentProxyforfinan

26、cial developmentCorporateGovernanceOwnershipLARGEST回歸系數(shù)數(shù)為負(fù),在5%水平上顯顯著,LARGESTSQ的回歸系系數(shù)為正正，在10%水平上顯顯著第一大股股東持股股比例從從零開始始增大, 公司司越不會(huì)會(huì)commitscandal;當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蟠蠊蓶|持持股比例例達(dá)到一一定水平平,持股股比例越越高,公公司越可可能commitscandal;LOCAL和LEGALP的回歸系系數(shù)為正正，LOCAL在5%水平上顯顯著，LEGALP在0.1%水平上顯顯著非國(guó)有法法人和地地方政府府控制的的公司更更有可能能違規(guī)董事會(huì)BOARDSIZE, INDEPENDENT均不

27、顯著著董事會(huì)規(guī)規(guī)模和獨(dú)獨(dú)立董事事席位（比例）CHAIRCEO不顯著CEO是否兼任任董事持股董事事人數(shù)（比例）和付報(bào)報(bào)酬董事事人數(shù)（比例）均不顯顯著CHAIRHOLDING為負(fù)，在在10水平上上顯著董事長(zhǎng)持持股比例例越高，公司越越不會(huì)commitscandal監(jiān)事會(huì)監(jiān)事會(huì)規(guī)規(guī)模不顯顯著持股監(jiān)事事人數(shù)（比例）不顯著著付報(bào)酬監(jiān)監(jiān)事比例例顯著為為正(10%水水平)取得報(bào)酬酬的監(jiān)事事比例越越高，公公司越可可能commitscandal機(jī)構(gòu)投資資者機(jī)構(gòu)投資資者持股股比例不不顯著分拆上市市或整體體上市分拆上市市或整體體上市沒沒有顯著著影響Controls流動(dòng)比率率的回歸歸系數(shù)顯顯著為負(fù)負(fù)流動(dòng)比率率越高的的公

28、司，financialdistress的可能較較小,違違規(guī)可能能較小DEBT的回歸系系數(shù)為正正，但統(tǒng)統(tǒng)計(jì)上不不顯著ROA的回歸系系數(shù)顯著著為負(fù)資產(chǎn)收益益率較高高的公司司違規(guī)可可能較小小RegiondevelopmentNortheast顯著為正正,公司發(fā)生生丑聞的的可能性性較高midyangtz顯著為正正,公司發(fā)生生丑聞的的可能性性較高Economicdevelopmentlgdppc，該省人均均GDP對(duì)數(shù)值為為負(fù)，并并在統(tǒng)計(jì)計(jì)上顯著著經(jīng)濟(jì)越發(fā)發(fā)達(dá)，公公司發(fā)生生丑聞的的可能性性越小LegaldevelopmentMeasure of legal effectiveness檢察院(procura

29、torialsystem)ProcuratorialCases_per_capita:立案經(jīng)濟(jì)濟(jì)案件ProcuratorialCases_gdpLoss_to_GDP:The ratio of saved lossbyprocuratorialsuitstolocalGDPCadre_In_procurate:This measures thecorruptnessofofficials. Thenumberofcadres at countylevelorabove(縣處級(jí)以上)involvedinprocuratatedivided by thepopulationLegaldevelopment法院(courtsystem)Case_Close_RateRCMP:Thenumber of commercialcasesreceivedbythe court permillion of population律師協(xié)會(huì)會(huì) (lawyerassociation)Lawyer_per_capitaLawyer_GDP